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Some years ago I had the opportunity to hear a church historian
speak about the death of Archbishop Oscar Romero in El Salvador. He
had just returned from the funeral service of Oscar Romero and shared
with us his perception of the church in Latin America. His description
has remained in my memory these many years. He stated that the church
in Latin America was experiencing a history which corresponds to that
of the early church. It is a church being built upon the blood of
martyrs. More recently I made friends with a man and woman from
Central America. They shared with me their experience of violence in
Guatemala. They had lost a child in military raids on their village
and had watched a cousin publicly executed in the village square as an
example to others. This couple is now going to South America to teach
christian education in another country characterized by violence.
It is this commitment and discipleship which is foundational for
Liberation theology. And it is to be recognized that Liberation
theology diminishes some of the profundity of this experience when it
is reduced to descriptive narrative or logical argument. It is
difficult to communicate successfully the experience of poverty and
violence which characterizes Latin America. The masses of the dead and
disappeared too easily lose their humanity in the recitation of
numbers. And the commitment and self-giving which occurs in this
context can not be captured on the written page or in the imagination
of the reader.
It is for this reason that a qualifying statement is required
before entering into the critique of Liberation theology. This study
is pursued in humility before the profound realities of Latin America.
This study is not to trivialize the poverty and violence of Latin
America. Neither is it to denigrate the sacrificial self-giving common
to discipleship in Latin America.
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What this study is intended to achieve is the critical assessment
of the theology which seeks to give meaning to this experience of
discipleship. It is this theology which has emerged from the Latin
American context which is to be placed in critical dialogue with the
theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. Both Liberation Theology and Niebuhrian
theology are concerning with social justice and its relation to
Christian faith. It is the thesis of this study that Niebuhrian
realism provides a theology which is better able to guide and give
meaning to discipleship which seeks social justice. At the same time
this study will examine the areas of Niebuhrian theology which are
challenged by the insights and criticisms of Liberation theology. The
end result of this study will be the explication of a Niebuhrian
realism which is 'liberative'.
Our examination of the theme of justice will begin with an
analysis and critique of Reinhold Niebuhr's understanding of justice.
This first section of our study will comprise four chapters which deal
with Niebuhr's anthropological realism, the values of justice, the
implementation of justice, and a final chapter of critique and comment.
At this point I need to take responsibility for my reading of Niebuhr.
I am conscious that I have organized and abstracted Niebuhr's position
in a systematic manner which is lacking in his own works. In this
manner I have reduced the dialectic tension and ambiguity experienced
in the reading of Niebuhr. Whether this is a loss or gain to
Niebuhrian theology I will leave to the reader to assess. A second
comment to be made concerning this analysis of liebuhr's theology has
to do with the term 'Christian Realism'. In the following study I have
avoided the use of this term. This term has come to refer to liebuhr's
theology and the theological movement related to it. It is my concern
in this study to deal specifically with liebuhr's position and not the
post-Niebuhrian theological movement.
The next section of our study will involve placing Niebuhrian
theology in dialogue with Liberation theology. This dialogue will
begin with a comparison of theological method. Following this chapter
on theological method will be three chapters which deal with specific
theological topics and their relationship to social justice. . These
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topics are; sin, salvation, and christology. The final chapter in this
section will deal with the values and ethics of Liberation theology.
It is necessary at this point to define what is meant by
'Liberation theologian' and how these theologians are chosen to be in
dialogue with Riebuhrian theology. Our study will be limited to
dialogue with Liberation theologians of Latin America. This
identification has do with context and commitment rather than
geographical location or cultural identity. These theologians write
with the socio-political and economic context of Latin American in mind
and with a commitment to social transformation which favours the poor
and oppressed of Latin America. The choice of specific Latin American
Liberation theologians will correspond to the topic under
consideration. Different Liberation theologians will be brought into
dialogue with Riebuhrian theology according to the subject matter which
their work addresses. This means that our choice of Liberation
theologians will be selective, but still representative.
Another issue to be addressed concerning Liberation theologians is
their differing theological traditions. In this study I have avoided
the identification of Liberation theologians as either Roman Catholic
or Protestant. It is not that this distinction is insignificant. It
is no accident that Protestant Liberation theology presents some of the
most significant challenges to the Riebuhrian position. This
distinction between theological traditions is avoided because of the
commonly-held ideas among the various theologians. It is very
difficult to make general statements concerning Liberation theologians
which identifies them as either Roman Catholic or Protestant. The
consideration of each specific theologian requires so much
qualification concerning his or her relation to a tradition, that such
identification seems counterproductive to the task at hand.
The final section of our study will be an attempt to present a
Riebuhrian theology modified by the critical insights of Liberation
theology. In this section we will consider a theology of justice which
is inclusive of the realism of liebuhrian theology and also inclusive
of the historical commitment of Liberation theology. We will identify
this modified Riebuhrian theology as Liberative realism.
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A concluding introductory comment needs to be made concerning the
limitations of this study. There are areas of justice and of
contemporary concern which are not addressed in this study, such as
issues of penal justice or ecological concerns. Both Liberation
theology and Nlebuhrian theology are primarily concerned with
distributive justice in regard to social life. They are concerned with
the structures and systems of justice and how they determine social
existence. A contemporary issue which neither Liberation theology or
Uiebuhrian theology address is that of ecology. This is certainly a
growing issue in national and international justice concerning
pollution and the global affect of the decimation of the rain forests,
but it lies beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Another limit of this study is in regard to the ideological
plurality of social existence. This dissertation is concerned with
presenting a Christian theology of justice and does not deal with the
religious and secular diversity of which social life is composed. In
this regard, further study would be required which explores how a
Christian position on justice relates to a society in which there is a
variety of religious and secular positions in regard to social justice.
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PART OHE: THE HIEBUHRIAH THEOLOGY OF JUSTICE
1. ANTHROPOLOGICAL REALISM
From the perspective of Niebuhrian realism, the development of a
theology of justice will begin with an examination of the possibilities
and limitations of human agency. For this reason we begin this study
with a detailed description of Niebuhr's anthropological realism. It
is this anthropological realism which is the initial critical concern
in relation to the construction of social justice. Niebuhr's
theological and political critique is centred in his concern for a
theory of human existence which is inclusive of the full height and
depth of human nature. His criticism of contemporary theological and
philosophical thinkers is that they have excluded, ignored or neglected
particular aspects of human life. Either they have neglected the
natural organic aspects of human nature in favour of the rational, or
they have neglected the rational and religious aspects in favour of
concerns over organic and social aspects of human nature. For Niebuhr,
'realism' means a full consideration of human nature in its totality.
Thus, for Niebuhr, any philosophy or theology desiring to explicate an
aspect of human existence must be in dialogue with this complete
anthropology.
Niebuhr's anthropological concerns can be listed under four
categories; organic, transcendent, religious and social human being.
Although these categorical abstractions are helpful for analysis, it is
to be remembered that these categories describe the unity of human
nature. There is no organic human nature without social, transcendent,
or religious human nature. All four aspects of human life
interpenetrate one another in a unity of being. According to Niebuhr,
the weakness of philosophies and theologies which have not embraced
realism is found in this very point. To exclude, ignore or neglect one
of these categories in reflective thought is to leave one's self
unaware of either the limitations or the potentials of human life.
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Organic human being
Our initial concern is with the human being as organism in
relation to nature and other human organisms. The ordering of our
examination of categories does not reflect a valuing of 'less' to
'more' or 'evil' to 'good'. Niebuhr expressly rejected the greek
tradition of exclusive 'spirit-flesh' dualism in which the organic body
was 'evil' and transcendent spirit or soul 'good'.1 Rather, it is my
intention that the ordering of categories reflect natural degrees of
differentiation of consciousness and order in human life. ¥ithin this
intention, it seems reasonable to begin with the biological reality out
of which human life has evolved and which continues to serve as
foundation and base to human existence.
The universe in which the human being has evolved appears as an
environment of conflict. This conflict is the temporal flux wherein
unity and chaos, harmony and anarchy, seem in constant dialectical
opposition. Organically related to this dynamic universe is the human
being. This world of nature exists both as environment and as
'essence' of the human. The human being discovers itself to be a
finite organism existing in a passing flux, a prisoner of partial
perspectives and also to be subject to inner biological impulse.
The obvious fact is that man is a child of nature, subject to its
vicissitudes, compelled by its necessities, driven by its
impulses, and confined within the brevity of the years which
nature permits its varied organic form, allowing them some, but
not too much, latitude.2
In this world the human finds his or her personality determined by
specific forces of nature. The human being receives the determinative
fate of sex, race, geographical location and physical individuality.
In this regard physical existence is found to be characterized by
contingent and arbitrary realities.
The human being is also organically related to a living world. In
this relationship the human is involved in the "inchoate harmonies in
nature's anarchies".3 The anarchy of this living world is the anarchy
of the 'forest'. In this ecology the species of life live by the death
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of other forms of life. The harmony of this 'forest' is that each
species survives. Within this context the human being has evolved the
various impulses by which it survives and expands itself in the world.
It it these impulses which form a dynamic organic base for human life
and which influence transcendent, religious and social life.
Siebuhr identifies two basic natural impulses which compel human
life. The first of these is the impulse of self-regard and the second
is the impulse of self-giving. The impulse of self-regard is the
biological will-to-live and is the natural egoistic drive of all
organisms for survival.
Human beings are endowed by nature with both selfish and unselfish
impulses. The individual is a nucleus of energy which is
organically related from the very beginning with other energy, but
which maintains, nevertheless, its own discreet existence. Every
type of energy in nature seeks to preserve and perpetuate itself
and to gain fulfilment within terms of its unique genius. The
energy of human life does not differ in this from the whole world
of nature."-
It is this egoism at the heart of human life which compels the conflict
of life with life. This is a focus of Niebuhr's realism. At all
levels of human existence we find this egoistic self-regard. Even the
more nobler pursuits of human beings are unable to eliminate the
influence of self-interest.
In dialectical apposition to the impulse of self-regard is the
impulse of self-giving. This impulse is also a natural impulse and is
expressed in community and family rather than in the conflict of life
with life. Self-giving has its initial expression in the family. Like
many other species of life, humanity lives in groups. But humanity
differs greatly from all other forms of life in terms of the family.
The family is unique to human beings. This uniqueness is caused by the
long maturation and dependency of children on parents and the fact that
human beings mature in life-skills by means of education rather than
instinct. This results in an intimate group where members are
organically related and dependent on one another. Within this 'family'
self-giving becomes a possibility. This is due to what Niebuhr calls
'common grace'. Common grace is the experience of security which the
individual feels in the family environment. This security is the gift
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of the intimate group to the individual and is thus 'grace'. It is
this security which mitigates the impulse of self-regard and allows the
individual to risk self-giving. Vithin the family the individual can
express the natural impulses of self-giving. Some of these impulses
are paternal, maternal and filial affection, gregariousness and
sympathy.
The family is the foundation for all larger social groups. These
larger communities also are to be understood as composed of organic
relationships. The community or society is organic in so far as it is
integrated by loyalties, forms of cohesion and hierarchies of
authority, kinship feeling, geographic contiguity, common memories and
common fears. Through these elements the family is extended and
consolidated.
This organic quality of families and communities does not ensure
that the impulse of self-giving will dominate the impulse of self-
regard. Self-regard finds expression both within and between families
and communities. Families and communities can be separated by organic
elements of nature as well as united by them. They can be separated by
geography, climate and accidents of history. In this separated state
they easily express self-regard and enter into the conflict of life
with life.
lature which creates the possibilities of organic union and self-
giving is also the source for self-regard within families and social
groups. It is nature which first provides human beings with the fact
of inequality.
Nature does not endow men equally; and the impulses of nature
create societies in which inequalities of endowment are
accentuated because the shrewd and the strong are able to arrogate
powers and privileges which enhance their strength and place the
week, the simple and unfortunate under additional disadvantages.®
It is enough at this point to indicate the organic base of self-regard
found between and within communities. This impulse will be further
examined in relation to communities under the categories of
transcendent and social human being.
A final aspect to be noted under the category of organic human
being is what Niebuhr calls 'primary religion' or meaning!ulness in
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human life. This is a factor of organic human being because it deals
not so much with rationality as with a basic trust.
Men may be quite unable to define the meaning of life, and yet
live by a simple trust that it has meaning. This primary religion
is the basic optimism of all vital and wholesome human life.®
In conclusion it is important to highlight the initial focus of
realism found in our examination of organic human life. This element
of realism is identified as the dialectic between self-regard and self-
giving which exists in individual and social human life. This
dialectic is founded in biological impulses and modified by the
securities and insecurities of life. In the security of kith and kin
one is supported and encouraged in the various expressions of self-
giving. In dialectical unity and interpenetration with this impulse of
self-giving is the impulse of self-regard. This impulse is supported
and encouraged by the character of life itself. "Man's insecurity lies
first of all in the determinate and finite character of human existence
amidst the immensities of the physical world and the caprices of
nature".'7 In this insecurity the will-to-live drives the human to
enter into the conflict of life with life in order to survive. This
dialectic of biological impulse is foundational in human being. It may
be transmuted or sublimated into other behavioural expressions, but is
is never absent. This dialectic will continue to be a major theme of
realism as we examine the other categories of human life.
The second focus of anthropological realism begins in this section
but finds its dialectical opposite in the next. This is the dialectic
between finite and transcendent human being.
Transcendent human being
The human being is an organism subject to the determinisms of
nature, and yet, it is also a creature with cognitive awareness which
allows it to transcend its determined nature and apprehend itself, its
world and the indetermined possibilities of human life. In self-
transcendence, the human being explores indeterminate degrees of
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freedom in relation to organic and social life. In this radical
freedom the self realizes its unique individuality.
Human consciousness not only transcends natural process but it
transcends itself. It thereby gains the possibility for those
endless variations and elaborations of human capacities which
characterize human existence. Every impulse of nature in man can
be modified, extended, repressed and combined with other impulses
in countless variations. In consequence no human individual is
like another, no matter how similar their heredity and
environment. ®
It is this self-transcending capacity of human existence which
Niebuhr identifies as 'spirit'. The human individual is a spiritual
creature insofar as he or she participates in a realm of reality which
transcends the realm of nature.3 This realm of 'spirit' has its
beginning in the creative possibilities which self-transcendence makes
available. Because the human being transcends self, others and nature,
it has the potential to be a creative agent in life. Human creativity
can manipulate the forms of nature and create new unities and
vitalities.
Here we encounter Niebuhr's second focus of realism. The human
being is both creature and creator, and determined and indetermined.
This is the dialectic between nature and spirit or organic and
transcendent human life. As with the earlier dialectic, this nature-
spirit or finite-transcendent relationship is a unity in which there is
mutual modification. In the human being there is no expression of
nature which is not repressed or expanded by spirit; and there is no
expression of spirit which is not limited or influenced by nature.
Thus the human being always lives with this self-contradiction: he or
she is transcendent yet finite, and all expressions of human freedom
reveal a conflict of limitation and possibility.
The initial expression of this realm of 'spirit' is that of reason
and imagination. Through reason and imagination the human can create
or destroy, limit or expand, the objects of its freedom. This rational
and imaginative aspect of spirit is to be differentiated from the more
ultimate form of transcendence in which the human encounters ultimate
realities. This form of spiritual vitality will be examined under the
category of religious human being.
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Through the creativity of reason and imagination the human being
can be described as moral and historical. Transcendent freedom makes
possible the construction of moral ideals and ethical systems, and
historical consciousness. Because the human being transcends the self,
with its relations and behaviours, it can become a manipulator of these
realities. Because the human being can also transcend and apprehend
time, it can create meaning out of temporal flux. But as with all
human endeavour, reason and imagination are subject to the dialectical
conflicts of self-regard and self-giving, and finitude and
transcendence.
The freedom of human self-transcendence makes morality not only a
possibility, but a necessity. "The human capacity for self-
transcendence, the ability to see beyond our immediate world to more
and more inclusive loyalties and values, is the basis of all that is
good and all that is evil in human life".10 Through the use of reason
and imagination the human being can be the creative source of
constructive as well as destructive vitality.
Through reason a 'sense of justice' is possible in human
relations. Compelled by a desire for social consistency, reason can
become the means of establishing justice. Reason accomplishes this
task by restricting the natural impulse of egoism and subjecting the
expansive will of human life to an arbitration between conflicting
rights wherein interest is related to interest and will to will in
increasing degrees of social harmony. liebuhr assesses the presence of
this rationality according to four categories. The first category to
be assessed is the vividness with which we appreciate the needs of
others. The more we understand the needs of other humans the greater
is said to be our rationality. The second category concerns the extent
to which we become conscious of the real character of our own motives
and impulses. This is an assessment of realism. The third category is
our ability to harmonize conflicting impulses in our life and in
society. And the fourth category which expresses our rationality is
the capacity to choose adequate means for approved ends.11
In this moral task, reason does not function free of limitation or
obstacle. Reason is utilised within the context of the dialectics of
realism. Concerning the dialectic of finitude and transcendence,
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reason is limited at two points. On the one hand reason can never be
pure in terms of transcendent consciousness. Reason will always be
subject to organic and social impulses, prejudices and passion. There
can never be a disinterested rational faculty which assesses moral
means and ends according to some uncompromised objective vantage point.
Moral rational endeavour will always find itself in a context of
limited knowledge and parochial concerns. On the other hand reason is
limited from the vantage point of ultimate transcendence. The self not
only transcends nature but it also transcends reason. From this
perspective there are moral concerns which are comprehensible only from
the position of religious human being. This transcendent aspect of
morality moves beyond the realm in which analytic or calculating reason
has its place.
In the same manner, reason is subject to the dialectic of self-
regard and self-giving. Through reason, the impulse of self-giving can
expand the organic impulses of family and community and create larger
social harmonies. But in the same way, reason can also be used to
serve self-regard. Motivated by self-regard, reason becomes the means
far rationalizing greater benefits for the self. By means of reason
the self universalises itself, making itself the end for moral action.
This leads to an important change in moral relationships and human
potential for destruction.
...in man reason bursts the bonds and limits which nature sets
upon her own impulses. Man's higher degree of self-consciousness
and egocentricity transmute the brute's will-to-live into the
human will-to-power.12
With the acquisition of power, the human can ensure a limited
security at the expense of other life. At this point, reason as
ethical expression is limited by the power-seeking of self-regard. It
is this will-to-power which necessitates the development of political
systems wherein political power is used to limit the egoistic
expansiveness of self-regard.
In like manner, imagination is expressed in this dialectical
realism. Imagination is a means for moral expression according to its
ability to imagine more just forms of community, empathize with the
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needs of others and create symbols and emotionally potent over¬
simplifications which inspire ethical action. In this function,
imagination contributes to moral rationality. But imagination also is
subject to the limitations and possibilities of finitude and
transcendence, and self-regard and self-giving. Imagination is limited
to the same factors as reason with the exception that imagination
further modifies the self-regard of human beings concerning their will-
to-power. According to Niebuhr, it is imagination which promotes the
inevitable human desire for power.
The beast of prey ceases from its conquests when its maw is
crammed; but man's lusts are fed by his imagination, and he will
not be satisfied until the universal objectives which the
imagination envisages are attained. His protest against
finiteness makes the universal character of his imperial dreams
inevitable. In his sanest moments he sees his life fulfilled as
an organic part of a harmonious whole. But he has few sane
moments; for he is governed more by imagination than by reason and
imagination is compounded of mind and impulse.13
Vith this consideration of reason and imagination as moral
instruments we perceive a primary focus of liebuhr's realism. Reason
and imagination are in themselves nuetral insofar as values of morality
and ethics are concerned. Yet they can be used to modify the organic
impulses of humanity far beyond the limits set by nature. In this
regard they become the means to create greater harmony and unity or
greater chaos and anarchy. It is the insight of liebuhr's realism that
human beings inevitably orient themselves to self-regard and the will-
to-power in moral and ethical endeavour. While this is not an ethical
pasture which is determined, thus violating human freedom, it is the
"...inevitable tendency of human beings to be more interested in their
own needs than in those of others and to prefer their advantage to that
of others,...". 1 4
The second major expression of human transcendent consciousness is
history,
/
Man's freedom to transcend the natural flux gives him the
possibility of grasping a span of time in his consciousness and
thereby of knowing history. It also enables him to change,
reorder and transmute the causal sequences of nature and thereby
to make history.1®
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In this regard the human being is both a creature and creator of
history. Niebuhr understands that it is only in relation to history
that we can fully understand the human being.
The fact is that the human self can only be understood in a
dramatic-historical environment. Any effort to co-ordinate man to
some coherence, whether of nature or of reason, will falsify the
facts; because the self's freedom, including both its creative and
destructive capacities, preclude such co-ordination.1&
For liebuhr, only a dramatic-historical description of human existence
will embody the full depth and height of human nature. In history we
see both the good and evil of human endeavour and obtain a realistic
anthropology. In this manner we know ourselves as creatures of time
and history. But in this same manner we also know ourselves as free
transcendent creatures who are creators of history. In this capacity
human beings are able to reconstruct the vitalities of nature and human
society and make history.
As with previous considerations of transcendence, the self in
relation to history is conditioned by the dialectics of realism. In
terms of the finitude-transcendent dialectic, the human being stands in
a conflicting relationship with time. In one sense time is the stage
of history. Because the human consciousness transcends time it can
create forms and institutions which are not governed by natural
necessity nor limited to the life spans of nature. Therefore time is
the stage on which human history can be created. But in another sense,
time is part of the very substance of history. In this regard human
consciousness is subject to the natural flux and historical
achievements and institutions are subject to decay and mortality. In
this way time reveals the partial and limited nature of human life and
endeavour.
It is in the context of this dialectic of finitude-transcendence
that liebuhr asserts the ambiguity and relative historical existence of
human beings.
In so far as the human mind in both its structure and in its
capacities of observation has a vantage point over the flux of
historical events, it is possible to. achieve valid historical
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knowledge, though this knowledge will never have the exactness of
knowledge in the field of natural science. But insofar as men,
individually or collectively, are involved in the temporal flux
they must view the stream of events from some particular locus. A
high degree of imagination, insight, or detachment may heighten or
enlarge the locus; but no human power can make it fully adequate.
This fact is one of the most vivid examples of the ambiguity of
the human situation.1'7
In the context of this ambiguity and relativeness the dialectic of
self-regard and self-giving find expression. Motivated by self-giving,
the human individual or society can seek the imagination and
intelligence to extend their historical parameters to include as much
of other life as passible. This self-giving can also motivate
individuals and societies to be realistic and self-critical concerning
the destructive impulses at work in their interpretation and
construction of history. Self-regard works in apposition to such
attempts. Self-regard seeks to universalize the individual or society
and make particular history a universal history. Through self-regard
the history of a society becomes the orienting norm for all societies.
It is in transcendent human being that the concerns of realism
become most acute. The problem with human beings, according to
liebuhr, is not their organic impulses or finite and partial existence.
It is rather the transcendent consciousness which refuses to recognize
the limits imposed by nature. The problem with humanity is that they
claim a degree of freedom which they do not have. They claim a
universality or disinterestedness which they can not obtain. It is the
inevitable frustration of the human being that 'his reach is beyond his
grasp'.
It is man's ineluctable fate to work on tasks which he cannot
complete in his brief span of years, to accept responsibilities
the true ends of which he cannot fulfil, and to build communities
which cannot realize the perfection of his visions. 1,3
The destructive side of this 'realism' is that human beings utilize
reason and imagination to further their will-to-power. And in their
search for security they claim certainty for their knowledge and
universalize their history and interpretation of life. It is thus in
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the free transcendent consciousness that injustice and sin become a
possibility.
Religious human being
The religious aspect of human existence stands in continuity with
its rational and imaginative elements. It is when we combine the two
categories of transcendent and religious human being that we have a
complete spiritual anthropology. Under this dimension of human
transcendence, Niebuhr introduces a new dialectic. This is the
dialectic between the human who yearns for the ideal, absolute and
unconditioned, and the human who is confronted by the absolute as
divine person.
Siebuhr understands human beings to be incurably religious. This
inclination toward religious consciousness finds its source in
transcendent human freedom. In this freedom, the self apprehends a
unity beyond itself.
The human spirit is set in this dimension of depth in such a way
that it is able to apprehend, but not to comprehend, the total
dimension. The human mind is forced to relate all finite events
to causes and consummations beyond themselves. It thus constantly
conceives all particular things in their relation to the totality
of reality, and can adequately apprehend totality only in terms of
a principle of unity.12'
It is in this awareness of the totality of existence that the
human seeks to expand 'primary religion' into more and more coherent
understandings of the meaning of the universe. In regard to the cosmic
totality in which the human exists, the transcendent self finds that
the world and the self are insufficient as sources of this meaning.
Therefore the self looks beyond itself and its world to more coherent
unities. In this sense the human spirit is homeless in this world and
yearns for a more absolute orientation in meaning.
In this yearning after the absolute, the human being is frustrated
by the dialectic of finitude-transcendence.
...man is, even in the highest reaches of his transcendent
freedom, too finite to comprehend the eternal by his own
resources. But it is also understood that man is, even in the
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deepest involvement of process and nature, too free of nature to
be blind to the possibilities of a disclosure of the Eternal which
transcends hims.20
For this reason we find the human in a dialectic in which it is
passible to apprehend a unity or absolute coherence, yet be unable to
understand and know it. For Uiebuhr, this dialectic is transformed by
the encounter with God. It is only through the self-revelation of a
transcendent God that this unity and coherence becomes explicit. This
is not to say that Niebuhr understands that human beings are totally
incapable of awareness of God. Niebuhr perceives God to be both
transcendent and immanent in relation to human life. "God is at once
the pinnacle and the basis of reality, the goal toward which life is
striving and the force by which it strives".21 This transcendence
means that comprehension is only possible by revelation. And yet God
is not totally 'other' in a Barthian sense. God can be apprehended at
the horizon of human yearning. Niebuhr identifies this apprehension of
God as 'general revelation'; "...the testimony in the consciousness of
every person that his life touches a reality beyond himself, a reality
deeper and higher than the system of nature in which he stands".2:2
liebuhr understands that this experience of general revelation is
composed of three elements. The first of these elements is the sense
of reverence for a majesty and of dependence upon an ultimate source of
being. This element of majesty and dependence corresponds to the human
apprehension of a seemingly infinite cosmos in which he or she exits as
a partial and finite being. The second element of general revelation
is a sense of moral obligation and of moral unworthiness before a
judge. This element corresponds to the moral nature in humanity which
experiences the guilt of a 'reach beyond its grasp' and a dialectic of
self-regard and self-giving which frustrates pure moral action. From
this posture the human experiences itself as a failure in terms of
cosmic process. The third element of general revelation is a longing
for forgiveness. This longing corresponds to the yearning for the
unity and coherence which the human apprehends beyond its particularity
and finiteness.23
It is in this regard that Niebuhr rejects the theological concept
of 'total depravity'. For Niebuhr, the human being maintains a degree
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of 'original righteousness'. He interprets the myth of the 'fall' of
humanity in the third chapter of Genesis as a description of human
existence rather than a literal historical statement. The presence of
'original righteousness' in humanity is an existential statement
concerning the ability of the transcendent self to apprehend that which
exists beyond its own history and nature. Of course, as discussed
above, this transcendent self is never free of its limited, particular,
and finite locus in history and nature.
As with all human endeavour, the yearning for the absolute is also
subject to the conflict of the dialectics of realism. In terms of the
finitude-transcendence dialectic it is easy for human beings to
transmute this yearning for the absolute into a devotion to relative
values. This is supported by the self-regard and self-giving dialectic
when the self universalizes its own values and places them in the
context of 'general revelation'. In this way religious endeavour can
serve either self-regard or self-giving. In terms of self-giving, the
human being apprehends its own limits and gives itself over to that
unity and coherence which stands beyond it. In terms of self-regard,
the human asserts itself by giving its particular and finite values the
pretension of universality and absoluteness.
In this context of relative ambiguity and unclear motivation, the
human being seeks the ultimate coherence in life. It is only in this
quest that the human can hope to know itself and the meaning of its
existence. "The individual never comes to full self-consciousness, and
therefore to a consciousness of what is nature and what is spirit in
him, until he strains after the absolute and the unconditioned".It
is in this yearning for the absolute, that the human being is
confronted by God.
liebuhr understands that the revelation of God, must of necessity,
be in history. This is due to the historical nature of human
consciousness.
Each individual transcends and is involved in the historical
process. In so far as he is involved in history, the disclosure
of life's meaning must come to him in history. In so far as he
transcends history the source of life's meaning must transcend
history.
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This self-revelation by God is termed 'special revelation' by
Niebuhr. This special revelation is "...apprehended in the context of
a particular history of salvation in which specific historical events
become special revelations of the character of God and of His
purposes".26 Corresponding to the three elements of general
revelation, special revelation reveals God as Creator, Judge, and
Redeemer. In this revelation there are two immediate consequences.
First is the contradiction of human culture. God's transcendence
stands over against all human constructions and vitalities. In this
event God is experienced as 'other' and judge, The second consequence
is the revealing of ultimate coherence. This revelation of meaning
completes the incompleteness, clarifies obscurities, and corrects
falsifications. This aspect of revelation is the basis for wisdom; a
total explanation of life.
According to Niebuhr, this historical and trans-historical
revelation finds its culmination in the revelation in Christ. In
Christ, the human-divine encounter becomes explicit. This revelation
and encounter takes place in history where the full height and depth of
human existence can respond and embrace the divine.
We must make it clear that the concepts of both personality and
history are ontologically ambiguous. Personality, whether God's
or man's, is defined only in dramatic and historic encounter.
...the truth in Christ cannot be speculatively established. It is
established only as men encounter God, individually and
collectively, after the pattern set by Christ's mediation. ...the
encounter between God and man, as the encounters between men in
history, must be by faith and love and not by the discovery of
some common essence of reason or nature underlying individuals and
particulars.27
It is in this encounter that the individual becomes aware of the
full stature of his or her freedom and also of the degree to which that
freedom is subject to the distortion of evil. In the encounter with
Christ we are confronted with the revelation of what we are suppose to
be and what we have become. In Christ we are confronted with the 'new
Adam'; the human characterized by self-giving love. According to
Niebuhr, this is the revelation of the essential nature of human being.
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The initial revelation in this human-divine encounter is the
awareness in the human being of personal sin. This sin is
characterized by a search for security which has led to the
misappropriation of power and the egoism of pride. Our misuse of power
leads to injustice and our pride causes us to forget we are creatures
of nature.
Ideally men seek to subject their arbitrary and contingent
existence under the dominion of absolute reality. But practically
they always mix the finite with the eternal and claim for
themselves, their nation, their culture, or their class the centre
of existence. ...man is destined, both by the imperfections of
his knowledge and by his desire to overcome his finiteness to make
absolute claims for his partial and finite values. He tries, in
short, to make himself God.23
liebuhr uses the theological concept of 'original sin' to describe
this inevitable aspect of sin in human life. This theological symbol
is not to be understood in historic terms, but rather as descriptive of
human existence. 'Original sin' refers to the inevitability of sin
inherent in human freedom. For liebuhr, human freedom is the source of
sin which makes it both possible and inevitable. Sin is a problem, not
of the organic or 'carnal' self, but of the spiritual transcendence of
human life. "Man...is a sinner not because he is one limited
individual within a whole but rather because he is betrayed by his very
ability to survey the whole to imagine himself the whole".2®
¥hile the first moment of revelation is one of judgement and the
awareness of sin, the second moment is one of divine mercy and grace.
In the revelation in Christ we encounter, not only the normative human,
but also the character of God. In this divine encounter we find a
divine self-giving love which will free us from the guilt of sin.
The Christian answer to the human predicament, a divine mercy
toward man, revealed in Christ, which is at once a power enabling
the self to realize itself truly beyond itself in love, and the
forgiveness of God toward the self which even at its best remains
in partial contradiction to the divine will, is an answer which
grows out of, and which in turn helps to create, the radical
Christian concept of human freedom.30
- 21 -
It is in this context of forgiveness and freedom that the human
being realizes the life of faith. In this life of faith the human
being subjects his or her will to an absolute and universal will. At
the same time this faith looks to the ultimate order beyond the
incoherences, incongruities and cross-purposes of life. In this way
the life of faith finds its orientation in a divine will and coherence
which is revealed as self-giving love in Christ. Thus, the life of
faith is one in which the human being both loses the self in subjection
to love and finds the self in freedom under divine forgiveness. In
faith, the human knows that its efforts to love will be supported by
the love of God, and that its inevitable failures to love will always
stand under the forgiveness of God. In this way the individual is free
to attain the highest self-realization in relation to the absolute.
But this life of faith is never free of the dialectics of realism.
For this reason forgiveness is necessary for freedom. This freedom is
never absolute, but always subject to the dialectics of finitude-
transcendence and self-regard and self-giving. This freedom is also
radical freedom because it is exercised in the knowledge that such
limitations as are the result of realism stand under the grace of God.
This divine grace which allows such freedom also necessitates a
second aspect of faith: an attitude of humility. This humility
transforms all levels of human transcendence and is the result of
realism concerning the potential of the life of faith.
From the position of the life of faith, reason and imagination are
to be exercised in an attitude of humility. It is not possible for
either reason or imagination to grasp the depth of meaning in the
encounter with God. The encounter which results in revelation is one
which transcends the analytic or creative capacities of either reason
or imagination. At best, such rational activity points beyond itself
to a realm which is not subject to understanding. "Religious
affirmations avail themselves of symbols and myths, which express both
trust in the meaning of life and an awareness of the mystery of the
unknowable that surrounds every realm of meaning".31
This limitation on reason and imagination has two subsequent
effects which make for an attitude of humility. The first is the
insight that faith can not make a claim to unconditioned truth. Truth
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that relies on rational and. imaginative cognition will always be
partial and subjective. All statements of belief or truth must always
be our truth and not the truth. We can never present our knowledge as
absolute or universal, In this presentation of conditioned knowledge
we affirm a second factor which promotes humility. This is the insight
that the knowledge which we do have does not come by means of rational
processes, but as a gift of grace. This means that the truth we have
in Jesus Christ is not one which we can verify by rational exposition.
This truth of God's love and grace in Christ is verifiable only in the
encounter in which one experiences saving grace.
Religion validates itself in spiritual experience and moral
triumph. Speculation and deduction contribute to religious
certainty only after experience has laid the foundation for
faith.32
With the recognition of these two insights concerning reason and
imagination, wisdom can be understood as knowledge and truth held
conditionally under the grace and love of God which limits all human
cognitive potential.
Another concern of transcendent human life, which is held in
humility from the perspective of the life of faith, is history.
In the more profound versions of historical religion it is
recognized...that there is no point in history, whatever the
cumulations of wisdom and power, in which the finiteness of man is
overcome so that he could complete his own life, or in which
history as such does not retain the ambiguity of being rooted in
nature-necessity on the one hand while pointing towards
transcendent, 'eternal' and trans-historical ends on the other
hand.33
This means that human social projects in history can never claim
absolute or exclusive value in relation to other human social projects.
All human endeavour in history is parochial and subject to the values
and hopes of a particular culture or society. No historical project
can claim universality or absolute validity as a norm for others. At
best it can be our hope that historical projects approximate what God
is doing in history. But our historical projects are never free from
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the will-to-power, self-regard and limitations of finite, particular
life.
A final aspect of transcendent life, expressed in humility in the
life of faith, is ethical and moral endeavour. The moral and ethical
endeavour of human beings is placed under judgement by the encounter
with God. In Christ we experience a self-giving love which reveals the
relative and self-centred nature of human morality. This self-giving
love stands as a religious ideal which both judges human ethical
endeavour and inspires it. This love judges human moral action because
it is a love which humans can never realise in their relationships.
The human being is never free of the self-regard and limited
perspectives which influence his or her motives and actions. For this
reason, self-giving love always exists on the edge of human history and
yet is never realized in it. At the same time this love inspires human
moral endeavour to greater and greater approximations of self-giving
love. This is done in the knowledge and experience of God's love and
forgiveness concerning our partial and limited attempts to love.
ITiebuhr identifies this ideal of self-giving love as the
'impossible possibility'. It is an ultimate possibility in God, yet a
human impossibility in history and nature. This 'impossible
possibility' has three immediate moral consequences. The first
consequence is that it makes relative all human claim to virtue. Under
this perspective of divine self-giving, we know that we are all
sinners. Niebuhr asserts that all humanity is equal in terms of the
state of sin in relation to God, yet he does differentiate degrees of
guilt concerning action in the human relational context. This is the
negative side of the divine perspective. The positive side is that we
are all children of God as well as sinners. This universal claim both
judges us and frees us in our moral life. We know that we have not
related to all humanity as our brothers and sisters, and yet we know
this is the ethical posture to pursue and approximate in moral
endeavours.
We are all imbedded in the contingent and arbitrary life of animal
existence and we have corrupted the harmless imperfections of
nature with the corruptions of sin. Yet we are truly 'children of
God' and something of the transcendent unity, in which we are one
in God, shines through both the evil of nature and the evil in
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man. Our heart goes out to our fellow-man, when seen through the
eyes of faith, not only because we see him thus under a
transcendent perspective but because we see ourselves under it and
know that we are sinners just as he is. Awed by the majesty and
goodness of God, something of the pretence of our pretentious self
is destroyed and the natural cruelty of our self-righteousness is
mitigated by emotions of pity and forgiveness.
This leads to the second consequence of the divine perspective: a
greater disinterestedness in moral endeavour. Under the divine
perspective we recognize our limitations and confess the evil which is
in us. Conscious of the realism concerning our human nature, we are
able to seek greater and greater disinterestedness in our relations
with others. But this disinterestedness is itself always qualified by
realism.
Wherever the tension between spirit and nature is adequately
maintained and the imperatives of spirit are pressed rigorously
against the immediate impulses of nature, the result is not only a
morality of purer disinterestedness but a religion of grace which
seeks to console the human spirit to its inevitable defeat in the
world of nature and history.3®
The third consequence of the divine self-giving love as
'impossible possibility' is the realization that the moral life of love
can only occur as the result of a personal encounter with God. We are
able to grow in loving due to the love which we have experienced in
divine judgement and grace. "...no meticulous obedience to specific
moral standards can be a substitute for the self's encounter with God,
in which the pretensions and pride of the self are broken and it is set
free from self and sin".3® In this way law and moral principles are
recognized as limited human artifacts which serve the transcendent
freedom of human morality lived under the grace of God.
To conclude this examination of religious human being, we
recognize that humility is the fundamental response to Niebuhr's
realism. This humility is held in the recognition of a realistic
anthropology which discloses both the possibilities and the limits of
human life. In humility we recognize the height of human being. We
can affirm the self-transcendence which makes the human in the 'image
of God' and a radically free spiritual creature. At the same time we
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recognize the organic limitations of human life. We observe that we
are subject to weakness, dependence and finiteness. In this regard the
human being is involved in the necessities and the contingencies of the
world of nature. The last element in anthropological realism is the
confession that there is evil within us and that sin characterizes our
relations with others. We must confess in humility that this evil and
sin is not the result of our organic, finite being, but rather is the
result of our unwillingness to acknowledge our dependence, finiteness
and insecurity.
Social human being
In the above we have examined the height and depth of Niebuhr's
conception of human nature. In this examination of his anthropology we
have identified the realism found in human impulse, rationality and
religious transcendence. And throughout this study we have briefly
mentioned the social or collective dimension of human being. It is now
appropriate to examine this dimension because the full scope of human
nature takes on new forms and expressions in this context. The human
being is always a social creature and the dialectical realism,
indicating limit and potential, create the possibility and the
necessity of social justice.
The human being is by nature a social creature. As mentioned
above, this dimension of human being has its basis in organic human
nature initiated in the family. But the human being is not limited to
this intimate and organic social cohesion.
The individual cannot be a true self in isolation. Nor can he
live within the confines of the community which 'nature'
establishes in the minimal cohesion of family and herd. His
freedom transcends these limits of nature, and therefore makes
larger and larger social units both possible and necessary. It is
precisely because of the essential freedom of man that he requires
a contrived order in his community.3'7
Because of this freedom, the human community is developed by means
of both organic and artificial coherences. On the organic level the
community is a unity by means of relational hierarchy, common memory,
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common language, geographical boundaries, and other natural vitalities
which encourage collective identity and purpose. On the level of
artifact, communities are held together as nation-states in which
political structures, law, economic systems, and police power serve to
expand and maintain social order and unity.
The individual relates to this community or nation in a
dialectical manner; for the community is the source of fulfilment as
well as frustration. In terms of fulfilment, the community provides
the context in which the self can expand its creativity and freedom.
This fulfilment is subject to self-regard and self-giving. From the
perspective of self-giving the community provides the social
environment of 'common grace' or security which allows the individual
to interact with others in increasing creativity. In this way the
human being is free to explore his or her indetermined possibilities of
growth in an environment of mutual trust and dependence. From the
perspective of self-regard, the community provides a context wherein
the self can expand its will-to-power and individual significance. The
self-regard of human beings achieve this significance by means of
identifying the prestige and power of the group with that of the self.
In this way the individual finds his or her ambitions realized in the
ambitions of the group. The human being is able to vicariously adopt
the egoism of the group as its own. This expression of self-regard
seeks to universalize the culture and values of the group so that the
self experiences transcendence and unity in a social group. This has
the result of resolving the self's lack of prestige and sense of finite
possibility. It is this desire for fulfilment motivated by self-regard
which leads to an exalted valuation of patriotism and the development
of civil religion.
In the imagination of the simple patriot the nation is not a
society but Society. Though its values are relative they appear,
from his naive perspective, to be absolute. The religious
instinct for the absolute is no less potent in patriotic religion
than in any other. The nation is always endowed with an aura of
the sacred, which is one reason why religions, which claim
universality, are so easily captured and tamed by national
sentiment, religion and patriotism merging in the process.33
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Vhile the nation or community provide various means of self-
fulfilment through the impulses of self-regard and self-giving, it also
establishes limitations to these impulses. This is the source of
individual frustration in the relationship with communities.
Concerning self-regard, the community or society establishes the
artifacts of justice which will subject this impulse to the need for
consistency and harmony in social relations. In this way the community
inhibits the will-to-power and expansive desires of the individual.
The community regulates this impulse to self-regard and limits its
expression within parameters which it regards to be good for the
society as a whole.
In a similar way the community is the source of frustration
concerning expressions of self-giving. But in this case the community
does not establish artificial limits. Rather it is organically limited
by its very nature as a social group. According to liebuhr, the social
group is always mediocre in its ethical and moral orientation. This is
due to the nature of the group as a variegated field of individual
moral and ethical positions. This field of varied moral positions
results in a group position which seeks to represent an average or mean
of the many moralities. This results in an ethical and moral posture
which is never as high as the ethics and morals of an individual. The
individual human being transcends the group as an ethical and moral
agent and finds that the group is unable to follow. In this way the
ethical individual is frustrated by the group's mediocrity and inertia
in regard to the more transcendent expressions of ethical and moral
life.
In this dialectic between the individual and the community,
Niebuhr perceives self-regard to be the dominant impulse which leads to
inequalities and conflict. In response to this potential for
destruction, the community exercises coercion to maintain order and
social continuity.
Our actual human communities are always shot through with disorder
and confusion; for the same freedom which enables man to build
wider and more complex communities also gives him the power to
make his own will, whether individual or collective, the perverse
centre of the whole community, whether the whole community be
defined in national or international terms. The domination of the
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weak by the strong and the conflict between various wills,
interests and farces are the inevitable corruptions of human self-
seeking in all historic communities, though tremendous differences
may and do exist between forms of justice which preserve a
tolerable degree of harmony and those which embody domination or
conflict. 3'3
To varying degrees, coercion or power is the vitality of political
structures and the means by which communities establish justice. While
other forms of social cohesion are effective, no society can maintain
itself without some form and degree of coercion. Human freedom makes
the use of political power necessary in order to maintain social life.
This egoism and self-regard which necessitates coercion and
political power within societies is also necessary in relations between
communities and nations. According to Hiebuhr, coercion is of greater
necessity between social groups because groups are far more egoistic
and self-regarding than individuals.
A distinction between group pride and the egotism of individuals
is necessary...because the pretensions and claims of a collective
or social self exceed those of the individual ego. The group is
more arrogant, hypocritical, self-centred and more ruthless in the
pursuit of its ends than the individual.
For liebuhr, the group is less capable of self-transcendence than
the individual. This means that the group responds less to the
transcendent qualities of human being. It responds less to rational
and spiritual impulse and more to emotional and organic impulse. For
this reason the will-to-live is more easily transmuted into the will-
to-power by the group. This also means that the group tends to respond
to immediate needs and impulses without reflection concerning long term
consequence. This inevitable tendency of groups to egoism and self-
regard results in the exercise of coercion between groups. Groups and
nations are unable to realize the ethical conscience of individuals and
therefore artifacts of justice and coercion become the means of
international relations.
This is not to say that other forms of coherence are unable to
mitigate the use of coercion. While coercion is always present in
national and international structures and relations, it can have a
greater or lesser presence depending on the vitality of other forms of
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social cohesion. These forms of cohesion are found in both organic and
transcendent levels of human existence.
In organic human being we find social coherence encouraged by
family relationships and feeling, hierarchies maintaining loyalties,
and common land, language, memories and hopes. This aspect of organic
coherence finds its ethical expression in the human conscience.
Through the vitality of the conscience one feels responsibility in
relation to others in the intimate group. It is the human conscience
which makes society possible. But the effectiveness of the conscience
is limited to intimate communities. As society becomes more complex,
the conscience is less able to regulate human relationships. Growing
complexity means that humans do not experience the results of their
actions. Their actions are part of a complex web of political,
economic, and technological relationships and they can not perceive the
multiple results of even one act. In this way the individual becomes
increasingly separated from others in the complexity of social
relationships and feels little responsibility concerning actions of
which he or she may never know the result. In this manner conscience
is only effective in the intimate group where one perceives the result
of action in the life of another human being.
Another force of cohesion in communities and nations which can
extend the concerns of conscience is the use of reason. Reason is able
to create artifacts of justice wherein the concerns of conscience can
be implemented. Through the creation of political structures and legal
systems reason subjects the various conflictive impulses to an ideal of
justice. It accomplishes this by resolving conflict between the
various interests in society. It arbitrates the conflict of life with
life and helps approximate greater and greater social harmony. But
reason also has its limits. While it is useful in analysing and
resolving conflict, it is very often the servant of an interested party
in society. Reason is always limited by its lack of objectivity. It
is always subject to the dialectics of realism.
A final source of social unity is that of religious cohesion.
Religious vitalities have the capacity to extend conscience and qualify
reason. By introducing absolute ideals, the religious imagination
makes repentance and forgiveness a force of social cohesion.
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Even at best human nature is so imperfect and relations between
groups as well as individuals so fruitful in misunderstandings
that it is impossible to maintain the mutual trust and confidence
which are the basis of society without the spiritual achievement
of mutual repentance and forgiveness.'11
But as with reason, religious vitalities are also subject to distortion
by the social group.
Nations and classes, cultures and civilization are usually able to
use religion, not to reveal the imperfection and partiality of
their life and values, but to give the prestige of the absolute to
what is relative and tentative.4:2
This completes our overview of Niebuhr's anthropological realism.
At the heart of this realism we have perceived dialectical forces which
permeate all levels of human existence. In the dialectics of self-
regard and self-giving, and finitude-transcendence, we begin to
perceive the height and depth of human being. This realism qualifies
the expectations of justice and directs the attempts at greater and
more inclusive justice.
Given this anthropological basis, we are now able to examine how
Niebuhr establishes the values which define his concept of justice. In
the above chapter we have identified the human vitalities which make
for community and order. We have also identified the limitations of
such vitalities. Now we can examine the values which human vitality,
freedom, and creativity are to serve.
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2. THE VALUES OF JUSTICE
The consideration of values of justice leads to a recognition of
the comprehensive dialectic which functions as the structure for
Niebuhr's theology. In his theology we find a dialectical relationship
between anthropological realism and religious idealism. As has been
observed in the previous chapter, this dialectic is not one of
exclusive opposites. But rather it is a recognition of conceptual foci
which maintain a fluctuating and varied relationship. This dialectical
relationship exhibits mutual opposition, modification and
interpenetration. This dialectic is perceived throughout liebuhr's
theology. In its most comprehensive form, it is the dialectic of
anthropological realism and religious idealism, In the previous
chapter we examined this dialectic with the emphasis upon realism. In
this chapter we will examine liebuhr's concern for religious idealism.
Religious idealism is itself subject to this Mebuhrian dialectic.
To refer to this basis of values as 'idealism' is to say that it is the
product of human reason and contingent to cultural and social
relativities. To call this basis of values 'religious' is to refer to
experience of transcendent, divine encounter. In this way religious
idealism is both the product of human conceptualization and divine
revelation. liebuhr affirms the divine revelation of a transcendent
relational norm. Yet this divine revelation occurs in human history
with all its relativities and anthropocentric concerns. Because of
this relativizing context, the 'truth' of this relational norm is
always embraced through faith actualized by the personal encounter with
the divine. It is never knowledge which is the result of a rational
idealism. The apprehension of the meaning and coherence of reality is
of necessity anthropomorphic, and yet, it is apprehension of
transcendent reality and true knowledge.
This relational norm, which is the focus of religious idealism, is
love. Niebuhr calls this norm the 'law of life'. It is the
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explication of this relational concept which will be pursued throughout
the body of this chapter. Initially it must be understood that Niebuhr
perceives love to be both a transcendent 'impossible possibility' and
an immanent harmonious element in the very nature of humanity and the
cosmos. In this way the values of justice, which grow out of the norm
of love, have their beginnings in organic human life and are verified
and transformed by their fulfilment in the divine life. In this way
the law of life is the ground for the values of justice in their varied
realizations in different human relational contexts. In the following
pages we will explore these different human relational settings and the
various values of justice utilized to approximate, the norm of love.
Values of intimate justice
Intimate justice is the expression of the 'law of life' in
intimate communities. In these communities, love is most directly
related to justice.
Where human relations are intimate (and love is fully effective
only in intimate and personal relations), the way of love may be
the only way to justice. Where rights and interests are closely
interwoven, it is impossible to engage in a shrewd and prudent
calculation of comparative rights. Where lives are closely
intertwined, happiness is destroyed if it is not shared.1
In intimate communities we find what Sfiebuhr calls 'brotherhood',
'kinship', and 'family'. It is in this form of human relationship that
we apprehend the organic interconnectedness of social life. In this
relationship the human being expresses the natural benevolence and
altruism that results from direct personal contact with others in the
community.
This intimate community is not a simple option for human life, but
a necessity.
Community is an individual as well as social necessity; for the
individual can realize himself only in intimate and organic
relation with his fellowmen. Love is therefore the primary law of
his nature; and brotherhood the fundamental requirement of his
social existence.2
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This intimate community has its first expression in the family. With
the family as the organic model, the intimate community is nothing more
than an enlarged family with kinship feeling as the force of cohesion.
It is this phenomenon of community, growing out of intimate human
social life, which is the focal value of intimate justice. In
community, the mutual love which justice seeks to approximate finds its
most natural and spontaneous expression. In community, the conflict of
life with life is resolved in the mutuality of 'family' which seeks the
good of all. Here, justice is not concerned with principles or
explicit values. Rather, justice is implicit in the relationships of
intimate social life and verified by the experience of the group. The
social group recognizes in its own experience that it is intrinsically
good to respect the lives, opinions, and interests of others. And thus
the intimate community prohibits violence to other's life, opinions and
interests.
It is in intimate community that liebuhr understands justice to
most closely approximate love. For this reason, organic community is
the first value of justice upon which other forms of justice in social
relationships must be built. But this phenomenon of community becomes
increasingly difficult as a society enlarges and becomes more complex.
In larger societies, the direct personal relationships, characteristic
of intimate communities, become more and more difficult. This
necessitates that the implicit relational values of intimate social
life become explicit. The explicit identification of these values
orients society in the regulation of justice to approximate love in the
context of increasingly complex social life. These extended values of
intimate justice are identified as the values of social justice.
Values of social justice
The values of social justice are values which must be explicitly
stated in the context of expanded community where intimacy has became
increasingly difficult. These values have their source in the
different aspects of human existence and must be explicitly stated. By
identifying the values of human life in extended and complex social
relations, society is guided in its structures and systems to act in
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such a way as to approximate the law of love, liebuhr understands that
it is impossible for society to approximate love in the way and to the
extent that an intimate community is able. Because society consists of
complex and fragmented human relationships, it is impossible for
society to realize the mutuality and organic life in which love is
functional. For complex society, justice is the best approximation of
love. This justice seeks, by means of rational calculation, to
implement principles, laws, political structures and economic systems
which will serve the values of social justice. In this way calculating
prudence extends and builds upon the justice of intimate communities.
This is not to say that social justice replaces intimate justice.
Social justice deals with extended community and guides society to
approximate love through structures and systems of law, government and
economics. But extended society can not exist soley on these
structures and systems. Extended society must always be built upon the
natural organic forces of cohesion which create community.
The values which inform the implementation of social justice are
three in number; freedom or liberty, equality, and order. These values
have their basis in three different sources. Freedom has its grounding
in the human individual, equality is the rational extension of the
value of intimate community, and order is the primary value of extended
social life.
The value of freedom has its source in the transcendent freedom of
human beings. The degree of this freedom has been examined in depth in
the previous chapter. It is important at this point to emphasize that
freedom can be more or less extensive depending on the social setting.
Niebuhr understands that the exercise of freedom is a phenomenon which
is capable of growth or diminishment according to the structures and
systems of a society. He also understands that this freedom is
necessary for both individuals and for the community as a whole.
Both the individual and the community require freedom so that
neither communal nor historical restraints may prematurely arrest
the potencies which inhere in man's essential freedom and which
express themselves collectively as well as individually.3
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In this manner society holds freedom as a value in order that
human individuals and societies might have the liberty to pursue their
various potentialities to the full. This value of freedom corresponds
directly to another value, the value of the individual. To value
freedom in a society is to affirm and respect the individual's ability £
transcend the determinative realities of life and to be a creator of
life. In this way freedom or liberty is the first value to consider
concerning social justice. Social justice seeks to preserve the social
environment wherein human beings are free to fulfil their natural
"7 potential^.
While Niebuhr recognizes this value of freedom as the first value
to consider concerning society, at the same time he recognizes that
this value necessitates consideration of a second value which is of
equal significance. "Since human beings live in a society in which
other human beings are competing with them for the opportunity of a
fuller development of life, the next highest good is equality; ...". "■
It is the transcendent freedom of human beings which makes the value of
equality necessary. In extended and complex social life human beings
compete to realize their potential without the mitigating forces of
intimate community. In this extended society they may gain at the
expense of others without ever being conscious of the cost of their
gain. In this complex society, it becomes increasingly difficult to
base a concern for mutuality on intimate relationships. This
necessitates that the mutual love and concern of the intimate community
be explicitly stated as a value for social life. This is the value of
equality.
For Niebuhr, the value of equality is the rational expression of
the law of love applied in a social setting where intimate
relationships are difficult due to conflict and social complexity.
Since the law of love demands that all life be affirmed, the
principle that all conflicting claims of life be equally affirmed
is a logical approximation of the law of love in a world in which
conflict is inevitable.®
This value serves as the guide for the development of systems and
structures which seek to preserve mutuality in human social relations.
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For Niebuhr, the preservation of mutuality centres on the
distribution and maintenance of power in society. This power is to be
understood basically as economic and political power. It is human
freedom which allows individuals and groups to obtain inordinate power
and thus introduce injustice into social relationships. The value of
equality resists injustice by promoting systems and structures which
seek to maintain an equilibrium of economic and political power in
society.
Hiebuhr understands both the values of freedom and equality to be
limited in actual application. Either of these values pursued
exclusively to their maximum possible expression would destroy
community. Freedom applied absolutely to community would result in
chaos and anarchy. Equality applied absolutely would allow no freedom.
In this way we see that freedom and equality exist in a dialectical
relationship wherein growth in one results in the diminishment of the
other. Growth in freedom means less equality as individuals realize
their natural inequalities and exploit these differences in the social
setting. Growth in equality means less freedom as individuals are
restricted by principles of mutuality.
For liebuhr, the value of equality is a rational ideal which must
be approximated but never actualized. He understands that not only
will there always be inequality, but also that inequality is necessary
for the existence of social life.
Equality, being a rational, political version of the law of love,
shares with it the quality of transcendence. It ought to be, but
it never will be fully realized. Social prudence will qualify it.
The most equal itarian society will probably not be able to
dispense with special rewards as inducements to diligence. Some
dif ferentials in privilege will be necessary to make the
performance of certain social functions possible.® " „
In this way the value of equality serves as a criterion of criticism
for the necessary inequalities of society encouraging greater and
greater approximations of social equality,
The third value of social justice is that of order. Order is a
value which has its grounding in the existence of the extended social
community. It is a value of exclusively social origin and is the
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primary value from the perspective of society. "...order must always
remain the first value of any community, (because chaos is tantamount
to nonexistence), . . . " , 7
This value of order has its primary expression in political
structures and the utilization of power. Through the construction of
hierarchical political authorities and the implementation of political
and economic force, justice as social harmony is approximated.
The question of politics is how to coerce the anarchy of
conflicting human interests into some hind of order, offering
human beings the greatest possible opportunity for mutual support.
In the field of collective behaviour the force of egoistic passion
is so strong that the only harmonies possible are those which
manage to neutralize this force through balances of power, through
mutual defences against its inordinate expression, and through
techniques for harnessing its energy to social ends. All these
possibilities represent something less than the ideal of love.
Yet the law of love is involved in all approximations of justice,
not only as the source of the norms of justice, but as an ultimate
perspective by which their limitations are discovered.®
liebuhr has no illusions concerning this use of coercion or force. He
knows it to be an evil.
Since power is a necessity of social cohesion a rational politics
must accept it as a necessary evil. But it must know that it is
an evil; and that injustice inevitably flows from its unchecked
expression.9
This brings us to consider the value of order in relation to the
values of freedom and equality. This value of order both results from
the tension between freedom and equality and also serves to limit both
these values. It is the value of order which results from the social
need to organize relationships around the values of equality and
freedom. Order is necessary for these values to be expressed in ways
which are conducive to social harmony. In this way order is the
servant of the values of freedom and equality. But order can also be
the primary value which subjugates all other values. To maintain peace
and obtain security society can value order at the exclusion of
freedom. In similar manner, society can value the political hierarchy
of authority, which inevitably makes for privilege, at the cost of
equality.
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liebuhr understands that these values of social justice; freedom,
equality, and order, have no ideal application in terms of a hierarchy
of importance. He perceives that societies structure their hierarchy
of values in relation to historical concerns and perceptions. This
will be explored further under the heading of the implementation of
justice.
Values of inter-group justice
Corresponding to our study of group behaviour in chapter one, it
is this relational context wherein we find the most difficulty
approximating the law of love. All the above values of justice apply
to inter-group relations, but they find very little utility by groups.
As liebuhr has made clear, groups and nations lack the self-
transcendence which leads individuals to moral behaviour.
Every group, as every individual, has expansive desires which are
rooted in the instinct of survival and soon extend beyond it. The
will-to-live becomes the will-to-power. '10
As individuals, men believe that they ought to love and serve each
other and establish justice between each other. As racial,
economic and national groups they take for themselves, whatever
their power can command. 11
This impulse to self-regard is mitigated within social groups by
intimate community, principles of freedom and equality, and the
political forces of order. But in inter-group relationships these
forces of cohesion either do not exist or are very weak. The most
significant lack is in intimate and organic cohesion. The sense of
communal 'family' or 'kinship' is very difficult to extend beyond the
boundary of the group. This means that groups lack the basic organic
cohesive farces which create unity and solidarity. They lack the
common language, geographic boundaries, common history, etc. In the
same manner the values of social justice are also limited. The values
of equality, freedom and order, all depend on the cohesiveness of a
political and social structure. As yet this only exists in very
limited form. Thus we see that the values of intimate and social
justice are very limited when applied to inter-group relationships.
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liebuhr does not reject these forces as means of justice in world
community. He is merely recognizing their limited application in
present global politics. liebuhr understands that international
justice can occur as the organic community of intimate justice grows
and provides the base for the other forms of social justice.
If we are patient enough we would cultivate the gradually growing
organic factors of world community and perfect them at opportune
moments by the constitutional contrivances which always express
and perfect what the forces of life and togetherness have
established.12
While this indicates liebuhr's agenda for the growth of justice in
the future it does not deal with how justice finds present inter-group
expression. Without the organic cohesiveness of intimate justice and
the contrived cohesiveness of social justice there is only one means of
mitigating the expansive desires of groups. This is through the use of
coercive force; political, economic, and military. Between groups, as
they presently exist in international relations, power becomes the
value of justice which approximates the law of love.
It is at any rate quite clear that only the preponderant power of
the great nations can be an adequate core of authority for a
minimal world order. The vitalities of the world community are
too diverse, the cultural and ethnic farces too heterogeneous and
the elements of common tradition and experience too minimal to
allow us to dispense with the policy of establishing preponderant
collective power as the initial basis of world order.13
Uiebuhr understands that this value of power is just as dangerous
in the international setting as it is within society. While it can be
used for greater unity and justice, it can not help but produce
injustice by the very fact that it is coercive. As with the use of
power and force in the service of the value of order, the use of
coercion in the international setting becomes a necessary evil until
more just farces of cohesion exist. For this reason Hiebuhr
understands that balance of power is the means of mutuality between
nations and groups and the minimal approximation of the law of love.
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The relational norm of religious faith and the transformation of the
values of justice
In the above we have examined the law of love as the law of life
which is organic and immanent in human existence. We have seen how
this law of love finds its most direct passible expression in the
intimate justice of organic communities. We have observed that as
communities become more complex and extended this intimate justice
becomes the rationalized and institutionalized justice of societies.
And we saw that this law of love is finally reduced to power politics
in international relationships. Niebuhr understands that this law of
love finds its optimal social expression as mutual love. As far as
intimate communities, political societies, or international relations
are concerned, mutual love is the highest passible expression of
justice.
From the standpoint of history mutual love is the highest good,
Only in mutual love, in which the concern of one person for the
interest of another prompts and elicits a reciprocal affection,
are the social demands of historical existence satisfied.1
In this mutual love the familial relation of life with life is
approximated by the means of the values of justice.
To this point we have examined only the immanent form of love
which is organic to human nature as the harmony of life with life. Now
we must turn to examine this same love from the transcendent
perspective. Just as God is understood as both immanent and
transcendent, in like manner is love to be understood. And in the same
way that the transcendent nature of Gad is revealed in human history,
so too is the nature of love revealed. This theological correspondence
obtains because love is revealed as intrinsic both to the nature of God
and also intrinsic to the nature of human beings as the 'image of God'.
The law of life is revealed, from the transcendent perspective, to
be sacrifical or self-giving love. This clarification of the depth of
love is revealed in God's self-revelation. In the Cross of Jesus
Christ we apprehend the nature of God as love. Ve also apprehend a
love which transcends the mutual love attempted in human relationships.
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The Cross symbolizes the perfection of agape which transcends all
particular norms of justice and mutuality in history. It rises
above history and seeks conformity to the Divine love rather than
harmony with other human interests and vitalities.1®
This agape or sacrificial love is the final norm for human
existence. The human being, in his or her transcendent freedom, always
finds the laws and calculations of mutual love to be insufficient. The
norm of self-giving love transcends human history corresponding to
human transcendence. The love which calls the human to self-giving
cannot be contained within the logic of mutual interest. This self-
giving seeks the good of the other without calculating the gain or loss
to self.
This form of love is only possible from the perspective of
religious faith. Self-giving love can not be validated in historical
life. It can only be validated as part of a divine life which is
understood as source and goal of all life. Thus love is possible due
to the grace of God revealed in the Cross of Christ and is possible
because of the faith this Cross engenders. In the Cross of Christ we
realize ourselves as children of God and are given hope which
encourages a life of love. From this perspective, forms of mutual
love, systems of justice, and principles and laws, always fall short of
the transcendent norm of love.
liebuhr understands this norm of self-giving love to be the very
focus of christocentric religious idealism.
In the teachings of Jesus the love ideal is stated unqualifiedly
and loyalty to it is demanded without a suggestion of those
compromises which political realities seem to make inevitable.
Men are to love their neighbours as themselves, they are not to
resist evil, not to resent injustice, not to desire concrete and
obvious rewards, in short not to assert the ego against the life
around it.1e
But this love is not to be understood as a transcendent element which
is alien to history and human life. It is not a love which is
exclusively known in the revelation of the Cross.
...the agape of Christ is not arbitrarily imposed upon life, It
is 'from the beginning'; that is, it is given in the essential and
created nature of man, which involves a freedom for which love is
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the only law. But the historic revelation clarifies that
commandment... . 17
Hiebuhr understands that it is only from the perspective of faith
that one apprehends that the self-giving love revealed in God is in
fact the law of life. This law of life has always been present in
human existence and approximated in the various forms of human love.
But it is only in the Cross that we apprehend self-giving love which is
free from self-regard. It is only in the Cross that love is given to
us without the mutual calculus of gain and loss. This self-giving love
of the Cross transcends any concept of justice.
It is from this perspective that we apprehend self-giving love in
dialectical relationship with mutual love and justice. As the
revelation of transcendent divine love, it is trans-historical and more
than any 'norm', principle, or law, can explain or grasp. In this
sense self-giving love is not a historical or human possibility. All
human love and social expressions of that love will be qualified by
self-regard and the self-contradiction of human nature. The
unconditional self-giving of the Cross is a divine possibility, not a
human one. In this way, self-giving love always stands as a norm
against which all human love and justice is assessed.
But to identify this love as a 'norm' is also to say that it is a
standard to which it is possible to have greater approximation in
social life. For Uiebuhr this means that the norm of self-giving love
has direct relevance to human social existence. It is not to be
understood as an exclusively transcendent reality.
...the prophetic tradition in Christianity must insist on the
relevance of the ideal of love to the moral experience of mankind
on every conceivable level. It is not an ideal magically
superimposed upon life by a revelation which has no relation to
total human experience. The whole conception of life revealed in
the Cross of Christian faith is not a pure negation of, or
irrelevance toward, the moral ideals of 'natural man'. While the
final heights of the love ideal condemn as well as fulfil the
moral concerns of common sense, the ideal is involved in every
moral aspiration and achievement. It is the genius and the task
of prophetic religion to insist on the organic relation between
historic existence and that which is both the ground and the
fulfilment of this existence, the transcendent.ie
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In relation to mutual love, self-giving love serves as both judge
and inspiration. Self-giving love serves as a norm which uncovers the
self-regard which exists in all forms of mutual love and helps prevent
that self-regard from destroying greater approximations to self-giving
love. In this correcting and inspiring role, self-giving love is to be
understood as the force which maintains the possibility of mutual love
in social life.
The most direct relationship of love to the problems of community
would seem to be the purifying effect of sacrificial love upon
mutual lave. Mutual love and loyalty are, in a sense, the highest
possibilities of social life, rising above the rational
calculations and the power-balances of its rough justice. The
grace of sacrifical love prevents mutual love from degenerating
into a mere calculation of mutual advantages. If mutual love is
not constantly replenished by impulses of grace in which there are
no calculation of mutual advantages, mutual relations degenerate
first to the cool calculation of such advantages and finally to
resentment over the inevitable lack of complete reciprocity, in
all actual relations.1-"
In this way we see that mutual and self-giving love stand in a
dialectical relationship. Absolute self-giving love is a historical
impossibility and yet mutual love has indeterminate possibility of
growth in terms of greater and greater approximation to self-giving
love. This self-giving love is at once a quality of relationship which
is beyond human reach and also the basis for all human relationships.
It is, as Miebuhr describes it, an 'impossible possibility'. It is a
love toward which we are drawn and yet in which we do not find
fulfilment till we receive it as grace from God.
In this dialectical relation, self-giving love is apprehended as
the the norm which is the ground and fulfilment of all social
expressions of mutual love. Thus it is from this perspective of the
Cross and the norm of self-giving love that all values of justice are
given reinterpretation.
The first value to be reinterpreted from the perspective of the
Cross and religious faith is the value of community. In its organic
and intimate form, this value represented the natural coherences of
familial love. Under the religious norm of self-giving love, this
value is expanded to universal proportions.
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' ' If ye love them that love you, what reward have ye?' declared
Jesus; and in the logic of those words the whole social genius of
the Christian religion is revealed. The transcendent perspective
of religion makes all men our brothers and nullifies the
divisions, by which nature, climate, geography and the accidents
of history divide the human family.20
Under the unconditional self-giving love of the Cross, humanity is
made aware of its failure at community. In light of this Cross human
self-regard is confessed and it is acknowledged that there can be no
calculus of deserved love. The grace of God is known in the Cross as
self-giving love which no one has deserved and yet all have received.
From the perspective of this universal love, it is impossible to make
exclusive claims against others. All humans stand under the Cross as
the revelation of human self-regard and sin, and also as the revelation
of a divine grace inclusive of all human beings. In this revelation in
Jesus Christ, God is revealed as parent and lover of the human family.
In this way the value of community is expanded and the kinship and
familial obligations extended to all other human beings.
The second value to be reinterpreted is that of freedom. This
value was recognized to originate in the self-transcendence of human
being. As a basic element of human existence, freedom finds new
importance and expression under the perspective of faith.
Christianity is responsible for a heightened sense of
individuality because, according to the Christian faith, the human
spirit in its freedom is finally bound only bv the will of God,
and the secret of its heart is only fulTy known and judged by the
divine wisdom.21
Within the value structure of faith, the individual is held in value
and recognized as an individual mystery known only to God. In
identifying the individual human being with God, the value of
individuality is raised above the mutual respect and obligation of
rational prudence. From the perspective of faith, obligation to the
other is grounded in the self-giving love of God.
It is in this self-giving love that human freedom is most fully
exercised. This love is the final norm for freedom because human
relationships transcend explicit principles or law. In this regard
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lave transcends obedience to rules. Rules can never hope to grasp the
possibilities of human social life.
Love is the only final structure of freedom. Human personality as
a system of infinite potentialities makes it impossible to define
absolutely what I owe to my fellow-man, since nothing that he now
is exhausts what he might be. Human personality as capacity for
infinite self-transcendence makes it impossible from my awn
standpoint to rest content in any ordered relation with my fellow-
men.22
This freedom to love has its ground in the self-giving love of
God. In the encounter with God the individual realizes that his or her
self-seeking freedom leads to greater anxiety and less freedom. And
that only by self-giving can the individual realize the fullness of
freedom in the greater context of God. In this way the love of God
provides the faith and hope which makes freedom possible. Through
faith one understands personal freedom to correspond to the harmonies
and coherences of creation. This faith also provides a vision of the
future which encourages hope. In this context of faith the individual
can grow in self-giving love, trusting in an unconditional transcendent
love.
Under this perspective the value of freedom is given new vitality.
It is understood as the indeterminate potential of humanity to lave one
another and approximate self-giving love in all forms of justice. This
freedom indicates the human capacity to explore and create new social
forms which would approximate greater and greater justice in spite of
the inertia found in human nature and existence,
The third value to be reinterpreted is that of equality. The norm
of self-giving love both reaffirms this value and negates it at the
same time. Equality is a value of faith in the sense that the Cross
declares the equal need characteristic of human beings. The Cross
makes explicit the fact of the equal status of human sin. Before the
Cross all human beings stand judged and are in need of divine mercy.
Correspondingly, all human beings receive the grace of God whereby
forgiveness of sins is realized. In terms of the divine-human
relationship it is not possible to claim privilege. From a theological
perspective, the value of equality is affirmed.
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What is true from the theological perspective is not true for the
social perspective, The norm of self-giving love stands in opposition
to the value of equal justice. Equality in society is less than the
love of the Cross. This equality is at best a rational form of mutual
love where interests are calculated and balanced. The norm of self-
giving love must always stand in critique of this form of equality.
Self-giving love is not concerned with the balance of interests or of
mutual concern. This love is always concerned for the other more than
itself and desires the good of the other before it seeks its own
interest. For this reason it is impossible for the norm of self-giving
love to be the focus of a social ethic. Its role must always be one of
judge in relation to the concern for equality in society.
...sacrificial love, as exemplified by the lave of Christ, the
agape of the New Testament, is too pure to be a guide for the
ordering of the affairs of the community. These require the norms
of justice and the mutualities of philia rather than the pure
transcendence over self of the New Testament agape. It is, in
short, very difficult, if not impassible, to construct an adequate
social ethic, requiring a careful calculation of competing rights,
from an agape ethic. ■23
The fourth value of justice to be reinterpreted is that of order.
Order is the primary value of society and realized in the construction
of political structures and economic systems. As with social equality,
this value has no place in the norm of self-giving love. The
structures and systems of social order always include hierarchies of
authority and privilege, and the use of coercion. Neither of these
aspects of social order can be justified by the norm of love. At best,
order is to be understood as a means of approximating mutual love and
justice. This relationship between the norm of self-giving love and
the structures and systems of order is one of judgement. The norm of
self-giving love continually reminds society of its need to seek
greater approximations of love. In this role the norm of self-giving
love is always the reminder that order is a human artifact and subject
to the limitations and relativities of human life.
...God's order can never be identified with some specific form of
social organisation. It is very important to arrive at concepts
of justice which draw upon the common experience of mankind and
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set a restraint upon human self-interest. But it must be
recognised that, in so far as such principles of justice are given
specific historical meaning, they also become touched by
historical contingency.2'1
The last value of justice to be reinterpreted is that of power.
This is the value of international justice where power exists as the
sale functional source for mitigating human expansive impulses. While
this value is recognized as a necessary evil, it is non-the-less
rejected by the norm of self-giving love. Self-giving love must stand
against power because power is coercive in its very nature. Power
consists in the coercive force of military, economic and political
threat. The Cross knows no such coercion. The power of the Cross is
not the force of coercion, but rather the ability to create new life.
This power is the power of knowledge of the law of life and the
security of God's sovereignty. It is faith empowered by the agape of
Christ. It is the knowledge that life and history will find its
fulfilment in God, From the perspective of the norm of self-giving
love there is no place in religious faith for a value of power
expressed in coercion.
This brings to a conclusion our examination of Niebuhr's religious
idealism. We have now reached the point where we can turn to examine
the implementation of justice, Our concern in the next chapter will be
to see how Niebuhr implements justice in human life between the
dialectic of anthropological realism and religious idealism.
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3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JUSTICE
In. Niebuhr's theology the social implementation of justice occurs
between the realism of human sin, finiteness and. self-contradiction,
and the absolute transcendent ideal of self-giving love. ¥ithin this
tension, human community is to struggle with the establishment of the
various forms of social order which will mitigate the destructive
impulses of human beings and encourage the creative and familial
impulses. This is easy to state, but difficult to implement. In
Niebuhr's long theological career, the implementation of justice was a
concern continually being rethought and restated. While his
anthropological realism and religious idealism saw changes in emphasis,
but little substantial change in content, his understanding of the
implementation of social justice between these dialectical concerns saw
radical change. In Niebuhr's early works, such as Moral Man and
Immoral Society, we find an explicit socialist approach to the
implementation of justice. This is to be contrasted with his works
following the Second World War when he promoted a form of welfare
capitalism.
This flexibility in the implementation of justice originates in
his dialectical theology. For Niebuhr there can be no absolute or
ideal political, economic, or social system in the tension between
anthropological realism and religious idealism. Within this tension,
human beings can only approximate the ideal of love through systems and
structures which inherently distort and prevent the ideal they seek to
realize. For Niebuhr this means that ethics must be fundamentally
pragmatic. While the 'end' of justice can be stated with some clarity,
the 'means' to achieve that 'end' is relative and obscure. For this
reason social creativity seeks the systems and structures which provide
the optimal harmony of life with life. But the identification of these
social systems and structures is not accomplished by means of the
implementation of abstract theory. Rather, the success of social
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systems and structures is dependent on the determative factors of
history.
For Niebuhr, justice is implemented within a historical context
and is dependent on that context for the form in which justice finds
successful expression. Human beings are creators and creatures of
history and it is in this context that social life is constructed and
maintained. For Niebuhr this means that the ethic of justice is an
ethic which is both transcendent and historical. It is to a detailed
examination of this ethic which we will now turn.
Ethics of Niebuhrian realism
To state that an ethic of justice has a transcendent dimension is
to recognize the norm of self-giving love as the measure of ethical
action. This norm transcends history and human existence and is the
norm by which all human action is judged. Human behaviour and social
creativity function under this relational ideal which both inspires and
judges the effectiveness of ethical endeavour. But this endeavour does
not occur in a moment of existential isolation, but rather in the
continuity of time, Therefore, ethics must also be a historical
phenomenon and have horizontal, historical foci of reference as well as
vertical, existential foci.
This move from transcendent to historical context for ethics is
not a negation of the dialectic of anthropological realism and
religious idealism. It is rather the reflection on this same dialectic
from a different perspective. Human life has both transcendent and
historical qualities. But a social ethic of justice finds its
operative environment in history. For Niebuhr, the human being is most
significantly a historical being. "Man is primarily a historical
creature. He plays his role against some ontological background, but
his real milieu is history".1 Therefore an ethic of Niebuhrian realism
must make this dialectic explicit in its historical context. In order
to accomplish this, the dialectics of anthropological realism and
religious idealism must be restated and identified as historical
phenomenon and defined in terms of ethical significance.
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The first reference point in this theological ethic is the concept
of creation. Niebuhr understands time and history to be the creation
of God, From this perspective one can speak of universal history as
God's history in his relationship with his creation. Within this
universal history we find the particular, limited, and parochial
histories of human groups.
This recognition of reality as divine creation has two immediate
ethical implications. The first of these is the recognition of mystery
concerning the intelligibility of the cosmos.
...belief in divine creation points to a realm of mystery which is
at once the beginning and the end of any system of meaning and
which prevents it from being reduced to a too simple system of
rational intelligibility.2
This recognition of the limitation of rationality concerning the
coherence and unity of the cosmos prevents us from developing ethical
theories which can claim ultimate compliance. We find ourselves in a
reality whose meaning transcends us at the limits of time and history.
If we look to our historical beginnings or end we find mystery.
This concept of divine creation also underscores the fundamental
relativity of human existence. This relativity is the second ethical
implication of the concept of creation. The recognition of reality as
divine creation not only sets barriers to meaning, but also to human
fulfilment within that meaning. Again, the beginning and end of time
stand as limits to human endeavour. This relativizes the ethical
endeavour of human life in history by pointing to the meaning and
fulfilment which exists beyond it.
Whether dealing with the Alpha or the Omega of history, with the
beginning or with the end, the Christian faith prevents
provisional meanings, judgements, and fulfilments from becoming
ultimate by its sense of a final mystery of divine fulfilment
beyond all provisional meanings.3
In this way we see the historical expression of the Niebuhrian
dialectic in the concept of creation. The recognition of reality as
creation identifies the history of human beings as partial and
relative, and at the same time identifies it as standing within a
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universal history over which God is sovereign, In this dialectic God
is not to be identified with creation, but neither is God absent from
it. The dialectic of transcendence and immanence is held in tension at
the horizons of history. In this manner we are given the ethical
context for human endeavour. This is a context of historical
relativity and finiteness which looks beyond itself for justification
of ethical life.
This brings us to consider the second reference point of a
theological ethic. This is the life, death and resurrection of Jesus
Christ. It is in Jesus of lazareth that the transcendent, trans-
historical meaning and fulfilment of history is revealed and
accomplished in history.
The affirmation that Christ is the end of history signifies that
in his life, death, and resurrection the meaning of man's historic
existence is fulfilled. The divine sovereignty, which gives it
meaning, is revealed to have an ultimate resource of mercy and
forgiveness, beyond judgement, which completes history despite the
continued fragmentary and contradictory character of all historic
reality.*
Niebuhr understands that Christ is the revelation of the telos of
history. In Jesus Christ is revealed the meaning of historical
existence in which self-giving love is the coherence and unity of
reality. In the Cross of this Jesus, we are confronted with God's love
and with our failure to love. In this confrontation we experience the
judgement and mercy of God in our inability to love without self-
regard. But in this same Cross we know that God's mercy and love
fulfils the love we lack. In this way the Cross stands as a symbol of
our historic failure to fulfil history as harmony of life with life,
and at the same time indicates God's intention to fulfil that same
history by his own intervention.
This revelation of God's 'end' or telos for history has two
immediate ethical consequences. The first of these results from the
consciousness of forgiveness which results from the judgement and mercy
experienced in the Cross. This sense of forgiveness results in the
ethical expression of tolerance toward the failures and limitations of
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others. In this sense the Cross is the symbol of our equality in sin
and compels us to treat others as we have been treated.
The second ethical consequence results from this same insight.
The Cross declares our sin and presents us with an ethical ideal of
love which occurs in history only to be rejected and destroyed. In the
crucifixion is revealed the impossibility of self-giving love as a
simple historical goal. liebuhr understands this to be a rejection of
any theory of 'progress' in terms of human ability to love and achieve
a pure harmony of life with life. The Cross is the verification of the
self-contradiction within human beings which will remain till the end
of history. Niebuhr understands that growth in reason, or
progressively better social systems, will never remove this basic
impulse in humanity to self-regard and will-to-power. He recognizes
the biblical symbol of the antichrist to represent this fact of
history. The symbol of the antichrist is the assertion that growth in
love or justice also means growth for potential evil. For Niebuhr the
dialectic between self-regard and self-giving will always be present
until the end of history. For him there can be no Utopia of harmony of
life with life within the reach of human endeavour.
The life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ reveals more than
the telos of history, it also indicates its finis. liebuhr understands
that Christ reveals the 'end' or telos in a historical event whereby
the coherence and unity of reality is revealed. But this telos is not
a historic dynamic which can be perceived in the movements of history.
The telos of life and history is trans-historical and is revealed as a
hidden or obscured coherence. While the revelation of this telos
indicates the nature of human fulfilment, this fulfilment is not
completed in history. For this reason Christ and the Cross indicate a
future 'end' or finis beyond which the harmony of life with life will
be accomplished. In this sense the Cross is the nexus between creation
and consummation. It reveals the nature of our historical being and
declares a future divine event in which our historical life finds
fulfilment.
It is this eschatological finis which is the third theological
reference for an ethic of Niebuhrian realism, This finis indicates
that the fulfilment of history is not in history, but at its end. As
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long as there is history there will be ambiguities and contradictions
indicative of human existence. Therefore human life looks to
completion beyond history.
There are provisional meanings in history, capable of being
recognized and fulfilled by individuals and cultures; but mankind
will continue 'to see through a glass darkly' and the final
meaning can only be anticipated by faith. It awaits a completion
when 'we shall know even as we are known'. There are provisional
judgements upon evil in history; but all of them are imperfect,
since the executors of judgement are tainted in both their
discernments and their actions by the evil which they seek to over
come. History therefore awaits an ultimate judgement. There are
renewals of life in history, individually and collectively; but no
rebirth lifts life above the contradictions of man's historic
existence. The Christian awaits a 'general resurrection' as well
as a 'last judgement'.5
This finis is not to be understood as a rejection of current human
history. But rather as its transformation. "Christian eschatology
looks forward to an 'end' of history in which the conditions of nature-
history are transfigured but not annulled."e This understanding of the
end of history is expressed in the symbols of the 'general
resurrection' and the 'last judgement'. These theological symbols
indicate a basic continuity between current history and the
consummation of history. Here again we perceive the Hiebuhrian
dialectic. The consummation of history, in which life realizes the
harmony of life with life under the sovereignty of God, is not a
possibility in human history. And yet it is this harmony of life with
life which is the coherence and unity of current history. Therefore
the realization of this law of love at the end of history is not alien
to current historical life. It is in fact anticipated in history by
divine revelation and human social endeavour.
It is beyond this eschatological finis of history, that we find
the resolution of the dialectic of anthropological realism and
religious idealism. Niebuhr understands that as long as there is human
history there will be the tension of this dialectic. Only by the
intervention of God in which history is terminated and transformed can
this tension be resolved. It is this divine intention which is
revealed in Christ to be the telos of history and which will be
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fulfilled beyond its finis. In Christ this intention and fulfilment is
identified as the 'Kingdom of God'.
The Kingdom of God is the theological symbol which illustrates
God's intention and fulfilment of history. In the Kingdom of God we
obtain a vision of a world in which life exists with life in harmony
under the sovereignty of God. In this Kingdom of God the
contradictions and frustrations of human life have been removed. In
this Kingdom human beings express self-giving love and achieve the
purest form of justice.
It is this theological symbol which is the primary reference for
an ethics of justice. The Kingdom of God is not a human possibility,
but reveals the ideal toward which human endeavour must proceed. "The
Kingdom of God is relevant to every moment of history as an ideal
possibility and as a principle of judgement upon present realities".'7.
This Kingdom of God is revealed in Jesus Christ and indicated as a
future event beyond the end of history. This places ethical action in
an 'interim' between the revelation of God's intention in Christ, and
the fulfilment of that intention at the end of time.
The full implication of the double idea that the 'Kingdom of God
has come' and that it is 'coming' is that history is an interim,
... In thus conceiving history after Christ as an interim between
disclosure of its true meaning and the fulfilment of that meaning,
between the revelation of divine sovereignty and the full
establishment of that sovereignty, a continued element of inner
contradiction is history is accepted as its perennial
characteristic. Sin is overcome in principle but not in fact.
Love must continue to be suffering love rather than triumphant
1ove,®
In this way we perceive the ethical significance of the Kingdom of God.
It is identified in Jesus Christ as the ideal of human social
relationships under the sovereignty of God. In this regard it is a
goal toward which all social creativity aims. And yet it is not a
historical possibility.
The Kingdom of God is always at hand in the sense that
impossibilities are really passible, and lead to new actualities
in given moments of history. Nevertheless every actuality of
history reveals itself, after the event, as only an approximation
of the ideal; and the Kingdom of God is therefore not here. It is
in fact always coming but never here.3
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It is in the concept of the Kingdom of God that we find the
historical counterpart to the transcendent ideal of self-giving love.
It is these two ideals which are the primary references for a
theological ethic. In fact, they are a single idea. The Kingdom of
God is nothing more than the ideal of self-giving love portrayed in
social-historical terms. As with the ideal of self-giving love, the
Kingdom of God is both relevant to present life and yet is ultimately
beyond the possibilities of human existence. As with self-giving love,
the Kingdom of God is an 'impossible possibility' which has its
realization only in the realm of the divine.
In this ethic of Siebuhrian realism, the transcendent and trans-
historical ideals find approximate realization within the relativities
of history. The expression of these ideals is always limited by
anthropological realism. Humans will appropriate these ideals within
their social context and in continuity with their particular historical
experience. This means that an ethic of justice finds as many
different expressions as there are social groups. In this relative and
parochial context the values of justice; community, freedom, equality,
and order; will be held in a variety of hierarchies of importance.
This will result in justice taking shape in a number of forms.
For Niebuhr this means that an ethic of justice must be pragmatic
and progressive. It must be pragmatic in that it seeks to find optimal
expression within a historical-social context. Within this context
justice must seek those structures and systems which will successfully
approximate the norm of love and the Kingdom of God. Because of the
variety of social experience and parochial history, there can be no
'ideal' structure or system. Systems and structures must be judged
within the limitations of historical existence according to their
ability to produce justice. Because the ideals of justice are
necessarily transcendent and trans-historical, the ethics of social
justice executed in the context of historical relativity must be
flexible and pragmatic.
Hiebuhr also understands that an ethic of social justice must be
progressive. This is not to be confused with the concept of progress
wherein society evolves to achieve an optimal justice or even Utopia.
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It is rather the recognition that forms of justice can never be static.
Justice is applied in a living social situation which is continually
changing. This means that systems and structures of justice must be
forever reforming to approximate the ideals of justice in continually
new situations. Niebuhr recognizes that when forms of justice seek
permanency, they result in becoming the source of injustice in the new /
social context.
This recognition of relativity does not mean that Niebuhr accepts
all systems and structures of justice. Systems and structures of
justice are validated by their result in greater approximations to the
ideals of justice. It is obvious to Niebuhr that some systems and
structures are more successful than others. It is to this concern that
we now turn as we examine the artifacts of justice.
Artifacts of justice
Vithin an ethic of progressive and pragmatic justice the
implementation of justice depends on the construction of social
artifacts. These artifacts are the structures and systems of a society
which maintain and promote the greatest approximation of harmony of
life with life under the ideals and values of justice. The first
artifacts to be examined will be those of law, politics, and economics.
The last artifact to be considered will be that of world community.
Law, politics, and economics are basically the artifacts of national
communities. But these artifacts also are related to the developing
phenomenon of world community and will be also considered in that
context.
Law
Niebuhr concerns himself with two expressions of law. One form of
law serves distributive justice and the other serves corrective or
penal justice. Law as distributive justice is concerned to ensure that
the values of justice are preserved within the complexities of social
human relationships. This form of law serves to guide and limit
behaviour in society. Corrective justice is directly related to
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distributive justice and must deal with its violation. We will examine
both these forms of law in detail.
Law as distributive justice seeks to approximate the norm of self-
giving love by establishing rules and principles which embody the
values of social justice; community, freedom, equality, and order. In
this way law seeks to be a form of love.
The law seeks for a tolerable harmony of life with life, sin
presupposed. It is, therefore, an approximation of the law of
love on the one hand and an instrument of love on the other
hand.10
But law can never be more than an approximation. For the norm of lave
transcends the calculative and prescriptive expressions of law
corresponding to the transcendent freedom of human beings. In this way
the possible social expressions of love cannot be restrained to the
simple boundaries of law.
...beyond and above every human relation as ordered by a fixed
structure of justice, by custom, tradition, and legal enactment,
there remain indeterminate possibilities of love in the individual
and personal encounters of those who are in the structure.11
liebuhr understands that there is a 'push' and 'pull' to the role
of law. As a prescriptive statement the law details our duty to one
another in social life. By this moral 'push' the law seeks to
approximate the norm of love. But at the same time liebuhr recognizes
that the norm of self-giving love can not be commanded as moral duty.
Love cannot be coerced by a rational sense of obligation. Obedience to
law must therefore also result from the 'pull' of grace. Because we
have received love, we are enabled to give love.
In this manner we see that law is always an approximation to the
norm of love and therefore always a relative expression. But law is
also relative from the perspective of history and society. From the
perspective of history, law is seen to be contingent according to time
and place.
... a culture which has learned to scan the vast varieties of
social and cultural configurations in history is not certain that
any law is adequate for all occasions. It is the more sceptical
because it has learned to discount the pretensions of universality
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and eternal validity which have been made for various structures
and norms of ethics in various cultures. It has learned, in
short, that the so-called 'self-evident' truths in the sphere of
morality usually cease to be self-evident under new historical
circumstances and in new occasions.12
This historical relativity finds expression around two concerns.
The first concern is that of social relativity, Niebuhr understands
that law invariably represents the interests of a particular group in
society. Despite the fact that a society seeks inclusiveness in law,
it will always be partial and reflect the values and interests of
dominant groups, The second concern of relativity is reason.
There is no universal reason in history, and no impartial
perspective upon the whole field of vital interests, which compete
with and mutualy support each other. Even the comparatively
impartial view of the whole of a society, as expressed
particularly in the carefully guarded objectivity of its juridical
institutions, participates in the contingent character of all
human viewpoints.13
While it is recognized that historical relativity is a basic
limitation concerning law, it must also be recognized that it is this
same historical relativity which gives law its validity. "The
'positive law' of historic communities gains its force primarily from
its specificity".'"1 The effectiveness of law does not correspond to
the purity of its abstract conception, but rather to its relevance to
the social vitalities of a particular culture and time.
Rules of justice do not follow in a 'necessary manner' from some
basic proposition of justice. They are the fruit of a rational
survey of the whole field of human interests, of the structure of
human life and the causal sequences in human relations.1--1
From this perspective it is seen that law is the result of both the
abstract values of justice and the social and cultural vitalities of
history.
Usually the norms of law are compromises between the rational-
moral ideals of what ought to be, and the possibilities of the
situation as determined by given equilibria of vital forces. The
specific legal enactments are, on the one hand, the instruments of
the conscience of the community, seeking to subdue the potential
anarchy of forces and interests into a tolerable harmony. They
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are, on the other hand, merely explicit formulations of given
tensions and equilibria of life and power, as worked out by the
unconscious interactions of social life.16
For these reasons law is to be understood as the result of a
social process in which various perspectives have been synthesized into
more and more inclusive forms of justice. Under the norm and values of
justice, groups within a society enter into a process of pressure and
counter-pressure until a consensus is reached which reflects the
concerns and interests of the majority of society. In this way law is
the expression of transcendent values appropriated to the relativities
of a particular society. As we have seen, this is both the weakness
and the strength of law. Law is weak in the sense that it is relative
and not absolute or universal. In this manner law is never a static
force but an artifact which must be continually reassessed and
reformulated. But law also has strength because of this same
relativity. This relativity allows it to have a specificity which is
necessary if it is to be functional.
Given the inherent relativity of law, Hiebuhr understands that a
successful form of law is one which is flexible in its constitution and
negative in its statement. The law must be flexible for reasons
already examined above. Cultural relativity and the human
indeterminate potential of love necessitate a form of law which is
flexible and amenable to change. liebuhr recognizes this as a priority
in the rapidly changing circumstances of modern technical society.
For similar reasons the law is stated in negative terms. The law
cannot coerce people to love and have a moral disposition towards
others. At best it approximates the norm of love by setting the limits
to human behaviour. In this way the law is stated in negative terms
and yet is open and optimistic. It states what we can not do but
leaves open the indeterminate possibilities of love.
... law, however conceived, accepts and regulates self-interest
and prohibits only the most excessive forms of it. It does not
command that we love the neighbour but only that we do not take
his life or property. It does not command that we seek our
neighbour's good but that we respect his rights. Broadly
speaking, the end of the law is justice.1'7
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Eiebuhr understands that the form of the law that serves
corrective or penal justice also stands under a transcendent
'impossible possibility'. As distributive justice stands under the
norm of self-giving love, corrective justice stands under the
corresponding ideal of forgiveness. "...imaginative justice moves in
the direction of forgiveness, or at least to remedial rather than
punitive justice".10 As with distributive justice, corrective justice
also exists in a context of relativity. Here law seeks to correct the
violation of justice. But this corrective activity is not done in a
social vacuum. As much as corrective justice seeks objectivity it can
not avoid the impulses of vengeance which it seeks to mitigate.
An element of vindictive passion will probably corrupt the
corrective justice of even the best society. The collective
behaviour is not imaginative enough to assure more than minimal
approximations of the ideal. Genuine forgiveness of the enemy
requires a contrite recognition of the sinfulness of the self and
of the mutual responsibility for the sin of the accused. Such
spiritual penetration is beyond the capacities of collective man.
It is the achievement of only rare individuals. Yet the right to
such understanding is involved in the most basic of human rights
and fallows logically if the basic right to life is rationally
elaborated. Thus all standards of corrective justice are
organically related to primitive vengeance on the one hand, and
the ideal of forgiving love on the other.1-'
The above statement also identifies a second point of relativity
affecting corrective justice. This is the insight that a society
rarely perceives its own responsibility for the violations of justice
which it seeks to correct by punitive law.
Before we move to consider the other structures and systems of
justice, it is important to indicate the relationship between law and
the other artifacts. Law is fundamentally different from the artifacts
of politics and economics. Niebuhr understands that law, more than any
other artifact, is a product of rational abstraction. For this reason
law is able to more closely approximate the norm of self-giving love.
Politics and economics, on the other hand, are more the result of
historical vitalities than of reason. This means that these artifacts
are more historically contingent and relative and less an approximation
to the ideal. But the difference between law and politics and
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economics must be seen as difference in degree rather than in hind.
Law is organically related to the other artifacts of justice and is
disfunctional without them.
The harmony of communities is not simply attained by the authority
of law. Nomas does not coerce the vitalities of life into order.
The social harmony of living communities is achieved by an
interaction between the normative conceptions of morality and law
and the existing and developing forces and vitalities of the
community,350
Politics
Politics is the artifact of social order which is built upon the
foundation of organic community with the aim of implementing the values
of freedom and equality in social life. It is the task of politics to
regulate and maintain the quality of social interaction as a community
becomes more complex and extended.
The conscious contrivances of statecraft . . . seek to prevent
partial and parochial interests from clashing in chaotic
competition or conflict, . . . provide channels for the maximum
degree of cooperation, . . . suppress undue recalcitrance against
minimal standards of justice and order, . . . equalize fortuitous
inequalities in the interest of justice, and . . . create a larger
community than is possible upon the basis of the 'natural' limits
of human sympathy and concern for the neighbour. 21
In this way it is the role of politics to provide a structure of
order which will stabilize the life of the community. This is
accomplished with the introduction of power. Political power is a
necessity if political structures are to function. This political
power "...rests upon the ability to use and manipulate other forms of
social power for the particular purpose of organizing and dominating
the community".2:2 This power found in political order exists between
two dialectical foci. "These two elements of communal life - the
central organizing principle and power, and the equilibrium of power -
are essential and perennial aspects of community organization;...".23
The organization of power and the equilibrium of power are both
necessary for justice in social order. And at the same time they can
be the sources for injustice and the destruction of social life, They
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exist in tension with one another and yet they can not exist without
the other. It is this dialectic of power which is the life and breath
of political justice.
liebuhr understands that power is the continual potential source
of injustice in social life. "If men are inclined to deal unjustly
with their fellows, the possession of power aggravates this
inclination".2"- For Niebuhr, injustice is directly related to
excessive power acquired by any individual or group. For this reason
the means to ensure the continuance of justice is through the
equilibrium of power. By balancing power against power the inordinate
accumulation of power is avoided and a tenuous justice is achieved.
A healthy society must seek to achieve the greatest possible
equilibrium of power, the greatest possible number of centres of
power, the greatest possible social check upon the administration
of power, and the most effective use of forms of coercion in which
consent and coercion are compounded.2®
By balancing the powers of social life, domination by any one
group or individual is avoided and justice maintained. But this same
principle of justice can also be a source of destruction of social
life. The principle of equilibrium of power can be a principle of
anarchy and destructive conflict. It is for this reason that the
principle of equilibrium of power must exist in a relationship of
dialectical necessity with the principle of organization of power. It
is the organization of power which restrains the potential anarchy of
the balance of power.
...historic contests of power must be managed, supervised, and
suppressed by the community, precisely because they do not move
within the limits of 'nature'. The battleground is the human
community and not the animal herd; and the contestants are armed
with powers which have been drawn from the historic and communal
process.2S
The organization of power is achieved by means of government or
central authority which utilizes two sources of power.
...forms of restraint do of course presuppose a central authority,
which manages the whole competitive and co-operative enterprise.
It has this authority by reason of possession of both prestige and
force.27
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Prestige or 'majesty' is the power to obtain uncoerced, consent to
govern and utilize other forms of power. This prestige is founded upon
social and historical sources. Prestige or 'majesty' gains authority
from social consent corresponding to the perceived justice of the
political system. The success of justice in a political system
encourages trust in the system. This prestige of authority is
effective even during temporary periods of injustice if it is believed
that the long term result of the political system will be greater
justice.
Prestige is also the result of historical processes. A particular
form of government has a history in a culture which encourages consent
on the basis of custom and habit. liebuhr understands that custom and
habit are strong sources of prestige for government.
Efforts to create ... an authority by purely constitutional means
must confront the fact that the prestige of authority is
necessarily the product of historical forms of community, which
legal and constitutional means can perfect and redirect, but which
they cannot create out of whole cloth.:2:s
The second power of centralized authority is that of 'dominion' or
force. This power is that of coercion expressed through police and
military. This 'dominion' is given to government by consent of the
governed in order that internal harmony may be maintained.
The internal peace of a community is always partly coercive
because men are not good enough to do what should be done for the
commonweal on a purely voluntary basis. There are both organic
and moral farces of inner cohesion; but they are not sufficient to
obviate the necessity of coercion.23
¥hile this organization of power works for order and justice, it
is also the source of injustice. The centralization of power
necessarily creates a hierarchy of authority and privilege. Niebuhr
understands that this hierarchy is necessary for the exercise of
authority. But while this hierarchy is a functional necessity, it also
creates the basis for inequality of privilege. Another result of this
centralization of power is that it tends to create an oligarchy. At
the top of this hierarchy of authority is inevitably a social group
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which pursues its own interest by the use of political power. Niebuhr
perceives no simple way to resolve this problem of political hierarchy
and oligarchy. For these reasons government is both a force for
justice as well as injustice.
Because of this tendency to injustice, the principle of
organization of power must be limited by the principle of equilibrium
of power. Centralized authority must be subject to the balance of
power which limits inordinate political domination. Without this limit
on centralized authority the society is in danger of the injustice of
tyranny.
As with the artifact of law, political structures are subject to
the relativities of human limitation and historical contingency.
Political structures are especially subject to historical relativity
because they are the product of a historical process.
History is ... not a realm of indeterminate growth and
development. It is a realm of conflict. In this conflict new
forces and forms of life challenge the established powers and
orders. They are a reminder to the established forms and powers
of the contingent character of all historical configurations; and
a judgement upon the pretension which denies this contingency.30
For this reason political structures are subject to reassessment and
reformulation in the same manner as the artifact of law. They are to
be understood as limited approximations to the Kingdom of God and the
harmony of life with life. As contingent and particular structures of
a specific time and culture, the political artifacts of social life are
always in need of greater and greater approximation to the impossible
ideal.
Niebuhr identifies democracy as the form of political structure
which is most successful within the limitations and possibilities of
political justice. He understands democracy to correspond to
anthropological realism. "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy
possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy
necessary".31 Niebuhr understands democracy to provide a free society
in which human beings can realize their transcendent possibilities and
at the same time provide the balances of power which will restrict the
destructive human self-regard and will-to-power.
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Democracy does indeed require some confidence in man's natural
capacity for justice. But its institutions can" be more easily
justified as bulwarks against injustice. indeed it is because
democracy holds every public power under public scrutiny and
challenges every pretension of wisdom, and balances every force
with a countervailing force, that some of the injustices which
characterize traditional societies, and modern tyrannies, are
prevented.3ai
Kiebuhr also understands that the prestige and dominion of central
authority is qualified within a democratic system. In a democracy,
prestige and dominion are directly dependent on the community due to
the distribution of power through universal suffrage. The prestige and
dominion of the government is the prestige and dominion of the
community itself. In this way the rule by oligarchy is qualified and
the hierarchy of authority placed under constant review and subject to
reform.
It is this political flexibility which makes democracy successful.
As new forces and forms of life appear in history, a democratic system
is able to adjust and restructure. By means of explicit consent to
govern, provided by society through suffrage, and the flexibility of
political structure, which allows the alternation of particular
governments and the reform of structures, democracy provides the best
known approximation to the ideal of a just society within the
limitations and possibilities of anthropological realism.
Economics
Economics is a social artifact which is also a form of power and
subject to the dialectic of power. In economics we find the same
tension between a centralization of power and the equilibrium of power.
As with political power, economic power meets the requirements of
justice when it is widely distributed.
Since economic power, as every other form of social power, is a
defensive force when possessed in moderation and a temptation to
injustice when it is great enough to give the agent power over
others, it would seem that its widest and most equitable
distribution would make for the highest degree of justice.33
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Unfortunately this distribution is difficult to achieve. The
equilibrium of economic power, held in harmonious tension, is not a
natural occurrence. From this perspective Niebuhr rejects the optimism
of laissez-faire or free economic theory. He understands that human
freedom transcends any 'natural' balances of economic life. There is
no 'natural law' which will restrain the human will-to-power and self-
regard in economic relationships. "If the economic process is left
severely alone either the strong devour the weak, in which case
monopoly displaces competition, or competition breeds chaos in the
community".3A
This problem of distribution and equilibrium is compounded by the
fact that centralization of power is inherent in the economic process.
Niebuhr understands this to be particularly true in a technological
society. He perceives in modern technical civilization a historical
process wherein centralization of economic power moves toward greater
efficiency and has social value. But at the same time this
centralization of economic power provides the basis for injustice. For
this reason the issue of centralization and equilibrium of economic
power become ethically ambiguous.
The tendency toward monopoly is obviously a concomitant of the
general increase of interdependence in communal relations in a
technical society. In so far as the unification of technical
process is a service to the community (despite the perils of
centralization of power which inhere in it), the effort to destroy
the unification in order to avoid its concomitant perils, would
seem as unwise and futile as the analogous effort of peasants of a
previous age to prevent the use of machinery upon the land. The
community must find a way of dealing with the problem of
centralized power without destroying the unity and efficiency of
the process.3®
One solution to this centralization of economic power is its
socialization. Niebuhr rejects the Marxist extreme of socialization.
The Marxist form of socialization places too much power in the hands of
the managers of economic life and compounds economic and political
power. This form of socialization leaves society open to tyranny.
But Niebuhr does not reject the need for regulation or order. The
centralization of economic power and the distribution of economic power
need to be placed under political control. The problem is one of how
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the social values of equality and freedom are to be applied to
economics. How much freedom is allowed for economics to create centres
of power and how much regulation is needed to ensure some level of
equality? This problem becomes increasingly difficult within the
context of social life which functions under a hierarchy of authority
and privilege. This hierarchy of authority encourages inequalities in
economic power.
For Niebuhr there is no easy answer or 'ideal' solution to this
problem of economic freedom and economic regulation. He understands
that the issue of equality is one which remains ambiguous in social
life due to the very structures of society.
. . . there are naturally no possibilities of arriving at explicit
agreements in any society about the degree of inequality which is
necessary for the proper performance of different functions or for
maintenance of social incentives, or how much equality is
necessary to meet the requirements of justice.3e
For this reason Niebuhr contends that social solutions to the problem
of economic justice must be proximate, contextual and continually
revised.
This pragmatic approach to economics functions best within the
political structure of democracy; "... democracy is a method of finding
proximate solutions for insoluble problems".3"^ Within democracy,
economic freedom and economic regulation are determined by political
power held by society. By means of universal suffrage, democracy
provides a regulative force over the potential inequalities of economic
power.
Within this political context two forms of economic life are to be
further examined: property and the market economy. Niebuhr understands
that property, like social hierarchy, is an ambiguous necessity of
social life. Property is a source of justice in that its possession is
a safeguard against the tendency of people to take advantage of one
another. In this sense property is a source of security. But
property, like social hierarchy, is also the source for injustice.
Property is a form of power which can be used for domination of others
within society.
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There is no clear distinction between the various forms and uses
of property. Property can be a source of power over others, a source
of security, and a necessary aspect of social function. And it can be
all of these at the same time. There is also no clear measure of
social value for assessing the quantity of property held and the
corresponding economic power. For this reason the problem of property
can not be solved by an abstract principle, but only in the context of
a democratic process. "There must ... be a continuous debate on the
property question in democratic society and a continuous adjustment to
new developments".3®
Vithin this context Niebuhr understands that society may choose to
socialize some forms of property. He presents this option with some
reservation.
Since there are no forms of the socialization of property which do
not contain some peril of compounding economic and political
power, a wise community will walk warily and test the effect of
each new adventure before further adventures.3'3
The socialization he presents as a solution to some social problems of
property is one informed by pragmatic concerns. The socialization of
property must promote justice in society and avoid the compounding of
political and economic power. He does not know if this is possible,
but suggests that the democratic process might help in placing a check
upon the managers of socialized economic property.
The second concern of economic justice within a democratic
political structure is that of the market economy. The market economy
is the functional expression of the tension between economic freedom
and economic regulation. This economic system consists of a harmony of
interests held in equilibrium. This equilibrium is not the result of
human goodwill, but rather a balance of economic power.
A harmony of a market economy is, in any event, not a harmony
created by mutual forbearance and consideration. It is a harmony
of special interests held in equilibrium. It is tolerable if the
interests are armed with fairly equal power; but the situation can
become intolerable if the disproportions of power are too great.
- 72 -
As already noted above, this balance of economic power cannot exist
without a centralized authority which maintains the potential chaos
within a structure of order.
Uiebuhr understands that the most successful form of economic
justice is one which takes advantage of a market economy regulated by a
democratic political structure. In this construction of economic and
political justice, the society takes advantage of the vitality of the
market system, yet regulates its inherent inequalities under the
political equality of democracy. The primary means of mitigating the
inequalities of the market system is through the political right of
equality of opportunity. This social system is identified by Niebuhr
as a 'welfare state'. For him, this is the best possible political and
economic approximation to justice.
Healthy free societies ... have used broadly based political power
(universal suffrage) to equalize the inequalities of economic
power, to establish minimal standards of security and justice, and
to assure the community some services which the market does not
find it profitable to supply. These are the general and minimal
accomplishments of the 'welfare state' which develop in healthy
nations, whether their original orientation was 'capitalistic' or
'socialistic'.
World community
Global justice utilizes these same artifacts of social justice;
law, politics and economics; but finds that the artifacts which make
for world community and justice are weakened by the lack of organic
community. As examined in previous chapters, systems and structures of
justice must be built upon the organic fabric of community. This
common fabric is lacking in international relations. But despite this
limitation, Niebuhr understands organic community is being extended by
human artifact. The artifact of modern technical civilization is
creating extensions of organic community. This community is being
created by two technical phenomena. The first force of cohesion and
mutuality is that of universality created by the interdependence of
nations due to technological civilization.
technical civilization, developed during the past century,
introduced a new force of universality into history. Its
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instruments of production, transport and communication reduced the
space-time dimensions of the world to a fraction of their previous
size and led to a phenomenal increase in the interdependence of
all national communities. This new technical interdependence
created a potential world community because it established complex
interrelations which could be ordered only by a wider community
than now exists.^
The second cohesive technical phenomenon is that of the threat of
nuclear annihilation. This is certainly a negative force of cohesion,
but it is a force for community. "...the recognition by both sides of
being involved in the common fate of the nuclear dilemma may create the
first strands of community which could be enlarged by various forms of
mutuality".A3
While modern technical civilization provides some forces of
cohesion and community, it also develops and creates power which serves
the egoism of nations. In this regard, the world community is subject
to the dialectic of power. But in this global community there is no
central authority which provides order to regulate the power of
nations. For this reason the world community is one of an anarchy of
nations restrained by a balance of power. This balance of power is not
the harmony of the equilibrium of power. In the global setting some
nations have great power while others have little. It is these great
nations which exist in a tentative balance of power. Niebuhr
identifies this precarious balance as one of 'terror' caused by the
potential of nuclear annihilation.
...a precarious nuclear peace, based on a 'balance of terror', has
been established in the world because the novel dimension of
destructive capacity in nuclear weapons creates an identity
between mutual interest and self-interest in the two
contestents.
In this way the centres of power in the global community are restricted
from using coercion to dominate and enforce their vision of unity on
the world.
Within this context of potential community and potential conflict,
the artifacts of justice have significance. Although limited by
current lack of organic community, their utility directly corresponds
to the indeterminate growth of community. The artifact of law cannot
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create community, but it can be helpful in guiding the growth of
community. In like manner, the artifact of politics is dependent on
community for its prestige and dominion. At present this world
community does not exist, Yet a limited political artifact can be
helpful in the growth toward world community. Niebuhr identifies the
United Nations as one such limited artifact which has value in this
regard. It is limited in terms of power, yet it serves as a forum and
foundation for the development of principles and law and the political
structuring of a world community.
The strongest cohesive artifact of world community is that of
economics. The growth in economics corresponds directly to the growth
of technical civilization. "Most important as a force of social
cohesion in the world community is the increasing economic
interdependence of peoples of the world".This artifact of economics
is the strongest force for community in the world and it is also a
primary source of injustice. While economics allows us to affirm the
mutuality of dependence, it also is a source of power for the egoism of
nations. Economic power is expressed in an international hierarchy
with the greatest power held by the central powers of the great
nations. Until there is some form of world order and justice,
economics will continue to be a force of unity as well as a source of
injustice.
For Niebuhr, world community must be built between hope and fear.
It is a task which requires the realism to perceive the limitations and
the possibilities of all human endeavour. One point of realism is that
human beings will never construct world community on the basis of
mutual love and self-giving, but rather in combination with human self-
interest.
The world community must be built by men and nations sufficiently
mature and robust to understand that political justice is
achieved, not merely by destroying, but also by deflecting,
beguiling and harnessing residual self-interest and by finding the
greatest possible concurrence between self-interest and the
general welfare.
A second point of realism is that human beings cannot escape the
conflict of groups and nations caused by differences of social and
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historical particularity. This makes any 'ideal' construction of world
community an impossibility.
The task of building a world community is man's final necessity
and possibility, but also his final impossibility. It is a
necessity and possibility because history is a process which
extends the freedom of man over natural process to the point where
universality is reached. It is an impossibility because man is,
despite his increasing freedom, a finite creature, wedded to time
and place and incapable of building any structure of culture or
civilization which does not have its foundations in a particular
and dated locus.4"'
As with all other artifacts of justice, world community is also an
approximation to the harmony of life with life required by the norm of
love. And like all artifacts of justice, it is a limited and relative
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4. CRITIQUE All) COMMENT OS THE HIEBUHRIAS THEOLOGY OF JUSTICE
Niebuhr's theology has attracted criticism and comment for a
period spanning some fifty years. Paul Tillich1 was one of his first
dialogue partners and criticism continues to come from contemporary
theologians such as Judith Vaughan:i:. It is not the intention of this
chapter to cover the wide spectrum of criticism and comment related to
Niebuhr's theology. But rather, the focus will remain on issues
relating directly to his theology of justice.
Two distinct areas of criticism will be avoided. The first
relates to Niebuhr's polemic style of writing. This form of
theological writing attracted a great deal of criticism and most of
this criticism was itself polemic in style. This type of comment is
not helpful in the critical task of assessing Niebuhr's work because it
abstracts Niebuhr's theology to one or more focal points and ignores
the complexity of his dialectical method. It will be the intention of
this critique to assess his theology of justice within its dialectical
complexity.
A second area of comment which will not be within the critical
concern of this chapter is that of Niebuhr's personal practice of this
theology in his social and political context. This study will be
restricted to examining Niebuhr's theology and ethics as theory and
method and will avoid discussion of his personal implementation of his
theology. Of course, it must be stated that he developed his theology
and ethics in direct relation to his social and political practice.
Niebuhr's theological and ethical process was always a movement from
ethical practice to theological reflection. It was his engagement in
specific social, economic and political issues that led him to rethink
and reformulate theological and ethical theory and method. The
flexibility of this theological and ethical process is reflected in the
other theologians who embraced his 'christian realism' yet did not
necessarily follow his implementation in social practice. In this
regard Biebuhr's theology can be described as 'open' concerning actual
decision making and action in political settings. For this reason it
is passible to assess his theology and ethics without necessarily
entering into criticism or defence of how he implemented his thought in
his particular historical context. The relation between theory and
practice will become clearer during assessment of his dialectical
theology and pragmatic ethics.
The following critique of Biebuhr's theology of justice will be
concerned with his theology and ethics in relation to the ongoing
process of social justice. It will not be concerned with application
of his theology to any particular historical social setting, but
rather, it will assess how his theology and ethics provide a general
theory or method which can be applied to social settings.
The intent of this chapter is to examine the strengths and
weaknesses of liebuhr's theology of justice. In particular, the
concern will be to examine key themes and elements of his theology and
ethics. Prior to examining these various themes and elements it is
helpful to assess his theology and ethics as a general theory and
method. This will provide the context for our examination of
particular themes and elements of liebuhr's theology of justice.
Dialectical theology
To begin this critique with an assessment of Biebuhr's dialectical
theology is somewhat of an arbitrary decision. In some sense this
decision moves in opposition to Biebuhr's own method. I would agree
with James Gustafson's comment on Biebuhr's theological method;
"Theology is more in the service of ethics, I believe than ethics is in
the service of theology".3 As a general description it can indeed be
said that Biebuhr's method moves from practice to theory. For this
reason his pragmatic ethics is not to be understood as a concern which
proceeds from a fully developed theological system, but rather is part
of the process of theological reflection. In Biebuhr's theology we
find a dialectical interpenetration of theory and practice.
In spite of this dialectical relationship between theology and
ethics, I believe it is appropriate to begin our critique by examining
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Niebuhr's dialectical theology. His theology has its roots neither in
rational theological reflection, nor in pragmatic ethical practice, but
in the biblical-dramatic worldview. Niebuhr perceives that the content
of this biblical-dramatic worldview illustrates the various dimensions
of theological dialectic. In this regard an initial critical
observation needs to be made. While Niebuhr finds a dialectical
reality in the text of scripture, it is questionable whether the
hermeneutical procedure he employs demonstrates this dialectic. This
criticism will be pursued when we place his theology in critical
comparison with the Liberation theology of Latin America.
It is Niebuhr's understanding of scripture and revelation which
provide him with theological themes which are regulative in regard to
the development of his theology as well as the practice of his ethics.
Niebuhr believes that scripture provides us with symbols and myths
which illustrate the divine-human relationship. At the pinnacle of
this symbolic and mythic tradition is the cross of Jesus Christ. These
symbols and myths are 'true' to the extent that they illuminate human
life and history. As Gustafson has commented concerning Niebuhr's
understanding of revelation;
The 'truth' of revelation was not so much a correlation between
religious language and the being and acts of God as its power to
disclose profound dimensions of human experience. Revelation is
heuristic in function and its 'truth' is confirmed by what it
unveils about human life.A
In this manner we see that pragmatic methodology is already at
work in identifying the regulative themes of the biblical tradition.
The authority of these themes is not a priori founded in a doctrine of
inspiration, but rather their authority depends upon their ability to
give meaning and direction to human life and history. These themes are
also not embraced on the basis of rational analysis. They are embraced
by faith and verified in experience.
Gustafson identified three regulative principles in Niebuhr's
thought which are derived from the biblical tradition: judgement,
mercy, and hope. The principle of judgement indicates an
anthropological realism which demonstrates the limits of human life.
The principle of mercy illumines God's grace and sacrificial love and
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is the impetus to human achievement in life and history. The principle
of hope directs us to an ultimate coherence of creation and God's
intention for history in the Kingdom of God.®
This biblical tradition is also the foundation for Niebuhr's
dialectical method, Within scripture he discovers the 'impossible
possibility' of love and the Kingdom of God. He finds also the
immanence and transcendence of God and human nature defined by nature
and spirit. This dialectic of mutual interpenetration and opposition
is also subject to pragmatic assessment. For Niebuhr, this dialectic
method best corresponds to human history and experience. His dialectic
illustrates the different limits of various phenomena without too
simply abstracting the phenomena for clarity. His dialectic maintains
the ambiguity and tension which is common to human existence.
From symbol and myth embraced by faith and verified in experience,
Niebuhr moves to theological reflection. It is at this point that he
develops his anthropological realism and love idealism. It is also at
this point that he develops his understanding of history with its
tension between the ideal and the real. This theology is dominated by
his dialectic as well as subject to pragmatic assessment. His 'ideas'
are verified by their coherence with other ideas, logic, or empirical
experience.
This dialectic and pragmatic method makes Niebuhr's theology
integrative, contextual, and dynamic, It is integrative theology in
that it follows a pragmatic method which seeks coherence with a larger
environment of ideas and experience. This makes Niebuhr's theology
open and not exclusive. It is also integrative due to its dialectic
structure. Dialectic method prevents theology from embracing a simple
coherence. The dialectic method forces theology into dialogue
concerning its own areas of tension and ambiguity.
In the same manner, Niebuhr's theology is contextual and relative.
Because it follows pragmatic concerns, theology seeks to be relevant to
a particular historical situation. The dialectical method also reminds
theology of the relative nature of theological reflection and prevents
it from the arrogant assumption of providing universal, eternal truths.
Because of the integrative and contextual nature of theology, it
is to be understood as a process rather than as a closed system. This
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makes Uiebuhr's theology dynamic rather than static. Uiebuhr follows
Augustine's dictum of 'faith seeking understanding' and interprets this
as an ongoing process.
The weakness in Uiebuhr's theology is his movement from biblical
symbol or myth to theological interpretation and application. How he
interprets the biblical-dramatic worldview determines the emphases and
direction of his theology and ethics. The primary points of criticism
regarding this hermeneutical move have to do with divine agency, human
potential, and historical possibility. These areas will be commented
on in depth under the appropriate theological themes found below. It
is these concerns which set the limits to the realization of justice in
human life and history in Uiebuhr's theology.
Throughout the examination of Uiebuhr's theological method we have
perceived his pragmatic concern which looks to verification in life and
experience. In this way ethics are placed at the centre of Uiebuhr's
theology. It is to a consideration of his ethics that we now turn.
Pragmatic ethics
As with theology, ethics finds its foundation in the biblical-
dramatic worldview. The three regulative principles identified above:
judgement, mercy, and hope, are relational and inherently the grounding
for ethics. At the focus of this biblical-dramatic worldview is the
Cross which provides ethics with its behavioural norm. In the Cross
the 'impossible possibility' of sacrifical love is revealed as the
overriding moral 'end' for Christian life.
This norm of self-sacrificial love makes Uiebuhr's ethics a
dispositional ethic. The norm of love does not explicitly provide a
detailed description of what expressions of love are possible for human
life, but rather serves as an 'impossible possibility' which judges all
forms of human love and calls these expressions to greater
approximation to self-sacrificial love. This ethical norm indicates a
disposition without restricting the possible forms love may take.
While this ethic recognizes a dispositional norm, it is also a
consequential ethic because of its pragmatic method. Guided by the
norm of love, the ethic seeks to express itself within a particular
- 83 -
social context. It is at this point that we discern the dialectic
between love and justice. While love is the transcendent norm of
theology, justice is the ethical approximation to love responding to
the specific needs and problems of the social context. Niebuhr's
pragmatic ethic is not a pure pragmatism which utilizes any method
which 'works', but rather seeks a workable method or practice under the
judgement and guidance of the norm of sacrificial love.
As can be perceived by the relationship of disposition to
consequence, and love to justice, ITiebuhr's ethic is thoroughly
dialectical. Between the regulative principles of judgement, mercy,
and hope, and the concrete decisions of social, economic, and political
life, there is the tension and ambiguity which is characteristic of
Mebuhrian dialectic. While this ethic seeks to fulfil norms through
pragmatic strategy, the dialectic realities found in theology,
anthropology, and history, maintain an ambiguity and tension in all
ethical response. Therefore, as with theology, ethics must be
perceived as integrative and 'open', contextual and relative, and as a
dynamic process rather than a series of universally applicable
behavioural norms.
At this point we see that theology and ethics stand in a
thoroughly dialectical relationship and that separate critique of each
may be misleading. Theology provides the interpretation of biblical
symbol and myth which looks to experience and practice for
verification. This pragmatic method places ethics as the central arena
in which theology is justified. On the other hand, ethics is not an
independent practice guided solely by concern for consequence, but is
guided by regulative themes or principles of theology. In this manner
we find theology and ethics in circular relationship of mutual
dependence and modification.
Concerning this dialectical relationship, I find myself in
agreement with Gustafson concerning the primacy of ethics in Niebuhrian
theology. This primacy of ethics has the result of establishing the
love-justice dialectic at the centre of theology. For Niebuhr, love is
not one theological theme among others, nor is justice one concern of
ethics among others. Love and justice become the central concerns of
christian existence in light of the drama of the Cross.
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In the above we have identified liebuhr's theology and ethics as
having expression in a qualified pragmatic methodology. It can also be
recognized that this pragmatic method may provide a serious weakness in
his theology and ethics. Roger Shinn identifies this weakness as a
tendency to conservatism.
The paradox of pragmatism is that it is an avowedly progressive
philosophy that in the last analysis may be conservative. ...a
pragmatic ethic is inherently progressive because it looks not to
past authority but to future possibilities, not to precedents but
to consequences. Yet, . . . pragmatism presupposes a general
consensus about society and its goals. In asking its favourite
question — 'what works?' — pragmatism asks the question within a
context. ... The context is usually a functioning social system,
in need of improvement, but capable of improvement. The context
includes also some kind of consensus on values.®
This raises the question of whether Riebuhr's theology provides a
sufficient prophetic and visionary foundation to mitigate the
conservative tendencies of a pragmatic method. As we examine Riebuhr's
theological themes of anthropological realism, Jesus Christ and love
idealism, and God and history, we will examine their bearing on his
development of a concept of justice.
Anthropological realism
Riebuhr's anthropology is the strongest aspect of his dialectical
theology. This is due to his use of historical verification rather
than verification by subjective experience or pragmatic utility. Even
so, his anthropology reveals a particular bias which has drawn comment
from feminist theologians. Theologians Daphne Hampson, Judith Vaughan,
Judith Plaskow, and Rosemary Ruether perceive in Riebuhr's theology an
anthropology which excludes their experience as women.7 Their
criticism of Riebuhr's theology also includes concerns which will be
dealt with under the headings of Jesus Christ and love idealism and God
and history. Under this heading we will restrict critique to Riebuhr's
understanding of sin in relation to individuality and society,
Reinhold Riebuhr defines sin in terms of pride, which is to be
understood as a extension of will-to-live to will-to-power. This pride
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occurs in the freedom and imagination of human self-transcendence
whereby the human makes claims for the self which extend beyond the
limits of human existence. In other words, pride is the human seeking
to be God,
Feminist theologians claim that this understanding of sin is
partial and a particularly male interpretation. For them, sin as pride
corresponds to a male concern for individuality and power hierarchy and
neglects the sociality and inter-connectedness of human existence. And
most importantly, it ignores the position of those in society who are
denied the possibility of self-transcendence. For the oppressed and
powerless, sin as pride does not address their situation. Pride is
rather the sin of those who possess or aspire to power.
Fiebuhr understands that sin as pride also includes sin as
sensuality. Fiebuhr defines the sin of sensuality as; "... the
destruction of harmony within the self, by the self's undue
identification with and devotion to particular impulses and desires
within the self".e This form of sin involves the loss of self in the
vitalities of nature or the structures and systems of society. For
liebuhr, sin as sensuality is a form of sin as pride. Plaskow
identifies this as a weakness in Fiebuhr's understanding of sin. "The
flaw in his doctrine of sin lies in the fact that, in subordinating
sensuality, he loses sight of it as a significant human sin and one
independent of pridefulness".3
Feminist theologians suggest a fuller understanding of sin which
results in a more thorough dialectic. From their perspective, sin as
pride and sin as sensuality stand in dialectical relationship. Pride
and sensuality are to be equally understood as expressions of sin.
According to this interpretation, sin as sensuality is the acceptance
of a diminutive role in life whereby one flees from freedom and does
not realize the possibilities of self-transcendence. As Plaskow
states;
The refusal of self-transcendence ought to be, if one uses
Fiebuhr's categories, no less a sin than pride — a sin against
oneself, against other persons, and against God. If pride is the
attempt to usurp the place of God, sensuality is the denial of
creation in his image.10
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Vaughan understands this dialectic of sin to illustrate a
relationship to power which creates alienation and the breakdown of
community. Pride is the refusal to relinquish power and sensuality is
the refusal to claim power. The first form of sin creates a self who
perceives itself to be separate from others, the second form of sin
creates a self who perceives itself as a mere appendage of others.11
Ruether takes this analysis one step further by asserting that
this dialectic of sin leads to different moral obligations. For the
person of pride and power, the theoretical moral obligation is to
relinquish power. For the oppressed and powerless, the moral
obligation is to claim power.12 This analysis has implications for the
understanding of salvation and of human agency in history and will be
addressed below.
This dialectic of sin as pride and sensuality modifies liebuhr's
theology of justice. His understanding of sin as pride serves as a
restraint on the ambition and will-to-power of the powerful. In this
regard it is helpful to the establishment of justice. But this same
understanding of sin could also be used as a restraint on the will-to-
live of the oppressed and powerless. In this regard it becomes the
basis for injustice. For this reason Hiebuhr's theology needs the
fuller dialectic provided by sin as pride and sin as sensuality. This
dialectic allows for both the restraint of power as well as the
appropriating of power. This has the result of mitigating some of the
conservative tendencies of liebuhr's pragmatic method and creating a
more radical pragmatism in service of justice.
It is in light of this fuller dialectic of sin that we now turn to
the critique of Uiebuhr's christology and understanding of love.
Jesus Christ and love idealism
At the centre of Niebuhr's theology and ethic is a love idealism
illustrated in the Cross of Jesus Christ. In the following critique we
will examine this love idealism and will examine the christology upon
which it depends.
The critique of Niebuhr's love idealism focuses on two areas; love
as an ethical idealism and perfectionism, and love as mutuality and
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sacrifice. The first concern for comment is the love idealism in
Niebuhr's theology and ethics. Niebuhr provides us with a love ideal
which he calls an 'impossible possibility'. The strength of this
perfectionist ideal is that it serves as a source of judgement in
relation to human self-regard. It continually reminds the human being
that his or her acts of lave are always proximate, ambiguous, and in
constant need of correction and improvement. The weakness in this
ideal is that it may function as a retardant to ethical action because
of its negative posture of judgement and status as an 'impossible
possibility'. The question to be raised is whether Niebuhr's
perfectionist ideal is too abstract and removed from life to be
relevant to human experience and practice. This same question will be
addressed to his christology.
This criticism is not to be understood as disregarding Niebuhr's
insight concerning agape or sacrificial love as a norm which judges all
human attempts to love. It is rather a question concerning his
formulation of this love as a perfectionist ideal. As a perfectionist
ideal, Niebuhr's concept of love may be a 'pinnacle' which is far too
high to stand in creative dialectic with all proximate forms of love,
An understanding of agape which exists within the ambiguities and
impulses of human existence may be a more helpful norm than a
perfectionism. This would mean that agape or sacrificial love is never
an abstracted disinterested love, but rather an expression of
disinterested self-giving in spite of self-regard. This understanding
would maintain agape as a transcendent norm, but move it towards
'possibility' rather than 'impossibility'.
The second area of critique concerns the dialectical relationship
between love as self-sacrifice and love as mutuality. This critique
was raised by the Feminist theologians noted above. As they perceive a
bias in Niebuhr's understanding of sin, so also they perceive a
corresponding bias in his ideal of sacrificial love. From their
perspective, love as self-sacrifice addresses the sin of pride but
neglects the sin of self-deprivation. For the person under oppression,
who experiences life as broken-ness and limitation, the norm of self-
sacrifice is heard as a moral directive to accept their restrictive
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condition. For Daphne Hampson, love is not normative as self-
sacrifice, but rather as mutuality.
If woman's basic problem is not self-centredness, but rather lack
of a sense of self, a scheme of salvation which consists in
breaking the self, and in discontinuity with the past, may be
unhelpful. The inter-relation of love, with God and with others
. . . allows one to feel good about oneself. One is affirmed as a
self by being loved for oneself, and out of a certain centredness
in oneself, loves another.13
This insight into the limitation of self-sacrifice as the ultimate
expression of love leads to a fuller dialectic between love as self-
sacrifice and mutuality. This dialectic would recognize that love
consists of self-giving as well as receiving, and that both these
dynamics are present in love as mutuality and as sacrifice. In other
words, mutuality and sacrifice are two expressions of one love which is
realized in the receiving and the giving of love.
Love as mutuality recognizes the inherent sociality of human
beings and the love that is realized in this context. It is in the
context of intimate community with its 'common grace'1d and inter¬
dependence, that human beings receive love and are given the security
and strength to love others. It is on this organic level that human
beings learn to love. Being loved makes love possible. In this
context the norm of love is that of loving the neighbour as one loves
one's self. But not all social situations provide a context of 'common
grace'. In the situation of oppression and self-deprivation, the norm
of loving the neighbour and self becomes a radical ethic of solidarity
and social transformation. In this context the love ethic seeks gains
in mutuality and social self-realization.
Love as sacrifice is the norm of human transcendent freedom. It
is the norm which judges human pride and encourages humility. It is in
freedom that human beings embrace the self-giving love of God revealed
in the Cross of Jesus Christ. It is the reception of this divine self-
giving which makes the response of human sacrificial love possible. In
the context of God's love, human beings have the security and strength
to be self-giving, even to the ultimate limit of sacrifice of life.
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Love as sacrifice and love as mutuality stand in a dialectic of
inter-dependence and inter-penetration. Love has its origins in
organic community and this community is the foundation upon which love
in transcendent freedom is grounded. Life under 'common grace'
prepares the human being for life under divine grace. But as Niebuhr
rightly observes, love as mutuality also needs love as sacrifice.
Self-sacrificial love provides the basis for forgiveness and toleration
which is necessary for mutuality to succeed.
As with the dialectic of sin, this dialectic of love provides a
broader foundation for ethical optimism within Niebuhr's theology.
While it does not affect the structure of his understanding of justice,
it does strengthen some of its insights. This fuller dialectic of love
reaffirms Niebuhr's insight concerning community as the foundation of
justice. The community is given greater emphasis as the context for
mutuality and as the ground which serves as the impetus towards
justice.
This love idealism in Niebuhr's theology and ethics is founded in
his christology. Therefore, I would agree with Paul Lehmann that;
"Christology is the key to the understanding and interpretation of his
work",1® There_ are two primary areas of critique concerning his
christology. This critique deals with the relation between the Jesus
of the biblical witness and the Christ of 'myth', and the issue of
divine agency in the life of Jesus.
The first area of critical concern corresponds to the degree of
abstraction found in love idealism. Alan Richardson1® and Edward John
Carnell17 both perceive Niebuhr to be presenting a christology
representing a Christ of Liberalism, In such a representation, it is
questionable what relationship this Christ of Liberalism has to do with
the Jesus of history. As Carnell states;
Perhaps the greatest disappointment that one encounters in
studying Niebuhr is the regrettable way in which a sharp division
is made between Christ the abstract wisdom of history, the
revelation of the mind of the eternal God for man, and Jesus the
historical person who walked in Jerusalem. There is not the
slightest question but what Niebuhr takes a high view of agape as
the revelation of the mind of God. As wisdom and truth, Christ is
heaven-sent. But on the question of the person of the Jesus of
history, Niebuhr fails to pass beyond his erstwhile liberalism.1®
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Fiebuhr creates this division by developing a 'Christ myth' which
corresponds in abstraction to his lave idealism. Carnell is correct
when he perceives that this use of myth moves Christ into a non-
historical sphere; "A slight suspicion ... easily arises that Fiebuhr's
concept of 'myth' refers not only to something trans-historical but
also to something non-historical".'13 In this christological
representation, Fiebuhr abstracts the Jesus remembered in the biblical
text to a symbolic Christ of the Cross. This Christ of abstracted
disinterested love could be seen to have little relation to the Jesus
of the socio-political context of first century Palestine. This
criticism will become more significant as we examine the christology of
Liberation theology.
The second point of critical concern, the agency of God, grows out
of this initial point of criticism. liebuhr not only neglects the
socio-political and historical context of Jesus, he also reduces to
symbol and myth the elements in the narrative of Jesus' life which
indicate a divine presence and agency. The most significant symbolic
and mythical reduction is the resurrection of Jesus. Here again,
Fiebuhr stays within the tradition of Liberalism and reduces the
historical Jesus to significance as myth and symbol. This
understanding of the resurrection as symbol or myth has a detrimental
effect on Fiebuhr's theology. It brings into question liebuhr's
conception of God's agency in history and human life. This critical
point will be developed further as we comment on liebuhr's view of
history.
In Fiebuhr's christology we find a relaxation of his dialectic.
In his construction of a myth of disinterested love which serves
presuppositions of Liberalism, he has created a dialectic which is one¬
sided in favour of a trans-historical, if not non-historical, Christ of
the Cross. In this dialectic we find missing the interpenetration and
dependence of a historical Jesus and a transcendent Christ. Missing
from this partial dialectic is the ambiguity and tension that would
exist between Jesus as a social being involved in the socio-political
realities of his historical context and the Christ who in his
individual freedom reveals the agape of God by self-giving which
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ultimately leads to self-sacrifice. I believe that the richness of
liebuhr's own dialectical method, when fully applied to christology, is
a better critical guide to the height and depth of the historical and
transcendent significance of Jesus the Christ than the limited
'mythical' method which he has employed. This issue will be pursued
further in regard to Liberation theology.
The significance of this critique for Niebuhr's theology of
justice is the increased relevancy allowed by a fuller dialectic. As
with previous critical concerns, a christology which is mare
dialectical allows a greater emphasis to be placed on issues of justice
within the context of history. This move from the height of exclusive
myth ensures that the transcendent Christ is trans-historical rather
than non-historical and that the significance of the historical Jesus
is found in creative tension between his temporal bound humanity and
his transcendence.
The primary critical issue this raises for his theology and ethics
of justice is the agency of God in human life and history. The
limitations and the possibilities of God's agency is tied to Siebuhr's
christology. As Carnell observed; "Fiebuhr clearly states that the
relation between Jesus and Christ does not differ from the relation
between 'all life and history and the transcendent'".20 If we
understand the dialectic between 'Jesus' and 'Christ' to be more
balanced, then we have increased the positive significance of history
and God's agency in history. This theological move results in an
ethical optimism in Fiebuhr's theology of justice. It is to this issue
of God's agency in history that our critical concern will now turn.
God and history
I agree with Gustafson when he states that; "For liebuhr, I
believe that the transcendence of God was finally accented more than
v the immanece" .21 Ve have seen this emphasis in liebuhr's love idealism
and transcendent christology. If we take this vertical dialectic of
divine transcendence and immanence and view it diachronically as a
dynamic of history, we find that the same criticism applies. In
Fiebuhr's understanding of history, the Kingdom of God as history's
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fulfilment stands beyond the end of history itself. Once again we are
confronted with a dialectic which may be too severe to function as a
creative ethical force in the establishment of justice.
One of Niebuhr's later categories for describing history was the
term 'irony'. This term was meant to indicate the phenomenon in which
historical actions have results different from what was anticipated.
' Irony" indicated the ambiguity and limited nature of all human
activity in history. This term can be applied to liebuhr's theology.
Niebuhr developed his theology with the intention that it would serve
as a guide to transformation and reform of society in service of
justice. In this intention he was optimistic. He claimed that history
was filled with indeterminate possibilities and that there were no
limits set in history for achievement of a more universal brotherhood.
And yet, the irony is that his theology as a whole does not communicate
this optimism. By placing the fulfilment of history beyond history in
the Kingdom of God, Hiebuhr inhibits the ethical impetus for justice in
the present. Ruether observed this as the 'reality' of Niebuhr's
realism.
Niebuhrian realism gradually gave way to a complacent satisfaction
with minimal expectations that all too easily supported the
conservative status quo. When that faith in the impossible
possibility of a real kingdom in a real future disappears, faith
in man's ability to change his situation fades as well.22
liebuhr provides us with a dialectic of realism which protects us
from the delusions and tragedies of an extreme historical optimism.
But in developing this dialectic of realism he neglects the imaginative
and visionary sources of human hope which look to an improved
existence. As Gabriel Fackre observed;
Critics assert that realism is so preoccupied with balancing power
blocks and practising the art of the possible that commitment to
the radical social change necessary for our times is never
generated. It lacks a passion for openness to the future, for
doing the undoable, thinking the unthinkable, seeing the
unseen.23
In other words, Niebuhr's dialectic between present history and the
Kingdom of God beyond history lacks the imaginative vision of the
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historically possible which stands at the nexus between things as they
are and things as they ultimately will be. Niebuhr's 'impossible
possibility" of the Kingdom impinging on the present can be perceived
as a simple impossibility and therefore irrelevant and 'other-worldly'.
Another element which adds to pessimism concerning hope in the
present is Niebuhr's avoidance of divine agency as a transforming power
in history. Niebuhr's theology leaves one at the Cross of Christ as a
revelation of God and indicates little significance in the ongoing
presence and agency of God. The resurrection, pentecost, the Church as
the community of faith, and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, have minor
importance in Niebuhr's work. Hiebuhr perceives history as an interim
between the Cross and the eschatan which leaves one with the impression
that the present has little potential and hope.
Against this pessimism is the need to recognize God's transforming
presence as an immanent reality which makes possible the Kingdom of God
in history in fact rather than simply in principle. This is not to
deny that the ultimate realization of the Kingdom of God is beyond the
end of history. It is rather the recognition that mutuality and
relationships of love can be realized in human history and that
mutuality and love can be the foundation for justice inspired by the
transforming agape of God. As the Jewish theologian Abraham Heschel
stated;
Biblical history bears witness to the constant corruption of man;
it does not, however, teach the inevitable corruptibility of the
ultimate in the temporal process. . . . There are good moments in
history that no subsequent evil may obliterate. ... We believe
that there are corners full of light in a vastness that is dark,
that unalloyed good moments are possible. It is, therefore,
difficult from the point of view of Biblical theology to sustain
Niebuhr's view, plausible and profound as it is.:ZA
Heschel's view of God places divine agency in the midst of history
and envisions God as one who travels with us in our struggles to create
community and justice. This vision of God would create a more balanced
dialectic of divine transcendence and immanence. In this dialectic,
God would not only be creator, judge, and redeemer in our past and
future, but also in the ambiguities and struggles of the present.
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As with all previous comments, this criticism of Riebuhr's
conception of history does not alter the structure of his theology of
justice. Rather, it causes a shift in emphasis towards ethical
optimism. This criticism indicates the need and possibility of
modifying the theological base of Riebuhr's theology of justice so that
it reflects a more balanced view of the possible as well as the
impossible. Through a modified conception of divine agency and an
imaginative hope, the pragmatism of Riebuhr's ethic avoids a simple
conservatism and his dialectic is maintained in a balance which more
accurately reflects our experience of historical possibility.
The continuing significance of the Riebuhrian theology of justice
Riebuhr provides us with a theology of creative tension. He does
not allow us the temptation to reduce justice to a simple coherence.
In his theology of justice he maintains the ambiguity of historical
experience and he limits excessive ethical optimism. In this creative
tension Riebuhr provides us with a theology which is fundamentally
integrative and dialogic. His theology, in its method, is inherently
open to modification. These are the strengths of his theology and
ethics. He does not allow us a simplistic optimism concerning
ourselves and our history, nor does he claim the final word on
theology, anthropology, or history.
It is because of this theological openness and flexibility that
the above critique does not denigrate Riebuhr's theology, but instead
modifies it. Because Riebuhr's theological method is pragmatic, it is
open to dialogue. His 'truth' is verified in experience, and different
experience calls for dialogue concerning 'truth'. In this manner
Riebuhr's theological foundations are continually brought into dialogue
with contemporary experience. This allows his theology of justice to
develop, modify, and reform in light of new contexts and to become
contemporary and relevant.
It is in recognition of the vitality and relevance of the
Riebuhrian theology of justice that we bring it into dialogue with the
experience of Latin American Christianity. If Riebuhr's theological
realism is sufficiently integrative, it should be capable of embracing
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PART TWO: THE CHALLENGE OF LATI5 AMERICAS LIBERATIOS THEOLOGY TO THE
EIEBUHRIAB THEOLOGY OF JUSTICE.
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5. LIBERA!IOF THEOLOGY: THE CHALLEIGE OF THEOLOGICAL METHOD
The comparison of two theologies requires some initial
justification. There has to be basic and general reasons for placing
Liberation theology in comparison with Reinhold Fiebuhr's theology of
justice. An initial answer to these questions is that Liberation
theology is a theology of justice which takes its insights from the
socio-political realities of the Third World. Although its concern for
justice corresponds to liebuhr's, its context for theological
reflection differs. This difference in context leads Liberation
theology to embrace methodologies, theological themes, and means of
implementation which differ greatly from those embraced by Fiebuhr.
And yet, there is great similarity between liebuhr's theology and the
theology of liberation. It can be said that both theologies are
biblical and christocentric. Both theologies could also be described
as contextual, open or integrative, and as an ongoing process. In very
general terms, these theologies seem somewhat similar. Consequently
the rationale for a critical comparison between liebuhr's theology of
justice and Liberation Theology is found in both their similarities and
differences. This critical comparison will also be dialectical in
nature. We will be placing Fiebuhrian theology in contrast with
Liberation theology throughout the examination of Liberation theology.
In this way, critique and assessment will occur throughout the study
which will result in the modification of Fiebuhrian theology.
The specific Liberation theology to be placed in comparison with
Fiebuhrian theology will be that written in Latin America. It is
Latin American theologians such as Gustavo Gutierrez, Jose' Miguez
Bonino, Leonardo Boff, Jon Sobrino, and others, who have produced
theology relating a vision of justice in response to the socio¬
political problems unique to Latin America. This large body of
literature, relating to the common experiences and problems of Latin
America, provide a rich dialogue partner for Fiebuhr concerning the
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topic of justice. This is not to say that all Latin American
Liberation theology will concern us in this comparison. Rather, it is
Riebuhr's theology of justice which will set the agenda. This means
that some Latin American Liberation theology will be treated as less
appropriate than others as a focus for critique. Rubem Alves and his
concern for language would be an example of Liberation theology which
may have a peripheral role in later chapters. On the other hand,
Ismael Garcia and his work; The Concept of Justice in Latin American
Theology of Liberation, will serve as a touchstone throughout this
critical comparison.
What then is Latin American Liberation theology? Ismael Garcia
provides us with an initial definition.
Liberation theology is that form of reflection that attempts to
discern the religious significance of the socio-political
struggles the poor are engaged in as they free themselves of their
present state of political domination and economic exploitation.1
Liberation theology is not a theology which seeks to radicalize the
socio-political environment of Latin America. Rather, theologians of
liberation recognize that they do their work of theological reflection
in a context which is already radicalized by political movements of
liberation. For this reason Latin American theologians perceive their
task of reflection as that of exploring the religious significance
found in the context of structural oppression and the resulting
yearning for liberation. Garcia identifies this as a quest for
identity.
...the reality of mass poverty and political powerlessness to
which the people of this continent have been subjected and their
struggles to overcome this burden are seen as religiously
significant events, events that raise once more the question of
what it means to be a Christian and what it means to be a Church
in today's world.s
Because of this radicalized context, Liberation theology does not
claim a neutral position from which to do theological reflection.
Rather it is compelled to theologize from within a specific commitment.
This commitment is to the poor and oppressed, and to their liberation.
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Gustavo Gutierrez understands this committed theological posture as
reflection on faith as liberation praxis.
It will be an understanding of the faith from an option and a
commitment. It will be an understanding of the faith from a point
of departure in real, effective solidarity with the exploited
classes, oppressed ethnic groups, and despised cultures of Latin
America, and from within their world. It will be a reflection
that starts out from a commitment to create a just society, a
community of sisters and brothers, and that ought to see that this
commitment grows more radical and complete.3
It is within this commitment that Liberation theology is
understood to be more than simply a rational consideration of classical
theological themes. Vithin this commitment, theology itself is
expected to be liberating, not merely a reflection on a new topic
entitled 'liberation'. Correspondingly, Liberation theologians prefer
to speak of orthapraxis rather than orthodoxy as the criterion for
theology. For Juan Luis Segundo, this is a fundamental question
concerning method in theology.
It is my feeling that the most progressive theology in Latin
America is more interested in being liberative than in talking
about liberation. In other words, liberation deals not so much
with content as with the method used to theologize in the face of
our real-life situation,4
For Liberation theology it is the real-life situation, the socio¬
political context, which is the focal concern in theological
reflection. Jon Sobrino understands that the problem of faith in Latin
America is not the problem of rational coherence in relation to post-
enlightment critical thought, but rather the problem of oppression
which obscures the meaning of faith. It is the contextual problems of
political and economic oppression which restrict human existence and
distort faith. In this oppressive context Liberation theology works to
transform the real-life situation and at the same time recover the
meaning of faith.5
This theology can not be liberating if it is the product of
academics restricted to the environment of the institutional setting.
Guti/rrez understands that the locus theologicus for understanding the
faith will be the life, preaching, and historical commitment of the
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Church. This theological locus is specifically identified with the
comunidades de base or 'base communities'. Guti/rrez is clear that
these base communities are composed of, and oriented toward, the poor.
When we say 'christian base communities', we do not mean lay
people, nuns, and priests who are against the church hierarchy.
'Base' refers to the last people in society, the poor and those
who are committed to them.®
In this way, theology can became liberating because it is the
theological reflection oriented around those who suffer poverty and
oppression. It is not a theology imposed from above, but rather a
theology which has its roots in the life and experience of the people
of Latin America.
In comparing Reinhold Fiebuhr's theology of justice with this
Latin American Liberation theology, we will be concerned to identify
bath similarities and differences. The differences will provide
creative critique of Fiebuhr's theology and lead to passible
modification. These differences will be of two types. One type is
comprised of differences which are not inherently exclusive in regard
to Fiebuhr's theology. These critical differences would perhaps point
to a more thorough inclusive dialectic. The second type of difference
would be that which is irreconcilable with Fiebuhr's position and would
indicate a focal point of contrast. The area of comparison which will
be the concern of this chapter is that of methodology. Under this
heading of methodology, we will be examining Liberation theology in
regard to its use of praxis, dialectic and hermeneutics.
Pragmatism and historical praxis
Pragmatism and praxis are the terms with which are identified the
central epistemological concerns of Fiebuhrian theology and Liberation
theology, In essence, both these terms are concerned to describe the
relation between acting and knowing. And on this general level of
comparison, pragmatism and praxis show a similarity of concern. Both
are concerned to demonstrate that knowing occurs within the context of
acting. Liberation theology understands that truth or knowledge is
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verified within an action of modification or transformation. Gutierrez
is representative of this claim.
Truth, for the contemporary human being, is something verified,
something 'made true'. Knowledge of reality that leads to no
modification of that reality is not verified, does not became
true.7
Niebuhr differs somewhat from this position by locating
verification in experience. This experience may in fact verify
knowledge which has utility in modifying or transforming reality. But
Niebuhr is not bound to a theory of knowledge which must result in some
form of modification of reality. His position indicates that knowledge
can be verified on the level of existential experience. Niebuhr
understands that human transcendent freedom indicates a dimension of
experience which transcends history. This transcendent dimension of
human experience allows the human being to apprehend realities beyond
the self. An example of this knowledge is that of the coherence or
unity which is beyond the self. In this manner, knowledge comes as the
result of the existential transcendence of the human subject. This is
not to say that this type of knowledge is unrelated or insignificant in
regard to history. But it is not to be reduced to verification by
historical modification.
As regards theological method, both pragmatism and praxis indicate
a movement from practice to theory. Niebuhrian theology agrees with
Liberation theology that theological reflection is a 'second step'
following involvement in the concrete realities of life. And for this
reason both theologies can be described as contextual and as a process.
/
Niebuhrian theology agrees with following statement by Gutierrez
concerning the contextual and relative nature of theological
reflection.
Theological reasoning is an effort on the part of concrete persons
to form and think out their faith in determinate circumstances, to
plan activities and make interpretations that play a role in the
real-life occurrences and confrontations of a given society. The
theologian does not work in some kind of ahistorical limbo. His
or her reflection has a milieu, starts out from material bases,
addresses us from a precise location, speaks the word of the Lord
to us in the vernacular.®
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Because of the relative and contextual nature of theological
reflection, Liberation theology understands theology to be an ongoing
process in history. Again Gutierrez states;
As critical reflection on society and the Church, theology is an
understanding which both grows and, in a certain sense, changes.
If the commitment of the Christian community in fact takes
different forms throughout history, the understanding which
accompanies the vicissitudes of this commitment will be constantly
renewed and will take untrodden paths. A theology which has as
its points of reference only "truths" which have been established
once and for all - and not the Truth which is also a Way - can be
only static and, in the long run, sterile.-'
Niebuhrian theology agrees with Liberation theology that theology is
never unconditioned, so as to claim to be absolute or have a universal
applicability.
The fundamental difference between Hiebuhr and Liberation theology
is the emphasis placed upon history. For Liberation theology, praxis
is necessarily 'historical' praxis. It is always concerned with the
modification of historical realities. For Liberation theology, the
transformation of history is the event and place where knowledge and
truth are realized. Commenting on Hugo Assmann and Gustavo Gutierrez,
Miguez Bonino articulates this distinction as follows;
When Assmann speaks of the rejection of 'any logos which is not
the logos of a praxis' or Gutierrez writes about an
'epistemological split', they are not merely saying that truth
must be applied, or even that truth is related to its application.
They are saying, in fact, that there is no truth outside or beyond
the concrete historical events in which men are involved as
agents. There is, therefore, no knowledge except in action
itself, in the process of transforming the world through
participation in history.10
Niebuhr does not deny that human beings are fundamentally
historical creatures and that all knowledge occurs within the context
of history. But, he embraces a broader epistemology in his emphasis on
experience. He agrees that the transformation of history is a point at
which human beings express their transcendent freedom and are able,
through creativity, to verify truth or knowledge. But Hiebuhr also
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claims that there are other existential encounters with reality which
also verify truth, yet do not involve the necessary modification of
that reality. This is particularly true of the encounter with God
which reveals human sin and divine grace. The experience of
justification by grace through faith does not fit into an epistemology
limited to verification by modification of reality.
Another problem that liebuhrian theology has with historical
praxis is that it is an epistemology grounded in Marxism. Sobrino is
representative of many Liberation theologians on this point.
...the liberating function of theological understanding does not
consist in explaining or giving meaning to an existing reality or
to the faith as threatened by a particular situation, but in
transforming a reality so that it may take on meaning and the lost
or threatened meaning of the faith may thereby also be recovered.
In this general sense, the influence of Marx on the conception of
theological understanding is evident. His Thesis XI on Feuerhach
is the paradigm for the liberative aspect of theological
understanding. To transform does not mean to look for an
intelligible form whereby reality may be ordered for the mind; it
means to give a new form to a now wretched reality. Theological
understanding is thus inseparable from the practical and the
ethical and cannot be reduced to the giving of explinations.11
From the perspective of Niebuhrian theology, the concept of historical
praxis must be questioned concerning its exclusivity in relation to
restricting verification of knowledge to the modification or
transformation of history. Such a restrictive epistemology seems to
simplify the ambiguity of historical experience, as well as ignore a
transcendent trans-historical reality.
It is at this point that Niebuhrian pragmatism appears to be more
integrative than historical praxis. Miebuhr's pragmatism seeks
coherence with larger environments of ideas and experience. For this
reason theological pragmatism would grant the priority of commitment to
liberation and the priority of action over discourse within the context
of Latin America. It would be pragmatic, under a love ideal and in a
context of oppression and dehumanization, to place theology under a
commitment to liberation. But this would not be a restrictive theology
grounded in historical praxis. Liberation theology appears to be
vulnerable to realization as reflection within a restrictive context.
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While Fiebuhr's theology is contextual in order to be relevant,
Liberation theology faces the danger of being exclusive in its
commitment to being contextual.
Another dimension of this problem is raised by Dennis McCann
concerning the issue of ideology.
Vhile ideology is primarily an existential problem for Fiebuhr, it
is primarily a cognitive problem for liberation theologians. If -
as Fiebuhr assumes - experience is more or less reliable, then
ideological conflicts may be understood as more or less
transparent expressions of the will to power inherent in human
nature. If - as liberation theologians assume - experience is
radically problematic, then ideological conflicts may reflect
objective differences rooted in the structures of society,12
McCann identifies the epistemological problem between Fiebuhr and
Liberation theology. In some sense it is the old problem of nature
verses nurture. Fiebuhr looks to 'nature' or an anthropology grounded
in the existential limitations and possibilities of human knowing.
Liberation theology, on the other hand, looks to 'nurture' or
structures and systems of socio-political life which limit the
possibilities of human knowing. Of course, both positions are 'true'
and verified in experience. They only become problematic if they are
perceived as mutually exclusive.
The point where historical praxis confronts the Fiebuhrian
theology of justice is in the area of historical commitment. Vhile
Fiebuhrian theology has a broader epistemological foundation and a more
open or integrative method, it must be questioned concerning its
effectiveness or relevancy in a concrete socio-political context. This
suspicion will be pursued as we compare the use of dialectic in
Liberation theology and Fiebuhrian theology.
Dialectic method
Praxis also comes under the heading of dialectic. As Miguez
Bonino recognizes, praxis inherently involves a dialectic process.
Praxis, and only human action can be called praxis, is indeed in
itself already a dialectical concept involving both theory and
action. It is dialectical also in a further sense, in that the
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two terms (theory and. praxis) are not related to one another in a
sort of stable equilibrium; such perfect harmonization could be
produced only in the realm of thought, falling back on pure
idealism in which dialectics would come to an end. On the
contrary, instead of a balanced harmony we must think in terms of
two poles that challenge each other, making change and movement
possible. Action overflows and challenges the theory that has
informed it; and thought, projecting the shape and future of
reality, pushes action to new ventures. Reality is transformed
through human action, and action is corrected and reoriented by
reality. This dialectical interplay seems to be the necessary
presupposition for political ethics.13
This dialectical movement within praxis is not restricted to the
historical present. Liberation theology understands that praxis must
be in dialectic relationship with both the past and the future. Rubem
Alves understands that the past presents us with 'promise' which
modifies present praxis.
Through the promise which the past presents, man is made free to
think about the possibility of a new tomorrow. The act of
remembering is thus, as an expression of love for the present -
and only as such - a liberating possibility. It provides new
grounds for negation, new possibilities of hope, new freedom for
action. It is this dialectical relationship that keeps the
language of faith always in permanent movement.'"1
This dialectic with the past involves an examination of scripture and
tradition. Jt/guez Bonino understands that scripture provides the
theologian with the witness of 'germinal' events of faith which are
explored by means of such concepts as liberation, righteousness,
shalom, the poor, and love. Some of these 'germinal' events are God's
dealing with Israel, the birth, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus,
and the hope of the Kingdom.1® In similar manner, praxis involves a
dialectic with the future. Liberation theology understands that praxis
must occur within an eschatological framework. It is in light of the
Kingdom of God that current praxis is inspired.
It is this dialectical content of praxis which provides theology
with its critical dimension. As Alves noted above, the past provides a
negation to the present. Raul Vidales makes the same observation
concerning the future. He states that theology; "detects and spells
out the concrete experiences of liberation going on around it; at the
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same time ... it maintains a critical outlook in order to offer
provocation, in order to keep prodding us on toward the final
consummation" . 1 e
It is concerning this dimension of dialectic that Niebuhrian
theology faces serious critique. It is questionable whether Uiebuhr's
theology has a functional dialectic relationship with the past and
future. This criticism of Niebuhr will be examined below under the
comparison between hermeneutical procedure.
On the level of general comparison, it can be said that Liberation
theology and Niebuhrian theology are both dialectical theologies.
Beyond this simple comparison, one quickly encounters fundamental
differences. Both theologies are dialectical in the sense that they
both recognize a dynamic quality in thought and reality wherein
creative and destructive tension exists between various elements. In
other words, both theologies recognize the conflictual nature of
change. Where these theologies differ is in possibilities,
significance and outcome of the dialectical process.
Liberation theology has adopted a historical dialectic which
follows the 'thesis-antithesis-synthesis' or 'negation of the negation'
paradigm. Liberation theology perceives this dialectic as the dynamic
quality of history. In this historical process, the present historical
moment contains within it the seeds of its own transformation.
Gutierrez gives us an example of this historical dialectic,
The present in the praxis of liberation, in its deepest dimension,
is pregnant with the future; hope must be an inherent part of our
present commitment in history. Theology does not initiate this
future which exists in the present. It does not create the vital
attitude of hope out of nothing. Its role is more modest. It
interprets and explains these as the true underpinnings of
history. ... To reflect upon a forward directed action is not to
concentrate on the past. It does not mean being the caboose of
the present. Rather it is to penetrate the present reality, the
movement of history, that which is driving history toward the
future. To reflect on the basis of the historical praxis of
liberation is to reflect in the light of the future which is
believed in and hoped for. It is to reflect with a view to action
which transforms the present.17.
Liberation theology understands that history is a conflictual
process which can be progressive and cumulative. Guti/rrez identifies
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this progressive dimension of history in the fulfillment of divine
promise in history. As Gutierrez states;/ "Human history is in truth ;
nothing but the history of the slow, uncertain, and surprising
fulfillment of Promise".1® The possibility of a cumulative process in
history is illustrated by Garcfa concerning the growth of justice.
The quest for justice and human rights is radically historical.
At different times different freedoms and rights have been
struggled for by different history bearing groups. Each of them
represents a contribution, leaving us with a permanent imprint in
our present understanding of what a just state of affairs is. The
old and the new achieve new levels of synthesis.13
This cumulative process is not to be understood as necessary progress
toward greater forms of justice. This cumulative process can also be
regressive toward greater forms of injustice.
This perspective of historical dialectic differs from that of
Niebuhr's theology. From the perspective of realism, any claim for a
historical process which is cumulative or progressive, is to be
questioned. From Niebuhr's position, such claims obscure the
ambiguity of history and human agency. Niebuhr's dialectic avoids a
synthetic understanding of historical progress. This is not to deny
the cumulative processes in history whereby knowledge or technology
find growth. It is rather the recognition that Niebuhr's dialectic is
always one of tension which allows no simple interpretation of history.
This tension is the result of limited nature of human agency and the
perennial presence of sin in historical ambition. For Niebuhr, any
growth in justice is always accompanied by a corresponding potential
for injustice.
As with our comparison of pragmatism and praxis, Niebuhr's
dialectic is the broader of the two theologies. While Liberation
theology embraces a historical dialectic, Niebuhr embraces a dialectic
which is existential as well as historical. The dialectics of realism
include a much broader field of human experience moving from organic to
transcendent human existence; from communal life to individual life;
from human yearning for the absolute and unconditioned to transcendent
divine self-disclosure.
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A primary element of the historical dialectic of Liberation
theology is the presence of God in history, Liberation theology
understands God to be immanent in history. Sobrino illustrates this
immanent understanding of God's presence in his examination of
historical mediations of theological meaning. Sobrino states thatjf T
"... the concrete mediations of theological understanding are those
realities that point by contrariety to the wholly other - other not
because it is beyond present reality but because it contradicts present
reality",20 In this understanding of God's presence as immanence, God
becomes the dialectical negation of the negation. Because of this
divine immanence in history, Sobrino can understand the present
historical moment as the time and place in which God continues self
revelation. This provides Liberation theology with a strong basis for
a doctrine of pneumatology.
Vhile we must make a technical distinction between the revelation
of God in the past and the manifestation of God in the present, it
is clear that faith here and now can only be a response to the
manifestation of God here and now. Theology must therefore be
reflection on faith as currently practiced, on the response given
here and now to the manifestation of God. ... Arguing a priori,
if pneumatology has any role to play in the real life of the
church, if we accept that the Spirit of God continually acts in
history and in the Church, then we should not be surprised by the
idea that we are to search continually for the manifestation of
God in our times. lor should it surprise us that the
manifestation will take on new forms during new times.21
Liberation theology understands the presence of God to be mediated
in the concreteness of historical experience. For Liberation theology,
this divine mediation occurs through the presence of the poor and
oppressed and those committed to the poor and oppressed. Sobrino
understands the 'Otherness' of God to be mediated in the 'otherness' of
the oppressed.
In Latin America, theology has been less concerned with the
language used in speaking of God than with the concrete mediation
of God. The mediation of the absolutely Other takes the form of
those who are really 'other': the oppressed. In the oppressed the
Other is discovered dialectically and through a sharing of
suffering. But the break required in order to grasp the Other
comes through the real break occasioned by the oppressed. The
oppressed challenge us with regard to our own identity. The break
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therefore takes place not at the level of self-understanding or
feeling but at the level of reality. Conversion comes, as in the
gospel, through those who are historically 'other' in relation to
us: the oppressed.
It is this mediation of divine significance through the 'otherness' of
the poor and oppressed that Enrique Dussel identifies as the alteridad
del projimo or 'transformation of the neighbour'.23
As the concrete mediation of God's presence, the poor and
oppressed take on a role of confrontation as regards the present state
of affairs. Following Marxist historical dialectic, the poor and
oppressed take on a role corresponding to the proletariat. They become
the impetus for the transformation of society as well as the historical
mediation of meaning. Gutie'rrez provides an example of this analysis
in his rejection of progress through a gradual reform of present socio¬
political structures and culture.
The point of departure of the theology of liberation is not only
different from that of the progressivist theology, it is in
contradiction with it. The contradiction can be grasped only in
the real world of history. To speak of the 'postmodern world' is
a superficial response, and of little help. It is not a matter of
chronological order, but of concrete historical and dialectical
contradiction. This dialectical opposition to the bourgeois
ideology and the dominant culture comes up out of the popular
classes, and from their vanguard. The exploited strata of society
are the concrete, historical agents of a new understanding of the
faith. The God of the Bible reveals himself through those
despoiled of their dignity as a people and as human beings. He
manifests himself in those the gospel calls 'the poor' and 'the
least'.
Miguez Bonino recognizes a danger in this dialectic of immanence.
He perceives that this theology has put itself at risk by reducing the
transcendence of God to historical dynamics. He makes this point in
commenting on the hermeneutical procedure and ideological commitment of
Liberation theology.
(Liberation theology) appears as the hopeless prisoner of a
hermeneutical circle, the spell- of which it cannot break. The
text of Scripture and tradition is forced into the Proscrustean
bed of ideology, and the theologian who has fallen prey of this
procedure is forever condemned to listen only to the echo of his
own ideology. There is no redemption for this theology, because
it has muzzled the Word of God in its transcendence and freedom.
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In fact, it seems to me that our Latin American theology of
liberation has not yet become sufficiently aware of the weight of
this risk and consequently has not yet developed adequate
safeguards against it.s®
Here we recognize liebuhr's strength and weakness in relation to
Liberation theology. EFiebuhr's theological strength is a dialectic
wherein God is transcendent and ethical action is under the judgement
of a transcendent ethic of self-giving love. This 'impossible
possibility' is sacrificial love which is God's possibility and our
impossibility. According to this transcendent dialectic all human
action is judged and inspired to new approximations of the ideal. Yet
liebuhr's understanding of divine transcendence is similar to
Liberation theology in that God is not removed from historical
existence. He differs from Liberation theology in the degree that God
is epistemologically transcendent. God is always immanent in history,
yet his presence is 'hidden' and not easily identifiable with any human
activity or creation of history.
The weakness of Hiebuhr's position in light of Liberation theology
is its seemingly lack of historical commitment. The danger of
Niebuhr's theology is that it can be perceived as emphasizing the
dialectic of transcendence to the loss of immanence. In this theology,
transcendent judgement and historical ambiguity blunt any ethical
commitment and obscure the validity of any concrete historical action.
This weakness of Siebuhrian theology becomes explicit in the
examination of hermeneutical procedure.
Hermeneutical procedure
Liberation theology uses a hermeneutical circle in its
interpretive process. The content of this process is the result of
decisions made concerning language, ideology, and social science.
Before examining this hermeneutical circle, these elements need to be
explicated as to their role in the theological process.
For Liberation theology, theological language is contextual and
subject to a dialectical process of modification. For Alves, a static
language is a dead language. "The life of the language of faith . . .
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depends on its ability to negate itself, to change, to die in order to
gain a new life".2® Because this language is part of a living process,
theological language is never merely descriptive, it is also a language
of imagination.
The language of the community of faith, consequently, is an
expression of imagination. It is not purely descriptive. A
purely descriptive language transforms facts into values.
Imagination, by rejecting the facts as its limit, expresses
reason's transcendence over the given. Imagination is a form of
critique of what is, an expression of negation, a function of
reason that is dependent on man's spirit, on his power to move
beyond the closed world of the facts. A purely descriptive
language is able only to name the things that are present and
thereby sets them as the limit for man's freedom. A language
created by imagination is able to 'name the things that are
absent' and when it does this it breaks the spell of the things
that are present.2"-'
As a contextual language, Segundo understands that theology is
always bound up with its socio-political context. "The liberation
theologian's suspicion is that anything and everything involving ideas,
including theology, is intimately bound up with the existing social
situation in at least an unconscious way".20 This means that theology,
in its contextual and dynamic process, is never neutral. Mfguez Bonino
states that there are no nonpartisan languages.
Today we know enough about language, thanks to structural
analysis, to realize that the meaning of a language is determined
not simply by the intention of the speaker but through the code or
context of meanings which are already present and into which the
pronounced word becomes inserted, independently of the speaker's
intention. . . . The question, therefore, is not what is intended
with words, but how do they operate. And they always operate in a
given direction. There are, from this point of view, no
nonpartisan languages.2®
For Liberation theology, theological language always contains a
ideological dimension. The question which Liberation theology asks of
theology concerns the intentionality of its choice of language and
corresponding ideology. For Mfguez Bonino, ideology; "... is the
instrument through which our Christian obedience gains coherence and
unity".30 Thus, the choice of language, with its inherent ideological
commitment, must serve the commitment of faith in a given historical
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context. Miguez Bonino, in this way understands theology as a
discipline which must make decisions about language and the socio¬
political options connected with that language.
The choice of a language is never a purely neutral or formal
decision. In the very act, a realm of reality, or better said, a
relation to reality is introduced as subject matter of theology.
This is particularly so in the political case, when categories
chosen do not merely intend to describe human existence but to
shape and transform it. A theology cast in political terms cannot
satisfy itself with reformulating in a new way the theological
heritage; it has to grapple with the dynamics of the language it
uses. It has to concern itself with its relation to power. The
words it uses belong to a context of militancy. The categories of
analysis in which it casts its reflection are engaged categories
and, as they gain a certain determinant power, the theologian
cannot remain any more above the realm of political options.31
It is at this point that we begin to comprehend why Liberation
theology chooses the language of social sciences. It is the explicit
concern of Liberation theology to participate in the transformation of
a particular historical reality. Therefore the language most
appropriate is one which is operational rather than philosophical.
Sobrino is representative of this choice by Liberation theologians of
the operational language of the social sciences.
If the problem of theology is to give meaning, then there will be
a spontaneous appeal to philosophy. In this case philosophy is
understood in the traditional manner as the model for universal
understanding; it can therefore serve for a expression of meaning.
If, however, the concern is the liberation of the real world from
its wretched state, theology will turn spontaneously to the social
sciences. For they analyse the concrete misery of the real world,
the mechanisms that create it, and consider possible models of
liberation from it.3®
The choice of a language and of a method of analysis provided by a
social science is not an arbitrary decision. Liberation theology
chooses a specific science to serve within a commitment of faith. As
we have already seen, this commitment is to the poor or oppressed.
Garcia understands this to be the criteria for selecting a social
science. "The needs of the poor and the creation of a new society that
will enable them to overcome their poverty and domination serve as the
criteria by which these theologians choose among the social
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sciences".33 Following this criteria, Liberation theology has chosen
Marxist analysis as the most appropriate science for the Latin American
context. Miguez Bonino clarifies this choice as one of objective
rationality and historical appropriateness.
Nobody will claim, in fact, that his analysis of social,
political, and economic reality is more than a rational exercise,
open to revision, correction, or rejection. It is in this sense
that we incorporate the Marxist analysis of society. The point is
of great importance and the source of many misunderstandings. Our
assumption of Marxism has nothing to do with a supposedly abstract
or eternal theory or with dogmatic formulae - a view which is not
absent in certain Marxist circles - but with a scientific analysis
and a number of verifiable hypothesis in relation to conditions
obtaining in certain historical moments and places and which,
properly modified, corrected, and supplemented, provide an
adequate means to grasp our own historical situation (insofar,
moreover, as it is closely related and significantly shaped by the
model originally analyzed).3A
Following the adoption of Marxist social analysis, Miguez Bonino names
the elements of Marxist theory which become the criteria for critique
of social praxis.
The social (collective) appropriation of the means of production,
the suppression of a classiest society, the de-alienation of work,
the suppression of a slave consciousness, and the reinstallation
of man as agent of his own history are the theoretical hypotheses
on the basis of which revolutionary praxis is predicated. They
become, therefore, intrinsic tests for such praxis. A consistent
engagement demands a constant criticism in these terms.35
In adopting Marxist analysis as a critical science, Liberation
theology is concerned to separate itself from the dogmatic expressions
of the Marxism of Europe. Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff exemplify
this concern to demonstrate that Liberation theology is only interested
in Marxism as a scientific method.
Dialectical analysis is science, divorced from its philosophical
presuppositions, divorced from dialectical materialism. Science
is knowledge submitted to control by experimentation and
verification. Philosophy is a universalizing interpretation of
being and global history. It is Marxist science, and only
science, that will serve our purposes.35
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Ifiebuhrian theology is suspicious concerning the anthropological
presuppositions as well as the societal expectations of this use of
Marxism. But it must he recognized, that liebuhr's pragmatic method
would not necessarily reject Marxism as an analytical science
appropriate to the context of Latin America. While Niebuhrian theology
would modify and critique such an analytical method from the
perspective of anthropological realism, it could accept its utility on
pragmatic grounds. The strength of Marxist analysis is its recognition
of the destructive potential of capitalism. This destructive dimension
of capitalism is not a theoretical possibility in Latin America, it is
a reality of current history. Thus, Marxism provides language and
concepts which help theology come to an understanding of how such
socio-political states come into existence and help to explore possible
resolutions to such exploitive conditions.
This adaption of Marxist analysis by Liberation theology leads to
a serious critique of Niebuhrian theology. Mlguez Bonino makes a
general comment concerning theologies which pivot on ethical
principles. This comment could apply directly to Niebuhrian theology.
There are ... a number of Christians who, while unreservedly
taking up the cause of the oppressed, refuse (or at least take
with great reticence) elements of the Marxist analysis such as the
class struggle, the role of the proletariat, and other elements.
The problem is that instead they usually assert 'ethical
principles' which, lacking a vigorous historical mediation, not
infrequently end up in frustration, inability to act or different
forms of reformism. 97
Here again we perceive the weakness in Niebuhrian theology
concerning the dominance of transcendence in theological dialectic.
While liebuhrian theology can critique Marxist themes on the grounds of
anthropological realism and historical ambiguity, it can not avoid the
criticism of lacking a 'vigorous historical mediation'. liebuhrian
theology of justice pivots around agape, the ethical ideal of self-
sacrifical love. This ethical ideal becomes the focus for the
transcendent commitment of theology. But Liberation theology raises
the question of imminent historical commitment. Without this vigorous
historical commitment, the liebuhrian theology of justice does not have
a balanced dialectic wherein justice is assessed and modified. It is
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this lack of a vigorous historical mediation which allows Alves to
accuse Christian Realism of being the ideology of the establishment; in
other words, of serving the economic and political ideologies of Rorth
America. 3e
This examination of language, ideology, and social science,
provide us with the background needed to understand the content of
Liberation theology's hermeneutical procedure. Garcfa understands this
procedure to entail a hermeneutical circle which is a never-ending
process. "The method is depicted as a never-ending dialectic between
theory and practice, i.e., a hermeneutical circle between the concrete
socio-political and historical praxis of the community of faith and its
interpretation of Scripture, the theological tradition and in
particular its interpretation of God's historical presence".3-' The
focus of this hermeneutical process is always present historical
existence. It begins with analysis of present historical praxis, moves
to examine Scripture and tradition, and then returns to reinterpret the
present.
The first moment in this hermeneutical circle is the analysis of
the historical present. As Leonardo Boff states; "Liberation theology
begins with an anal ytical, sociological, and structural reading of
reality that is as scientific as possible".do For Liberation theology
this means a critical reading of socio-political as well as ecclesial
practices of present historical existence. This involves the
examination of the Church's practice, it's language and the ideologies
implicit in its language. This first moment in the hermeneutical
circle is a moment of critical self-awareness. It asks how the socio¬
political and economic structures and systems are functioning in the
present historical moment; and it asks what role the Church is
fulfilling within those systems and structures. Segundo understands
that this first moment of the hermeneutical procedure should result in
questions which encourage an openness in the theological process. For
him, the creation of questions serve as a precondition for the
hermeneutical circle to be fruitful.
The first precondition is that the questions rising out of the
present be rich enough, general enough, and basic enough to force
us to change our customary conceptions of life, death, knowledge,
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society, politics, and tlie world in general. Only a change of
this sort, or at the very least a pervasive suspicion about our
ideas and value judgements concerning those things, will enable us
to reach the theological level and force theology to come back
down to reality and ask itself new and decisive questions.4"1
The second moment in the hermeneutical procedure of Liberation
theology is essentially a moment of listening. With questions and
relative self-awareness, we hear the witness of scripture and
tradition. In this hermeneutical move, it is scripture which is the
primary concern of theology, Vidales identifies scripture as the
'soul' of theology. For him, scripture is the locus of the word of God
and therefore of primary importance as authority.
This biblical perspective places liberation theology within the
most solid and sound tradition of Christian theology. The pre-
eminet function of Scripture is indisputable, as is the functional
character of the church and the magisterium and their service
role. Once again Scripture becomes the soul of theology, as it is
meant to be,42
While tradition has a place of importance in the hermeneutical process,
it is secondary to and dependent on the witness of scripture.
Segundo understands this hermeneutical circle to involve an
interpretation of scripture which continually changes according to the
questions and self-knowledge resulting from analysis of the present
historical context.
Here is a preliminary definition of the hermeneutic circle: it is
the continuing change in our interpretation of the Bible which is
dictated by the continuing changes in our present-day reality,
both individual and societal. ... And the circular nature of
this interpretation stems from the fact that each new reality
obliges us to interpret the word of God afresh, to change reality
accordingly, and then to go back and reinterpret the word of God
again, and so on.43
It is this dynamic understanding of the interpretation of scripture
which Segundo understands to be a second precondition for the
effectiveness of the hermeneutical procedure.
The second precondition is intimately bound up with the first. If
theology somehow assumes that it can respond to the new questions
without changing its customary interpretation of the Scriptures,
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that immediately terminates the hermeneutical circle. Moreover,
if our interpretation of Scripture does not change along with the
problems, then the latter will go unanswered; or worse, they will
receive old, conservative, unserviceable answers.
Liberation theology understands this interpretive process to
require the full depth of exegetical science. Miguez Bonino states
that we are to use historical, literary, traditio-historical, and
linguistic critical instruments to examine the 'germinal' events of
faith which we find in scripture. The primary purpose of this
exegetical procedure is to discover the historical significance of the
biblical witness.
we must insist that the penetration of the original
historicity of the biblical events is basic for its present demand
and efficacy. Consequently, however questionable and imperfect,
the critical use of the instruments that help us reach a better
understanding of this historicity is indispensable for a
reflection on our Christian obedience today.AS
It is the historical dimension of scripture which is the hermeneutic
concern for Liberation theology. This historical dimension is the
medium by which theology is confronted concerning the presence of God
in history and the role of the Church in the present and the future.
Vidales provides an example of this dynamic view of scripture.
. . . the Bible is not to be read as a Magna Carta but rather as a
creative and provocative witness to our mission in the world.
This focus will do a great deal to keep us from abstract
interpretations that simply try to comprehend the past in terms of
the present. It will force us to keep trying to comprehend the
temporal dimension of the biblical word which finds its
incarnation in the present, its trans-temporal and metahistorical
dimension in the future, and the dynamic interrelationship between
the two.
Miguez Bonino does not claim that this hermeneutic process
provides an interpretation which in its scientific method is free from
ideological bias. Rather, he understands that the interpretive process
entails not only an examination of the text, but also an examination of
the interpreter. "Every interpretation of the texts which is offered
to us (whether as exegesis or as systematic or as ethical
interpretation) must be investigated in relation to the praxis out of
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which it comes". A7 Thus, at this second moment in the hermeneutical
circle, critical self-awareness is also fundamental to the success of
interpretation.
Tradition, as part of this hermeneutical circle, also comes under
critical analysis. Tradition is subject to critique concerning its
relation to the witness of scripture as well as to its ideological
role. While theological tradition must be assessed as an
interpretation, explanation, and application of biblical and
theological themes, it must also be assessed according to its socio¬
political significance. Garcia claims that tradition must be subject
to continual reformulation.
It demands a reformulation, a purification, as it were, of the
distortions that result not only from the socio-historical
limitations of the author in question — the limitation of vision
and understanding natural to every finite creature — but also
from the personal and collective sin of which everyone is part.*®
It is this examination of scripture and tradition which provides
theology with criteria, principles and guidance concerning the
questions arising out of the context of the interpreter. From this
second moment in the hermeneutical circle, the interpreter moves to the
third moment with the theological insights gained from exegesis. This
third moment in the hermeneutical circle is a moment of
reinterpretation and application. It is thus a moment of prophecy and
ethical action. Guti/rrez understands this to be the role of theology
linked to praxis.
... theology thus understood, that is to say as linked to praxis,
fulfils a prophetic function insofar as it interprets historical
events with the intention of revealing and proclaiming their
profound meaning. .. . But if theology is based on this
observation of historical events and contributes to the discovery
of their meaning, it is with the purpose of making the Christian's
commitment within them more radical and clear.
Leonardo and Clodovis Boff understand this prophetic moment as an
interpretation of the present historical context through the categories
of faith.
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These categories of faith, as grasped by and set forth in the
scriptures, afford the possibility of an interpretation ... of the
justice or the injustice of a given social configuration as the
presence of salvation or perdition, the presence of the kingdom of
God or of the antikingdom, the presence of grace or of sin. Faith
adds nothing to the social configuration ontologically: it sees,
within that configuration, its theological moment, and explicates
it theologically.30
As already stated, these theological normative criteria not only
allow a theological interpretation of the historical present, they
also provide guidance for ethical action. Gutierrez believes this to
be the ultimate legitimation of the exegetical process. "In the final
instance the exegesis of the ¥ord, to which theology wishes to
contribute, is accomplished in deeds".31 But Liberation theology
understands that there is no direct application of criteria derived
from scripture to the socio-political options of present history.
Garcia is representative in identifying this function as one of reason
embodied in the social sciences.
No one has the right to argue that one's analysis of the present
state of affairs and one's prescribed solutions to solve its
problems are directly derived from scripture and the theological
tradition. Neither of these provides by itself enough resources
to construct a socio-political program or to decide which among
the available programs is the best. . . . Political options and
social analysis are primordially a matter of scientific
rationality. Their selection, while it must agree or be
consistent with our theological convictions and commitments, must
be justified rationally. A theology engaged in the struggle of
social justice, thus, needs to use the tools and procedures
provided by the social sciences.32
Garcfa also perceives that this indirect application of
theological criteria reveals the relative and limited quality in
theology. This indirect application allows no simple dogmatic claim
for theology over particular socio-political options. For this reason
Garcia understands that application of theological criteria continually
involves dialogue within the community of faith.
Such knowledge (theological) is always mediated and very much
subject to human fallibility. The best we can claim is that our
views and options seem not to contradict God's purpose as revealed
in Scripture and understood by tradition. We are obliged to
remain attentive to the views of others as we proceed to assert
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our basic convictions on these matters. The community of faith is
obligated to be a community of socio-political discourse.®3
In this hermeneutical circle, we see that the third moment of
application and interpretation is also the first moment of questioning
and self-awareness. For Liberation theology, scientific social
analysis and theological assessment are two sides to one interpretive
moment where historical praxis is evaluated. For this theology, the
historical present is a moment of analysis, assessment and application'^
in continual movement between the sources of theological values and
their application in life.
The point at which liebuhrian theology comes into conflict with
this hermeneutic is its concern for historical interpretation.
Liberation theology perceives in the historicity of the biblical texts
a paradigm for God's presence in the historical present. These texts
provide the hermeneutic principles for the perception of God's
involvement and commitment. It is on the basis of the perceived
solidarity of God with the poor and oppressed in scripture, that
Liberation theology understands God's present solidarity with the poor
and oppressed. Where liebuhrian theology comes into conflict with this
interpretive process is its confidence in historical interpretation.
For Niebuhr, the meaning of history is not immediately accessible.
Historical meaning is always subject to a dimension of mystery. This
interpretation of history is further complicated by the distorted
perception of human beings. No reading of history, past or present, is
free from human self-regard which seeks to universalize a particular
history for reasons of self-interest. While Niebuhrian theology is in
agreement with the critical processes incorporated in the hermeneutic
procedure of Liberation theology, it asserts that the interpretation of
history is never free of bias and self-interest. This liebuhrian
position would mitigate any strong interpretive pasture claimed by
Liberation theology concerning the knowledge of God's movement in
history.
To turn this critique around, it is precisely at this point that
Liberation theology demonstrates its superior hermeneutic. The
strength of Hiebuhr's hermeneutic is its suspicion of historical
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interpretation. It's weakness is that it seems to exclude the
historical dimension from its hermeneutic procedure. In centring
hermeneutics around the concepts of symbol and myth, Uiebuhr indicates
his commitment to existential concerns. For Uiebuhrian theology,
symbol and myth are the medium in scripture and theology which point to
a realm of meaning surrounded by mystery. In this use of symbol and
myth, divine and human relations are illustrated in scripture and
verified as 'true' by experience in the present encounter between the
human and divine. The strength of this hermeneutic is that it avoids
the whole discussion of historical veracity. ¥hat is 'true' about
scripture is what can be verified by current experience; not what can
be established as historically 'true'. Thus, Uiebuhr can interpret the
early chapters of Genesis as myth which indicate the existential
predicament of human life. The problem with this hermeneutic is that
in avoiding the questions of historical reference, Hiebuhr also avoids
the issues of historical relevance. He does not ask what role these
texts played as they were redacted in the socio-political context of
Babylonian captivity. This is not to say that Niebuhr completely
avoids discussion of God's action in history. But his emphasis is on
God's action in the biblical past or in the eschatological future. In
the 'interim' between these points of divine activity, hermeneutics
seems to be only concerned with the existential dimension of the
divine-human relationship and not with a reading of God's movement in
present history.
This hermeneutic move between myth and symbol and present
experience does not seem to incorporate the dynamic character of
liebuhr's dialectic. In avoiding the historical dimension of the
biblical text and the present moment, liebuhr looses his dialectic. In
this regard, the hermeneutic circle of Liberation theology provides us
with a stronger dialectic hermeneutic corresponding to Hiebuhr's
theological dialectic. Once again we become aware of the weakness in
liebuhrian theology concerning its trans-historical emphasis. This is
not to say that liebuhr's interpretive concepts are inappropriate. It
is rather to recognize that a dialectical hermeneutic needs both
existential and historical dimensions in its interpretive procedure in
order to be fully relevant. It is the recognition that we need to ask
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not only who we are in relation to God's past and future action, but to
ask in relation to God's present movement in history.
Summary of methodological concerns in relation to the Slebuhrian
theology of justice
In the above comparison with Liberation theology we have seen that
fiebuhr's dialectic and theological pragmatism provide us with a
theological method which is relatively more open, integrative and
flexible. Hiebuhrian theology provides us with a general method that
functions on a more trans-cultural and trans-historical level. This
prevents his theology from being reduced to a closed parochialism or to
a narrow historical perspective. At the same time, liebuhrian theology
is contextual and and seeks to be relevant to the historical moment.
The question which Liberation theology raises of Uiebuhrian theology is
the specific mediation of this methodological relevancy. While
liebuhrian theology provides a general method which results in analysis
of regulative principles, political institutions, and economic systems,
Liberation theology questions the particular locus for the assessment
of justice. This questioning does not reveal a weakness in the
dialectic or pragmatic method, but rather questions its content and
dialectic breadth. From the perspective of Liberation theology,
liebuhrian theology is in danger of being too general and not specific
enough in its assessment of justice in the particular historical
context.
This criticism finds a focus in theological presuppositions which
guide the pursuit of justice. Niebuhr develops his theology from the
perspective of the transcendent ideal of self-giving love. While this
gives him a foundation from which to assess the different expressions
of power in the socio-political and economic sphere, it does not
provide a point of assessment grounded in the perspective of the
powerless within a particular historical context. Liberation theology
asserts that such assessment of justice should occur from within a
commitment to the poor and oppressed. This commitment results from a
reading of scripture wherein God is perceived as being in solidarity
with the poor. Here we find the hermeneutical differences between
- 125 -
Liberation theology and Niebuhrian theology which result in different
theological presuppositions concerning the assessment of justice.
Niebuhr embraces a trans-historical, transcendent ideal while
Liberation theology looks to an immanent historical mediation. In this
comparison of hermeneutics, Niebuhrian theology is the weaker of the
two and needs to incorporate the historical dimension into the
hermeneutical procedure. This would broaden the theological foundation
which informs the Niebuhrian dialectic and pragmatism.
If we broaden the Niebuhrian dialectic to include immanent
historical mediation as well as transcendent trans-historical ideal, we
find that Liberation theology provides emphasis and procedure which
result in a balanced method. This balanced method would include a
dialectical concern with immanence which would revolve around the
commitment of theology to the poor and would have religious and
procedural dimensions. From the perspective of procedure, this
commitment would mean that theology has its locus in the community of
faith which is in solidarity with, and composed of, the poor and
oppressed. From the religious perspective, this commitment of theology
to the poor would mean the recognition of divine presence in the
relationship with the 'other' of the poor and oppressed. In this
alteridad del projlmo or transformation of the neighbour, the presence
of the poor is given theological significance and incorporated into the
practice of faith. Through recognition of the significance of the
comunidades del base or base communities and the alteridad del projimo,
the commitment of theology to the poor is given a vigorous historical
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6. SIff AID THE SEED FOR LIBERATIOS
A theology of justice begins with an examination of two
theological topics which are regulative for the development of that
theology. These two determinative topics are the foci around which a
theology of justice will revolve in order to establish its legitimacy.
The first of these foci is an anthropology. An anthropology defines
human nature with its limitations and possibilities. The second focus
is that of soteriology: God's saving agency and presence. This second
topic deals with the modification or influence which divine agency has
upon human nature and agency. Niebuhrian and Liberation theology find
themselves in both agreement and conflict concerning the content of
these two topics. It is the purpose of this chapter and the following
chapter, to assess these respective theologies concerning their
positions on human and divine agency in life and history.
For both liebuhrian and Liberation theology, these two theological
concerns are crystalized in the significance of Jesus Christ. Within
this chapter and the following chapter, reference will be made to the
significance of Jesus Christ, but a detailed analysis of the differing
christologies will not be made. This christological analysis will be
provided in a subsequent chapter in which christology will be the
exclusive theme,
It will be concern of this chapter to examine the topics relevant
to human limitation and possibility. In chapter seven we will examine
divine agency and presence. To pursue this end, liebuhrian and
Liberation theology will first be placed in dialectical comparison on
the topics of anthropology and sin.
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Anthropology
The initial definition of human nature is determinative in
Liberation and Niebuhrian theology as regards the development and
emphasis within their respective theologies. Mebuhr initially defines
human nature as reflecting a dialectical tension between biological
impulse and transcendent consciousness. Liberation theology takes a
completely different starting place. Liberation theology initially
understands human nature as that which is defined by a socio-political
context. Because of this initial decision, Liberation theology
understands human nature to be fundamentally social rather than
individual; Leonardo Boff is representative of this initial commitment
of defining the human being as primarily social in nature.
...the social dimension of the human being is ontologically rooted
in the very core of the human being as a person. It does not
arise after the individual dimension. It is not merely the sum of
various juxtaposed individuals who happen to form a community or
society. It is not a mere byproduct that is reducible to a more
basic reality. Ontologically speaking, we can say that the social
dimension is fundamental. It exists prior to the will of
individuals or their encounter with each other. It is a
structural reality that helps constitute the human person. Either
a person is social or is not a person at all. ... Individualism
is a false understanding of the human being. The ego is always
inhabited by others. The individual is always an abstraction. In
concrete reality the person always shows up as a complicated web
of active relationships.1
This emphasis on the social dimension of human nature makes us
aware of the role of society in human fulfilment. Ismael Garcia
identifies this significance of society in contrast to a more
instrumental conception.
The individualistic understanding of human society must be
transformed into a more relational and social view of
individuality. Our vision of society must be transformed from an
instrumental concept of the social — society as the place from
which we derive necessary goods and services — to a more
substantive notion of the social — society as part of what it
means to live a life worthy of the name human.'2
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The other side of this same insight concerning the social dimension of
human nature is that society is determinative in the development of
human individuality. Juan Luis Segundo is representative in this
regard.
From the very beginning of a man's life, even within the private
and affective relations of the nuclear family, a culture is being
transmitted to him. He encounters the norms, values, and
behaviour patterns that form the basis of a consensus which makes
societal life possible and orderly. From the very beginning of
man's life, he is being brought into relationship with all of
society — in a way that is no less real for being indirect.3
In like manner, Boff states;
The social dimension is not something added later to the human
person. It pervades the human person and is a constituent element
of the latter. In the form of institutions, values, forms of
organization and power, it has its own independent density.A
This recognition of the relationship between the human individual
and the social context leads Liberation theology to reject any concept
of human nature which is static or fixed a piori. Garcia claims that
human beings can not be identified according to definitive relational
qualities such as egoism or altruism. But must be understood in regard
to the social order which determines human behaviour.
Liberation theologians assume that significant social changes
within the socioeconomic and political structures of society have
consequences on who we become as persons, i.e., for the formation
of our characters. The communities we belong to have a
determining influence in shaping who we are. They structure our
behaviour and reinforce beliefs and value systems. There is no
such thing as a fixed human nature. Persons cannot be defined as
being egoistic or altruistic by nature. By nature people are not
driven by the uncontrollable desire for social gain nor by the
saintly virtue of self-sacrifice. Selfishness, egoism, the
unrestrained desire to acquire and accumulate or consume are
characteristics all persons share in different degrees as are the
virtues of caring and feeling for others. These are practices,
however, that a given social system encourages or discourages.
People can change. The possibility of changing is very much
determined by changes within the social order.5
While Garc/a emphasises the role of social context in determining human
personality, he does recognize that there is a dialectical relationship
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between the social structure and the individual. It is not simply the
case that social change will result in individual change. "Social
change by itself does not create a new person, in the same way that
transforming persons does not automatically induce a new social
order".s
This emphasis on the social dimension of human nature places
Liberation theology in both agreement and contrast with Niebuhrian
theology. As we have already observed in relation to Feminist
critique,7 the Niebuhrian position tends to emphasize individuality
because of its existential analysis of human nature. Niebuhr's concern
with the dialectical relationship between organic impulse and
transcendence leads him to focus much of his analysis around individual
dimensions of human life. His most substantial analysis of social
reality revolves around the egoistic behaviour of groups. His seeming
lack of breadth in social analysis is due to his concern to underscore
the insight that social injustice has its origin in human nature,
liebuhrian theology disagrees with Garcfa that human beings cannot be
defined as being egoistic or altruistic by nature. Rather, for
Niebuhrian theology, the human situation is complicated by the insight
that human beings are both egoistic and altruistic by nature. This is
not to say that Hiebuhrian theology claims a static or fixed human
nature. But rather that egoism and altruism are present in varying
degrees in all human beings and that there is no point where these
emotive sources are transparent to analysis. This does not deny the
insight that the socio-political context modifies behaviour, it rather
qualifies the impression that human nature is too simply malleable by a
social context.
In principle, liebuhrian theology does not disagree with the
assertion of Liberation theology that human beings are fundamentally
social. Niebuhr understands that individuality is grounded in a social
context which makes it possible and that it returns to the social
context to find fulfilment.
The highest reaches of individual consciousness and awareness are
rooted in social experience and find their ultimate meaning in
relation to the community. The individual is the product of the
whole socio-historical process, though he may reach a height of
uniqueness which seems to transcend his social history completely.
His individual decisions and achievements grow into, as well as
out of, the community and find their final meaning in the
community.e
This necessary social dimension of human nature finds it ultimate
expression in Hiebuhr's "law of love".
The self is so created in freedom that it cannot realize itself
within itself. It can only realize itself in loving relation to
its fellows. Love is the law of its being.3
In this manner we see that although Hiebuhr may not have considered in
detail the social dimensions which are of primary concern to Liberation
theology, liebuhrian theology is not in principle contrary to it.
Rather, Niebuhrian theology seeks a dialectical balance between
individuality and social dimensions of human life.
A second anthropological concern of Liberation theology is that of
human creativity. In continuity with an understanding of human nature
as socially and historically malleable, is the assertion that the human
being is creative in relation to its world and to its self. As Garcfa
states; "Persons constitute themselves as persons not only in the
process of dominating nature but also and mainly in the process of
creating a more humane and just world".10 Thus, human beings create
themselves as they create their world. For Gustavo Guti/rrez this is
fundamental to an understanding of the human being as a historical
being.
History, contrary to essentialist and static thinking, is not the
development of potentialities preexistent in man; it is rather the
conquest of new, qualitatively different ways of being a man in
order to achieve an ever more total and complete fulfilment of the
individual in solidarity with all mankind. 1 1
Boff identifies this historic creativity as the 'fundamental
project' of the human being. This project is one of continual creative
synthesis.
a human being is one who lives by fashioning an ongoing
synthesis of all that it finds and thus fashions its own world.
The life of a human being is a oneness of meaning, a history.
There may be breaking points and ruptures, but they can always be
taken up in a new synthesis. Taken individually, the actions of a
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human life both concretize and reveal the unity of a person's
life.12
In this manner, Boff understands human nature to be dialectically
creative in the realization of a life project. For Boff, human
creativity corresponds to an understanding of human nature and
historical existence which is fundamentally open-ended.
The future of human beings cannot be deduced from their abstract,
metaphysical essence; it is open-ended. They are no longer
defined in terms of what they are and have already done. Instead
they are seen in terms of what they can be, what they have not yet
done or experienced but might possibly in the future.13
On the whole, Niebuhrian theology agrees with Liberation theology
concerning the creative potential in human beings. Niebuhr affirms
that human beings are both creatures as well as creators of history.
As creatures subject to finitude and limitation, human beings are the
product of historical farces and particular social environments. At
the same time, human beings can obtain a degree of transcendence over
history and culture, and thereby they can be agents in the creation of
history. Where Niebuhrian theology differs with Liberation theology is
concerning the degree to which human beings can create and modify
themselves. As with the above disagreement with Garc/a, Niebuhrian
theology has difficulty following Boff in his optimism concerning human
nature in regard to an open future, For liebuhrian theology, there are
specific aspects of human nature which are definitive and which will
always mitigate the aspirations of any life project. This disagreement
will become more apparent when we view the topic of sin.
A third general concern of Liberation theology is the recognition
of the human being as a spiritual self. In this regard, liebuhrian and
Liberation theology stand in agreement. Both reject any body-soul
dualism which too simply reduces spirituality to an other-worldly hope.
Both also perceive reason to be limited in regard to the transcendent
quality of spirit. And most importantly, both basically follow
Augustine in the recognition that there is a fundamental yearning for
God within all human beings. Boff is representative of this
anthropological position.
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The spirit is the whole human being, its mode of being insofar as
it is living transcendence, total openness, and all-around
relationship. Humanity as spirit signifies a yearning for the
Infinite, a longing for God. Nothing in this world and no one by
his or her humanity alone can claim to offer fulfilment. Human
beings do not want just this or that. They do not pander just
this or that reality. They want everything and they contemplate
totality. Only God seems to be the satisfactory pole toward which
their interior compass points. Only in God will they find rest.
Their natural desire to love God is rooted in the very depths of
their being.1A
This basic understanding of human spirituality corresponds to that of
Niebuhr.
This essential homelessness of the human spirit is the ground of
all religion: for the self which stands outside itself and the
world cannot find the meaning of life in itself or the world.1S
The human spirit cannot be held within the bounds of either
natural necessity or rational prudence. It its yearning toward
the infinite lies the source of both human creativity and human
sin.1s
The fact that man can transcend himself in infinite regression and
cannot find the end of life except in God is the mark of his
creativity and uniqueness;. . .17
Where Niebuhrian and Liberation theology differ, concerning human
spirituality, is the development and growth of this spirituality within
a historical practice. Niebuhr tends to emphasize the transcendent
existential quality of spirituality while Liberation theology
emphasizes temporal transcendence in relation to the future. One
criticism already noted, is that Niebuhrian theology does not provide a
functional spirituality capable of being lived out in history. 13 This
criticism will be further pursued under the topic of spirituality.
The above analysis, of general anthropological differences and
similarities in Niebuhrian and Liberation theologies, provides an
introduction and foundation for the examination of specific topics.
The first topic of major concern to both theologies is the role of sin
in human life and history.
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Sin
Liberation theology understands sin to be a relational, social,
and structural phenomenon. Liberation theology is not concerned with
metaphysical discourse concerning the existence of sin. Rather, it is
concerned with sin as historical phenomenon. Garcia observes that;
"Liberation theologians concern themselves with the reality of
sinfulness not in its pure or disembodied form, the general condition
of sinfulness all humans share in, but as it becomes manifest in
specific or concrete forms".1'5'
From this perspective, sin is first and foremost a relational
phenomenon. As a relational phenomenon it is a refusal to love. This
refusal results in alienation between God and human beings and in
alienation among human beings. As Guti/rrez states; "Insofar as it
constitutes a break with God, sin is a historical reality, it is a
breach of the communion of men with each other, it is a turning in of
man on himself which manifests itself in a multifaceted withdrawal from
others".20 This refusal to love and breach of communion manifests
itself in two ways. The first is what Enrique Dussel calls the
totalization of the self.
Sin, all sin, is by nature a totalization. When we sin, we think
we are all that there is and are therefore divine. We deny the
Other and believe that our own totalized order is the kingdom of
Heaven.21
This totalization also includes the denial of the human being as an
'other' with whom we stand in relationship.
The second form of sin which results in alienation and the breach
of communion of human beings among themselves is what Guti/rrez calls
the 'sin of omission'. This sin involves not so much the totalization
of the self but rather the withdrawal of the self from involvement in
the conflict of social life. "The cowardice that keeps silent in the
face of the sufferings of the poor and that offers any number of adroit
justifications represents an especially serious failure of Latin
American Christians".22 Garcia also recognizes that the poor and
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powerless are responsible for this form of sin. "The poor and
powerless however are also responsible insofar as they tolerate and
remain complacent with the status quo".23
This understanding of sin as a relational breach occasioned by
totalization or withdrawal is applicable on the social level as well as
the individual. Garcia states; "Collective sin also represents a
fixation upon self, an act of disregard for the other in need".2'1 For
Liberation theology, collective sin is manifest in the relationship
between wealthy nations of the forth Atlantic and the poor nations of
the world. This sin takes the form of economic and technological
dependency. Boff is explicit concerning the consequences of this
collective sin.
From the standpoint of faith, the situation of dependence and
underdevelopment that characterizes our continent cannot help but
be seen as an enormous social and structural sin. The symptoms of
dependence are clear and inescapable: hunger, infant mortality,
endemic diseases, cheap manual labour, deteriorating pay scales,
abandonment of the schools by young people who must help their
families eke out a living, a lack of participation and freedom, an
inability to gain recognition of the most basic human rights,
political corruption, and control of the nation's wealth by a
small but powerful elite. Such a situation produces an inhumane
way of life, and marginalization prevents people from being real
human beings.2®
Liberation theology understands that this relational and
collective sin becomes institutionalized in the political structures
and economic systems of a society. In this way sin is manifest in its
most comprehensive and concrete form. Guti/rrez sums up our
examination of sin to this point.
Sin is present in the denial that a human being is sister or
brother to me. It is present in structures of oppression, created
for the benefit of a few. It is present in the spoliation of
peoples, cultures, and social classes. Sin is the basic
alienation. For that very reason, sin cannot be touched in
itself, in the abstract. It can be attacked only in concrete
historical situations — in particular instances of alienation.
Apart from particular, concrete alienation, sin is meaningless and
incomprehensible.
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Niebuhrian theology is in basic agreement with this understanding
of sin. As Niebuhr states;
The religious dimension of sin is man's rebellion against God, his
effort to usurp the place of God. The moral and social dimension
of sin is injustice. The ego which falsely makes itself the
centre of existence in its pride and will-to-power inevitably
subordinates other life to its will and thus does injustice to
other life.2'7
Niebuhrian theology not only agrees with Liberation theology concerning
its assessment of collective or social sin, but claims that this
manifestation of sin is more ruthless than that of individual sin.
...the pretensions and claims of a collective or social self
exceed those of the individual ego. The group is more arrogant,
hypocritical, self-centred and more ruthless in the pursuit of its
ends than the individual. 2,3
A modified Niebuhrian theology is also in agreement with
Liberation theology concerning sin as totalization and withdrawal.
Niebuhr's analysis of pride easily corresponds to Dussel's statement
concerning the totalization of the self. But in contrast, Niebuhr's
understanding of sensuality does not correspond to Gutierrez or
Garcia's perception of sin as withdrawal or complacency. This same
issue was addressed above in the Feminist critique of Niebuhr's concept
of sensuality.23 The same analysis and result can be applied here.
While Niebuhr neglects the dimension of sin as self-deprivation or
withdrawal, it is not alien to his dialectic. An expanded
understanding of the loss of freedom experienced in sensuality leads to
the same position held by Liberation theologians. In other words, sin
is expressed in the giving up of freedom through avoidance and
withdrawal. This expression of egoistic behaviour is an attempt to
protect the self in a context of conflict and risk. Ironically it is
also a loss of self and a refusal to love.
Another point of agreement between Liberation theology and
Niebuhrian theology concerns the recognition that there are varying
degrees of responsibility regarding the sin of social injustice.
Garcia claims that the rich and powerful have greater responsibility in
this sin.
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It is possible to argue that the rich and powerful have greater
responsibility since they determine policies and do so because it
benefits them. They struggle very hard to keep things as they
are.30
Efiebuhr makes this same observation when he perceives that while sin
may be equally present in all, guilt is not equal.
...men who are equally sinners in the sight of Gad need not be
equally guilty of a specific act of wrong-doing in which they are
involved. ...the men who are tempted by their eminence, and by
the possession of undue power, become more guilty of pride and of
injustice than those who lack power and position.31
In spite of differences of emphasis and analytical language,
Niebuhrian and Liberation theology are in general agreement concerning
the manifestation of sin. Where we encounter conflict between these
respective theologies concerns the origin or inception of sin, and
correspondingly, the solution or mitigation of sin.
The origin or inception of sin in human life is problematic for
Liberation theology. Liberation theology wants to avoid metaphysical
language and at the same time present a cosmology infused with grace.
This leaves them with a problem concerning the existence of evil and
the inception of sin in human history. There is little consensus in
Liberation theology concerning this problem. Boff approaches this
problem by renaming evil as 'dis-grace' in contradistinction to grace.
For Boff there is no explanation for the presence of dis-grace. It is
a fact which must be simply accepted.
Dis-grace is absolute absurdity, sheer darkness without a trace of
light. It has no rationale. There is no logical argument for
dis-grace and sin, which cannot be understood in any way. Dis¬
grace is a brute fact, which can only be realized. It farces
itself upon us as the absurd, and yet it exists as a fact and an
experience.3:2
Where Boff agrees with other theologians is in the insight that
the dis-grace and sin of individuals is tied up with the dis-grace and
sin of society. In this regard, the individual's life project is
caught up in the project of a particular culture. It is in this social
context that Dussel wants to locate the inception of sin in human life.
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Dussel understands sin to be transmitted through culture and that sin
in the individual human life is the result of cultural conditioning.
Original sin is transmitted through the ontological constitution
of our being in the course of our education. On the day the child
is taken from the uterus, it is not in the kingdom but neither is
it condemned. The child has the potentiality of being a person,
but by adolescence is already in the kingdom of sin because
cultural formation has taken place within the institutions of
injustice. ... The sin of the world is the sin of the flesh, and
the sin of the flesh is likewise transmitted through cultural
conditioning. 33
Segundo takes a similar approach to sin but identifies it with
various forms of inertia caused by both psychobiological and social
determinisms. This inertia is the cause of the various forms of
alienation in human life.3* In this manner, Segundo locates the
inception of sin in both nature and in the social environment.
Gutie'rrez looks for the inception of sin in the weakness of
biological, finite life of the self. Gutierrez utilizes Pauline
language and text to place the inception of sin in the 'flesh'. The
term 'flesh' has a variety of definitions ranging from 'material,
corporal, carnal creature', to 'human self-sufficiency'. Gutierrez
understands that the 'flesh' is weak because it is mortal, limited, and
finite. He understands that it is this weakness inherent in the
'flesh' which makes human beings liable to be snared by sin. In even
stranger terms he claims that this 'flesh' is a force of evil that lays
hold of human beings.
We have here another aspect or nuance in the complete idea of
'flesh'. This aspect is undoubtedly linked to the others but it
is also distinct from them within what I have been calling the
gamut or range of meanings. Flesh comes on the scene here as a
force for evil that lays hold of human beings and subjects them to
its own desires . . .33
This force of the 'flesh' is not understood to be strictly
determinative in relation to the inception of sin. Guti/rrez
understands that human beings act in freedom and thus sin is a
combination of this inherent weakness in the 'flesh' and a result of
human decision. "The flesh is thus seen as power that acts upon human
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beings and that with their complicity — a combination of weakness and
culpable acceptance — brings them into the kingdom of death".3®
What all these theologians have in common is their desire to place
the origin or inception of sin somewhere other than in the human
spirit. Dussel places it in social environment, Segundo locates it in
the inertias of the social environment and the psychobiological
dimension of the self, Gutierrez places it in weakness of the flesh,
and Boff restricts himself to the recognition of its empiric existence.
Of these theologians, Guti/rrez comes near to placing the inception of
sin in human spirit when he defines 'flesh' as the dimension of human
self-sufficiency. But all through his analysis there is distinction as
well as continuity between the material, biological, and finite
dimension of 'flesh' and its mdre transcendent aspects.
By making sin a weakness or an identifiable inertia which has its
inception outside the human spirit, Liberation theology too easily
seems to reduce sin to a rectifiable fault rather than an ambiguous
distortion of the self at the very height of human spiritual
realization. It is concerning this issue that Niebuhrian theology is
in stark contrast to Liberation theology. Niebuhr places the inception
of sin in the transcendent dimension of human nature. For liebuhr sin
is realized in the freedom of the human spirit. While he recognizes
that finiteness and mortality are limitations which are the source of
anxiety in the human, these realities are only the occasion for sin and
not the cause. Sin lies in human imagination and freedom which seeks
to resolve this anxiety by means of pretension. "Man ... is a sinner
not because he is one limited individual within a whole but rather
because he is betrayed, by his very ability to survey the whole, to
imagine himself the whole".3® This difference between Liberation
theology and Biebuhrian theology will become explicit as we consider
the resolution or mitigation of sin in the following chapter.
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The significance of sin for a theology of justice
This difference on the position of sin is not a minor one. While
there are many points at which Liberation theology and Niebuhrian
theology are in agreement, or differ in emphasis rather than substance,
there is a fundamental difference on the origin and inception of sin
which will continually be a point of contention. Liberation theology
perceives sin as a fault or as a rectifiable determinism. Niebuhrian
theology perceives sin in the very depth and height of human
spirituality. For liebuhr, sin is a corruption which permeates the
self in all its dimensions. This fundamental difference in
anthropology becomes the determining factor in how these respective
theologies identify the values of justice and choose the ways and means
to implement these values in social, economic, and political,
structures and systems. The question which this difference raises is
whether Liberation theology has embraced a conception of sin which
leads to an optimistic anthropology which is lacking in realism. But
the question can also be put to Niebuhrian theology whether its realism
is overly pessimistic. These questions can not be answered until we
have considered the agency of God as one who mitigates or resolves the
power of sin. This will be our concern in the next chapter.
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7. SALYATIOff AS LIBERATI01
In the preceding chapter we examined anthropology and sin as
determining factors in understanding the limits and possibilities of
human agency. This examination is incomplete without a thorough
understanding of divine agency and its effect in transforming these
same limits and possibilities, This transforming quality of the divine
encounter with human beings we will designate as 'salvation-
liberation' . In this assessment of the position of Liberation theology
we will begin by examining the general themes of salvation-liberation.
The event of salvation-liberation is apprehended in Liberation
theology within the framework of three interrelated theological themes;
a cosmology of grace, salvation history, and eschatological promise.
These three themes indicate different dimensions of the unity of divine
grace in salvation-liberation. An assessment of these themes precedes
the examination of the event or process of salvation-liberation as an
individual or collective experience.
General themes of salvation-liberation
As mentioned in the previous chapter, liberation theologians seek
to place their understanding of sin and salvation within the context of
a cosmology of grace. Gustavo Gutie'rrez and Leonardo Boff are forceful
proponents of this position. In this cosmology, God is immanent in the
world and in human beings as grace. For Boff, God is not outside the
world or above the world, but at the very core of the world. In this
manner grace is to be understood as the ontological foundation of the
cosmos. "... in the light of the ultimate foundation, God, everything
is grace because everything is referred back to him, sustained and
supported ontologically by him".1 This means that human beings live in
what Boff describes as a divine milieu of grace. Grace is present in
everything and nothing can escape its influence.2
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For both Boff and Gutierrez this means that the divine is
universalized and present in all human beings. Christology plays an
important role in this universalizing of the presence of God. As
Guti/rrez states;
Since God has become man, humanity, every man, history, is the
living temple of God. The 'pro-fane,' that which is located
outside the temple, no longer exists.3
In this cosmology, grace appears as a teleological force
underlying all reality. Yet the presence of grace is not strictly
determinative concerning human beings. In this cosmology, human beings
can exercise freedom whereby they can resist this teleological force.
Yet even this freedom is seen to be a potential provided in God's
grace. In this manner, even human rebellion reveals the gracious
foundation of reality.
According to Gutie'rrez and Boff, this sin of rebellion is unequal
/
to the presence of grace in human beings. Gutierrez uses the terms
'flesh' and 'spirit' to describe the antithesis between the selfish,
death-dealing principle in human beings and the life-giving presence of
the divine in human beings. For Guti/rrez this antithesis is unequal
in favour of the 'spirit'. Vhile 'flesh' is a principle of weakness
and passivity in the human being, the 'spirit' is the presence of the
vitality of the divine person." Boff takes this same position in his
antithesis between grace and dis-grace. For him, grace is always
victorious over dis-grace, "The human capacity for rejecting God and
sinning is never the equal of God's offering of grace".5
In Liberation theology, sin appears to be an aberration in a
cosmos infused by grace. And this aberration appears to have its locus
in the human being for reasons considered in the previous chapter. For
Baff this means that evil has no cosmological or ontological dimension.
In the ontological dimension of reality no action is bad in
itself, for it depends of God. Evil appears only in the moral
dimension, Created freedom is summoned to dialogue. It is
created and hence dependent and imperfect. It can choose freely
to withdraw itself from its dependence on the divine. It cannot
do so ontologically because it can never exist without God. But
in its freedom it can will the impossible, and that is sin . . . ®
Hiebuhrian theology embraces a cosmology which stands in contrast
to the cosmology of grace as proposed by Liberation theology,
liebuhr's criticism of naturalistic monism apples to the cosmology of
Liberation theology. He claimed that the naturalistic monism of modern
culture was possible because the ethical character of the forces of
nature is overestimated.7 For this reason Niebuhrian theology resists
understanding grace as a teleological force underlying reality which is
transparent to interpretation. This is not to say that Efiebuhrian
theology fails to recognize theological significance in the forces of
nature. liebuhr apprehended in the cosmos an impartiality rather than
a teleological force. This impartiality in nature reveals both divine
mercy and divine judgement. The fact that rain falls on the crops of
the good and bad alike is a revelation of divine mercy as a cosmic
dimension. But in the same manner, the winter storm that destroys bath
the good and the bad alike reveals judgement over against all human
pretension and pride.® It is this element of judgement which calls
into question a teleological interpretation of the cosmos. From the
Hlebuhrian perspective, Liberation theology over-emphasizes mercy as a
cosmological determinant and restricts judgement to the socio-political
dimension.
This difference in cosmology also applies to the issue of
cosmological evil, Hiebuhr understands the myth of the devil as a
recognition that evil has a cosmological dimension.® This would mean
that sin is not strictly a human perversion, but that the evil in human
beings has continuity with a corresponding cosraological dimension.
What is at stake in this cosmolagical difference is the optimism of
Liberation theology that results from perceiving human sin as a
rectifiable anomaly in an otherwise 'gracious' cosmos. This optimism
obtains even though Liberation theology recognizes that sin is
ultimately rectified by divine eschatological transformation of the
human being. liebuhrian theology rejects this tendency toward optimism
concerning human nature or the cosmos. For Hiebuhrian theology the
human being and the cosmos contain elements which are constitutive of
evil.
Within the context of this ambiguous cosmos, liebuhrian theology
also questions Liberation theology concerning its perception of the
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transparency of the divine in human beings. Niebuhrian theology does
not disagree with a universal divine immanence in human life. It
rather questions that this immanence is so easily apparent. Miebuhr
understands that at best we may get a glimpse of this divine presence.
"... Jesus finds glimpses of God, of pure spirit, of perfect love, in
human nature, in the love of parents for their children, for instance,
and in the innocency of little children; yet he also knew that out of
the heart of this same human nature 'proceed evil thoughts, murders,
adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies' (Matt.
15:19)".10
For Niebuhrian theology, grace has a different meaning and
emphasis compared with Liberation theology. Niebuhr understands grace
to be first and foremost the forgiveness of sins extended from God to
human beings. Only then does grace became a power within human life.
In this understanding, grace is not an element constitutive of the
self, but is forgiveness and a power which comes to the human self from
beyond the self. In the context of forgiveness, the human being
apprehends the continuing sin of the self and the perfect love of God
which forgives in spite of sin. It is in this relationship that the
human being receives resources of love, wisdom, and power which are
operative as divine grace in human life. In this dual understanding of
grace, the emphasis is on grace as an act of God whereby God completes
what human beings can not complete.11
The second theological theme which provides the framework for the
salvation-liberation event is that of salvation history. Liberation
theology understands salvation-liberation to be fundamentally
historical. Corresponding to the cosmology of grace, history is also
grounded in divine agency and presence. For Gutierrez and Boff,
history is a unity of divine and human agency finding its meaning and
end in Jesus Christ. In this way, Gutierrez understands history to be
process of human development.
... we do not have two juxtaposed histories, one sacred and the
other profane. There is only one single process of human
development, definitively and irreversibly assumed by Christ, the
Lord of history.1^
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In this historical process, Gutierrez understands humanity to be
fulfilling the single vocation of all humanity to salvation. This
salvation is the convocation of all humanity to communion with God and
community with one another. Thus, for Guti/rrez, salvation is an
intrahistorical reality which orients, transforms, and guides history
to its fulfillment.13
According to Guti/rrez, this salvation history has its inception
at creation. In the event of creation God actualizes the divine
intention of salvation. For Gutierrez, salvation and creation are two
ways of describing the one historical process. The paradigmatic model
for this process is the Exodus story. In the Exodus event we perceive
the overriding will of God and the free consent of human beings
resulting in the creation of a historic liberation of Hebrew slaves.
Gutierrez understands Israel's history to be the prolongation of God's
ongoing creative agency. Correspondingly, he understands contemporary
salvation to also be a continuation of this same creativity. God
continues to create and human beings continue to choose to participate
in this salvific historic activity of creation. In this way human
beings enter into the process of salvation and become agents in the
salvation of the world.
For Guti/rrez, this process of historical liberation has its focus
in reference to a particular social group. This social group is
composed of the strata of society who are oppressed, despoiled, and
alienated. It is these human beings who bear the meaning of history
and who mediate the historical salvation of humanity.
The future of history belongs to the poor and exploited, True
liberation will be the work of the oppressed themselves; in them,
the Lord saves history.1-1
Boff also understands salvation history as a process of human
liberation. In his understanding of the historical process he
distinguishes the terms 'liberation' and 'salvation'. These terms
contain distinct as well as common meaning. Salvation refers to the
eschatological condition of the human being which is full and complete
in eternity. Liberation, in its distinctive meaning, is the historical
anticipation and concretization of salvation. Thus, historical
liberations are always grounded in the ultimate salvific intention of
God and eschatological salvation is the final and full liberation.
With this understanding, salvation is a transhistorical reality as well
as within the historical process. 1lS
For Boff, history is the creation of the free agency of human
beings and therefore can be a history of salvation or of perdition. As
a history of salvation it is a history wherein human beings embrace the
grace of God offered in the pervasive divine milieu. God's love
"...invites all to undertake a journey where God and human beings unite
to make history. This is the history of salvation, the fruit of two
freedoms at work and the product of two loves".1'7 In the same way
history can be a history of perdition, the rejection of God's love and
the rejection of human community. As with Gutierrez, Boff understands
this history to be one history. Perdition and salvation are the two
potential directions which history can take under human agency. It is
human agency which brings grace into history. "The grace of God
becomes history in the history of love at work in the world"."3 But
Boff also understands that historical liberation, the actualization of
grace in history, never fully achieves a history of salvation free from
perdition. This full salvation is an eschatological reality.
By reason of sin, liberation is never full and complete: it always
carries a quota of oppression. Salvation is total liberation, and
thereby it is salvation fully achieved — completely unsullied and
pure, never again to be threatened.13
Yet this admission of the inevitable presence of sin does not affect
salvation as a teleological force underlying history.
Vhat ought to be has a power of its own, and no one can keep it
down. Some day justice will overcome, and historical grace will
bear its full fruit in the midst of human beings.20
Once again we find liebuhrian theology to be in stark contrast to
Liberation theology concerning the immanence of God. Niebuhr
understands grace and salvation to have their origin and realization
beyond the obscurities and contradictions of history. Grace and
salvation are not epistemologically available in either nature or
history. Rather, the meaningfulness of history is disclosed by a God
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who is 'hidden'.*1 It is in this context that Niebuhr understands
history as Heilsgeschichte or salvation history. Salvation history is
not the process of liberation within a teleological divine milieu. It
is rather the revelation of the meaning of history (telos) and of the
ultimate fulfilment of history at its end (finis).*2 For Niebuhr, the
perennial presence of sin in human history defies an interpretation of
history as a process guided by a salvific teleological force. He
understands sin to be overcome in principle, but not in fact. This is
not to say that Niebuhr disregards the role of love as a transforming
power in history. It is rather to qualify the possibilities of love.
The love which enters history as suffering love, must remain
suffering love in history. Since this love is the very law of
history it may have its tentative triumphs even in history; for
human history cannot stand in complete contradiction to itself.
Yet history does stand in actual contradiction to the law of love;
and Jesus anticipates the growth of evil as well as the growth of
good in history.23
It is for these reasons that Niebuhrian theology rejects the
panoramic view of salvific-creative history proposed by Guti/rrez. For
Niebuhr, the inner contradictions of history do not allow for a
continuity of salvific-creative fulfilment. The only fulfilment that
Niebuhr perceives in present history is that which occurs in the moment
when human beings establish themselves in relation to God through
contrition and faith. This is not to deny the creative potential of
human agency in history. Niebuhrian theology agrees with Boff's
distinction between historical liberation and eschatological salvation.
The difference is that Niebuhr would place historical liberation in
dialectical relation to final salvation, rather than in teleological
relation. For Niebuhr, the eschatological salvation accomplished by
God will always reveal historical liberations as human approximations
which inevitably contain dimensions of self-regard and will-to-power.
For this reason, Niebuhrian theology is critical of the perception that
human agency in historical liberation is directly in continuity with
divine agency and will. This is not to reject the ethical demand of
human agency in historical liberation. It is rather a rejection of the
tendency to justify and universalize the values of a historical project
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in terms of divine will in disregard for the perennial tendency in
human beings to self-deception and pride.
... so long as the self, individual or collective, remains within
the tensions of history and is subject to the twofold condition of
involvement in process and transcendence over it, it will be
subject to the sin of over-estimating its transcendence and of
compounding its interests with those which are more inclusive.2A
It is for this same reason that Niebuhrian theology is critical of
Gutie'rrez when he claims that the poor and oppressed will be the
mediators and agents of historical salvation. This is not to say that
the presence of the poor is without theological significance or that
groups in society are incapable of being agents of social change and
achieving an improved state of affairs. It is rather to resist the
temptation to locate in any social group a moral authority free from
self-regard and will-to-power.
A too simple social radicalism does not recognize how quickly the
poor, the weak, the despised of yesterday, may, on gaining a
social victory over their detractors, exhibit the same arrogance
and the same will-to-power which they abhorred in their opponents
and which they were inclined to regard as a congenital sin of
their enemies. Every victim of injustice makes the mistake of
supposing that the sin from which he suffers is a peculiar vice of
his oppressor. This is the self-righteousness of the weak as
distinct from the self-righteousness of the powerful;...2®
This brings us to consider the third general theme which forms the
context for the event of salvific encounter. In continuity with the
theme of salvation history is the theme of the culmination of that
history in the Kingdom of God. It is the Kingdom of God which is
understood as the eschatolagical promise which gives history its
meaning and direction. This Kingdom of God is the fulfilment of God's
love and sovereignty in the realization of life and community liberated
from sin and death. This is the primary theme in Liberation theology.
As Gutierrez states;
...the Bible presents eschatology as the driving force of salvific
history radically oriented toward the future. Eschatology is thus
not just one more element of Christianity, but the very key to
understanding the Christian faith.2®
At the outset it must be stated that Liberation theologians do not
claim that this eschatological Kingdom is to be simply identified with
particular historical liberations. Yet different Liberation
theologians perceive the proximity between eschatological promise and
historical liberation in varying intensity. Leonardo Boff presents us
with a strong sense of continuity in his understanding of history as
process. "The Kingdom, although not of this world in its origin — it
comes from God — is nevertheless among us, manifesting itself in
processes of liberation".2'7 This manifestation of the Kingdom is
immanent in history and continually being realized in particular
liberations. "Liberations show forth the activity of eschatological
salvation by anticipation, as the leaven of today in the dough of a
reality fully to be transfigured in the eschaton".2,3
In like manner, Gustavo Gutierrez understands the eschatological
promise as an intrahistorical reality which is being fulfilled in human
history.
The Promise is revealed, appeals to man, and is fulfilled
throughout history. The Promise orients all history toward the
future and thus puts revelation in an eschatological perspective.
Human history is in truth nothing but the history of the slow,
uncertain, and surprising fulfilment of the Promise.29
Yet Gutierrez also understands this eschatological promise to stand in
dialectical tension with historical liberations. He maintains that
this eschatological orientation towards the future indicates an openess
and creative newness of God's activity in history. Thus, there is a
continual tension between the various realizations of the promise in
historical liberations and the novelty and completeness of future
liberation. "The Promise is gradually revealed in all its universality
and concrete expression: it is already fulfilled in historical events,
but not yet completely; it incessantly projects itself into the future,
creating a permanent historical mobility".30 For Gutierrez, this
dialectical tension is resolved in the complete encounter with God in
history. It is this encounter which will mark the end of history.31
Jose Mfguez Bonino differs from Boff and Gutierrez in that he
intensifies the dialectical relationship between history and the
eschaton. He is concerned to avoid deifying history or humanity which
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would result in a total immanent ism. For this reason he embraces a
dialectic which recognizes a distinct discontinuity as well as a
continuity between history and the eschatological promise of the
Kingdom. For him, the future indicates judgement as well as promise.
... I think we can posit a continuity-discontinuity between history
and the kingdom of God which is of the same order as that between
the earthly body and the resurrected body. Thus the kingdom of
God is not the negation of history but rather the elimination of
its frailty, corruptibility, and ambiguity. Going a bit more
deeply we can say it is the elimination of history's sinfulness so
that the authentic import of communitarian life may be realized.
In the same way, then, historical 'works' take on permanence
insofar as they anticipate this full realization. But in both
cases all possibility of confusion is ruled out because the
reality of judgement intervenes to divide and separate.
The kingdom is not the natural outcome of history.
Conflict and judgement intervene. Yet the kingdom does salvage,
transform, and fulfil the 'corporality' of history and the
dynamism of love and fellowship at work in it. This means that
the eschatological reality, in turn, is fashioned, nurtured, and
raised in history. 3:2
In this manner, M^guez Bonino avoids an understanding of the
Kingdom of God as an immanent 'final cause' which neglects the
dimension of eschatological judgement. And yet at the same time he
maintains an understanding of the Kingdom of God as promise and as a
creative presence in history. His dialectic between judgement and
promise allows him a qualified optimism concerning historical activity.
In relation to the kingdom, history is not an enigma to be
deciphered but a mission to be carried out. This mission, be it
noted immediately, is not a mere ensemble of actions but the
manifestation of a new reality — of the new life that is offered
and communicated in Christ and his Spirit. The first fruits of
the Spirit are the anticipation of the kingdom. They are the
quality of personal and collective existence that has a future, an
eschatological reality, and that concentrates authentic history
around its center.33
Niebuhrian theology also wants to maintain a continuity-
discontinuity between history and the Kingdom of God. In this respect
Hiebuhrian theology is in conflict with Boff and Guti/rrez. For
Hiebuhr, the eschatological Kingdom is transhistorical rather than
intrahistorical. As Hiebuhr states; "... we must look forward to a
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completion of life which is not in our power and is even beyond our
comprehension".34 For this reason Niebuhr understands history as an
interim between the disclosure of the meaning of history in Christ and
the fulfilment of history at the eschaton. This is not to say that
Niebuhr understands the Kingdom of God as a norm which so transcends
history as to be irrelevant to history. Niebuhr wants to avoid both
extremes of placing the Kingdom too simply within history or placing it
too external to history. Niebuhrian theology seeks to maintain a
dialectic wherein both promise and judgement serve to inspire
historical agency as well as reveal the self-regard and will-to-power
which obscures the moral claims of all historical projects. It is in
this regard that Niebuhrian theology is in agreement with Miguez
Bonino. Their differences are more polemic than actual. Niebuhr
emphasized the eschatological element of judgement to mitigate the
optimism of Liberalism while M/guez Bonino emphasizes the
eschatological element of promise in the face of poverty and despair.
But both recognize the dialectical relationship between the two themes.
Niebuhr's polemic concerns for an awareness of judgement should not
obscure his cautious optimism concerning agency in history. In
agreement with Miguez Bonino, Niebuhr understands the eschatological
Kingdom of God to be a resource of love which is available for the
creative transformation of history.
All the characteristic hopes and aspirations of Renaissance and
Enlightenment, of both secular and Christian liberalism, are right
at least in this, that they understand that side of the Christian
doctrine which regards the agape of the Kingdom of God as a
resource for infinite developments towards a more perfect
brotherhood in history.3-'
In these three themes of salvation-liberation; cosmology of grace,
salvation history, and eschatology, we perceive the broad salvific
context in which to understand the collective and individual experience
of salvation. Now we turn to the specific salvific encounter realized
in human experience and history.
The salvific encounter
Liberation theology describes the event of salvific encounter as
one of integral liberation. This liberation is to be understood as
permeating all levels of human existence. In commenting on the Puebla
document, Boff states; "Integral liberation, as its name indicates,
embraces all human dimensions; the personal, the social, the political,
the economic, the cultural, the religious, 'and all their
interrelationships'".3e In our consideration of integral liberation
realized in the salvific encounter, we will proceed by examination of
three 'moments' of this encounter. These 'moments' are somewhat
artificial in that they are abstractions of the one continual event of
encounter. Yet they are helpful in analysing the specific movements in
this encounter. These three 'moments' are initial encounter,
conversion, and 'the new self'.
The moment of initial encounter is fundamentally an encounter with
the purpose of God as revealed in Jesus Christ. In this encounter
humanity is introduced to communion with God and with the rest of
humanity as brothers and sisters. In this regard Gutie'rrez states that
Christ is to be understood as the new covenant.
Jesus Christ is himself the new covenant. In him God becomes the
Father of all nations, and all men and women see that they are his
children and one another's sisters and brothers.37
The possibility of this encounter presupposes human freedom and
agency. For Boff this means that this encounter is one of "filial
dialogue" and the "history of two freedoms, the meeting of two
loves".3"3 For both Gutie'rrez and Boff this means that the encounter
with the divine involves an acceptance or rejection of God's presence
and purpose in history. As Gutierrez states; "Human existence, in the
last instance, is nothing but a yes or no to the Lord...".33 This 'yes
or no' is not to be understood as merely cognitive assent, but is
primarily a profound relational commitment which can function
independently of religious knowledge. Gutierrez states that, "... man
is saved if he opens himself to God and to others, even if he is not
clearly aware that he is doing so",AO In like manner, Boff states that
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salvation, "...is offered to all, and is appropriated by all through
their respective moral praxis, independent of any reflexive awareness
on the part of the agent of moral praxis that salvation or perdition is
linked with that praxis...".41
For Liberation theologians this encounter with God has a specific
locus in history. This locus is the presence of the poor and
oppressed. Where Liberation theologians differ is the extent to which
the poor and oppressed mediate the presence and purpose of Gad.
Gutierrez maintains a sacramental understanding of God's presence in
human beings in general. He understands that since all humanity, each
human being, is the living temple of God that therefore when we
encounter other human beings we are encountering God.42 He understands
that the love of God and the love of neighbour are more than intimately
related. To love the neighbour is to literally love God.
It is not enough to say that love of God is inseparable from the
love of one's neighbour. It must be added love for God is
unavoidably expressed through love of one's neighbour. Moreover,
God is loved in the neighbour... To love one's brother, to love
all men, is a necessary and indispensable mediation of the love of
God; it is to love God...43
This encounter with God in human beings finds a focal point in the poor
and oppressed.
We find the Lord in our encounters with men, especially the poor,
marginated, and exploited ones. An act of love towards them is an
act of love towards God.44
It is in the poor person that we encounter God. "The poor person,
the other, becomes the revealer of the Utterly Other".4® But poverty
is not the quality which necessarily carries a divine dimension.
Rather, poverty is the context wherein a desire for liberation is
realized. This desire for liberation is the dimension wherein we
encounter God. "...this is our aim and goal: an encounter with the
Lord, not in the poor person who is ' isolated and good' , but in the
oppressed person, the member of a social class that burns with struggle
for its most elemental rights and for the construction of a society in
which persons can live as human beings".4®
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Gutierrez understands this encounter with God in the poor as a
dialectical event of self knowledge and knowledge of God. In this
manner it is both an invitation to communion with God through the
praxis of justice and also a crisis concerning our identity.
To know God is to do justice, is to be in solidarity with the poor
person. And it is to be in solidarity with that poor person as he
or she actually exists today — as someone who is oppressed, as a
member of an exploited class, or ethnic group, or culture, or
nation.
At the same time, a relationship with God who has loved me —
loved me first and loved me freely — despoils me, strips me. It
universalizes my love for others and makes it gratuitous too.
Each of the two movements demands the other, dialectically.4?
Leonardo Boff also embraces a sacramental view of humanity with
the poor and oppressed being the focus of the encounter with God. He
differs from Guti/rrez in that the christological significance of the
poor lies in their suffering. In this suffering Boff perceives the
suffering of Christ.
Historically, the eternal Son, in whom we are God's offspring
(Eph. 2:10), became incarnate as the suffering Servant. Hence all
the suffers of history are special sacraments of Jesus Christ, the
suffering Servant. In them we find a deeper and more concentrated
presence of Christ.4®
Boff also differs from Guti/rrez in that he perceives the various
dimensions of history to be sacramental and to have the potential to
mediate an encounter with God. To answer 'yes or no' to the elements
of God's design, be they economic, political, etc., is to answer 'yes
or no' to God. Thus, for Boff, the salvific encounter is one wherein
human beings either commit themselves to situations that contradict
Gad's salvific design or to situations that are gradually conforming to
that design.43
Like Gutie'rrez, Boff also understands this encounter to be one of
both invitation and crisis. It is an invitation because it offers new
opportunity for growth. At the same time it is a crisis because it is
a judgement on present existence.
As crisis, grace also passes judgement on a human being. Ve must
make a decision, snapping out of our lethargy and moving away from
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the things we had taken for granted in our life project. Like any
crisis, this entails ruptures that can be painful. But it also
offers a great opportunity to grow, to give new direction to our
life, or to solidify our trust in the path we have already
chosen.so
Ismael Garcia does not follow Boff or Guti/rrez in their
sacramental view of human beings, especially the incarnational
significance of the poor and oppressed. Rather he understands that we
encounter God when we commit ourselves to a praxis which embodies God's
concern for the freedom and well-being of human beings.
We encounter God in our commitment to forward the freedom and
well-being of humanity. It is a privileged position to experience
God as the enabler of new possibilities as well as the sustainer
of what forwards life.®1
It is within this divine concern for freedom and well-being that the
poor and oppressed take on special significance. God is in solidarity
with the poor and oppressed. "God is known and found amongst those who
have no one to defend, forward and protect their well-being and
freedom" . 5:2 But these poor and oppressed do not take on significance
because of incarnational or sacramental qualities. Rather, they are
receiptient of God's preferential concern because of their need.
God's preferential option for the poor is not a denial of divine
love for the whole of humanity. The poor are not assured a place
in God's kingdom because of the historical accident of their
belonging to a given social class under particular socio-
hlstorical circumstances that made them disadvantaged and
oppressed. Uor are the poor more virtuous in any morally and
religiously significant way. God made the poor chosen ones just
because they are poor, in spite of considerations of merit or lack
of it. God does justice to the poor solely because they are in
need and calls upon God's people to do the same.®3
It is within this perspective that the poor are understood to have
theological significance. The poor became a focal point of God's
general concern for all humanity. In this way the liberation of the
poor has significance which is inclusive of all human beings. The poor
are also significant in that their presence indicates a quality of
crisis in our encounter with God. The presence of the poor indicate
that the promise of liberation is still unfulfilled. In this way they
become the 'other'; "The poor are the 'other', who call us to move
beyond ourselves and make a commitment to the well-being of others".5d
In this manner Garc/a maintains that the poor are continually
significant in our relationship with God without making a literal
identification between God and the poor.
Niebuhr is both in agreement and disagreement with Liberation
theology concerning the dynamics of this initial encounter with God.
Niebuhr agrees with the Liberation assessment of human agency in the
divine encounter. He understands that human beings must 'open the
door', and are capable of doing so. Where he disagrees with Liberation
theology is concerning the quality of this encounter. Niebuhr presents
a heightened sense of crisis in his emphasis on divine transcendence
and revealed judgement and mercy. He understands that Christ is the
focus of this encounter which is confrontive in nature. In Christ is
revealed God's judgement on sin and the mercy which triumphs over the
divine wrath. In this confrontation the human self is shattered in
that his or her sins are brought to consciousness and the real source
and centre of life is revealed. At the same time, this encounter is a
confrontation with divine grace and self-giving love which makes this
consciousness bearable.s®
It is concerning this issue of confrontation with divine mercy and
judgement that Niebuhr disagrees with Boff and Gutierrez. For Niebuhr,
this encounter of judgement and mercy must have a transcendent quality.
It can not be simply identified with any human group or social process.
This is due to Niebuhr's understanding of sin and the transcendent
quality of the self. For this reason judgement must ultimately come
from beyond any socially contingent relationship.
While all particular sins have both social sources and social
consequences, the real essence of sin can be understood only in
the vertical dimension of the soul's relation to God because the
freedom of the self stands outside all relations, and therefore
has no other judge but God.se
For this reason Niebuhrian theology rejects an incarnational or
sacramental view of divine encounter in social movements or the poor.
This is not to say that Niebuhr disregards any theological significance
for the presence of the poor. Niebuhr understood that the prophetic
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tradition was anti-aristocratic in favour of the poor and oppressed.
For him, this anti-aristocratic tradition was significant in that it
proclaimed God's judgement on the so-called 'good, mighty, noble, and
wise' . In this way the presence of the poor became the occasion for
revealing the pretension of the powerful.
It is at this point that Garcia's understanding of the role of the
poor challenges Niebuhrian theology to broaden its perspective.
Hiebuhr emphasises the transcendent character of the divine encounter
to the loss of immanent historical mediation. While rejecting a too
simple understanding of the immanent divine presence in human persons
or social movements, Uiebuhrian theology can be seen to neglect the
continuing theological significance of the presence of the poor. When
the poor are seen to be the continuing and perennial occasion for the
divine encounter of judgement and mercy, an intensity or 'crisis' is
maintained which has bath transcendent and immanent dimensions. This
focus on the poor creates a historical immediacy which corresponds to
the transcendent encounter in Christ. Both Christ and the poor become
the occasion for the encounter with divine judgement and mercy. In
this way a balance can be maintained between the trans-historical and
the historical. Garcia also understands that the poor are more than
an occasion for encounter with divine judgement and mercy. They also
represent invitation and opportunity. In this way the 'crisis' of
encounter is not only that of confrontation with sin and divine
forgiveness, it is also a 'crisis' which provides the opportunity for
change, of self-giving, of the praxis of justice. This brings us to
consider the next 'moment' in the encounter with God: conversion.
Gustavo Gutierrez understands conversion to be a radical
reorientation of the self; "Conversion means going out of oneself,
being open to God and others; implies a break, but above all it means
following a new path". This new orientation is one wherein the self
enters the divine circle of love.
To be saved is to enter into the circle of charity which unites
the three Persons of the Trinity; it is to love as God loves. The
way to this fullness of love can be no other than love itself, the
way of participation in this charity, the way of accepting,
explicitly or implicitly, to say with the Spirit: 'Abba, Father'
(Gal. 4:6). s
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But this conversion is not to be understood as a purely 'interior' or
subjective spiritual event. It is also a conversion to the neighbour
who is also in this circle of love.
This conversion to God and the neighbour involves a reorientation
of the self on several levels. On the level of cognition it requires
what Liberation theologians call 'conscientization' or consciousness
raising. Guti/rrez understands conscientization to involve both the
oppressed and the oppressors. For the oppressed it means an awakening
to the dynamics of the oppressive situation and the realization that
the various values and perceptions held by the oppressors in this
situation have been integrated into their own consciousness. For the
oppressor it means an awakening to the part they have played in this
oppressive society and that their lack of self-fulfilment is tied to
the alienation prevalent in society as a whole which is revealed
specifically in the poor and oppressed.so For this reason conversion
means a break with how we have understood our world and our
relationships to others.
A second level of this conversion involves a moral commitment to
the world of the neighbour, especially the neighbour who is oppressed
and poor. As Gutierrez states;
Rediscovering the other means entering his own world. It also
means a break with ours. ... To enter the world of the other, the
poor man, with the actual demands involved, is to begin to be a
'new man'. It is a process of conversion.®1
This moral commitment has its impetus within the various understandings
of the role of the poor already considered. Gutierrez and Boff
perceive this to be a commitment to Christ in the poor person.
Gutierrez exemplifies this position.
Conversion means a radical transformation of ourselves; it means
thinking, feeling, and living as Christ — present in exploited
and alienated man. To be converted is to commit oneself to the
process of the liberation of the poor and oppressed, to commit
oneself lucidly, realistically, and concretely.
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The position taken by Garcia, rejecting the sacramental
interpretation of the poor, is no less rigorous in its commitment to
the world of the poor. In this all Liberation theology is in
agreement. The commitment to God necessarily involves a commitment to
the neighbour, and specifically the neighbour who is poor and oppressed
with whom God is in solidarity.
The third level of this conversion process is necessitated by this
commitment to the world of the poor. For Liberation theology,
conversion must have social, political, and economic dimensions. As
Guti/rrez states; "The change called for is not simply an interior one
but one that involves the entire person as a corporal being . . . and
therefore also has consequences for the web of social relationships of
which the individual is a part".®3 For Guti/rrez, conversion is not
authentic if it lacks this social dimension.
Our conversion process is affected by the socio-economic,
political, cultural, and human environment in which it occurs.
Without a change in these structures there is no authentic
conversion. We have to break with our mental categories, with the
way we relate to others, with our way of identifying with the
Lord, with our cultural milieu, with our social class, in other
words, with all that can stand in the way of a real, profound
solidarity with those who suffer, in the first place, from misery
and injustice.®"1
Boff also recognizes that this lack of the social dimension in
conversion results in moral ambiguity.
When Christians take cognizance of the link between the personal
and the structural levels, they can no longer rest content with a
conversion of the heart and personal holiness on the individual
level. They realize that if they are to be graced personally,
they must also fight to change the societal structure and open it
up to God's grace. Insofar as the latter does not happen, their
personal goodness will remain terribly ambiguous.es
Ismael Garcia makes this same point when he observes that integral
liberation achieves authentic reconciliation; "It (liberation) creates
conditions for authentic reconciliation because it attempts to overcome
those abjective and subjective conditions that are obstacles to the
concrete realization of mutuality".®®
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Garcia approaches this social commitment from a different
perspective. While Gutierrez speaks of 'radical transformation' of the
self and Boff speaks of 'personal holiness', Garcia maintains the
perennial sinfulness of human beings but distinguishes the sinful
condition of humanity from the particular manifestations of sin.
We can never overcome our sinful condition but we can and are
called to overcome particular manifestations of human sinfulness.
The universal and all-embracing character of sin does not make it
impossible for humanity to improve its life in new and unexpected
ways. God provides conditions for humanity to strive for the
greater good rather than merely conform to the lesser evil. We
are called to conversion, a conversion that has a social
dimension. It demands our commitment to the creation of a more
just world. We are not liberated from sin through the act of
conversion but we are liberated to make a historical difference as
witnesses of God's kingdom.*57
Niebuhrian theology is in agreement with Liberation theology that
conversion is an entering into the 'circle' of divine love. But
Niebuhr emphasizes this as an existential experience wherein the self
is embraced by the justifying grace of God. In this encounter the self
is confronted by the transcendent relational ideal of self-giving love
and is moved to repentance of the pretensions of the self. In this
repentance the self finds itself understood and accepted in spite of
its sin. For Niebuhr, this is the assurance of grace.
All men who live with any degree of serenity live by some
assurance of grace. In every life there must at least be times
and seasons when the good is felt as a present possession and not
as a far-off goal. The sinner must feel himself 'justified', that
is, he must feel that his imperfections are understood and
sympathetically appreciated as well as challenged. Whenever he
finds himself in a circle of love where he is 'completely known
and all forgiven' , something of the mercy of God is revealed to
him and he catches a glimpse of the very perfection which has
eluded him. es
liebuhrian theology challenges Liberation theology concerning this
issue of 'justification'. In its programmatic concerns, Liberation
theology appears to minimalize this sense of 'the good felt as a
present possession' because of its fear that it might weaken the
impetus to social transformation. This difference emphasises the
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liebuhrian understanding that forgiveness relates to a dimension of the
self which transcends social relationships.
This is not to say that Niebuhr does not perceive the danger of a
too individualistic ethic. But liebuhrian theology must be questioned
concerning its success in avoiding this danger. liebuhr recognizes the
social dimensions of christian commitment but places the ethical
tension of this understanding within a transcendent context. It is the
perfectionism of Christ which maintains the 'tension' in- human ethical
endeavour. The danger of this type of ethical ideal is recognized by
/
Gutierrez.
Ve may talk about accepting the gift of divine sonship and making
all people our brothers and sisters. But if we do not live that
acceptance from day to day in the conflict-ridden reality of
history, then we are merely engaging in talk and allowing
ourselves to indulge in the self-satisfaction of a noble ideal.
This ideal must be translated into real-life identification with
the interests of those human beings who actually are being
subjected to oppression by other human beings. It must lead to
identification with the struggles of the exploited classes. It
must enrich political processes from within through its creativity
and criticism, for those processes tend to close in upon
themselves and mutilate authentic dimensions of the human
person.
Liberation theology challenges liebuhrian theology to bring this
ethical 'tension' down to earth. Liberation theology places this
'tension' in relation to the poor and oppressed and recognizes this as
the context for the divine salvific encounter. In this manner-
Liberation theology places the love of God and the love of neighbour in
an unavoidable intimacy which has concrete social, political and
economic referents.
Vhile recognizing this weakness in liebuhrian theology, it must
also be recognized that Liberation theology lends itself to a
fundamental danger in its identification with the poor and oppressed.
In its neglect of the dimension of divine transcendence as judgement
and mercy, it leaves itself vulnerable to mistaking the 'spirit' of
group identity for the 'Holy Spirit'. Niebuhr is aware of this danger.
The possession of the self by something less than the 'Holy
Spirit' means that it is possible for the self to be partly
fulfilled and partly destroyed by its submission to a power and
spirit which is greater than the self in its empiric reality but
not great enough to do justice to the self in its ultimate
freedom. ... The invasion and possession of the self by spirit,
which is not the Holy Spirit, produces a spurious sense of
transfiguration. The self is now no longer the little and narrow
self, but the larger collective self of race or nation. But the
real self is destroyed. The real self has a height of spiritual
freedom which reaches beyond race and nation and which is closer
to the eternal than the more earthbound collective entities of
man's history.70
This brings us to consider the 'new self' as the culminating
'moment' in the salvific encounter. This 'new self' is the state of
the self as a result of the divine encounter and conversion. The first
thing that can be said of this 'new self' is that the individual is a
person of faith. Liberation theology understands faith to be a
confidence or trust that has its focus beyond the self. Gutierrez
understands one focus to be the love of God,
Faith is confidence in love. It is faith in the Father who loved
us first, without any merit of our own, and who fills our life
with love and largess.71
This faith in God's love characterizes the life of the 'new self' as
one which is secure in its openness to the future and responsive to
God's love. Leonardo Boff also understands that this focus on God
creates an existential attitude from which reality can be interpreted
as either being ordered to God or deviating away from God.7:2
Garcia identifies a second focus for faith in the promise of the
Kingdom of God. This confidence in God's promise liberates the 'new
self' from anxiety concerning the ambiguities of historical praxis.
God frees God's people from the paralysing forms of anxiety and
fears that are intrinsic to a struggle for justice taken under the
most adverse odds. The divine promises make us aware that
ultimately no immediate or remote historical power can prevent the
final realization of the kingdom of justice. This assurance can
free us to make a stand even when we are aware that we are not in
control of all the variables and cannot be sure of the final
outcome of our actions.73
In light of this faith, the 'new self' is also to be characterized
as a being of praxis. As Garcfa states; "The new person is defined as
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a being of praxis, capable of critical reflection and responsible
action".7'1 For Liberation theology this means that the 'new self' is
not only one who has confidence in divine love and the ultimate
realization of the Kingdom, but is also an agent in the approximate
realization of that love and Kingdom. Thus, the 'new self' is not only
a recipient of salvation, but also an active agent in its historical
realization. Gutierrez exemplifies this understanding; "To work, to
transform this world, is to become a man and to build the human
community; it is also to save".'715
This brings us to a final characterization of the 'new self'. The
'new self' is fundamentally a person of community. It is in community
that faith and praxis is realized. Gutierrez understands that it is
community which corresponds to the ultimate meaning of human life.
"Man is destined to total communion with God and to the fullest
brotherhood with all men".'75 For this reason community is not merely a
result of faith and praxis, it is a fundamental dimension of the
salvific encounter.
Faith cannot be lived on the private level of a purely interior
life, for faith is the rejection of any turning in upon oneself.
The dynamism and inner thrust of the good news, the news which
reveals us to be children of our heavenly Father and brothers and
sisters of others, leads to the creation of a community that
serves as a sign of Christ's liberation to our fellows.7"7
In this way the salvific encounter in all its 'moments' is seen to have
a collective dimension. Boff also embraces this significance of
community and adds to it his understanding of God's grace as
sacramentally present in the neighbour.
Grace and salvation are a joint effort of persons and their
worlds, of persons and the communities with which they share life.
One is responsible for the grace of the other. Each must be a
sacrament of salvation for the other. Herein lies the deepest
meaning of love for neighbour, which is to embrace even our enemy.
Grace and salvation entail universal solidarity. The concrete
course of divine love passes through human love and everyone that
I approach. 7,3
Once again we find that Niebuhrian theology has a different
emphasis if not different content. Niebuhr is concerned with the
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transcendent mercy and judgement of God and tends to focus his concerns
on the existential dimension of human being. In regard to the 'new
self* he perceives the agency of God's transcendence as the foundation
for the possibility of true selfhood. This is not to say that he
neglects the communal nature of selfhood, but rather places the social
dimension in contingency to the transcendent.
The Christian experience of the new life is an experience of a new
selfhood. The new self is more truly a real self because the
vicious circle of self-centredness has been broken. The self
lives in and for others, in the general orientation of loyalty to,
and love of, God; who alone can do justice to the freedom of the
self over all partial interests and values. This new self is the
real self; for the self is infinitely self-transcendent; and any
premature centring of itself around its own interests,
individually or collectively, destroys and corrupts its freedom.'73
Thus, in regard to the transcendent mercy and judgement of God, the
'new self attains this status by faith and God's grace.
. . . the new self is the Christ of intention rather than an actual
achievement. It is the self only by faith, in the sense that its
dominant purpose and intention are set in the direction of Christ
as the norm. It is the self only by grace, in the sense that the
divine mercy 'imputes' the perfection of Christ and accepts the
self's intentions for achievements.eso
In this manner Niebuhr emphasises justification by grace through faith
over against Liberation theology's emphasis on historical praxis in
regard to the 'new self*.
Having recognized this basic difference in emphasis, it must be
stated that Hiebuhrian theology does agree with Liberation theology at
a great many points. It agrees with Garcia that confidence in God's
promise of the establishment of the Kingdom serves to free the self
from anxiety concerning its agency in the various levels of liberation.
And in relation to divine love, Niebuhr agrees with Guti/rrez when
Hiebuhr states; "The ideal possibility is that faith in the ultimate
security of God's love would overcome all immediate insecurities of
nature and history."®1
In the same manner Niebuhrian theology agrees with Liberation
theology that the 'new self' is a being of praxis and communal in
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nature. Niebuhr simply wishes to establish the preeminence of divine
transcendence in relation to these dimensions of human selfhood. From
this perspective, faith has as much to do with contrition in
recognizing our limits and pretensions as it does with confidence in
love and promise which opens up the future to possibility.
This brings to a conclusion our examination of the salvific
encounter as understood by Liberation theology. But this salvific
encounter is not to be understood as an event which is self-contained
and complete. Rather it is to be understood as the beginning of a
process: a spirituality. It is this salvific encounter as a continuing
process, as a spirituality, that is now to be examined and assessed.
Liberation spirituality
For Liberation theology, spirituality is a life-style determined
by the specific socio-historical situation in which the divine
encounter takes place. This spirituality avoids subjective
individualism and is understood as a manner of life which is inclusive
of all dimensions of human existence. As Gutierrez states; "We need a
vital attitude, all-embracing and synthesizing, informing the totality
as well as every detail of our lives; we need a 'spirituality'.'"32 In
this manner, spirituality is a process of continual encounter,
continual conversion, and continual realization of the 'new self'.
According to Guti/rrez it is a journey, a discipleship, a continuous
search for the fullness of communion with God and with other human
beings.
This spiritual journey is fundamentally a collective journey.
Because divine love and communion is at the heart of this spiritual
experience, community is a necessary dimension of spirituality.
Gutierrez does not deny an individual dimension of spirituality, rather
he places it in its proper context.
...'walking according to the Spirit' is an activity undertaken
within a community, a people on the move. This is a dimension of
every spirituality, despite presentations that at times suggest
that a spirituality is for a purely individual journey. When I
say that the following of Jesus is a collective adventure I am, of
course, not eliminating the personal dimension; on the contrary, I
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am giving it its authentic meaning as a response to the con¬
vocation of the Father.33
For this reason community is at the heart of a spirituality. Gutierrez
understands that community is necessary for a spirituality to exist.
"Without community support neither the emergence nor the continued
existence of a new spirituality is possible".34 And he also
understands that the building up of community is essential to the whole
salvific encounter. "Community life cultivates receptivity for God's
reign and also proclaims it; in this receptivity and proclamation a
community builds itself up as a community".eK
This liberation spirituality has several distinctive attributes.
A primary attribute is that of freedom. As Gutierrez states;
Spirituality, in the strict and profound sense of the word is the
dominion of the Spirit. If 'the truth will set you free' (John
8:32), the Spirit 'will guide you into all the truth' (John 16:13)
and will leads us to complete freedom, the freedom from everything
that hinders us from fulfilling ourselves as men and sons of God
and the freedom to love and to enter into communion with God and
with others. It will lead us along the path of liberation because
'where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty' (2 Cor.
3:17).ee
Leonardo Boff agrees with Guti/rrez and understands that it is grace,
or the Holy Spirit, which arouses human beings to free activity. For
Boff the spirit is freedom and God's activity permeates this freedom
giving it greater intensity and affection.07 Segundo also agrees that
this attribute of freedom is fundamental to the christian life. He is
especially concerned that freedom be understood as freedom for
something; "... human liberty is liberty for something definitive and
indeed eschatological: the building up of the kingdom of God".ss
Another fundamental attribute of liberation spirituality is love.
Gutierrez understands that love is the central gift of the Spirit.
This gift of the Spirit contains all other gifts of the Spirit which
serve the building up of the community.
Love is a source of dynamic activity and life. The power of the
Spirit leads to love of God and others and not to the working of
miracles. This is why the purpose of the charisms is the building
up of the community.e'3
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This gift of love and the empowering of freedom come to human
beings from the grace of God. This grace comes undeserved and thus is
the font of another attribute of liberation spirituality. This is the
attribute of gratuitousness. Gutierrez understands that gratuitousness
is the human response to the gift of divine encounter and communion.
A spirituality of liberation must be filled with a living sense of
gratuitousness. Communion with the Lord and with all men is more
than anything else a gift. ... the knowledge that at the root of
our personal and community existence lies the gift of the self-
communication of God, the grace of his friendship, fills our life
with gratitude. It allows us to see our encounters with men, our
loves, everything that happens in our life as a gift.30
For Gutierrez it is this gratuitousness which is the source of joy.
"... the gratuitousness which allows me to encounter others fully, the
unique encounter which is the foundation of communion of men among
themselves and of men with God, these are the source of Christian
jay". 31
Belated to this attribute of gratuitousness is the quality which
Gutierrez calls spiritual childhood. This spiritual childhood involves
a continual openess to God, being totally at God's disposal, and an
abandonment and trust in the Lord. It is in this regard that Gutierrez
defines spiritual poverty.
God's communication with us is a gift of love; to receive this
gift it is necessary to be poor, a spiritual child. This poverty
has no direct relationship to wealth; in the first instance it is
not a question of indifference to the goods of this world. It
goes deeper than that; it means to have no other sustenance than
the will of God. This is the attitude of Christ".32
This spiritual poverty does not exclude voluntary material poverty.
Voluntary poverty is a possibility of a spirituality in solidarity with
the poor and oppressed.
Evangelical poverty ... began to be lived as an act of liberation
and love towards the poor of this world, as solidarity with them
and protest against the poverty in which they live; as
identification with the interests of the oppressed classes and a
rejection of the exploitation of which they are the victims. If
the ultimate cause of exploitation and alienation of man is
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egotism, the underlying motive of voluntary poverty is love for
one's neighbour.-'3
In the above statement Guti/rrez introduces the final and
unavoidable attribute of liberation spirituality. This is the
attribute of solidarity. This is a solidarity rooted in the will of
God and continually realized in relation to the poor and oppressed.
Gutierrez understands that this spirituality requires an ongoing
conversion to the neighbour who is oppressed and poor. "A spirituality
of liberation will centre on a conversion to the neighbour, the
oppressed person, the exploited social class, the despised race, the
dominated country".'3"1 Gutierrez understands that it is in this
solidarity that we live out our spirituality as a liberating praxis.
Liberating involvement is the locus of a spiritual experience in
which we encounter once more the great prophetic theme of the Old
Testament and of Jesus' preaching alike: God and the poor person.
To know God is to do justice, is to be in solidarity with the poor
person.
Leonardo Boff adds another dimension to the spirituality of
liberation. He understands spirituality as a process within a divine
milieu wherein the option for God can gain intensity throughout life.
Boff calls this habitual grace or sanctification.
The fundamental project of a human being can be oriented to God in
such a way that it welcomes the divine mystery with every
increasing intensity as life unfolds. In that case we can talk
about an increase of grace. We are talking about a person's
increasing openness to God, which presupposes and implies
increasing self-giving on God's part as well.®13.
According to Boff, this process of habitual grace has two effects on
the human self. It has the effect of creating greater coherence in
human activity and it has the effect of creating a qualitative change
in the human self and community.
This habitual grace manifests itself in operation. It helps human
beings achieve ever greater harmony between their fundamental
project and their concrete, individual acts. It also plays a
formative role, perfecting and unifying human beings. It elevates
them to deeper communion, ensuring the victorious dominion of
love, understanding, mercy, forgiveness, and sincerity in their
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lives. They become more and more tuned to all that is truly human
and divine.3'7
For Boff, habitual grace is not guaranteed as a progressive
process leading to greater and greater sanctification. It can also
became a process of decrease of grace wherein the habitual dimension is
reorientated away from God.
Decrease of grace means that a human project is moving further and
further away from God and drying up. Vices begin to take over and
deviations in the moral life undermine our basic option. We begin
to develop a different basic project in which God will no longer
be the radical meaning of life or the culmination of existence.3S1
This decrease in grace can even lead to the total loss of God's grace.
"The continued closing up of the human person to any higher destiny and
the ongoing betrayal of God's appeals in reality can give rise to the
total loss of God's grace".33
Juan Luis Segundo introduces a similar issue with the concept of
'merit'. By this term he understands that human activity and intention
has 'eternal' worth which provides merit for gaining entrance to the
eternal Kingdom of God. He rejects the protestant primacy of the
concept of justification by faith over justification by good works in
accordance with moral law. Segundo believes that 'merit' maintains a
historical factor which transcendent justification by faith neglects.
This is not to say the Segundo rejects justification by faith. He
wishes to place the two positions in mutual modification and
correction. He wants to avoid the legalism of theologies of merit and
also avoid the passivity of theologies of transcendent justification.
But overall, he places emphasis on the need for justification by merit
as the primary impetus to historical transformation.100
In earlier critique of Niebuhr it was noted that he did not
develop a coherent spirituality in regard to his theology. But his
theology does address the issues of spirituality. In general, it could
be said that Niebuhrian theology agrees with the qualities of
spirituality identified by Gutie'rrez. But Hiebuhrian theology does
perceive a transcendent dimension of the self and the divine life which
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Gutierrez neglects. This difference does lead to a qualifying of some
of the optimism of these spiritual qualities.
One such spiritual quality which is subject to Niebuhrian
qualification is that of freedom. Kiebuhrian theology does not
understand the self to obtain the degree of moral freedom which
Liberation theology seems to assume. For Kiebuhrian theology, this
truth is demonstrated by the experience that guilt rises with moral
achievement. In this regard the self is not free enough to make
absolute distinctions.
The fact that the sense of guilt rises vertically with all moral
achievement and is, therefore, not assuaged by it nor subject to
diminution or addition by favourable and unfavourable social
opinion, throws a significant light on the relation of freedom to
sin. The ultimate proof of the freedom of the human spirit is its
own recognition that its will is not free to choose between good
and evil. For in the highest reaches of the freedom of the spirit
the self discovers in contemplation and retrospect that previous
actions have invariably confused the ultimate reality and value,
which the self as spirit senses, with the immediate necessities of
the self. If the self assumes that because it realizes this fact
in past actions, it will be able to avoid the corruption in future
actions, it will merely fall prey to the Pharisaic fallacy.101
In the same manner the quality of love comes under qualification.
Niebuhr understands that the tragic quality of the spiritual life is
that self-love and the experience of divine love are always
confused.102
It is in relation to these qualifications concerning freedom and
love that Niebuhrian theology would broaden the understanding of
gratuitousness held by Gutie'rrez. Hot only is gratuitousness in
response to the gift of love and communion. It is also the response to
a mercy wherein forgiveness is a gift in spite of the perineal nature
of human sin.
Whenever the power of sinful self-love is taken seriously there is
a concomitant sense of gratitude in the experience of release from
the self. It is felt that this is a miracle which the self could
not have accomplished. The self is too completely its own
prisoner by the 'vain imagination' of sins to be able to deliver
itself. 103
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In this manner the spirituality of liebuhrian theology is understood as
a religion of grace which; "...seeks to console the human spirit to its
inevitable defeat in the world of nature and history".1C,A
In regard to the charisms of the Holy Spirit, liebuhrian theology
is in agreement with Gutierrez. Niebuhr understands that the Holy
Spirit is the indwelling of the spirit of God in human beings. This
indwelling provides resources of love, wisdom, and power. Niebuhr is
careful to note that the Holy Spirit is not to be identified and
confused with the most universal and transcendent levels of the human
mind or consciousness. But he does understand that there is a degree
of continuity and compatibility between the human selfhood and the Holy
Spirit.1os
Vhere the spirituality of Niebuhrian theology is challenged by
Gutierrez concerns solidarity as a spiritual quality. Once again we
see that Niebuhrian theology neglects the historical and social
dimension in favour of the transcendent. Solidarity as a quality of
spirituality makes spirituality a historical and social experience. It
provides the necessary dynamic to prevent spirituality becoming solely
an existential subjective experience of a purely transcendent reality.
¥here Niebuhrian theology is in disagreement with Liberation
spirituality is concerning Boff's understanding of habitual grace and
Segundo's concept of merit. Niebuhrian theology understands that Boff
has confused two dimensions of grace. Niebuhr understands that God's
grace is a power over human beings and also a power in human beings.
As a power over human beings, grace is judgement and mercy which is
revealed as forgiveness. This grace completes what human beings cannot
complete and overcomes human sin. As a power in human beings, grace is
the resources of love, wisdom and power which are available to human
beings through faith. Boff seems to neglect grace as a power over
human beings and reduce it to a power in human beings. This leaves the
human being on a sliding scale where human agency determines divine
relationship. Niebuhrian theology wants to maintain the emphasis on
divine power as forgiveness over human life which determines the
divine-human relationship. According to the Niebuhrian position,
sliding up or down the 'habitual scale' makes no difference in one's
relationship with God. For Niebuhrian theology there is no point in
- 174 -
'sanctification' in which God is more or less distant. At all points
in the journey of life forgiveness is needed and available.
It is this same issue which is at stake in the Uiebuhrian
disagreement with Segundo. The concept of merit places salvific agency
in the intentions of the human self rather than in the agency of a God
which transcends all human actions and intentions. Once again it
appears that human agency qualifies the divine relationship with human
beings. Niebuhrian theology avoids this position in the recognition
that human agency is never transparent concerning ultimate value. To
place the divine-human relationship in dependence on human behaviour
or intention inevitably results in ambiguity due to the confusion
inherent in all human intention and behaviour. This ambiguity is
avoided in the Niebuhrian position. A Niebuhrian spirituality realizes
that the divine-human relationship is one which is initiated and
fulfilled by divine love and forgiveness. It is this grace as power
over human beings which is unambiguous and which qualifies the
ambiguity of human intention and action.
The significance of salvation-liberation for a theology of justice
At the heart of the dialogue between Niebuhrian theology and
Liberation theology is the issue of transcendence and immanence. It is
around this issue that the concept of justice is determined. Niebuhr
apprehends the transcendent self-giving love of God, which judges and
reveals all human endeavour in its self-delusion and pretension, as the
guiding norm of justice. Liberation theology apprehends an immanent
divine source of love and agency, which transforms all human agency and
reveals its possibilities and freedom, as its regulative norm. In the
same manner liebuhr perceives that sin as self-regard and will-to-power
is an immanent dynamic inherent in the very freedom of the human self
and revealed in all dimensions of individual and collective life. In
corresponding fashion, Liberation theology perceives sin as
transcending the self and as an aberration which conditions the life of
the self and which is located in the determinisms of economic,
political, and social structures and systems. In isolation and mutual
exclusion these various positions are resistive to the development of
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justice. But if taken as the various dimensions of a unified
dialectic, then these insights provide a fertile ground in which a
concept of justice can take root.
For Niebuhrian theology the significance of salvation-liberation
is in its transcendent power of divine forgiveness in regard to the
realization that self-regard and will-to-power are perennial in human
history. But Niebuhrian theology needs to be informed by a qualified
optimism that Liberation theology provides in its understanding of
liberation as an individual, social and spiritual historical praxis.
This is especially true of the insights of Miguez Bonino and Garcia.
While Niebuhr rejects a teleological cosmology of grace and a
sacramental view of divine immanence in human beings, he does recognize
the power of love as a transforming force in human agency and he does
recognize the fundamental openness and possibility that confronts human
beings as creators of history. What the dialogue with Liberation
theology provides is substance for these convictions.
The most substantial contribution which Liberation theology makes
to the Niebuhrian understanding of justice is the role of the poor as a
qualifying referent in tension with the Niebuhrian norm of transcendent
divine self-giving love. The poor serve as an immanent criterion by
which social justice is assessed in its adequacy and challenged to
increasing effectiveness. In this way the poor serve as a historical
mediation of divine judgement and mercy. In the poor we are confronted
with both our failure to love and with the possibility of loving more
effectively. This confrontation has a divine dimension and theological
significance grounded in the divine filiation with all humanity. In
this way Liberation theology provides a criterion which can serve in a
historical-transhistorical dialectic with the Niebuhrian norm of
transcendent love. This dialectic avoids the tendency toward
subjective individualism resulting from the emphasis of Niebuhrian
theology on transcendence. In the same manner, this dialectic avoids
the restricted immanentism and collectivism of Liberation theology.
It is at this point that the critical comparison of christologies
becomes important. Both Niebuhrian theology and Liberation theology
appeal to the significance of Jesus Christ for the justification of
their respective positions. These theologies are christocentric and
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appeal to a christology in order to justify the various theological
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Christology stands at the centre of bath Liberation and Niebuhrian
theology. The christocentric concern of both theologies allows these
theologies to stand in critical dialogue leading to mutual
modification. These two theologies have very little in common except
the conviction that christology is relevant in relation to
possibilities of history. It is this common thematic concern which
makes comparison possible and productive. The realization of justice
in history is the focal concern of both Liberation and Niebuhrian
christology.
This chapter will not attempt to bring Niebuhr into exhaustive
comparison with the christological reflections of every Latin American
theologian. While this presentation of Liberation christology will
range far and wide, it will primarily look to a core of literature
provided by Leonardo Boff and Jon Sobrino. This core literature will
be the christological works, Jesus Christ Liberator and Christology at
the Crossroads, respectively.
Alfredo Fierro makes the observation that christologies always
depend on extra-christological presuppositions. 1 Two of these extra-
christological presuppositions need to be made explicit in approaching
Liberation christology. The first of these is the recognition that
christologies are worked out within a theological framework. Decisions
about God and human existence are in many ways prior to christological
work. This would seem to indicate a circular relationship between the
theological format and the particularity of christological formulation.
We bring theology to the task of christological reflection, but our
christological work may change our understanding of God and human
existence. This hermeneutical circle between the horizons of a
theology and the specific reflection on christology can be perceived in
previous examination of sin and salvation. This concern for the larger
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theological context will stand in the background as we examine
Liberation christology.
A second extra-christological presupposition is the socio¬
political context in which christological reflection takes place. Boff
recognizes this to be an unavoidable dimension of christological
reflection which disallows any claim to neutrality.
The themes and emphases of a given Christology flow from what
seems relevant to the theologian on the basis of his or her social
standpoint. In that sense we must maintain that no Christology is
or can be neutral. Every Christology is partisan and committed.
Willingly or unwillingly christological discourse is voiced in a
given social setting with all the conflicting interests that
pervade it.2
The role and importance of the social setting for christological
reflection will become more obvious when we examine the hermeneutical
circle employed by Liberation christology. At this point it is
sufficient to note that what justifies the predicate 'Liberation' for
christology is its liberating function within a given socio-political
setting. Thus, Liberation christology is relevant insofar as it is a
force for socio-political transformation.
Having taken note of the general theological and socio-political
environment of christological reflection, it is now appropriate to
observe where Liberation christology begins in theological reflection.
The beginning point of christological reflection is probably best
exemplified by where it does not begin. For most Liberation
theologians it does not begin with the classical christological
formulations. Gustavo Gutierrez is one of the few theologians who
starts with the classical affirmations of christology with an emphasis
on the historical relevance of these formulations. He uses what
Sobrino calls a 'christology of descent'. Sobrino and Boff are
representative of christological reflection which has another beginning
point. They begin with a 'christology of ascent' which is founded in
the 'historical Jesus'.3 This alternate beginning point is reflective
of suspicion and sometimes rejection of classical formulations.
Sobrino is representative of this suspicion of classical christology.
He rejects classical christology as a starting place because it tends
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to abstract the 'historical Jesus'. This tendency toward abstraction
removes Jesus from history and thus creates an impartial Christ which
is available for manipulation by the various interests in socio¬
political life.A Liberation theologians have chosen the 'historical
Jesus' as the starting point of christological reflection because this
procedural starting point guarantees the historical dimension in
theological reflection.
In starting with the 'historical Jesus', Liberation theology
develops a christology which is relevant to the conflicts of .socio¬
political life. This 'historical Jesus' becomes the measure and judge
of christological formulations. As Miranda states;
So authority can decree that everything is permitted; for justice
and exploitation are not so indistinguishable. And Christ died so
that we might know that not everything is permitted. But not any
Christ. The Christ who cannot be co-opted by accommodationists
and opportunists as the historical Jesus. ...
Only the historical Jesus can judge our differences and be measure
of our theologies. And for us this Jesus is to be found in the
Bible.*
Reinhold Niebuhr agrees with this starting point. He too, is
concerned with maintaining the historical significance of christology.
But his approach is quite different, He develops what can be called a
mythical-prophetic christology. He is concerned with the 'historical
Jesus' as a symbol of the eternal within history.
Religious faith needs specific symbols; and the Jesus of history
is a perfect symbol of the absolute in history because the perfect
love to which pure spirit aspires is vividly realized in the drama
of his life and cross. Thus a man becomes the symbol of God and
the religious sense that the absolute invades the relative and the
historical is adequately expressed.®
In this mythical-prophetic approach, Niebuhr is concerned to maintain
the insights of classical christological formulations in their
relevance to history. But he agrees with Liberation theology in
suspicion and rejection of metaphysical abstraction. In orthodox
formulations he perceives that the historical and human characteristics
of Christ are lost in a reduction to speculative reason.'7 Niebuhr
maintains the insights of classical christology by recognizing their
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significance as symbol and. myth. In this way he can maintain the
paradox found in these formulations without recourse to ontological
rationalization.
While Niebuhr looks to the 'historical Jesus' for historical
relevance in christological formulation, his christology is never-the-
less a 'christology of descent'. He is primarily concerned with the
transcendent dimension and significance of Jesus Christ. In this
manner the 'Christ myth' stands in prophetic confrontation with the
aspirations of historical development. This raises a question
concerning the adequacy of his development and understanding of the
'historical Jesus'. Dennis McCann and J.M. Lochman both raise the
question of this relationship. McCann points out that Niebuhr's
religio-poetic symbol of the 'historical Jesus' may not in fact conform
to the life and teachings found in the biblical text. He recognises
that Niebuhr's formulation is vulnerable to historical criticism.63
Lochman asks a similar question concerning Niebuhr's symbolical method.
He recognizes that this method itself has a tendency to portray Jesus
Christ in docetic terms which neglect the concreteness of a human-
divine life in history.3 This criticism will be further explored as we
examine the interpretation and content of this 'historical Jesus'.
Before examining this hermeneutical process that allows definition
of the 'historical Jesus', it is important to make explicit the
epistemological presupposition of Liberation theology. Boff
understands that access to the significance of Jesus Christ does not
come through abstract analysis. Jesus Christ is not an 'object' of
analysis but rather a 'subject' and 'person' who is known through
relationship. For this reason, knowledge of Jesus Christ follows the
same path as the first disciples; "...it was by seeing, imitating,
deciphering, and living with Jesus that his disciples came to know God
and the human person".10 Thus, it is by faith and discipleship that we
also come to comprehend Jesus Christ. Sobrino makes this same point
concerning epistemology.
It is not just that discipleship is one of the fundamental themes
of any Christology that seeks to reflect on the life of Jesus.
Nor is it just that discipleship is the gospel's way of expressing
what is most fundamental in Christian ethics. I stress the
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following of Jesus here because it is only this that makes
christological epistemology possible at all.11
Hiebuhr also understands that Jesus Christ can not be reduced to a
'object' or 'fact' of history. He emphasises that Christ is known
through repentance and faith.12 This repentance and faith is in
relationship to divine meaning and grace which transcend human
possibilities of knowledge in a realm of mystery. Again we perceive
that Niebuhr emphasizes the transcendent dimension of this
relationship. This stands in stark contrast to Liberation theology
which seeks knowledge of Jesus Christ in a relationship of discipleship
or historical praxis. For Hiebuhr, Jesus Christ is the 'symbol' of
divine judgement and grace leading to repentance and faith. For
Liberation theology, Jesus Christ is the way of historical praxis
wherein God and the human are known. One must ask whether these
epistemological differences are mutual exclusive or whether they
indicate a dialectic of knowledge which includes both transcendent and
historical references. Regardless of how this difference is resolved,
both Liberation theology and Niebuhrian theology are in agreement that
knowledge of Jesus Christ involves a relationship which can not be
reduced to simple rational abstraction.
Given this relational epistemology we can now examine the
hermeneutical process utilized by Liberation theology. Liberation
theology understands the hermeneutical process to entail a
hermeneutical circle between the 'historical Jesus' of the biblical
text and the current socio-political context. This is a dialectical
process involving Jesus' history and our history. Raul Vidales
describes this dialectical process in the following manner.
... it is not ... a matter of promoting novel para-dogmatic
fundamentalisms, or mechanistic processes of inconsistent and
uncritical transposition, comparison, accommodation, or
parallelism. It is a matter of constructing and applying a
hermeneutical process that will be able to establish the
dialectical interrelationship, between the historical event of
Jesus and his word, and the historical experience today in which
the commitment of faith is required now here, and now suddenly
there.13
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The first moment in this hermeneutical circle has to do with what
is brought from the social context to the biblical text. Ellacuria
understands that the interpreter brings a fundamental question
concerning "... how Jesus actualizes the fullness of his mission as
saviour of human beings". 1 A This question brings with it the
contextual concerns of Latin America. Boff understands that Latin
Americans question the 'historical Jesus' from the perspective of
dependence and oppression.155 This questioning recognizes that there
are no neutral christologies. Liberation theologians recognize that
the christologies which already exist in the Latin American context
serve various socio-political interests. They also recognize that
these christologies have not been in the service of the poor and
oppressed, but rather the oppressor. Thus, it is the intention of
Liberation theology to ask questions of the 'historical Jesus' from the
perspective of the poor and oppressed and thereby come to an
understanding of christology which speaks to their needs and concerns.
It is this context of socio-political oppression which is brought to
the interpretive process.165
The second moment in this hermeneutical circle is the reading of
the 'historical Jesus'. This interpretive 'reading' is not a simple
process. It is complicated by the fact that the interpreter has no
direct access to the Jesus of history to whom the biblical texts bear
witness. As Mfguez Bonino understands, we are left with a plurality of
christologies.
Even without succumbing to Bultmann's radical skepticism, we have
to admit that biblical studies show not only that we have various
christologies already present even in the New Testament, but that
it is impossible to 'go behind' these images, which already
contain theological interpretation, in order thus to arrive at a
'historical Jesus'. What the New Testament gives us, as we weary
of hearing, is a message, not a biography. 17
Other Liberation theologians are not as skeptical as Miguez
Bonino. Segundo recognizes that there is no direct access to the
'historical Jesus', but this does not mean there is no access to him.
Segundo understands the interpretive process involves entering into the
hermeneutical circle within the biblical text. This means entering
into the dialogue that is occurring between the 'historical Jesus' and
his Few Testament interpreters.
The correct solution, it seems to me, lies in the realization that
the study of the historical Jesus, far from depriving the
interpretation of the witnesses (Paul, Matthew, etc.) of
importance, gives it its real value and ensures its future
relevance. Vhen we establish a certain distance between Jesus and
his interpreters, it is easier for us to discover the creative
work of the latter, the reasons for their interest in Jesus, their
set of problems and how the human being Jesus shed light on it.
Instead of being mere screens between Jesus and ourselves, such
people as Matthew, Mark, and Paul became witnesses in and of
themselves, not just to Jesus. They become real people with their
own meaningful content, and the latter makes them interesting to
us in turn.1e
Segundo understands that this process does not give us a definitive
interpretation. ¥e are still left with a plurality of christological
interpretations in the scripture.
In spite of this christological plurality in scripture, Liberation
theologians do believe that exegesis can provide us with a basic
understanding of the 'historical Jesus'. Miranda believes it is this
Jesus of the Few Testament which prevents us from arbitrarily creating
a christology to serve our own ideological concerns.19 Sobrino is also
in agreement that while we can not identify Jesus with historical
certainty, we can at least establish basic traits of Jesus with moral
certainty.20
Another issue which complicates the interpretive process is what
Croatto calls the reservoir of meaning within a text. Fot only is
there a plurality of christological interpretations in the biblical
text, but there are also dimensions of the text which only come to
light when interpreted within a particular context.
The meaning of Christ's praxis is codified in a text. This text,
both as linguistic structure and as message, lies open to
interpretation. This interpretation is not something added to the
original meaning. It is this same meaning, now read in a richer
and more inclusive dimension.21
For Liberation theology the context which enters into the
interpretive process is the context of socio-political oppression.
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This brings Liberation theology to read the 'historical Jesus' from a
particular interpretive vantage point. This vantage point is history
and its socio-political dimensions. Boff is representative of this
socio-political interpretive focus and describes it in the following
manner.
It examines and gives special emphasis to all the gestures, words,
and attitudes of Jesus that have to do with conversion, a change
in existing relationships, a rapprochement with those on the outer
margins of Jewish society, a predilection for the poor, a
willingness to challenge the religious and social status quo of
his day, and the political content of his proclamation of God's
kingdom.22
For Sobrino this is an interpretive process which historicizes the
figure of Jesus and makes him relevant for human existence in current
history.
The aim is not just to overcome the aura of mythology that
surrounds Christology and thus indirectly get at the real
Christian morality of Jesus. It also is looking for a focus that
will historicize the figure of Jesus in an authentic and truly
operative way. . . . The supposition is that in and through a real
historicization of Jesus we will discover the most profound
dimension of his existence as the Son, and hence the most profound
dimension of those whom 'he is not ashamed to call ... brothers.'
(Heb, 2:ll).23
This hermeneutic of historical praxis places Liberation theology
in contrast with the liebuhrian hermeneutic of mythical-symbolic
interpretation. The Niebuhrian position is closer to Miguez Bonino
when he states that the biblical text provides us with a message and
not a biography. This is not to say that Liberation theology rejects
mythical-symbolic language. Boff recognizes the vitality of such
language in indicating transcendent dimensions of human existence.
...myth, symbol, and analogy constitute the core of religious
language; we can speak only with great hesitation and must use
figurative and representative language when dealing with the most
profound realities of life, of good and evil, of joy and sorrow,
of human beings and the Absolute. ... this mode of expression is
more involving than cold conceptualization. Because it has no
tight and defined limits it is far more suggestive of the
ineffable and the transcendent than any other scientific language
or historical method. 2A
Where Liberation theology differs with Niebuhrian theology is the
starting place. Liberation christology begins with the historical
dimensions of the Jesus of the biblical text. In this way the socio¬
political dimensions of Jesus' life come to the fore in the development
of christology. It is this emphasis which is lacking in Niebuhr's
development of christology.
In contrast to Liberation christology, Niebuhrian theology is
suspicious concerning the optimism with which Liberation theology
identifies the 'historical Jesus'. This is especially true in regard
to Segundo and his assertion that a 'distance' can be established
between Jesus and his interpreters. Niebuhrian theology recognizes the
unresolvable obscurity of the historicity of Jesus. It is for this
reason that Niebuhr finds language of myth and symbol more helpful.
This dramatic-historical approach avoids the problems of historicity.
For this same reason, Niebuhrian theology questions Liberation theology
in its assertion that the 'historical Jesus' is less subject to
manipulation by interested parties. The recognition of the 'reservoir
of meaning' or interpretive flexibility in a text demonstrates an
ambiguity in the text which can be exploited to justify various
interests.
Hugo Assmann points out that establishing a description of Jesus
through exegesis of the biblical texts is not sufficient to ground a
christology. All christologies functioning within a particular context
can make the same claims due to the plurality of christologies in the
New Testament texts and the reservoir of meaning inherent in the text.
This means that other criteria are needed.This brings us to the
final movement of the hermeneutical circle: the movement from the
reading of the 'historical Jesus' to the socio-political context.
This move from the reading of the 'historical Jesus' to the socio¬
political context involves situating Jesus in current history. It is,
as Assmann understands, a question concerning where and through whom
Christ is operating in current history.26 This means that
christological reflection in the context of oppression looks to the
'historical Jesus' who provides the way of liberation. According to
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Sobrino and Boff, this christology is operative in Jesus as Liberator.
As Sobrino states;
Emphasis is placed on those christological elements that serve to
constitute a paradigm of liberation (e.g., the resurrection as
utopia and the kingdom of God) or to highlight practical ways of
understanding and realizing it (e.g., the socio-political activity
of Jesus and the obligation to follow in his footsteps).37
Boff understands that this hermeneutical move from the 'historical
Jesus' to the current context is a necessary move for every generation.
"Each generation ought to confront itself with the mystery of Christ
and try to give him the names that correspond to our living experience
of his inexhaustible reality".3® In this way christology is an open
ended process ever being realized within particular socio-political
contexts. For the context of Latin America this is a christology which
realizes Jesus as Liberator.
This realization of a Liberation christology within a context of
oppression means that this christology is one of crisis. Boff
understands that this hermeneutical process necessarily brings us into
confrontation with the 'historical Jesus' and his praxis in favour of
the oppressed and poor. This calls into question our historical praxis
and challenges us to discipleship in liberative praxis.3'3 Assmann also
understands that this christology places us in the conflict of the
socio-political situation. In following a Christ who is Liberator we
necessarily come into conflict with the many other 'christs' serving
other ideological interests.30
In the above we have briefly examined the hermeneutical process of
Liberation theology. It is now appropriate to move from analysis of
method to actual content. In the fallowing sections we will be
concerned with elaborating and assessing what Liberation theology
understands as the 'historical Jesus'. This analysis will be organized
under the headings of Ministry of Jesus, Death of Jesus, Resurrection
of Jesus, and Continuing presence of Jesus.
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"Historical Jesus": ministry of Jesus
For Liberation theology the 'historical Jesus' is thoroughly a
human being subject to all the dynamics of human existence. As Boff
states;
All that is authentically human appears in Jesus: anger and joy,
goodness and toughness, friendship and indignation. He possesses
all the human dimensions of vigour, vitality, and spontaneity. He
partook of all our feelings and the common conditionings of human
life...31
He also understands Jesus to be a person of imagination and good sense.
For Boff these are fundamental qualities of Jesus. Creative
imagination allows Jesus to perceive human beings as greater and richer
than the cultural environment that surrounds them. For Boff good sense
"consists in grasping the original nature of human beings, which we all
live and know but find difficult to formulate and translate into
images".3:2
In addition to these human qualities, Jesus is also a person
subject to limitation in knowledge and subject to temptation. Sobrino
understands that Jesus was subject to ignorance and to the process of
intellectual growth as is common to humanity. In the same way Jesus
was also subject to temptation throughout his ministry. In the face of
various historical limitations, Jesus was tempted to resolve these
conflicts in a manner inconsistent with his ministry.33
This limitation and conflict in Jesus' human existence leads to
another central concern of Liberation theologians. Liberation
christology wants to assert that Jesus' awareness of his relationship
to the Father and to his ministry were never possessed as static
absolute knowledge. Rather they assert that his awareness grew and
changed in relation to the concrete conflicts in which he found
himself. As Sobrino states;
Ve shall be studying the person of Jesus, whose awareness did not
grow mechanically but in connection with his own real-life praxis
and the conflicts it evoked. It also means that we shall stress
that there was a process of evolution going on in Jesus himself,
not only on the level of normal human development but also on the
theological level of his relationship with the Father.3A
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It is this developmental understanding of Jesus' self-awareness and his
ministry that provides the focal concern for reading the 'historical
Jesus'. For Sobrino this focal concern is identified as the faith of
Jesus. The faith of Jesus has to do with his historical praxis and its
development. In reading the 'historical Jesus' as the history of
Jesus' faith we place Jesus firmly in the socio-political context and
the conflicts of that context.3S
Niebuhrian theology agrees with the fundamental assertion of
Liberation theology concerning Jesus' humanity. Niebuhr agrees that
Jesus was subject to the conditioned and contingent existence common to
human beings and therefore was also subject to ignorance and
temptation.3e Niebuhr even goes so far as to reject metaphysical and
moral assertions of perfection or sinlessness in Jesus. In this regard
he agrees with Schleiermacher.
Schleiermacher is quite right of course in suggesting that to be
tempted means in a sense to have sinned; for temptation is a state
of anxiety from which sin flows inevitably. And this anxiety is a
concomitant of finite and insecure existence. It is not possible
for this reason to assert the sinlessness of every individual act
of any actually historical character.3'7'
Niebuhr takes this course in order to reject any reduction of Jesus to
simple historical facts that can be measured. As always, Niebuhr is
concerned to protect the transcendent dimension of Christ as mystery.
In order to accomplish this he understands 'perfection' and
'sinlessness' as embodied in the relational dynamic of agape. This
relational dynamic does not lend itself to measurement and therefore
maintains the paradox of Jesus who is fully human and yet the mediation
of divine agape. In this way mystery and transcendence are maintained
within the conditioned and contingent person of history.
Of course, Liberation christology is not concerned with Jesus'
humanity in order to maintain the paradox of a Jesus as fully God and
fully human. Liberation christology is concerned to explore the
humanity of Jesus in order to illuminate his faith as historical
praxis. For Liberation theology it is this faith as historical praxis
which gives content and direction to the task of following Jesus in
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contemporary history. It is to the content of this faith as historical
praxis that we now turn.
The faith of the 'historical Jesus' as praxis needs to be examined
from two perspectives. These two perspectives are the Fatherhood of
God and the Kingdom of God. Both of these dimensions of Jesus'
historical praxis are concerned with reference to the divine and are
religio-political in function. Both 'Father' and 'Kingdom' are in
reference to the one God revealed in Jesus' self-understanding and
ministry. Therefore, it must be kept in mind that this division is
somewhat artificial. The difference between 'Father' and 'Kingdom' has
to do with emphasis in examination rather than in the praxis of Jesus.
'Father' can be understood to refer to the relational, existential, and
'vertical' dimension while 'Kingdom' refers to the operational,
historical, and 'horizontal'.
Both Boff and Sobrino understand that Jesus had a unique
relationship with God wherein he knew him as Father.33 This Father-son
relationship is realized in the openness and nearness of God to Jesus.
Jesus is aware of God drawing close to him. It is this intimacy of
Father to son that gives Jesus the authority to speak and act in God's
name. As Boff states;
Ve believe that his profound experience of the Father, as well as
the corresponding sonship, constitute the basis of Jesus'
awareness of being the messenger and the inaugurator of the
kingdom of God. Jesus did not use the title 'Son of God' to
express this religious experience. But his sonship was the basis
for the primitive community to call him the only-begotten Son of
God. Intimacy with the Father gives him authority to speak and
act in the place of God.33
Sobrino also understands that it is in this relationship that Jesus is
conscious of his mission.
Alongside this movement of Jesus toward the Father in total trust
and confidence is Jesus' awareness of the Father's movement toward
him. The Father has given him a mission, and Jesus' response is
one of total obedience. *°
Sobrino perceives that the relationship of Jesus to the Father is one
of trust and obedience. This relationship consists of trust in the
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Father's presence and obedience to the mission which the Father
entrusts to him. For Sobrino this is the content of the history of
Jesus' faith: his trust in God and his fidelity to his mission.*1
The mission and ministry to which Jesus is called is that of
bringing other human beings into this relationship to the Father.
According to Boff this means that Jesus 'fleshes-out' the love of
God.4:2 He understands Jesus to be completely open to God and to
others, to love indiscriminately without limits. Boff calls this
quality 'being-for-others'; "The whole life of Jesus was a giving, a
being-for-others, an attempt to overcome all conflicts in his own
existence, and a realization of this goal".*3 Or as Gutierrez states;
"Loving us as a man, Christ reveals to us the Father's love".** Thus
in word and in deed, Jesus' historical praxis was that of proclaiming
God as Father full of mercy and inclusive love.
Sobrino wants to make a careful distinction concerning this
revelation in Jesus of God as loving Father. Remaining within the
relational categories of Father-son, he wants to emphasize that Jesus
is not the revelation of the absolute mystery of God, but rather the
revelation of the way of being a 'Son'.
Strictly speaking .., Jesus reveals the Son. And if we view Jesus
in terms of his concrete history, we can say that what Jesus
reveals to us is the way of the Son, the way one becomes Son of
God. Jesus does not, then, reveal the absolute mystery. He
reveals how one may respond to that absolute mystery through trust
and obedience to the mission of the kingdom.*5
In this way Sobrino is concerned to maintain that Jesus carries out his
praxis in confidence and trust in a transcendent God and also as Son of
the Father to carry out his mission as 'firstborn' and brother to other
human beings.
As 'firstborn' and brother to other human beings, Jesus calls
others to be children of God. Miranda understands that being children
of God is a functional rather than an ontological status.
Corresponding to the Father-son relationship, to be children of God
involves the relational dimension. To be a child of God means to love
your enemy, show compassion, be peacemakers.*5
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This historical praxis of fraternal love means that the presence
of Jesus discloses human sin. In the presence of Jesus, human beings
are made aware of their failure to be children of God. As Sobrino
states; "Jesus is aware of the fact that every human being can be an
oppressor, and that traits of oppressor and oppressed can be found in
all".
This historical praxis of fraternal love not only reveals the
general condition of sin in human life, it also has a specific
historical focus. As Boff and Segundo understand, this God of love
whom Jesus proclaims as Father is one whose love is preferential toward
the poor, the suffering, those socially and religiously marginalized.
This praxis of love creates a crisis in the socio-political situation.
Sobrino understands that Jesus does not limit his praxis of love to a
recognition of the universality of sin. "Jesus does not invoke this
universal theological truth to avoid spelling out clearly who is
oppressor and who is oppressed in a given concrete situation".'13 In
this manner the historical praxis of Jesus is a praxis of crisis
wherein the Father's love is made concrete in an option for the poor
and oppressed. It is a love which takes sides in a socio-political
situation. This will become more explicit when we examine the Kingdom
of God in Jesus' historical praxis.
liebuhrian theology agrees with Liberation christology that love
is the law of life and that Jesus Christ incarnates this agape in human
life and history. Vhere Niebuhr disagrees with Liberation christology
is concerning the emphasis and role of divine love. Niebuhr presents
the love in Jesus as an 'impossible possibility'. It is a transcendent
love which is impossible to human beings and only possible to God.
This divine agape in Jesus brings judgment on all forms of human love
and reveals them to be permeated with self-regard and sin. As Niebuhr
states concerning Jesus;
The final majesty, the ultimate freedom, and the perfect
disinterestedness of the divine love can have a counterpart in
history only in a life which ends tragically, because it refuses




His ethical doctrine contains an uncompromising insistence upon
conformity to God's will without reference to the relativities and
contingencies of historical situations. The animating purpose of
his life is to conform to the agape of God.®1
Niebuhr is concerned to maintain the 'historical Jesus' as a
symbol of God's absolute and transcendent love. A love which confronts
human beings as both mercy and judgement. Liberation christology is
not opposed to this transcendent dimension of divine love. Rather,
Liberation christology calls this exclusive 'impossible possibility'
into question. Hiebuhr is subject to the criticism that he tends to
portray Jesus exclusively in absolute terms. According to Niebuhr,
Jesus mates impossible demands on human beings; "Jesus ... made demands
upon the human spirit, which no finite man can fulfil, without
explicitly admitting this situation".And lived out an ideal of love
which can only exist as suffering love in human history. Liberation
christology is concerned to demonstrate the 'possible' found in the
'historical Jesus'. In examining the historical praxis of Jesus,
Liberation christology understands love to be more than suffering love
and 'impossible possibility'. They understand love to be a functional
commitment to the poor and oppressed in a way which is a 'possibility',
not only for Jesus in the relativities of his historical context, but
also for us as we follow Jesus in his praxis. Liberation theologians
understand that the divine love in Jesus causes him to take sides in
socio-political conflict. This exegesis by Liberation theologians
calls into question Niebuhr's abstracted symbol of the 'historical
Jesus'.
Another way of defining Jesus' ministry and mission is through the
concept of the Kingdom of God. As stated above, this concept defines
Jesus' ministry in operational and historical terms. Liberation
theologians understand that the Kingdom of God was central to the
praxis of Jesus. As Sobrino states; "The most certain historical datum
about Jesus' life is that the concept which dominated his preaching,
the reality which gave meaningfulness to all his activity, was 'the
kingdom of God"'.53 This Kingdom of God is defined by Boff as
following;
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The kingdom of God is the realization of a fundamental utopia of
the human heart, the total transfiguration of this world, free
from all that alienates human beings, free from pain, sin,
divisions, and death. ...
The kingdom of God is a total, global and structural
transfiguration and revolution of the reality of human beings; it
is the cosmos purified of all evils and full of the reality of
God.
Sobrino understands that there is a dialectic relationship between
Jesus and the Kingdom of God. Both the Kingdom of God and Jesus must
be understood in relation to one another. Jesus' identity and mission
are to be understood in relation to the God's reign and the historical
future. Without this dimension Jesus becomes separated from the
historical and prophetic faith of Judaism. But in like manner, the
definitive Kingdom of God is only revealed in the praxis of Jesus. In
this way Sobrino is careful to define the Kingdom of God as a dynamic
reality pertaining to the reign of God. It is not to be understood as
a static entity.ss
For Liberation theologians, Jesus' preaching and actions are not
simply declarations concerning the existence of the Kingdom of God.
Rather they understand that in Jesus' person the Kingdom of God has
arrived. Miranda perceives that this is what makes Jesus' praxis
' goodnews'.
According to Jesus and the New Testament authors this fact that
the kingdom is arriving is the truth believed, the object of
faith. Everyone knew that there was going to be a kingdom of God.
Everyone knew that there had to be an eschaton. No one doubted
that there had to be a Messiah. All that was easy to accept, for
it belongs to the unreal realm of concepts. But that all this was
really happening, that it was becoming present reality — that is
what the Pharisees, the conservatives, the establishment refused
to accept. -16
Thus it is to be understood that in the teaching and actions of Jesus
the Kingdom of God is being realized. As Boff states;
With Christ the kingdom has already begun to act in the world.
The old order is already moving in the direction of its end. A
sun has arisen that knows no setting; the time of liberation has
already made its breakthrough.
Different Liberation theologians express this same insight in different
ways. Rubem Alves speaks of the politics of God, of power that invades
history.513 Segundo understands that Jesus has set in motion mechanisms
that are constitutive of the reign of God.53 All these theologians
understand that the miracles in Jesus' ministry are the signs of the
Kingdom of God as transforming and dynamic power.50
This transforming power of the Kingdom is not a possibility of
human agency. Both Boff and Sobrino understand that the Kingdom
depends on God's initiative and comes from beyond the contingencies of
history. As Boff states;
When we say that the Kingdom of God expresses man's Utopian
longing, we do not mean to convey the idea that the Kingdom is a
mere organic extension of this world, as it is encountered in
history. The Kingdom does not evolve, but breaks in. If it were
the evolution of present possibilities, it would never surpass the
situation of the present, which is always ambiguous, with the
wheat and the darnel growing together.61
This presence of the Kingdom in Jesus' praxis is not to be
understood as the final and ultimate realization of God's reign. It
may indicate and to some extent realize that reign, but it is not the
eschatological Kingdom. As Segundo understands, the Kingdom in Jesus'
ministry exhibits a partial power. It does not transform the world but
leaves this to future divine initiative.5:2 Boff understands that there
is a dialectical tension in Jesus' presentation of the Kingdom as
present and as future.
In Jesus we find this dialectical tension properly maintained. On
the one hand he proclaims a project of total liberation: the
kingdom of God. On the other hand he displays mediating gestures,
actions, and attitudes that translate this project into the
ongoing process of history. On the one hand the kingdom is a
future reality yet to come; on the other hand it is present and
near at hand.53
This Kingdom of God which is actualized in Jesus' praxis is both
good news and judgement. In an absolute sense it is judgement on all
human endeavour. As Sobrino states;
God's kingdom does not confirm the present reality of humankind
and its history; rather, it passes judgement on that reality in
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order to re-create it. This crisis may be interpreted in many
different categories: temporal, existential, situational, or
practical. They all share the notion that people and history
cannot go on as before in the face of this proclamation of the
kingdom. No longer permitted to follow the old routine, people
and history must change.®4
The understanding of the Kingdom of God as eschatological
judgement does not prevent Sobrino from making an analysis of concrete
socio-political realities as relative approximations or rejections of
the Kingdom. It is in this regard that Sobrino understands sin. Sin
is not against God in the abstract, but against the reign of God.
The twofold commandment of laving God and neighbour is clearly
grounded in the logic of the kingdom. Sin is no longer seen as
directed against God but rather against the kingdom of God.
Divine filiation is broken because human brotherhood is broken.es
This Kingdom of God is also specifically goodnews for some and
judgement for others in the context of a socio-political environment.
Segundo makes this clear.
important is the fact that the kingdom itself cannot be
preached indiscriminately as good news, as gospel. The kingdom is
destined for certain groups. It is theirs. It belongs to them.
Only for them will it be a cause for joy. And, according to
Jesus, the dividing line between joy and woe produced by the
kingdom runs between the poor and the rich.es
According to this understanding of the Kingdom, it is judgement to
oppressors and the powerful and good news to the marginalized, the
poor, the oppressed, and the powerless. Sobrino presents this
partiality in the Kingdom as fundamental to Jesus' praxis.
Despite the gratuitous nature of the approaching kingdom, Jesus
performs acts and gestures indicative of the kingdom's presence or
dawning approach. His most fundamental gesture is taking sides
with human beings in a concrete situation where the existing
politico-religious structure has dehumanized people. It has
turned those with power into brutes, while alienating and
oppressing everyone else. Jesus does all he can to concretize and
make present real love as the quintessence of the kingdom.ST
liebuhrian theology is in agreement with much of Liberation
theology as regards the Kingdom of God. As divine love and human love
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are organically related, so too is the eschatological Kingdom and the
partial realizations of the Kingdom in history. Niebuhr is in
agreement with Boff that dialectical tension is maintained between the
presence of the Kingdom in history and the final realization of the
Kingdom at the end of history.
The kingdom of truth is ... not the kingdom of some other world.
It is the picture of what this world ought to be. This kingdom is
thus not of this world, in so far as the world is constantly
denying the fundamental laws of human existence. Yet it is of
this world. It is not some realm of eternal perfection which has
nothing to do with historical existence. It constantly impinges
upon man's every decision and is involved in every action. ee
With this understanding of the Kingdom, Niebuhrian theology agrees with
Liberation theology that the Kingdom is a source of judgement and
crisis that demands socio-political response.
The Kingdom of God is relevant to every movement of history as an
ideal possibility and as a principle of judgement upon present
realities. Sometimes it must be obeyed in defiance of the world,
though such obedience means crucifixion and martyrdom. Sometimes
courageous obedience forces the evil of the world to yield, thus
making a new and higher justice in history possible. Sometimes
the law of the Kingdom must be mixed with the forces of nature
which operate in the world, to effect at least a partial
mitigation of oppression.
While Niebuhrian theology agrees with Liberation theology in
principle concerning the relevance of the Kingdom of God to current
history, Niebuhr does not develop this understanding christologically.
Niebuhr maintains that Jesus is the disclosure of the hidden
sovereignty of God in history and the disclosure of the fulfilment of
that sovereignty in the eschatological future. In this manner he
emphasizes that Jesus is the disclosure of meaning.
Prophetic and apocalyptic hopes anticipated an end which would
both disclose and establish the sovereignty of God; which would
both reveal the meaning of life and fulfil it. In Jesus' own
reinterpretation, these two facets of history's culmination are,
at least partially, separated. The indication of this separation
is given in the double affirmation on the one hand that the
'Kingdom of God has come' and on the other hand that the 'Kingdom
of God will come' . On the one hand, history has reached its
culmination in the disclosure of the hidden sovereignty of God and
the revelation of the meaning of life and history. On the other
hand history is still waiting for its culmination in the second
coming of the triumphant Messiah.70
With this emphasis on meaning, Niebuhr maintains Jesus and Kingdom
of God as symbols which serve as ethical ideals in relation to
historical endeavour. This means that Niebuhr does not develop a
reading of the 'historical Jesus' and the Kingdom which includes
involvement in the ambiguities and relativities of socio-political
life. He develops an understanding of this involvement for those who
live under the disclosure in Jesus of the Kingdom as an ideal. But he
does not develop this socio-political involvement in the life and
ministry of Jesus himself. Thus, Hiebuhr does not emphasize the
commitment of Jesus and the Kingdom of God in relation to the poor and
oppressed. He maintains Jesus and the Kingdom as relational ideals
that serve as points of judgement and ethical stimulus. In maintaining
the Kingdom of God as the symbol of 'hidden sovereignty' Miebuhr can be
seen to be neglecting the operational side of the Kingdom of God in the
praxis of Jesus which includes the taking of sides in socio-political
conflict.
It is appropriate at this point to examine in detail how
Liberation christology understands Jesus to be involved in this socio¬
political conflict. Liberation theologians recognize that Jesus'
praxis is primarily prophetic and religious and seeks the liberation of
human beings. And because this prophetic and religious praxis seeks
liberation, it also has a political dimension. As Croatto states:
"Jesus' praxis is prophetical — denouncing oppressive evil and
proclaiming the liberation of the oppressed — but with a necessary
reference to politics".71
Central to this religio-political understanding of Jesus' teaching
and activity is the use of power. Liberation theology understands that
Jesus rejects two papular understandings of the Kingdom of God and the
power associated with the establishment of those respective kingdoms.
The first of these means of establishing the Kingdom is that held by
the Zealots. This is the way of violent revolution resulting in the
overthrow of Roman domination. Liberation theologians understand that
Jesus rejected this use of coercive power. They understand that he
rejected the way of the Zealots for two reasons. The first reason is
that the project of the Zealots would reduce the Kingdom of God to the
horizon of Jewish nationalism. Croatto makes clear that he perceives
in Jesus a rejection of this reduction.
...Jesus did nothing we know of to liberate the Jews from the
Roman yoke. It appears that he made no political and nationalist
commitment like that of the Zealots. When all things are put in
perspective, it is precisely here that we see his lucidity and his
greatness. Had he been a revolutionary leader on the surface of
the revolution, he would have been doing the Jews a favour — but
his activity would have been exhausted on this political, racial,
and geographical level.
The second reason why Jesus is understood to reject the project of
the Zealots is because the use of coercive power is alien to the love
found in the Father and the Kingdom of God. Sobrino and Boff
understand that God's love does not dominate or coerce. The Kingdom
that Jesus' embodies in his praxis is not one established through
imposition or force, but rather comes as grace. As Sobrino states;
According to Jesus ... God's coming was an act of grace. He did
not espouse religious nationalism or political theocratism. The
basic temptation facing him and others was the temptation to
establish God's kingdom through the use of political power. The
only true power in Jesus' eyes was the power embodied in truth and
love.73
Sobrino understands that Jesus rejects the idea that God possesses and
wields power in history. He understands that power in history tends to
be oppressive in fact and therefore cannot be the ultimate mediation of
God. As Sobrino states; "Over against the nation of Gad as power Jesus
sets the notion of God as love".7"1
The second popular understanding of the Kingdom of God which Jesus
rejects is that held by the Jewish religious authorities. In this
conflict Jesus rejects a kingdom established by obedience to religious
legalism. Jesus is against 'tradition' when it puts distance and
difficulty between people and the Kingdom. As Croatto states;
Jesus initiates his program of liberation by redeeming human
beings rescuing them from the structural power of the law, from
the 'traditions' and from the marginalizing prejudices of
institution, sect, race, and religion. He denounces the
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legalistic 'justice' of the Pharisees ... and the perverted and
alienating 'authority' of the Sadducees.7,5
It is in this confrontation that we perceive the religio-political
praxis of Jesus. Liberation theologians understand that this
confrontation was not merely 'religious'. It was a confrontation with
the social fabric and structures of domination maintained by religious
authorities. Thus, to confront the religious authorities was to call
into question the systems and structures which also had political and
economic dimensions. Ellacuria perceives the 'cleansing of the temple'
as an example of this religio-political praxis.
Any action touching religion was perforce an action touching
public life, and although Jesus' immediate emphasis was not upon
the socio-political but upon the socio-religious, his action could
not have been interpreted as anything short of a grave act of
interference with the prevailing power structure.
The clearest proof of this is that those who dominated the
religion of Israel, and through it the social structure and life
of the people, saw in Jesus, just as they had in John the Baptist,
a major threat to their preeminence and power. By attacking their
monopoly of faith in Yahweh, by impugning the need for their
mediation in an individual's encounter with God, Jesus was
undermining the power of the priestly establishment. More than
this, he was placing in danger . . . the delicate balance between
the people and the power of the Ramans, within which equilibrium
the Jewish authorities were manoeuvering in order to maintain
themselves in their acquired status. Finally, he endangered the
source of their income, as can be appreciated in the cleansing of
the temple.76
It is because of this praxis of prophetic confrontation with religious
authority and its structures and systems of domination that Liberation
theologians can describe Jesus as a religio-political agitator77,
reformer76, and revolutionary76. It is in this regard that Ellacuria
and Segundo understand that Jesus was more 'political' and more of a
threat than the Zealots. While the Zealots were concerned with the
overt dimensions of political power, Jesus undermined the religio-
social foundations of the systems and structures of power. His attack
was on the social fabric that supported religious authority and gave it
legitimacy.130
As has been stated before, Jesus' socio-political praxis is
realized by 'taking sides' within a social context of conflict. It is
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this 'taking sides' which creates the political dimension in Jesus'
ministry. Sobrino understands that it is this political dimension
which makes love relevant.
Jesus' universal love is 'political' in that it seeks to be real
and effective in a given concrete situation. That is why Jesus'
universal love takes different concrete forms, depending on the
situation. He manifests his love for the oppressed by being with
them, by offering them something that might restore their dignity
and make them truly human. He manifests his love for the
oppressors by being against them, by trying to strip away all that
is making them less than human. In short, Jesus' love is
political because it is situated in the concrete. It is
proclamation and hope, denunciation and anathema.®1
This understanding of religio-political praxis and 'power' both
agrees and disagrees with Niebuhrian theology. Niebuhr agrees with
Liberation theology that Jesus was a prophetic presence and was a
threat to the power of the priests.31:2 He also agrees that Jesus
rejected messianic expectations of both the Zealots and the Jewish
religious authorities.e® And he is in agreement that Jesus rejected
the use of coercive power. The difference that Niebuhr has with
Liberation christology is the degree to which Jesus is understood to
embody powerlessness.
It is impossible to symbolize the divine goodness in history in
any other way than by complete powerlessness, or rather by a
consistent refusal to use power in the rivalries of history. For
there is no self in history or society, no matter how impartial
its perspective upon the competitions of life, which can rise to
the position of a disinterested participation in those rivalries
and competitions. It can symbolize disinterested love only by a
refusal to participate in the rivalries. Any participation in
them means the assertion of one ego interest against another.
For this reason Niebuhr is concerned to present Jesus as the 'suffering
servant' who in powerlessness represents the disinterested love of God.
Jesus' own conception of history was that all men and nations were
involved in rebellion against God and that therefore the Messiah
would have to be, not so much a strong and good ruler who would
help the righteous to be victorious over the unrighteous, but a
'suffering servant' who would symbolize and reveal the mercy of
God; for only the divine forgiveness could finally overcome the
contradictions of history and the enmity between man and God.es
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Here again we can see where liebuhr emphasizes the 'historical
Jesus' as the symbol of suffering love. ¥hile there is agreement
between Niebuhrian christology and Liberation christology on the
rejection of coercive power, there is not agreement on other dimensions
of 'power'. Niebuhr understands that disinterested divine love must be
removed from the rivalries and competitions of social life. Liberation
theology understands just the apposite. Liberation theology
understands that disinterested love is not concrete unless it enters
into the rivalries and competitions of social life for the sake of all
parties involved. It is interesting to note that Uiebuhr's theology
agrees with this understanding of love and social involvement. It is
his christology that emphasizes a passive suffering love in order to
maintain the 'historical Jesus' as the symbol of impartial grace that
imparts forgiveness to sinful collective humanity. This emphasis means
that the partiality of the 'historical Jesus' in his socio-political
context is neglected.
In concluding this section on the ministry of Jesus it is
appropriate to examine Sobrino's developmental understanding of Jesus'
praxis. As has already been stated, Sobrino understands that an
examination of the 'historical Jesus' is an examination of Jesus'
faith. This faith is composed of a basic trust and confidence in God
as Father and a commitment to the mission of making the Kingdom of God
present. Sobrino perceives that this faith as praxis is fundamentally
historical and is therefore subject to relative knowledge and social
conflict. This historical dimension of faith and praxis necessitates
change and growth in Jesus' awareness and practice of his mission.
Sobrino maintains that we can observe two distinct phases in Jesus'
ministry. In the initial phase of Jesus' ministry he can be perceived
as an orthodox Jew fulfilling the prophetic role of Hebrew tradition.
In this role Jesus proclaims and anticipates the Kingdom of God. This
is done through his teaching, miracles, and forgiveness of sins. In
this praxis, Jesus demonstrates that he is in service of the Kingdom
and that his prophetic condemnation of sin is that of sin against the
Kingdom and God's coming. In this phase, sin is understood as
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rejection of the future and the reign of God. At this point Jesus
understands the Kingdom to be immanent in time.®0
Sobrino understands that this embodiment of Jesus' faith through
prophetic praxis reaches a crisis which requires a reinterpretation.
He calls this the 'crisis in Galilee'.
It is given that geographical label because Jesus abandons the
heart of Galilee, heading first to Caesarea Philippi and then
toward the ten towns of the Decapolis on the borders of Syria and
Phoenicia. This geographical break in Jesus' activity expresses
an even deeper break in the person of Jesus himself. Jesus comes
to realize that he has failed in his mission as he had previously
understood it. The crowds are abandoning him, the religious
leaders of the Jewish people will not accept him, and God is not
getting any closer with power to renovate reality. So there is a
real break in both the internal awareness and the external
activity of Jesus.07
In this crisis Jesus is tempted to close his heart to his mission.
Jesus comes to see clearly that his historical way of living out
his trust in the Father and his obedience to his mission cannot
proceed according to its old logic. He is tempted to withdraw
into seclusion, to picture his mission more in terms of some
restricted sect. That is why the Gospels talk about him
withdrawing from his usual geographical haunts and heading to more
distant regions. This geographical retreat symbolizes the
temptation to close his heart to his mission. Jesus does overcome
that temptation, but it will entail a radical change in his
understanding of himself and his mission.00
This reinterpretation of his faith and praxis means that he comes
to a new understanding of his relationship to God as Father and a new
understanding of how he is to make the Kingdom of God present.
The referential pole of his life continues to be the Father. He
continues to have confidence in him, but now that confidence finds
nothing in which to root. It becomes a confidence or trust
against trust. ... Fidelity to the Father now stands in the
presence, not of the Father's imminent coming, but of Jesus'
imminent death. And Jesus sees his death as the death of his
cause. Letting God remain God now lacks any verification; it is
done in the absence of any verification at all.
Insofar as the kingdom of God is concerned, Jesus no longer
sees its imminent arrival. He also realizes that people have
rejected it as an ideal. His work in favour of the kingdom no
longer means placing all that he has at its disposal but rather
placing all that he himself is at its disposal. He must surrender
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Ms ideas and his person, accepting death. The power which he
displayed at the start of his public life, and which was
concretely embodied in his miracles, has now proved to be
ineffective. All that is left is the power of love in suffering.
His attitude toward sin is no longer embodied in the analysis
and prophetic denunciation of a sinful situation. Jesus must now
shoulder the very burden of sin.133
Sobrino understands that this shift in Jesus' praxis and self-
understanding means that Jesus now takes on the role of the 'suffering
servant' of Yahweh and that the Kingdom of God now has its focus in
Jesus. Jesus is now the new and painful way into the Kingdom and
eschatological salvation is determined by a person's stance in relation
to Jesus himself.30 Sobrino also perceives that this new praxis also
entails intensification of the temptation to resolve conflict through
coercive power. This temptation reaches its peak at Gethsemane.
After the Galilean crisis we see the growing intensification of
Jesus' conflicts. He has serious disputes with the priests, and
he drives the merchants out of the temple. Jesus realizes that
his life in in great jeopardy, and his disciples are now armed.
It is in this concrete context that he agonizes over the use of
power and feels the full weight of the temptation in that
direction. It truly seems that only the use of force can save
him. The agony in the garden is poles apart from any serene
perplexity. It is the total, absolute crisis of the logic of the
kingdom with which Jesus commenced his public life. Overcoming
this temptation no longer means some intentional overcoming of the
power of Satan as it did at the start of his public life; now it
means succumbing to Satan's power. Luke puts it in a bold phrase:
'This is your hour — the triumph of darkness!' (Luke 22:53). The
temptation cannot be overcome by fleeing from the conflictive
situation and the public gaze, by going off and forming some
isolated sect. It can only be overcome by immersing oneself in it
and allowing oneself to be affected by the power of sin.31
In comparison with liebuhrian christology there is little that can
be said in relation to this developmental understanding of Jesus'
praxis. As has already been noted, Niebuhr's christology emphasizes
this latter praxis of Jesus, emphasizing his role as suffering servant
and the embodiment of suffering love. The question can be raised from
Sobrino's perspective as to whether liebuhr has neglected the first
phase of Jesus' praxis which proclaims and anticipates the Kingdom of
God in history.
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This developmental understanding of Jesus' ministry "brings us to
the point where we can now move to examine the death of Jesus.
"Historical Jesus": death of Jesus
Jon Sobrino understands that; "At the very centre of Christian
faith lies the assertion that Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of God, died
by crucifixion".32 This statement recognizes that the Cross is to be
understood from two interpretive perspectives. The first perspective
is what Sobrino calls a 'slice of real history'. This 'slice of real
history' is "something that happened to a concrete human being who
lived the nearness of God and a life of service to human beings as no
one ever had before".33 The second perspective is that the Cross and
death of Jesus is to be understood as a theological symbol.
This twofold reading of the death of Jesus is necessitated by the
dialectical relationship which exists between the Cross and
resurrection. Sobrino and Boff both understand that the Cross and
resurrection must be understood in relation to one another.3"1 Boff
understands that the death of Jesus is a historically ambiguous event
which only becomes clarified in light of the resurrection.3® Thus, any
reading of the death of the 'historical Jesus' will also include a
theological reading of this event. In the following we will be
concerned initially with the 'slice of history' and subsequently with
the symbolic reading of the death of Jesus.
Both Boff and Sobrino perceive the Cross and death of Jesus to be
historical in the broadest sense of the word. They both reject the
theological understanding of the death of Jesus on the Cross as a
trans-historical divine decision. For Boff and Sobrino, the Cross and
the death of Jesus is the result of the specific historical realities
surrounding Jesus' life. It is the result of Jesus' decision to live
out God's love and embody the Kingdom of God within the relative socio¬
political realities of first century Palestine. As Sobrino states;
"The cross is not the result of some divine decision independent of
history; it is the outcome of the basic option for incarnation in a
given situation".3®
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In this historical understanding of the Cross and the death of
Jesus there can be perceived both continuity and discontinuity in
relation to Jesus' mission. Alves, Miranda, Segundo, Boff, Sobrino and
Gutierrez all recognize that the continuity in Jesus' life and death is
that of religio-political conflict.3"' Jesus confronted and threatened
the power and privilege of the religio-political authorities. In this
manner, Boff and Sobrino understand Jesus to die the death of a prophet
in continuity with his life mission.383 Segundo makes explicit this
prophetic and political dimension of Jesus' life and death.
. . . Jesus, once he was in Jerusalem, did nothing to dispel the
fatal misunderstanding that would necessarily picture him as a
political agitator; it explains why he did the very opposite, in
fact. He makes no effort to dispel the misunderstanding because
there is no such misunderstanding. ¥hen he is delivered into the
hands of men, it is because his message has reached its natural
goal, because it has been completely comprehended.331
Liberation theologians understand that the Cross is no accident in
the life of Jesus. It is the consequence of his life work. It is an
end which he has provoked and chosen. As Boff states;
Jesus chose and embraced death freely. He did not accept it as a
biological fate; instead he freely sacrificed his own life in
order to bear witness to his message. 'Mo one takes it from me.
I lay it down freely' (John 10:18). His death is witness, not
punishment; free choice, not fate.100
In this manner, Jesus' death by crucifixion is understood to be in
continuity with the self-giving love and voluntary suffering which
marked his conflictual life.
But Liberation theologians also understand that there is
discontinuity between Jesus' mission and his death. While Jesus died
the death of a prophet, Sobrino understands that he did not die the
death of a martyr. He understands that there is distinct discontinuity
between Jesus' life and his death. "... Jesus dies in total
discontinuity with his life and cause. The death he experienced was
not only the death of his person but also the death of his cause".101
Sobrino perceives this discontinuity in relation to Jesus' message
about the nearness of God and the immanent arrival of the Kingdom. His
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death stands in contradiction to his cause and message. Jesus is left
to face death in trust and faith in God in spite of the seeming absence
of God. Boff and Sobrino both agree that Jesus died abandoned by the
Father. As Sobrino states; "Jesus dies as the Son, as the one who
proclaimed the nearness of his heavenly Father and then died completely
abandoned by that Father".102 This is the scandal of the Cross and of
Jesus' death. This is also the source of ambiguity in Jesus' death
which only becomes clarified in the light of the resurrection.
In accepting the Cross, Jesus expressed his hope and faith in the
Father in spite of God's seeming absence and the death of his cause and
work. Boff understands that Jesus becomes a totally liberated self in
this approach to death. The Cross marks the ultimate expression of
Jesus' self-giving to, and faith in, God.103
Liberation theologians interpret Jesus' acceptance of death in
different ways. As examined in the previous section, Sobrino
recognizes that Jesus accepts the role of the 'suffering servant of
Yahweh'. While most Liberation theologians recognize that Jesus
accepted this role, they differ on their interpretation of his motive
for acceptance of a role that leads to death. Sobrino understands
that Jesus accepts this role because it is the only way to remain
faithful to God in a situation where people wanted a very different
God. In remaining faithful to Gad he embodies the trial of this God
concerning the true nature of God and the true essence of power.10"1
Boff understands Jesus' acceptance of death in a manner which
corresponds to Sobrino's interpretation. Boff perceives that Jesus
accepts death as imposed on him by historical circumstances. Yet Boff
also understands that Jesus embraces this death in his own free will in
fidelity to the cause of God. For Boff, it is Jesus' faithfulness in
self-giving love which leads him inevitably into conflict, arrest, and
death by crucifixion. 1 os Segundo embraces the most extreme
interpretation of Jesus' acceptance of death. He understands that
Jesus accepts the route to persecution and death because of its long
term critical affect on dominant ideologies. He perceives Jesus'
decision as one concerned with efficacy. He also speculates that Jesus
may not have really believed that this route would actually lead to
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death. He speculates that perhaps Jesus thought the Kingdom would
intervene or that he thought he had more time.1015
Kiebuhrian theology is in agreement with Liberation theology when
it recognizes that the death of Jesus is the result of his self-giving
love. liebuhr recognizes that it is Jesus' self-giving love which
leads him to the ultimate expression of love in self-sacrifice,
liebuhr differs from Liberation theology in that he neglects the socio¬
political processes surrounding this death. liebuhr's primary concern
is with the Cross as a theological symbol rather than as a socio¬
political event. For this reason he narrows the historical dimension
of Jesus' life to the insight that self-giving love in history leads
him to the Cross. This primary concern with the theological symbol of
the Cross almost leads him to give the Cross and death of Jesus
exclusive meaning independent of the life and work of Jesus. As
Niebuhr states concerning Jesus;
The animating purpose of his life is to conform to the agape of
God. His life culminates in an act of self-abnegation in which
the individual will ceases to be a protagonist of the individual
life; and the life ends upon the Cross. The Cross could not have
the symbolic significance for Christian faith if the life and
doctrine were not consistent with it. But on the other hand the
Crass symbolizes the perfection of love more consistently than any
cumulation of individual acts.107
liebuhr's christology can easily be described as a christology of
the Cross. He is concerned that this Cross be historical, but he does
not explore the various dimensions of that history. His primary
concern is with the Cross as a theological symbol of divine self-giving
love. It is therefore appropriate at this point to place Hiebuhr in
comparison with Liberation theology as regards the Cross and death of
Jesus as theological symbol.
As already stated, the Cross and death of Jesus is to be read as
both a 'slice of history' and as theological symbol. It is to be read
as theological symbol because, as Sobrino states; "... the resurrection
turns the cross into an ever open question about God".10® Thus, the
Cross is subject to interpretation concerning its significance in
relation to God.
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An initial meaning of the Cross as symbol is that it signifies the
human relationship to God as that of confrontation. Boff understands
that the Cross reveals human self-empowerment and self-sufficiency
which rejects God and God's project of liberation.
The cross is the symbol of what the world can do, with its piety
(pious people, not bad people, condemned Jesus), with its zeal for
God and with its dogma and its revelation, understood as self-
sufficient models. The cross is a paradigm of a set of priorities
based on self-sufficiency, and organized as a power or religion.
These involved the rejection of the future, of the kingdom as the
totality of liberation and of Jesus as the forerunner and bearer
of this liberation.103
As Boff states; "The cross was the real symbol of the kingdom of
man".11°
In a similar line of thought Sobrino understands that the Cross
confronts our conception of God and reveals the human tendency to
create a god which conforms to our interests and goals.
There is actually a contradiction between the true God and the
knowing subject who approaches the cross. The first thing that
the cross reveals about God is human hubris: People fashion images
of God that are in direct contradiction to the real God.111
This brings us to second meaning of the Cross as symbol. It is a
revelation of God. Sobrino and Alves agree that the Cross signifies a
God who suffers with and for human beings in history.113 For Sobrino
this is the revelation of divine love.
On the cross God's love for humanity is expressed in truly
historical terms rather than in idealistic ones. Historical love
presupposes activity, but it also presupposes passivity because it
is love situated in a contradictory structure that makes its force
and power felt. The passivity involved here is that of letting
oneself be affected by all that is negative, by injustice and
death.113
For both Sobrino and Alves, this suffering love is the key to
understanding God's relationship to history. By means of suffering
love God negates the negative within human history. As Sobrino states;
On the cross God does not show up as one who wields power over the
negative from outside; rather, on the cross we see God submerged
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within the negative. The possibility of overcoming the negative
is realized by submersion within the mechanisms and processes of
the negative.114
This is not to say that either Sobrino or Alves understand that
suffering love in history will at any point eliminate the negative in
history. Both understand this to be an eschatological solution. But
they do understand divine suffering love to be an ongoing source in
history for the negation of the negative in history. As Alves states;
"Because God has elected himself for history and man, his sufferings
will continue, with man and history, until the end of the world".115
Sobrino understands the Cross to be the symbol of both God's
contradiction of humanity and of God's solidarity with humanity through
suffering love. He understands that the Cross symbolizes a process in
the life of God wherein God is immersed in history and history brought
into God.
The cross suggests that the reality of God may be viewed as a
process that is open to the world. Through the Son, God actively
incorporates himself into the historical process; through the
Spirit, human beings and history are incorporated into God
himself. Thus human life can be described as a participation in
God's process.11®
It is at this point that Hiebuhrian theology comes into conflict
with Liberation theology. While Niebuhrian theology agrees with many
of the insights of Liberation theology concerning the symbolic
significance of the Cross, it can not agree with Sobrino's concept of
divine suffering love as historical process. In opposition to
Sobrino's position, liebuhr understands the Cross to signify God's
agency in history from beyond history. Niebuhr emphasizes the
transcendent rather than the immanent divine immersion in historical
process. For Niebuhr there is no negation of the negative in history.
The negation of the negative comes from beyond history and is
ultimately realized beyond history. This transhistorical negation of
the negative is called 'forgiveness'. Forgiveness has impact on human
beings in history but it is not to be found in the process or
structures of history.
- 213 -
The significance of the affirmation that God is revealed in
Christ, and more particularly in his Cross, is that the love
(.agape) of God is conceived in terms which make the divine
involvement in history a consequence of precisely the divine -
transcendence over the structures of history. The final majesty
of God is contained not so much in His power within the structures
as in the power of His freedom over the structures, that is, over
the logos aspects of reality. This freedom is the power of mercy
beyond judgement. By this freedom He involves Himself in the
guilt and suffering of free men who have, in their freedom, come
in conflict with the structural character of reality. The agape
of God is thus at once the expression of both the final majesty of
God and His relation to history.11'7.
For Hiebuhr the Cross signifies the divine judgement and mercy
toward human beings. With Liberation theology, Niebuhrian theology
agrees that the Cross is a symbol of judgement which reveals human
pride and the rejection of God. It also agrees with Liberation
theology that the God of the Cross is one who suffers with and for
human beings. But liebuhr emphasizes that the suffering of God is that
of assuming human sin and the judgement which sin incurs. As liebuhr
states; "The good news of the gospel is that God takes the sinfulness
of man into Himself, and overcomes in His own heart what cannot be
overcome in human life, since human life remains within the vicious
circle of sinful self-glorification on every level of moral
advance".11® This is not to say that liebuhrian theology rejects the
Liberation idea that the Cross reveals divine solidarity with human
suffering. Rather, it does reject this idea if solidarity means that
human suffering is a dimension of a divine process in history.
In previous criticism of liebuhr we indicated that his emphasis on
the Cross as the symbol of divine self-giving tends to lead him to
neglect the historical dimensions of the life and death of Jesus.
While this indicates a weakness in terms of historical breadth, it also
must be recognized that this emphasis on the symbolic nature of the
Cross has certain strengths. Niebuhr's understanding of the Cross, as
the revelation of divine agape exercised in judgement and mercy,
creates a symbol which is transhistorical and which stands beyond the
continual debates concerning the historicity of, or portrayal of, the
'historical Jesus'. In the Cross of Jesus Niebuhr finds a perfection
of divine agape which is historically relevant and yet is not
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historically relative. It stands as a transcendent norm which is
universally applicable in human history as the source of judgement and
mercy.
The Cross symbolizes the perfection of agape which transcends all
particular norms of justice and mutuality in history. It rises
above history and seeks conformity to the Divine love rather than
harmony with other human interests and vitalities. . . . The Cross
represents a transcendent perfection which clarifies obscurities
of history and defines the limits and what is possible in historic
development. 11 -1
This difference between Niebuhrian theology and Liberation theology
concerning the role of history will become more explicit as we examine
the resurrection of Jesus.
"Historical Jesus": resurrection of Jesus
Liberation theologians are concerned that the Cross and
resurrection be seen as one salvific event. This concern is founded in
*
light of the historical separation of the Cross and resurrection in the
traditional christologies of Latin America. Hugo Assmann is
representative of this concern. He perceives traditional christologies
as separating the Cross and resurrection and applying these to
different social groups. In this traditional use of christology, the
Christ of the Cross is the Christ of the poor and oppressed. The
crucified Christ represents the impotence, defeat, sacrifice, and
sorrow, which is the destiny of the poor. In like manner, the
resurrected Christ, the Christ who is the ascended Lord and King, is
the Christ for those in power.120 It is for this reason that
Liberation theologians are concerned to maintain that the resurrected
Christ, the Christ of faith, is none other than the 'historical Jesus'
who suffered persecution and death. For Sobrino it is not important
that someone was resurrected. Rather, it is important that Jesus in
particular was resurrected because he also was condemned, executed, and
abandoned.121
In the examination of the death of Jesus we began with historical
considerations related to the Cross. ¥ith the resurrection of Jesus we
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begin with the same concern. Alves, Segundo, Boff, and Sobrino, all
understand that the resurrection of Jesus from the dead is not an event
subject to scientific historical verification. 122 As Boff states, the
resurrection can only be grasped by faith.
At this point, historians are of little use to us. The
resurrection is not an ordinary historical fact capable of being
grasped by historians. It is a fact grasped only by faith.123
This recognition of the limitation of historical verifiability does not
mean that Liberation theologians deny the literal resurrection of Jesus
of Nazareth. Rather, it is central to their christology that the
'historical Jesus' was raised from the dead by God. Boff is
representative of this acceptance of the resurrection as an event in
the life of Jesus to which his followers became witnesses.
The resurrection is not the theological creation of some
enthusiastic follower of the person from Nazareth. Faith in the
resurrection is the fruit of the impact on the apostles of the
apparitions of the living Lord. They were startled and overcome
by this impact that was beyond their capacities of representation.
Without this, they would never have been a church, warship, nor
glory given to the name of this prophet from Nazareth. Much less
would there have been the greatest witness to this truth: the
martyrdom of so many in the early church.124,
Boff understands that it is only because of the resurrection that
the process of christological reflection is possible. The resurrection
necessitates a re-interpretation of what was apparently the failed
cause of a Jewish prophet. The resurrection forces a re-evaluation
concerning Jesus' ministry, his person, and the significance of his
death. Sobrino understands that the resurrection is the perspective
from which the soteriological import of Jesus' life and death became
apparent. It is also from this perspective that the theological
affirmation that Jesus is the Son of God becomes a possibility.123
This brings us to consider the theological significance of this
event. One theological aspect of the resurrection is that of
eschatological promise. Sobrino understands that while the
resurrection is narrated as a historical event, it is primarily an
eschatological event. He understands that the resurrection can be
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termed 'historical' because it is the fulfilment of the definitive
promise of God and indicates the future as promise. ,ae Segundo also
perceives the resurrection in this manner.
The narratives of Jesus' appearances are not historical: not
because they are false but because they are more than historical.
They belong to the eschatological plane, the plane where the
meaning of history is judged and verified.12'^
In this manner the resurrection is not only the verification of Jesus'
life, ministry, and sacrificial death, it is also the source of hope in
the historical future.
This hope in the historical future is concentrated around several
theological affirmations in relation to the resurrection. The first of
these is the assertion that in the resurrected Jesus we have revealed
the destiny of human beings. Both Boff and Sobrino understand that
God's ultimate word of love has been spoken in the resurrection of
Jesus. In this event God has revealed the divine commitment to the
transfiguration of human life. As Boff states;
Human hope was realized in Jesus resurrected and is already being
realized in each person. To the question: What is to became of
humankind? Christian faith joyfully answers: resurrection, as
total transfiguration of the human reality, both corporal and
spiritual.12e
In this way Boff understands that the resurrected Jesus is the
paradigm for human life and destiny.
Death was overcome, all the latent capacities in being and human
beings were realized, and the human person was inserted into the
divine sphere. Christ became the new being, the new Adam, the new
heaven and the new earth, the realization of human hopes for
total, human-divine liberation and realization. Christ assumed a
unique function in history: He became a reality-symbol and a
Gestalt (type, profile) for us.129
It is for these reasons that Boff and Sobrino want to emphasize the
significance of the biblical image of the resurrected Jesus as the
'firstborn' of many brothers and sisters (Rom, 8:29; I Cor. 15:20; Col.
1:18; Rev. 1:5; Acts 3:15).130
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A second theological assertion related to the resurrection of
Jesus is that concerning God's relationship to history. Boff is a
primary example of a Liberation theologian who perceives in Jesus'
resurrection the revelation of a teleological force in history. For
Boff, the resurrected Jesus is the last link in a historical and
evolutionary process. In Jesus the future is guaranteed by God.131 In
Boff's interpretation, the resurrected Jesus is immanent in history and
in all cosmic reality.
The earthly Jesus, before the resurrection, was a prisoner to the
coordinates of space and time, the limitations of a carnal body.
Now, by means of the resurrection, the new man emerged, no longer
carnal but pneumatic, for which the body is no longer a limit but
total cosmic presence and communion with all reality. The
resurrected Christ fills all reality, thus realizing to a maximum
degree his being-in-others and his being-for-others.132
Boff understands that Jesus is the eschatological human being who
reveals our future and who, in his presence in the present, draws us
into that future.
Christ, therefore, in our evolutionary perspective, is the Omega
Point, that point where the whole process finds its goal in a
personal being and hence is extrapolated into the divine sphere.
In him God is already all in all (I Cor. 15:28) and the centre
between God and creation. The human being whom God sought and who
is fully his image and likeness (Gen. 1:26) is not so much that
first man who emerged from the animal, but the eschatological
human being who broke through to God at the end of the whole
creational-evolutionary process. Christ, incarnate and
resurrected, has the characteristics of the ultimate human being.
The human being latent in the ascending process became patent in
him: He is the homo revelatus. Hence he is the anticipated
future, the end manifesting itself in the middle of the journey.
Because of this he assumes a determining, motivating, integrating,
orientating role and is the magnet that attracts those who are
still in a painful and slow ascent toward God.133
Sobrino interprets the resurrection as revealing a historical
dialectic of the future. Unlike Boff, his dialectic does not emphasize
the immanence of the resurrected Jesus as a teleological force in
history. Sobrino understands that the resurrection indicates that God
has taken history into the divine self. But this relationship does not
mean that God ceases to be transcendent, His transcendence is
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expressed as future promise. Thus, Sobrino maintains a relatively
stranger dialectic between the present and the future than is found in
Boff's evolutionary position. Yet Sobrino also understands that
history is in the process of fulfilment. He is careful to distinguish
that this fulfilment is not a potentiality in the structure of history
but rather comes as promise from the God of the future.
The resurrection is a still unfinished reality. It is still in
the process of fulfilment insofar as its saving efficacy is
concerned. In its historical structure, then, the revelation of
God effected in Christ's resurrection is a promise. His
resurrection cannot be comprehended by broadening the meaning of
some conception of history because it is not a possibility in the
world and in history but a possibility for the world and for
history.13"
This understanding of the resurrection as a revelation of the
dialectic relationship between the present and the future as promise
leads to a third assertion concerning the significance of the
resurrection. Liberation theologians understand the Cross and
resurrection to illustrate an ongoing dialectic of human agency in
history. Alves perceives this dialectic of the Cross and resurrection
to be the ongoing politics of God. He understands the resurrected
Jesus to be a 'factor' of history rather than a 'fact' of history.
Participating in this dialectic means taking part in God's ongoing
suffering in the world and also in God's power of love which negates
the negative and opens up hope for the future.13-"5
Boff also presents the relationship between the Cross and
resurrection in this manner. He understands that the Cross indicates
the 'kingdom of humanity' and that the resurrection indicates the
liberating Kingdom of God. This dialectic between Cross and
resurrection continues in history as human beings reject God's
liberation or realize relative historical liberations.136 Boff also
understands that the resurrection has specific meaning in regard to
those who give their lives within this dialectic process.
The resurrection of the crucified Jesus shows that it is not
meaningless to die for other human beings and God. In Jesus'
resurrection, light is shed on the anonymous dead of all those who
have lost out in history while fighting for the cause of justice
and ultimate human meaningfulness. 137
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Similar to Alves and Boff, Sobrino also understands that the Cross
and resurrection indicate a dialectic of human agency in history. The
Cross is found in the love which continues to suffer in history and the
resurrection is found in the promise which continually opens up the
possibilities of history. At the centre of this Cross-resurrection
dialectic is the power of love. Sobrino understands that it is this
dialectic which maintains love as divine power in history. As Sobrino
states; "¥ithout the resurrection love would not be authentic power;
without the cross this power would not be love".1383
liebuhrian theology agrees with much of Liberation theology as
regards the resurrection. liebuhr recognizes the significance of the
resurrection in regard to the re-interpretation of Jesus' ministry and
his death. He recognizes that the resurrection was fundamental for the
creation of the Church. He also agrees that while the resurrection is
not accessible through historical science, it never-the-less was the
conviction of the early Church that it was a 'fact'. A 'fact' which he
asserts can only be known by faith and repentance.1331
liebuhr also agrees with Liberation theology when it identifies
the resurrected Jesus as the revelation of the future for human beings.
It is concerning this topic that Niebuhr examines the idea of the
general resurrection at the consummation of history. For Niebuhr the
resurrection is a source of hope in a future wherein God completes the
incompleteness of human life and history.1AO
Once again the difference between Liberation theology and liebuhr
concerns the relation of the resurrection to history. In opposition to
a historical dialectic of the future, liebuhr maintains a dialectic of
transcendence. For liebuhr the resurrection does not reveal a
dialectic at work in history, but rather a dialectic which is trans-
historical. In this regard the resurrected Jesus is the revelation of
the telos which gives history its meaning and reveals its future. But
at the same time the resurrected Jesus is also the revelation that
history can not complete itself and that only divine transformation can
bring history to its consummation. Therefore history must have a finis
as well as a telos. For Niebuhr, this trans-historical 'end' is the
only resolution for the ambiguities and distortions found in history.
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For Niebuhr the resolution of the negative in history can never be
achieved within history. Thus, the resurrection is the revelation of
divine mercy and power which can and will resolve the problems of human
history and existence.
If ... the New Testament faith ends in the pinnacle of the hope of
the resurrection this is also the final expression of a faith
which sees no hope that man may overcome or escape the contingent
character of his existence; yet is not without hope, for it is
persuaded that a divine power and love has been disclosed in
Christ, which will complete what man cannot complete; and which
will overcome the evil introduced into human life and history by
man's abortive effort to complete his life by his own wisdom and
power.141
Corresponding to Niebuhrian criticism of Liberation theology
concerning historical process, is the difference in the interpretation
of the Cross and resurrection as a dialectic of human agency in
history. Niebuhrian theology does agree with Liberation theology that
the Cross continues to be expressed in human life. Niebuhr perceives
that self-giving love will always be suffering love in history. Where
Niebuhrian theology disagrees with Liberation theology is in the
attempt to find a historical correspondence for the resurrection. For
Niebuhr, the resurrection can only indicate the trans-historical
resolution found in divine love and power. Thus, the dialectic of
Cross and resurrection is not a dialectic of agency within history, but
rather a relational dialectic between God and human beings.
The climax of the crucifixion and resurrection . . . becomes not
merely the culmination of the whole series of revelations but the
pattern of all subsequent confrontations between God and man.
They must contain the crucifixion of self-abandonment and the
resurrection of self-recovery. Men must die to sin with Christ
and arise with him to newness of life. 14:2
As has been illustrated above, the primary criticism of Liberation
christology from the Niebuhrian perspective is its interpretation of
the resurrection as an event which reveals a divine intimacy with
history which leads to an optimism concerning the possibilities of the
historical process. Having recognized this tendency within Liberation
theology, it must be asked of Niebuhrian christology whether its
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dialectic of transcendence does not represent the opposite extreme.
This will be a primary question as we examine the continuing presence
of the 'historical Jesus'.
"Historical Jesus": continuing presence of Jesus
Liberation theologians understand that the resurrected Jesus
continues to be present in history as a spiritual force. In this
regard Jesus is the 'Christ of faith' with whom communion is
experienced in worship and prayer. But Liberation theologians are wary
of an understanding of the spiritual presence of Christ which can be
reduced to the subjective and personal religious experience of worship.
Sobrino makes it clear that access to the Christ of faith is only by
means of the 'historical Jesus'.143 In this manner Liberation
theologians maintain that the continued spiritual presence of Jesus the
Christ also includes historical dimensions. It is these various
historical dimensions of the spiritual presence of the 'historical
Jesus' that we will now examine.
An initial understanding of Jesus' spiritual presence is through
the memory of his history. Sobrino and Boff understand that the memory
of the history of Jesus creates a critical consciousness which serves
to summon human beings to re-create his history in current history. As
Sobrino states;
So long as domination and protest have not been overcome
completely, so long as sinfulness and conflict perdure in history,
Jesus will ever remain present as a 'dangerous' memory and a point
of crisis. He will remain to call our own path into question on
the basis of his own historical path. But the innermost core of
his history will be turned into reality only insofar as his
followers re-create his path rather than merely retrace it. In
this way the history of Jesus as history will serve as spirit,
standing in need of flesh to concretize itself.144
Uiebuhr has a similar understanding of the function of the history
of Jesus. He differs from Boff and Sobrino in that he is more aware of
the problems surrounding any simple identification of Jesus' life,
death, and resurrection as history. Niebuhr prefers to identify the
history of Jesus in a symbolic rather than literal manner. Thus,
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Niebuhr refers to Jesus' history as story, epic, and drama.1'1'1 This
does not change the fundamental role of Jesus' history as that which
creates a crisis in the human's self-understanding in relation to God
and history. Where Niebuhr differs from Liberation theology is
concerning the content of the revelation in the story of Jesus.
Niebuhr emphasizes the revelation of God's sovereignty as judgement and
mercy which calls into question all human attempts to complete history
and promises divine completion at the end of history. Niebuhr
emphasizes the transcendent dimension in the drama of Jesus' life.
This transcendent dimension finds ultimate realization in the
impossible possibility of Jesus' self-sacrificial love.
This difference that Niebuhrian theology has with Liberation
theology does not necessarily exclude the historical relationship which
Boff and Sobrino are concerned to maintain concerning the history of
Jesus and current historical practice. Understanding the history of
Jesus as story, drama, or epic, does not mean that it must be void of
historical dimensions such as the socio-political relationships which
Liberation theologians are concerned to identify. In this manner, the
mare sophisticated understanding of Jesus' history as story, drama, and
epic, can be the revelatory medium for both Niebuhr's concern for
transcendent self-giving love and Liberation theology's concern for
historical practice. What is lost to Liberation theology is the
ability to appeal to the authority of the historicity of Jesus' life.
But from the perspective of Niebuhrian theology this is not a loss
since the historicity of the life of Jesus is beyond exegetical
verification. For liebuhrian theology, the authority of the story,
drama, or epic, is in its function as the revelation of historical
meaning and as a medium of divine confrontation and forgiveness. Or
from the Liberation perspective, its authority is in its function as
revelation of human-divine praxis in history which summons human beings
to re-create that praxis.
This brings us to consider the second way in which the 'historical
Jesus' continues to be present. This second way of spiritual presence
is the continuing historical praxis of Jesus embodied in contemporary
human praxis. Sobrino understands that communion with the risen Christ
occurs in this continuation of praxis.
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Contact with Jesus is rendered possible only when our attitude is
one of service to the kingdom of God. To put it in
straightforward but pointed terms, we can say that Jesus'
intrinsic relationship to the kingdom means that our contact with
him will not come primarily through cultic acclamation or
adoration but through following Jesus in the service of God's
kingdom.
Boff and Gutie'rrez both agree with Sobrino that Jesus continues to be
present in history through human beings who engage in the following of
Jesus.1""'7 By means of this 'fallowing' or discipleship, the history of
Jesus is re-created. This discipleship is described by Sobrino as
follows.
Ve can now describe the nature of this following or discipleship.
First, it is a praxis, a line of action similar to that of Jesus
himself. The following of Jesus is a summons to collaborate with
the kingdom of God. Second, this action is structurally akin to
that of Jesus, and here we have an unvarying constant in Christian
praxis. It is directed toward the public sector, toward the
concrete manifestations of politics, bodily life, and the cosmos.
Third, its applications will vary with time and place. Hew forms
of sin, misery, and alienation will keep cropping up in history,
and they will call for new ways of overcoming them in practice.
Fourth, the following of Jesus is a praxis in which one
experiences the same sort of structural conflicts that Jesus did.
One encounters the power of evil over truth and love on the
political and religious level, and even on the level of God
himself. One confronts God's silence and relative historical
impotence in the face of evil. It is this that gives rise to a
hope against hope. Fifth, the one outstanding difference between
the follower and Jesus is that Jesus suffered and died in solitude
whereas his followers suffer and die in communion with him. 1
Liberation theologians make it clear that this discipleship is not
to be understood as an imitation of the history of Jesus. The history
of Jesus reveals motives and attitudes which Jesus actualizes within a
specific socio-political and religious context. For the Liberation
theologian, re-creating the history of Jesus does not mean making the
same socio-political decisions which Jesus made. But rather it means
re-creating his same motives and attitudes within a different socio¬
political and religious environment. This will involve different
decisions and the adoption of a course of action which may differ
greatly from those of the 'historical Jesus'. Sobrino and Boff
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recognize that one of the major differences between the 'historical
Jesus' and the contemporary realization of Jesus' praxis in
discipleship concerns the expectation of the imminent arrival of God's
Kingdom. As Sobrino states;
The long delay in the arrival of the parousia puts the Christian
in a situation that is fundamentally different from that of Jesus
himself. The difference is not fundamentally theological, because
God ever lies in the future both for Jesus and the Christian. The
difference lies in the fact that Christians must look for a
hermeneutics that will take due account of the way in which their
situation differs from that of Jesus. It must explain the
following of Jesus in the context of a history that does not seem
to be near its end as yet, and that therefore will require all
sorts of analyses if we are to organize history on our way toward
the kingdom of God. ¥e must now engage in religious, social,
economic, and political analyses. Thus the following of Jesus
must take due account of Jesus' own basic attitudes and motives,
but it cannot come down to any mere 'imitation' of Jesus. 14-3
Leonardo Boff understands that this re-creation of Jesus'
historical praxis finds its highest level of historical concretion in
the Church. It is the Church which specifically has the task of
carrying forward the message and mission of Jesus in novel historical
contexts.
. . . God realized his kingdom only in his Envoy. Consequently a
path was opened up for a church with the same mission and message
as Christ: little by little to announce and bring about the
kingdom of God among human beings. The goodnews ought to be
announced, not only to the Jews but to all, that the final destiny
of humankind and all reality is good and this destiny is corporal
and eternal life. The church carries the cause of Christ forward
in the world, at the same time giving witness to and realizing it
under the veils of faith, love, hope, and mystery.150
In this manner the Church realizes its historical role as the community
of faith and the body of Christ.
Niebuhr is in agreement with Liberation theology that the history
of Jesus contains normative aspects in relation to contemporary life.
Where he differs is concerning the content of Jesus as norm. liebuhr
understands that Jesus is the 'second Adam' in which is revealed the
'essential' human. In this way Jesus is the norm of human nature in
its ultimate expression as self-giving love.
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Christ as the norm of human nature defines the final perfection of
man in history. This perfection is not so much a sum total of
various virtues or an absence of transgression of various laws; it
is the perfection of sacrificial love.1®1
For liebuhr this norm is not a possibility within history. Jesus
as norm of sacrifical love is a norm which is over history and which
reveals both the perennial corruption of love and also the ultimate
fulfilment of love in God. Uiebuhr uses the biblical symbols of
'first' and 'second' Adam to indicate this dialectical tension in
history between the distorted achievements of human existence and the
norm of human existence in Jesus.
The whole character of human history is ... implicitly defined in
the Christian symbolism of the 'first' and 'second' Adam. To
define the norm of history provisionally in terms of prehistoric
innocency is to recognize that a part of the norm of man's
historic existence lies in the harmonious relation of life to life
in nature. To define it ultimately in terms of a sacrifical love
which transcends history is to recognize the freedom of man over
his own history without which historical creativity would be
impossible. The actual historic achievements of man in history,
his creation of larger and larger units of 'brotherhood', the
building of city-states, nations and empires, are always corrupted
by the twin evils of the tyrannical subordination of life to life
and the anarchic conflict of life with life. There is therefore
no pure ethical norm in history; nor any hope of history gradually
purifying itself so that it will achieve this norm. The
'essential', the normative man, is thus a 'God-man' whose
sacrificial love seeks conformity with, and finds justification
in, the divine and eternal agape, the ultimate and final harmony
of life with life."52
This normative role of Jesus over history is to be understood as
trans-historical rather than ahistorical. While liebuhr emphasizes the
transcendent nature of this norm, it is none-the-less the medium for
the empowerment of human agency in history. This norm mediates divine
judgement and mercy which requires the corresponding human response of
contrition and faith. In judgement and contrition human beings come
into awareness of their attempts to complete their own lives. In mercy
and faith they embrace divine power which completes their
incompleteness. This completeness is not to be understood as realized
in historical existence. It is the power of forgiveness which provides
- 226 -
newness of life through faith and. hope. It is this forgiveness and
mercy which is continually providing the human being with new
possibilities and potential in spite of his or her constant subjection
to finite limitations and impulses to self-regard. Niebuhr identifies
this power as grace or 'Holy Spirit' which provides human life with
resources which human beings do not have of themselves. In this manner
Jesus as norm is both the indicator of limitation in historical
endeavour and also the source of power for achievement in history.1S3
To understand that the Christ in us is not a possession but a
hope, that perfection is not a reality but an intention; that such
peace as we know in this life in never purely the peace of
achievement but the serenity of being 'completely known and all
forgiven',; all this does not destroy moral ardour or
responsibility. On the contrary it is the only way of preventing
premature completions of life, or arresting the new and more
terrible pride which may find its roots in the soil of humility,
and of saving the Christian life from the intolerable pretensions
of saints who have forgotten that they are sinners. 1S4-
In the same manner Niebuhrian theology is in qualified agreement
with Boff that the Church is the continuing body of Christ. Once again
Niebuhr differs in emphasis in relation to Liberation theology. For
Niebuhrian theology the Church is the continuing focus of divine
judgement and mercy. The Church continues to be conscious of its own
limitations and failures as individuals and as a group, and of its
continuing need of divine forgiveness. At the same time Niebuhr also
recognizes that the Holy Spirit is a power in the life of the Church
and that the Church will achieve relative embodiments of Christ's
praxis.
... the Church is the body of Christ and ... the noble living and
the noble dead in her communion help to build up in her the living
Christ, a dimension of life which transcends the inclinations of
natural man. It is consequently natural and inevitable that the
faithful should regard genuine acts of love as proceeding from
propulsions which are not their own, and should confess with St.
Paul, 'I, yet not I, but Christ that dwelleth in me.'1ss
A third understanding of the continuing presence of Jesus is that
of universal spiritual immanence in all human beings. This position of
universal immanence is held by Boff and Gutierrez.1Boff understands
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that Jesus is hidden, 'incognito', behind each human face. He
understands that Jesus, "... as glorified and present in each person,
is acting and fermenting the goodness, humanity, brotherhood,
communion, and love in all human beings".13'7
This issue of universal immanence has been addressed in earlier
chapters.1ss liebuhrian theology stands in stark contrast to this
position. liebuhr understands that this position of universal
immanence leads to an optimism toward human history and existence which
is unwarranted.
. . . the idea of the immanent Christ in man, just as a completely
immanent logos in history, obscures the real dialectic between the
historical and the eternal. It fails to recognize that the
freedom of man in history, whether conceived in rational or
mystical terms contains possibilities of both good and evil.13®
In the same manner Niebuhrian theology disagrees with Boff and
Guti/rrez that Jesus is the revelation of general divine spiritual
presence. Hiebuhr maintains that Christ is the revelation of the
holiness of divine spirit which is both transcendent and relevant to
human life. Niebuhr maintains a dialectical position in contrast to
universal immanentism.
According to the Christian faith, Christ is the criterion of the
holiness of spirit. He is the criterion of holiness because the
revelation of God in Christ is on the one hand an historical focus
of the divine, through which the mystery of the divine becomes
morally and socially relevant to human nature, involved in
finiteness and unable to comprehend the eternal. On the other
hand it is the unique character of the revelation of God in Christ
that it makes the divine and eternal known in history without
giving any particular or partial force, value or vitality of
history a sanctity or triumph which its finite and imperfect
character does not deserve. Christ is thus both the criterion of
the holiness of spirit and the symbol of the relevance between the
divine and the human.130
A fourth and final way in which Liberation theology understands
Jesus to have a continuing presence is related to the presence of the
poor and oppressed. This christological significance of the poor and
oppressed is not a recent assertion in Latin American theology.
Gutierrez likes to draw awareness to Fr. Bartolome de Las Casas of four
- 228 -
centuries past, who during the conquest, referred to the oppressed
amerindians as the 'beaten Christs of the Indies',1®1 Liberation
theologians understand the christological significance of the poor and
oppressed in different ways. Boff and Gutie'rrez tie the significance
of the poor and oppressed to their understanding of divine immanence,
This allows them to find a literal presence of Christ in the poor
whereby a relationship with the poor is identical with a relationship
with Christ. Boff understands this presence to be sacramental in
nature.
Historically, the eternal Son, in whom we are God's offspring
(Eph. 2:10), became incarnate as the suffering Servant. Hence all
the sufferers of history are special sacraments of Jesus Christ,
the suffering Servant. In them we find a deeper and more
concentrated presence of Christ.1®2
As stated above, Niebuhrian theology rejects this sacramental position
in favour of a dialectical relationship between the divine and history,
or groups within history. It resists identifying any group with a
'deeper and more concentrated presence of Christ',
This rejection of an immanent christological significance in the
poor and oppressed does not exhaust the christological significance of
the poor and oppressed. Other Liberation theologians explore this
issue in a manner concerning which liebuhrian theology has little
response. Sobrino and Vidales understand that the oppression which
Jesus suffered is continually re-enacted in contemporary oppression.1®3
In this way the Cross is a continual historical reality and all
oppression carries with it christological significance. Sobrino
understands that the Cross of Jesus and the divine sorrow associated
with it continues in current oppression. Thus, God continues in
solidarity and sorrow with the 'crucified' of history. It is this
divine solidarity and sorrow concerning the poor and oppressed which
provide a focus for the discipleship described above. It is in this
way that the poor and oppressed become a mediation of spiritual
encounter with Christ. Sobrino understands that the presence of the
poor and oppressed mediate a crisis wherein conversion and discipleship
can take place.
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The systematic importance of this point for any historical
theology of liberation lies in the fact that the privileged
mediation of God ever continues to be the real cross of the
oppressed, not nature or history as a totality. It is there that
we find something totally other than a 'natural' conception of
God. Oppressed persons are the mediation of God because, first of
all, they break down the normal self-interest with which human
beings approach other human beings. Merely by being there, the
oppressed call into question those who approach, challenging their
'being human'; and this radical questioning of what it means to be
a human being serves as the historical mediation of our
questioning of what 'being God' means. That is why those who do
approach the oppressed get the real feeling that it is they who
are being evangelized and converted rather than those to whom they
seek to render service.1SA
This understanding of the poor and oppressed as a mediation of
divine encounter is a general understanding of christological
significance. Boff understands that this significance becomes more
specific in those who find that discipleship leads to oppression and
death like that of Jesus.
Today the passion of the mystical Christ, embodied in the lives of
those who are sacrificed for the cause of justice, preserves the
same structure as the passion of the historical Jesus. Like
Jesus, many people today are being persecuted and killed for
defending the rights of the lowly and the just claims of the poor.
They suffer this fate out of fidelity to God, who asks them to
sacrifice their lives for those causes. Those causes are greater
than life itself, because they are the causes of God and God's
kingdom. 1
This continuing of the 'historical Jesus' through the
'crucifixion' of the oppressed and the poor has no parallel in
Niebuhrian theology. This is not to say that Hiebuhr has no
understanding concerning the theological significance of other human
beings. He does understand that there is a sense of common solidarity
as we exist under the judgement and mercy of God.
Gratitude for what life is in its essence creates a propulsive
power to affirm in existence what is truly essential, the harmony
of life with life. Furthermore, under the insights of such a
faith, the fellow man becomes something more than the creature of
time and place, separated from us by the contingencies of nature
and geography and set against us by the necessities of animal
existence. His life is seen under the aura of the divine and he
participates in the glory, dignity and beauty of existence. We do
not love him because he is 'divine'. If that pantheistic note
creeps into prophetic faith it leads to disillusion. He is no
more divine than we are. We are all imbedded in the contingent
and arbitrary life of animal existence and we have corrupted the
harmless imperfections of nature with the corruptions of sin. Yet
we are truly 'children of God' and something of the transcendent
unity, in which we are one in God, shines through both the evil of
nature and the evil in man. Our heart goes out to our fellow man,
when seen through the eyes of faith, not only because we see him
thus under a transcendent perspective but because we see ourselves
under it and know that we are sinners just as he is.iee;
The specific identification of the poor and oppressed as mediators
of christological significance is a challenge to liebuhrian theology.
Liberation theology perceives a continuity of the historical experience
of the Cross which gives contemporary 'crucifixion' corresponding
theological importance. Where Biebuhrian christology leaves judgement
and mercy at the Cross of Jesus, Liberation christology perceives
continuing divine judgement and call to discipleship in the 'crosses'
of history. This is not to say that Liberation theology seeks to deny
the transcendent dimension of divine mercy and judgement found in
Hiebuhrian theology. But it is equally concerned that divine encounter
have a location in history in continuity with the 'historical Jesus'.
This brings to a conclusion our examination of the 'historical
Jesus' of Liberation theology. It is now appropriate to identify the
primary christological affirmation which guides Liberation theology and
which is founded in the above 'historical Jesus'.
Theological affirmations
In our examination of Liberation christology we have not dealt
directly with the classical christological formulations of historical
doctrine. This is not because Liberation theology does not address
such issues as incarnation, two natures of Christ, or the Trinity.
These classical christological formulations have not been addressed in
this study because of limitations of length and more importantly
because the classical christological formulations are not the central
concern of Liberation christology. The different Liberation
theologians integrate the classical doctrines into their reflections in
various ways. But these theologians are concerned to emphasize the
a
significance of Jesus in a way which may or may not be in continuity
with the affirmations of classical christology. It is beyond the scope
of this study to assess their varied adaptation and re-interpretation
of the classical formulations. What is central to this study and to
the issue of justice is the primary affirmation of Liberation
christology that Jesus Christ is to be understood as Liberator.
The title of Leonardo Boff's booh, Jesus Christ Liberator,
expresses this central christological affirmation of Liberation
theology. This title indicates that the human, historical, Jesus has
universal significance as the Christ. And that this understanding of
'Christ' is one which has to do with ongoing liberation which is
historical and socio-political rather than exclusively eschatological
and trans-historical. In this manner Jesus is understood as the 'way',
and 'firstborn', providing a model for human-divine collaboration in
the historical process of realizing relative concretions of the Kingdom
of God. Boff and Sobrino are in agreement that the primary task of
christology is the identification and re-creation of the liberating
praxis found in Jesus. As Sobrino states; "... the most urgent task of
Christology is to reposition the path and course of believers so that
their lives can be a continuing, advancing discipleship, a following of
Jesus, and hence a process of concrete filiation as his life was".1®7
This theological affirmation of Jesus Christ Liberator stands in
contrast to liebuhrian christology. Mebuhrian christology presents
Jesus as Christ Crucified who is the 'second Adam'. As Christ
Crucified, Jesus is understood as the revelation of divine love which
through judgement and mercy takes the consequence of human sin into
himself. At the same time Jesus is the revelation of the 'second Adam'
which indicates the ultimate completion of human life in God. In both
these affirmations the Niebuhrian concern is with the transcendent and
trans-historical dimension of the theological significance of Jesus.
This contrast between Liberation christology and Kiebuhrian
christology is not necessarily one of mutual exclusion. Both these
positions could be seen as emphasizing different dimensions of a
complete christology. Kiebuhrian christolagy can be seen to qualify
the optimism of Liberation theology concerning the achievements of
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history, the epistemological accessibility of the divine in history,
and the moral agency of human beings. liebuhrian christology also
recognizes the exegetical inaccessibility to the 'historical Jesus' and
develops a more sophisticated approach to the 'historical Jesus'
through the concepts of 'story, drama, and epic'. In a similar manner
Liberation christology prevents Niebuhrian christology from realizing a
tendency toward an abstract symbolic christology which is in danger of
being ahistorical. Liberation christology farces on Uiebuhrian
christology the 'historical' dimension of the Jesus narrative. It
forces Hiebuhrian christology to recognize the socio-political
dimension of the 'historical Jesus'. This socio-political dimension
finds concretion in the divine solidarity with the poor and oppressed
who carry in their 'crucifixion' christological significance. In this
way Liberation christology establishes a historical dimension which is
lacking in liebuhrian christology. This mutual modification allows a
complete christology to maintain both historical and trans-historical
dimensions which are inclusive of the theological affirmations of both
Christ Crucified and Jesus Christ Liberator.
The significance of christology far a theology of justice
Liberation and liebuhrian christologies provide us with the
theological grounding for a theology of justice. liebuhrian
christology provides the trans-historical reference points of divine
agape and the Kingdom of God. These transcendent norms, or 'impossible
possibilities', illuminate the task of justice concerning its
limitations and possibilities. This theological foundation in
christology becomes the source for toleration, humility, and
forgiveness in the realization of justice in history.
In like manner, Liberation christology provides historical
reference points for orienting the task of justice. One of these
orienting paints is the 'historical Jesus' which serves as a source for
the creation of a strategy of discipleship. This discipleship, or
'following' of Jesus, is a creative model for pursuing justice within
the conflicts of a particular socio-political context. Host
importantly, in relation to this discipleship, Liberation christology
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provides tlie poor and oppressed as a reference point for assessing
justice and creating strategies of justice.
These themes of Liberation and Niebuhrian christology provide the
task of justice with theological breadth which is inclusive of a
transcendent horizon of reference as well as a theological reference
within the conflicts of socio-political life. It provides the task of
justice with the divine norm of agape as well as the concretion of love
identified with the poor and oppressed. These theological themes set
the limits to optimism concerning future achievement of justice in
history and also prevents complacency concerning the degree of justice
which has currently bean achieved.
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9. LIBERATION VALUES AID ETHICAL PRAXIS
In previous chapters we have examined the theological method and
primary themes of Liberation theology. In this chapter we will examine
the values which compel liberation praxis. The values which are at the
heart of Liberation praxis are love and the Kingdom of God. These two
values are intimately related and are fundamentally one reality. Both
are are two ways of expressing the one reality of divine-human
relationship. The identification of this reality in two values helps
in the examination of different dimensions of the one reality. Love
has to do with relational inclusiveness and self-giving while the
Kingdom of God has to do with the future and the promise of completion
of all present partial achievements. But this distinction between love
and the Kingdom of God must be seen as somewhat artificial. For love
is the law of the Kingdom and the Kingdom is the consummation and
perfection of relationships.
Love as as a value of liberating praxis
Liberation theologians understand that God's love is gratuitous
and universal. It is gratuitous in that it is a free and unmerited
love for human beings. As Gustavo Gutierrez states; "God's love, like
all true love, operates in a world not of cause and effect but of
freedom and gratuitousness". 1 It is for this reason that Liberation
theologians also understand this gratuitous love to be universal. This
universal and gratuitous love makes all human beings brothers and
sisters under one divine parent.
Jon Sobrino understands that this gratuitous love is dialectical
in relation to human existence. ¥hile it is a free and unmerited love
of human beings, it is not acceptance of the oppressive inequalities of
human social life.
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From the viewpoint of content, the Christian God is love but,
once again, love in a specific sense. This love contains a 'Yes'
and a 'No' to the real world. Logical priority belongs to the
definitive 'Yes' that God says to the world. But this 'Yes'
requires that we first hear a 'No' that God says to oppression.2
It is for this reason that Liberation theologians understand that
God's gratuitous and universal love is expressed by partiality to
specific human beings. Sobrino identifies these specific human beings
as those who are in need.3 In the context of Latin America it is the
poor and oppressed who are the receiptient of this preferential love.
Victorio Araya is representative of this understanding of divine
preferential love for the poor as the concretion of God's universal and
gratuitous love.
The partiality of God's love for the poor shows us the gratuity
of that love — the gratuity of a love addressed to the poor
because they are poor, because they suffer injustice and death,
and not because they may be 'spiritually poor' or morally good.
That is, God loves the poor regardless of their moral and
personal dispositions ...A
This partiality does not deny the universal nature of God's love, but
as Araya states; "The universality of God's love passes by way of its
partiality toward the poor ...".s
It is in the context of this gratuitous and preferential love that
Gutierrez perceives divine justice. God's justice is characterized by
solidarity with the poor and a willingness by God to suffer with and
for the poor. This is a justice which can not be confined to a narrow
conception of merit. It is an expression of God's freedom and
goodness. Gutierrez refers to the gospel parable of the prodigal son
as an example of this divine parental love which transcends any
formalities of human justice.®
This gratuitous love of God is the format for the praxis of human
love. In divine love human life finds its meaning and possibilities.
Within this context, human love is a response to divine love. This
human love seeks to achieve correspondence to God's gratuitous love in
human relationships. Liberation theologians understand that this love
has limitless possibilities in human life. As Leonardo Boff states;
"There are no limits to the human capacity for loving".2 This is not
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to be understood as the ability to achieve the perfection of divine
gratuitous love. As Segundo Galilea states; "Our love is a caricature
(Rom. 12:9). Our selfishness, our worries, and our sensitivity hold us
back".® Galilea is representative of the awareness that perfect love
is an eschatological reality and not one definitively achieved in this
world. But this does not deny the possibility of living out gratuitous
love. For Sobrino this is the ultimate possibility of human life.
The ultimate possibility open to human beings is that they should
live the very life of God or, in other words, do within history
that which finds expression in the essential reality of God,
namely, love in a way that re-creates, saves, and gives life.'3
In regard to the universality of God's lave this means that our
love is to also be universal. Sobrino states that we are to love human
beings because God first loved them. 10 Gutierrez makes the point that
this love for human beings is not merely the result of God's prior love
but must also be love of the human being for his or her own sake.11
Gutierrez and Boff base this love for the human being on an
understanding of divine immanence. As Boff states;
Perfect love is a love that loves everyone and everything because
it discovers the lovableness of all as the concrete presence of
God's own love. Every created reality is a locale for the
encounter with God that shines through the depths of every
being.12
For Guti/rrez this universal love means that we make all human
beings our brothers and sisters and that communion and brotherhood is
the ultimate meaning of human life.13 It is within this universal
context that Guti/rrez understands the command to love ones' neighbour.
Love of neighbour does not have to do with limitations of proximity.
As Gutierrez states; "The neighbour ... is not he whom I find in my
path, but rather he in whose path I place myself, he whom I approach
and actively seek".1'-1
Within the context of this divine filial and gratuitous love,
Liberation theologians maintain that human love is to be fraternal and
gratuitous. This means that love can not be simply individual or
subjective. Ismael Garc/a is representative of the perception in
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Liberation theology that gratuitous love entails the creation of social
mutuality and community.
Love calls for and demands the reunion of all people as a way to
enable and sustain their mutual self-realization, freedom, and
well-being. The quest for the reunion of humanity is an integral
part of the Christian faith because it is a faith centred around
the passion of love. It is a faith with a strong sense of the
need for community for the realization of persons.1--"
Araya understands that this entails political dimensions in the
practice of love which seeks the common good. Within this gratuitous
and fraternal love he recognizes that; "The Christian is called to live
in the gladness of a self-surrender that takes responsibility for
making a better and more human world".1®
This commitment to community and unity in history means- that
gratuitous love is to be expressed in a preferential manner in a
present historical context of social alienation. Corresponding to the
preferential nature of divine love, human gratuitous love will realize
its historical concreteness in relation to particular human individuals
and groups. Sobrino understands that the context of oppression and
impoverishment creates an urgency in the expression of love. In this
context it is concrete needs of the poor which determine the
particularity of a universal love.
The poor give love its urgency. Love is not just a commandment;
it is not even the greatest of the commandments simply because
Christ said so. If love were only a commandment it would retain
an element of arbitrariness. Love is rather a conformity to the
demands of reality, a conformity that is marked by urgency.1"'
Thus, in the context of Latin America, Gutierrez maintains that the
'neighbour' whom we seek out will be the neighbour who is oppressed and
poor.1s
This fraternal and gratuitous love which functions to transform
society in solidarity with the poor and oppressed has specific
dimensions. Sobrino describes these functional dimensions in terms of
two phases of love. The first phase has to do with effective action
and the second with accepted suffering.13 Liberation theologians are
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in agreement that gratuitous love requires political commitment if it
is to be efficacious. Araya is representative of this position.
Love for the oppressed calls for expertise in political thinking,
which will enable it, dialectically and without compromising its
evangelical gratuity, to become effective in terms of both the
reign of God and a political commitment.20
Liberation theologians understand that this effective love is
characterized by conflict. They reject an understanding of love which
is exclusively characterized as tolerance, compromise, or acceptance.
For love to be effective, it must also be seen as a source for the
generation of conflict leading to social transformation. Hugo Assmann
exemplifies this position.
Love tends toward reconciliation, dialogue, unity: this is basic
to the Christian viewpoint. But can 'love' be the ideology of
peace at any price? Has this in fact been the Christian position
in practice? In many ways it would seem that it has. Many
Christians are simply incapable of accepting conflict as a fact,
and as for deepening existing contradictions so as to bring out
their real nature, this would be unthinkable for most. Yet the
Bible is full of this: conversion, whether individual or
societal, implies assumption of conflict. Ve need to get rid of
falsely conciliatory disfigurements of Christian thought and
behaviour, and to release the rebel, negative and conflictive
energies of love so as to see it in action as conflict in
history; to design models of Christian love that are also models
of liberating struggle.21
Sobrino perceives that universal gratuitous love achieves particularity
within a social setting by taking sides. He understands that we take
sides with the oppressed against the oppressor for the sake of all of
them.22 Guti/rrez is also representative of this understanding of love
as creative conflict which seeks to liberate both the oppressed and the
oppressor.
The universality of Christian love is only an abstraction unless
it becomes concrete history, process, conflict; it is arrived at
only through particularity. To love all men does not mean
avoiding confrontations; it does not mean preserving a fictitious
harmony. Universal love is that which in solidarity with the
oppressed seeks also to liberate the oppressors from their own
power, from their ambition, and from their selfishness...23
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This gratuitous love which enters into the conflicts of social
inequality takes the form of liberative struggle for economic and
political justice. As Araya states; "Justice is a primordial,
irreducible form of love, for it takes account of the historical
reality of humankind and the social dimension of the human person".2*
In the context of oppression and poverty, justice is the appropriate
expression of love. And as Garc/a states; "To love today demands that
we become engaged in transforming praxis seeking to create a more just
social order".2® This is not to say that love and justice are to be
simply equated. Divine universal love makes relative all historical
projects of liberation and prevents them from making absolute any
particular project. In the same manner, the larger context of divine
love stimulates justice to greater and greater achievements of
mutuality. It is also because of this context of divine gratuitous
love that human love can achieve expressions of gratuitousness which
can not be simply reduced to formulas of justice. Guti/rrez is
representative of this understanding of the gratuitous love of God as
the context for creation of justice.
. . . emphasis on the practice of justice and on solidarity with
the poor must never become an obsession and prevent our seeing
that this commitment reveals its value and ultimate meaning only
within the vast and mysterious horizon of God's gratuitous love.
Furthermore, the very building of a just society requires a
stimulus and an enveloping atmosphere that gratuitousness alone
can supply. The point here is not to assign greater importance
to the element of play and gratuitousness than to justice but to
ensure that the world of justice finds its full meaning and
source in the freely given love of God.2®
While love can not be reduced to justice, justice within its
structural expressions is still to be perceived as a form of love
which helps to extend mutuality in social life. As Sobrino states;
"Love that takes the form of justice extends the horizon of shared
interests and of solidarity with other human beings. Love becomes more
universal, though it may thereby lose something in intensity.".2'7
Sobrino and Garcia maintain that there is not a qualitative difference
between love and justice. But rather a difference of intensity. As
Garc/a states;
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The practice of love takes place within different realms of human
existence. In all of them it expresses itself as a concern for
the other so that she or he too can achieve the fullness of life.
Love takes place within the family, within marriage, and within
friendship. Historically and politically speaking, love
expresses itself as the attempt to provide fullness of life and
the experience of community to the majority of the poor and
oppressed who have been kept marginal. Political love does not
exhaust the fullness of love, but without it we lose a
significant dimension of love that makes all other manifestations
of it an incomplete experience.
If there is a distinction between love and justice, then it is
not a qualitative one but rather one of intensity.213
Juan Luis Segundo takes a very different approach to the issue of
the effectiveness of love. He asserts that love is limited to
immediate effectiveness within intimate relationships. Within what he
calls an 'economy of energy' the energy of love is limited and can not
extend to humanity in general. Segundo recognizes that relationships
beyond intimate relations must be governed by law and coercion. This
does 'violence' to the individual depth of human personality by
reducing people to roles and functions within society. In this way
universal love becomes effective through means that are associated with
egoism and violence. Segundo understands that these means present
continual possibilities for both oppression and liberation, but that
law and coercion are the only means available to make love effective
and prudent on the social level within the limits of an 'economy of
energy'. Segundo differs from other Liberation theologians in that he
maintains that the 'neighbour' is to be understood as the person near
us and can not be generalized to apply to all humanity. He accepts
that a form of structural violence is necessary to regulate
relationships with all the 'others' who da not fit within our intimate
circle of relations. While this structural violence is necessary due
to the limits of human nature, it is in the service of effective
love.23
This basic structural violence is not opposed to love. It is an
essential and intrinsic dimension of any and all effective love
within the context of the human condition. The dynamic of love,
however, tends in the direction of reducing the quantum of
violence required for efficacy to the lowest possible level.30
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As stated above, a phase of love which co-exists with efficacy is
that of suffering. Sobrino perceives that this is a fundamental
dimension of love that is gratuitous. The function of love in a
situation of conflict in solidarity with the poor requires both
efficacy and a willingness to suffer. When political or economic power
is available then efficacy is a real possibility. But when love must
be expressed within the context of imposed powerlessness, then
gratuitous love necessarily becomes suffering love. This suffering
love finds its most extreme expression in martyrdom. In regard to the
urgency of the needs of the poor, Sobrino states;
This urgency explains the two characteristic traits of Christian
love: its effectiveness and its gratuitousness. Because the
purpose is to save those whose who have no salvation, a laving
intention is not enough nor are the means history shows to be
limited and inadequate. The need is for an effective love that
makes use of the practical and ideological means that will make
justice a reality. And because the situation of the poor is
desperate, love must be gratuitous, that is, more ready to give
than to receive; it must not count the cost even if this be the
surrender of life itself.31
Sobrino understands that love which is effective as justice must have
this quality of self-sacrificial commitment or kenosis within the
context of oppression. Love in solidarity with the oppressed implies a
willingness to suffer in service of the poor.32
In similar manner this gratuitous love which is self-sacrificial
and suffering is never without its concern for efficacy. Even the act
of sacrifice of one's own life must take place within a concern for
mutuality. Garcia raises the concern that gratuitous love not be
allowed to be taken advantage of by oppressors because of its nature as
self-giving.
This obligation of love-justice does not intend to make us
victims of other's exploitation and domination. One cannot allow
others to take advantage of our love and use it to reverse or
perpetuate a relation of domination. Even acts of self-sacrifice
must take into consideration the question of mutuality, an
intrinsic dimension of justice.33
liebuhrian theology is not in disagreement with the substance of
Liberation theology in its analysis of love as a value of justice. It
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agrees with. Liberation theology that divine and human gratuitousness is
relevant to every dimension of individual and social human life.3A
Where liebuhrian theology disagrees with Liberation theology is
concerning its lack of dialectical tension within its concept of love.
Liberation theology successfully explicates the positive and creative
relation between divine and human love and its determining influence on
justice. It demonstrates the continuity of gratuitous love at all
relational dimensions. But it does not sufficiently explore the
negative and discontinuous elements of human reality.
A primary issue of dialectical tension is the difference between
divine gratuitous love and human love. liebuhrian theology maintains
that any understanding of the continuity of divine and human love must
also be balanced by an understanding of its fundamental discontinuity.
Divine agape is an absolute norm to which human life can aspire but can
not attain. This limitation on human love is illustrated by the
paradox found in the biblical command to love. As Sfiebuhr states;
To command love is a paradox; for love cannot be commanded or
demanded. To love God with all our hearts and all our souls and
all our minds means that every cleavage in human existence is
overcome. But the fact that such an attitude is commanded proves
that the cleavage is not overcome; the command comes from ones
side of reality to the other, from essence to existence.3®
Mebuhrian theology asserts that all human acts of gratuitousness are
compounded with egoistic motives of self-regard and will-to-power. In
other words, there is no moment in human agency which is free of sin.
As Hiebuhr states; "Love is the law of freedom; but man is not
completely free; and such freedom as he has is corrupted by sin".3®
Uiebuhrian theology understands this to be a creative dialectic.
This absolute norm of love limits the pretension and arrogance of human
pride which desires to identify its relative achievements with absolute
justification. In dialectical opposition to this limiting function of
divine love is its ability to inspire greater achievements of
gratuitous love in human life. This transcendent norm continually
reveals the partial achievements of present expressions of love and
indicates future possibilities of new and different expressions. As
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Niebuhr understands; "The love commandment is ... always a challenge
which stands vertically over every moral act and achievement."3'7
Niebuhrian theology agrees with Liberation theology that God's
universal filial love is the basis for human universal fraternal love.
It also agrees that this love is a force for greater community and
unity.3® But once again, Liberation theology is one-sided in its
understanding of love in social life. It fails to take with equal
seriousness the limitations of love and the forces for anarchy.
Segundo is the exception to this criticism. His perception of the
limitations of love within an 'economy of energy' corresponds to
Niebuhrian insights concerning the limits of love. Niebuhrian theology
understands that love is immediately applicable in intimate
relationships but fails to have applicability in the complexity of
larger social constructions. In larger social contexts love does not
have the imagination to identify emotively with folk in indirect and
complex social arrangements. In addition to the problem of limitation
is that of distortion. The egoism of individuals and groups pursuing
their own interests within the complex social structure is such that a
simple application of love to social life is impossible.3'3
This brings us to the issue of effectiveness. Liberation theology
and its lack of dialectical rigour results in an optimistic view of
social life. It perceives love as a force for greater social unity and
community. Within this understanding of love it presents justice as a
form of love which helps to extend this unity and community. The
dialectic it perceives in this process is the dialectic between
fraternal love and its negation by oppression. In this context,
Liberation theology maintains that conflict is a necessary dimension of
love. Niebuhrian theology agrees with the realism of this
understanding of conflict. Where it disagrees is in the limited
application of this dialectic. Niebuhrian theology asserts that
conflict is a constant in social life. Because individual and group
egoism is a fundamental dimension of human life, there will always be
conflict of interests within the social sphere.AO It is for this
reason that justice and love cannot be simply equated. Gratuitous love
presumes self-giving without calculation of the cast to the self.
Justice presumes a conflict of interests where egoism of individuals
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and groups must be restrained and a relative harmony of relationships
maintained. For this reason justice is to be understood as negative in
function. From this perspective gratuitous love is seen to be an
impassible value for the organization of social life.'11
This position of liebuhrian theology does not deny the relevance
of gratuitous love to the establishment of justice. Divine agape is
the horizon of all human social effort. It reveals the injustice in
all relative achievements of justice and inspires greater mutuality in
present constructions of justice. As Niebuhr states; "... the law of
love is involved in all approximations of justice, not only as the
source of the norms of justice, but as an ultimate perspective by which
their limitations are discovered".4-2 In this regard liebuhrian
theology recognizes that gratuitous love transcends the distortions and
limitations of human social life and is not directly applicable as a
social value. liebuhrian theology recognizes that the greatest form of
love achievable in social life is that of mutual love. This form of
love is based on reciprocity and therefore has historical
justification.43 Within this context it is the social value of
equality which is the logical approximation of love within an
environment of egoistic self-regard and will-to-pawer. As Niebuhr
states;
Equality stands in a medial position between love and justice.
If the obligation to love the neighbour as the self is to be
reduced to rational calculation, the only guarantee of the
fulfilment of the obligation is a grant to the neighbour which
equals what the self claims for itself. Thus equality is love in
terms of logic.44
This does not deny the fact that individuals and even intimate
groups may act in conformity with gratuitous love and have positive
influence on social justice. liebuhrian theology understands that this
gratuitous love is necessary to prevent the basic or rough justice of
calculation of mutuality from degenerating into forms of injustice
because of imperfect formulations of reciprocity. As Niebuhr states;
"No system of justice established by the political, economic, and
social coercion in the political order is perfect enough to dispense
with the refinements which voluntary and uncoerced human kindness and
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tenderness between individuals add to it".AS It is in this context
that Niebuhrian theology understands that gratuitous love will always
be suffering love which mitigates the vindictiveness of social life
with the value of forgiveness.
This rigorous dialectic in Niebuhrian theology prevents the
analysis of love as a value in social life from degenerating into a
form of sentimentality which perceives love as directly applicable to
the complexities of economic and political life. This optimism in the
analysis of gratuitous love by Liberation theology calls into question
its effectiveness within the continual conflictive nature of social
existence. The positive contributions of gratuitous love to social
life becomes tenuous if the balances of power inherent in social
existence are not recognized and maintained. Niebuhr maintains that
the establishment of justice needs both love and balance of power.
A balance of power is something different from, and inferior to,
the harmony of love. It is a basic condition of justice, given
the sinfulness of man. Such a balance of power does not exclude
love. In fact, without love the frictions and tensions of a
balance of power would become intolerable. But without the
balance of power even the most loving relations may degenerate
into unjust relations, and love may become the screen which hides
the injustice. A'7
What protects Liberation theology from the charge of
sentimentality is the identification of divine and human love with the
poor and oppressed. Even according to Uiebuhrian analysis, gratuitous
love as a force for justice is appropriate in the context of Latin
America. The poor and oppressed of Latin America are not lost in the
complexities and indirect relationships of social life. They are
continually present as the majority of human beings in Latin American
social existence living in extreme poverty. There is no barrier to the
imagination whereby love can enter into their interests. In this
context gratuitous love is a powerful emotive force for social change.
Where Niebuhrian theology brings this force for justice under criticism
is concerning its applicability to smaller groups in the social
context. While love is immediately applicable to a majority in need,
it is imaginatively limited in its resources to deal with the many
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smaller groups in need whose interests may be different from the
majority. A second criticism concerns the egoistic tendency of any
group to give their relative values and interests ultimate
justification. The poor and oppressed are no less subject to this
danger than the oppressors.
Where Liberation theology confronts the liebuhrian position is
concerning its concreteness. Niebuhrian theology is rigorous in its
dialectical understanding of social conflict. But it can be accused of
being too general in its understanding of love as the horizon of social
life which stimulates greater approximations and mitigates abuses.
While Niebuhrian theology provides an absolute norm by which
discriminating decisions are made concerning the degree to which a
social system approximates justice, there is no specific historical
locus from which this assessment is made. His formula for the
assessment of justice remains general. As Niebuhr states; "The closest
approximation to a love in which life supports life in voluntary
community is a justice in which life is prevented from destroying life
and the interests of the one are guarded against unjust claims by the
other".4® In contrast to liebuhrian theology, Liberation theology
provides the poor and oppressed as the perspective from which justice
is assessed. In this regard Niebuhrian theology is not dialectical
enough. It needs both the transcendent norm of divine love and the
concrete needs of the poor as the basis for discriminating decisions
concerning the effectiveness of a particular construction of social
justice. It needs both a transcendent norm and a specific historical
referent.
This brings us to the point where it is appropriate to examine the
value of the Kingdom of God as a value of liberating praxis.
The Kingdom of God as a value of liberating praxis
The value of the Kingdom of God is the value of love understood in
relation to time. The Kingdom of God is the promise of the fulfilment
of love in relation to the processes of history. It is the promise of
final unity and harmony at the horizon of human history and is the
completion and realization of love in the future of human existence.
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It is what Boff understands as total human and cosmic liberation.
Sobrino defines this Kingdom of God as follows;
. . . the kingdom of God is a reality in which the human world is
in harmony with the will and being of God himself. It becomes a
world in which human unity and the divine inheritance of all
God's children are coextensive.50
Liberation theology perceives that this definitive and absolute
Kingdom stands in dialectical relation to the present. The absolute
value of the Kingdom is not to be understood as future in exclusion to
the present. But neither is the Kingdom to be understood as a natural
possibility of historical processes. Enrique Dussel and Victoria Araya
exemplify this dialectical understanding of the Kingdom. Dussel
states;
To remove the present aspect of the Kingdom is to accept history
simply as a 'vale of tears' without further meaning. To remove
the future aspect of the Kingdom is to make a fetish of the
present and so to fall into idolatry.51
In similar manner Araya states;
The kingdom is not actualized on the margins of history. It is
not the negation of history as a mere episode deprived of
relationship with the kingdom (which would be religious
' reductionism'). But neither is the kingdom the natural
denouement of history (which would be an over optimistic
evolutionism). On the contrary, history issues in the kingdom
(eschatological plenitude) through the medium of suffering,
conflict, and judgement. The kingdom transforms and fulfils the
'corporality' of history and the dynamic of love and justice that
have been been operative in history.52
Gutierrez maintains that this dialectical relationship to the
present functions in terms of annunciation and denunciation. The
Kingdom of God is annunciation of the Father's love which reveals the
absolute meaning and goal of human existence.53 This absolute
realization of love is both continuous and discontinuous with the
present. It is discontinuous in that the final harmony and unity of
the Kingdom is not subject to realization in human history by human
agency. But at the same time it is continuous in that relative
achievements of love in history find their motivation and meaning in
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the eschatological Kingdom of love in the future. Gutierrez asserts
that the eschatological promise of love is both an absolute horizon and
a relative actualization in human history.
The eschatological promises are being fulfilled throughout
history, but this does not mean that they can be identified
clearly and completely with one or another social reality; their
liberating effect goes far beyond the foreseeable and opens up
new and unsuspected possibilities. The complete encounter with
the Lord will mark an end to history, but it will take place in
history. Thus we must acknowledge historical events in all their
concreteness and significance, but we are also led to a permanent
detachment. The encounter is present even now, dynamizing
humanity's process of becoming and projecting it beyond man's
hopes . .
In this way the Kingdom of love which is promise and which stands at
the horizon of human history is a powerful force orienting human action
in direction of its future fulfilment.
Liberation theologians are concerned to emphasize that the
absolute Kingdom is not merely an idea or model which provides a
template for moral behaviour. Segundo is critical of the theology of
Weth, loltmann, and Metz precisely concerning this point. He rejects
their description of the Kingdom as 'anticipation', 'analogy', and
'outline', in its relation to social activity.ss
... who dedicates their life to an 'analogy'? Who dies for an
'outline'? Who motivates a human mass or a people in the name of
an 'anticipation'? ...
What about the relationship between a liberative event in history
and the definitive kingdom of God? By virtue of the power of God
who lies behind it every such happening, however ambiguous and
provisional it may be, stands in a causal relationship to the
definitive kingdom. The causality is partial, fragile, often
distorted and in need of reworking; but it is a far cry from
being nothing more than an anticipation, outline, or analogy of
the kingdom.
Miguez Bonino is concerned with this same point.
. . . any language which confines the relation between history and
the Kingdom to the realm of image-reality remains inadequate.
The Kingdom is not merely adumbrated, reflected, foreshadowed, or
analogically hinted at in the individual and collective
realizations of love in history, but actually present, operative,
authentically — however imperfectly and partially — realized.-'7
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Segundo and Mfguez Bonino understand that the Kingdom of God has
direct causality in human life. The realization of effective love
through the achievement of relative justice and the extension of
fraternity are realizations of the Kingdom of God. They are what
Sobrino calls the 'Kingdom at hand'. As Sobrino states; "The kingdom
of God is at hand when men and women actively seek that efficacious
love that will transform this world according to the ideal of the
kingdom to come".50 These relative and approximate realizations of
human community and mutuality are not the absolute Kingdom which is at
the horizon of history. Yet they are the Kingdom of God in that they
are motivated by God and realize concrete historical embodiments of
love. In agreement with Segundo and Miguez Bonino, Sobrino perceives
that the 'Kingdom at hand' is something which is lived out through the
praxis of justice within an unconditional trust in the God of the
future.53
In the same manner the absolute Kingdom of God is to be understood
as denunciation in relation to the present. The definitive Kingdom of
God is denunciation and judgement because it is finally a gift of God
which human agency can participate in but can not achieve. The final
absolute realization of the Kingdom is something which God alone can
attain. In this manner the Kingdom is to be recognized as an
eschatological reality which will transform and fulfil all the partial
and limited achievements of human historical endeavour, From this
eschatological horizon all human achievement is brought under judgement
and their limitations revealed. As Mfguez Bonino states; "God's
judgement encompasses the totality of our human achievements".50 This
judgement prevents any historical project from claiming ultimacy.
There can be no sacralization of a human project from this
absolute perspective. In this regard Gutierrez recognizes that the
growth of the Kingdom in human history and projects of social
liberation are distinct and separate realities; "They have the same
goal, but they do not follow parallel roads, not even convergent
ones".61 This function of denunciation has the result of motivating
human agency to seek ever new and greater achievements of effective
love in history. This denunciation opens up the future and releases
- 255 -
the creative imagination of human life. It is a perspective from which
all current forms of community and mutuality are found wanting and new
possibilities are suggested. As Sobrino states; "God's kingdom does
not confirm the present reality of humankind and its history; rather,
it passes judgement on that reality in order to re-create it".e2
Liberation theologians maintain that this annunciation and
denunciation is not to be limited to theological categories or to a
general assessment of effective realizations of love. Annunciation and
denunciation is mediated in history in the presence of the poor.
Dussel is representative of this understanding of the role of the poor.
There is an essential link between accepting the tension of the
'already' and the 'not yet' and the material reality of the poor.
For as the oppressed, the product of injustice, the poor reveal
in their very misery the necessity of the coming of that infinite
fulfilment of all the insuff iciences of history that is the
kingdom. The reality of the poor makes us discover the reality
of the kingdom's 'not yet'; at the same time it prevents any
fetishization of the kingdom's 'already' and thus gives the
kingdom the necessary dialectical flexibility for making both
faith and hope still possible.e:3'
Dussel understands that it is the poor who are the subject-carriers of
the Kingdom and who concretize the annunciation and denunciation of
social life. The presence of the poor reveal the 'not yet' of the
Kingdom. They are the mediation of judgement and reveal the failure of
social projects to approximate the absolute Kingdom. In this way the
poor serve as an indicator of the degree to which social life
corresponds to the values of the Kingdom.
In their visible, material and undisguisable poverty the poor
show clearly where the system cannot adequately distribute its
goods, i.e. who are suffering from domination by others, and are
evidence of the sin of the system. The poor are the sign, the
bleeding wound, of the deep structural sickness of the system.
The presence of the poor is the measure of the absence of God's
kingdom in a society.**
Dussel also perceives that the poor are the historical mediation
of the annunciation of future possibility. In a positive restatement
of the above quote he understands that justice toward the poor is an
indicator of the degree to which social life moves in the direction of
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its ultimate realization in God's Kingdom. In this way the poor carry
in themselves the hope and motivation for future change. They are the
agents who carry the Kingdom forward. As Dussel states;
The struggle in the world is a contributive factor in the kingdom
of God. The struggle of the poor is the praxis of liberation; it
is the activity of the kingdom in history, raised up by Christ by
his Spirit, in the intimacy of the hearts of the poor, the
carriers of the kingdom.6S
This brings us to the question of effectiveness. Liberation
theologians understand that the dialectical relationship between
current historical projects and the future eschatological Kingdom
requires socio-political mediation. This mediation must translate the
hope of, and faith in, the future into concrete historical
possibilities. To achieve this end Liberation theology uses the
concept of utopia. As Dussel states; "... between the present sys'tem
and the eschatological kingdom there is always a third dimension — the
project and the hope it generates of a positive and historical
utopia".
Realistic utopia as mediation of historical possibility
Liberation theologians are not in agreement concerning the use of
the term 'utopia'. Sobrino uses this term to describe the absolute
Kingdom of God and its inspirational relationship to present human
endeavour. For Sobrino 'utopic' is an adjective by which he identifies
transcendent principles which cannot be adequately translated into
historical reality.'2'7' Boff also identifies the absolute Kingdom as
'utopia'. He understands that the eschatological Kingdom is the
absolute utopia which is the fulfilment of human hope. For Boff this
absolute utopia functions in teleological relation to all partial and
relative Utopias of human construction. This teleological
understanding is focussed on Jesus Christ who is the realization of
absolute utopia in human history. Boff's understanding of utopia
functions within a theology of divine teleological immanence. This
results in a strong continuity between the absolute utopia of the
eschatological Kingdom and the relative Utopias of human history. As
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Boff states concerning this absolute Utopia; "... Utopia goes hand in
hand with reality rather than being apposed to it; it is the total
realization of the potentialities latent in reality".®0
In contrast to this position is the understanding of Utopia put
forward by Gutierrez, Miguez Bonino, and Garcia. They perceive the
relationship between the absolute Kingdom and historical Utopia to be
more indirect and dialectical.®'3 As Gutierrez states;
The Gospel does not provide a Utopia for us; this is a human
work. . . . But the Gospel is not alien to the historical plan; on
the contrary, the human plan and the gift of God imply each
other.70
These Liberation theologians are careful to distinguish between utopia
as human creation and the absolute Kingdom which is the gift of God.
They are aware of the danger of sacralizing human social constructions.
Rubem Alves exemplifies this recognition that social constructions are
human creations and have no direct divine justification.
... Christian utopianism understands that what we call 'reality'
is a human construction .... It exists as a reality not because
of a divine or demonic necessity but because men in the past
built it. And since reality is a human construction, it can be
demolished by men in order to build a new one. Whenever we call
a provisional social game built by men reality we are involved in
idolatry: we are giving ultimacy — demonic or divine — to
something that is simply human and not destined to eternity.71
Within this understanding of utopia as a human construction, these
Liberation theologians define utopia as a historical plan for a
different society entailing new social relationships. As Guti/rrez
states, utopia is "... a historical plan for a qualitatively different
society and to express the aspiration to establish new social relations
among men".7:* For Latin Americans this historical plan looks to the
achievement of fraternal solidarity and the abolition of exploitation.
This plan involves the imaginative projection of economic and political
structures to achieve these ends. For Guti/rrez the content of this
historical plan is social revolution and not reform; liberation and not
development; socialism and not modernization of the prevailing
system. 73
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Liberation theologians are sensitive to the fact that Utopian
thought has been subject to the criticism of being unrealistic in its
expectations. Alves is representative of the understanding that
Utopian thought is not the development of impossible societies, but
rather the questioning of present societies which leads to imaginative
possibilities in the future.
. . . Christian utopianism is not a belief in the possibility of a
perfect society but rather the belief in the nonnecessity of this
imperfect order. It does not claim that it is possible to
abolish sin, but it affirms that there is no reason for us to
accept the rule of the sinful structures that now control our
society.
This positive perception of the possibility of future change of social
reality is based on a theological conviction that all human societies
stand under the judgement of God.
Christian utopianism is based on the vision that all social
systems are under God's historical judgement. Sooner or later
they will die. If this is the case, it is a serious mistake to
take these same systems as the ultimate criteria for what is
possible and impossible in history.75
The development of this historical plan as realistic Utopia
involves a method which utilizes not only imagination, but also various
referents and processes which locate the basis for future hope in
present realities. The first of these is the use of reason, and
specifically, the use of the analysis and insight of the social
sciences. As Garcia states;
Utopian thinking in a liberation perspective is neither wishful
nor illusory thinking. It is that form of creative and
imaginative thinking that refuses a adapt itself to the logic and
the limits of the status quo. It is informed by the social
sciences and thus has some sense of how a given social
organization works and what possibilities can emerge within it.
It seeks to understand 'what is' for the sake of bringing about
its untested possibilities. It understands every social
configuration of power as capable of being rearranged in ways
that enable those left at the margin to gain a more significant
say in the determination of their destiny. It continually
projects reality into what it ought to be and can be.7e
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A second process that makes for realistic Utopia is the continual
translation of this Utopia into human agency. As Gutierrez states; "If
utopia does not lead to action in the present, it is an evasion of
reality".'7"7 This means that the utopic future can not exist as an
imaginative reality existing soley in the future. For Guti/rrez there
can be no sharp distinction between 'means' and 'ends' in ethical
agency. Utopia is not a state of socio-political existence that exists
exclusively after future political action is carried out. Utopia is to
be verified in present praxis. This means that Utopian thought is to
be understood as a process wherein Utopian expectations are continually
brought into criticism from the perspective of present praxis.
Gutierrez understands that Utopia as imaginative future is legitimate
only if it is subject to the verification of praxis. Concerning this
imaginative function, Guti/rrez states; "... for utopia validly to
fulfil this role, it must be verified in social praxis; it must become
effective commitment, without intellectual purisms, without inordinate
claims; it must be revised and concretized constantly".'7®
The third element that justifies utopia as realistic is its
orientation to the poor. Gutierrez and Garcia maintain that
rationality and praxis have a specific referent in history. It is the
poor who are the motivating force for the need of a more just
society.73 As Garcia states;
From a liberation perspective Utopian thinking is integral to the
rationality of the poor and oppressed and their efforts to
overcome oppression. Utopian thinking relevant to the struggle
for social justice feeds itself on the experiences that emerge
from the praxis of justice. It rejects ahistorical and
uncommitted forms of rationality and utopia, denouncing them as
alienating and idealistic.®0
/
Gutierrez perceives that this realistic utopia functions in
relation to present social systems in a manner which corresponds to our
earlier examination of the Kingdom of God. Utopia serves as
annunciation and denunciation in relation to present reality. As
already stated, it announces imaginative future possibilities and
denounces the unjust realities of the present. But as already stated
above, this annunciation and denunciation will have qualities of
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realism only to the extent that it is concretized in history by human
commitment and agency. As Gutie'rrez states;
Utopia must necessarily lead to a commitment to support the
emergence of a new social consciousness and new relationships
among people. Otherwise, the denunciation will remain at a
purely verbal level and the annunciation will be only an
illusion. Authentic Utopian thought postulates, enriches, and
supplies new goals for political action, while at the same time
it is verified by this action. Its fruitfulness depends upon
this relationship.01
Liberation theology's understanding of the Kingdom of God and of
utopia both are subject to liebuhrian criticism concerning the function
of love which is central to the Kingdom and to Utopian aspirations.
What has earlier been examined concerning the lack of dialectical
rigour concerning love applies also to these topics. What will
assessed at this point is the temporal relation of the Kingdom and the
imaginative function of utopia.
Niebuhrian theology is in agreement with Liberation theology
concerning the dialectical nature of the Kingdom of God in relation to
history. liebuhr wants to avoid both dualism and naturalism in his
understanding of the Kingdom. He rejects any conception of the Kingdom
which restricts it to an absolute perfection in eternity with no
relation to time. In response to an unnamed theologian who claimed
that the Kingdom functions only as judgement and that our task was not
to alter the world but to look to God as the sole agent of change,
Niebuhr stated;
... I bluntly declare that if I thought for a moment that the
Christian gospel meant what is implied in these words, I would
prefer not to be a Christian. In such an interpretation,
Christian eschatology becomes the source of moral complacency.0:2
In this manner, Niebuhrian theology is in agreement with
Liberation theology concerning the Kingdom of God as annunciation of
not only future fulfilment but also present possibility. Niebuhrian
theology agrees with Sobrino concerning the reality of the 'Kingdom at
hand'. As Niebuhr states; "The Kingdom of God is always at hand in the
sense that the impossibilities are really passible and lead to new
- 261 -
actualities in given moments of history".®3 This leads Niebuhr to
affirm that the agape of the Kingdom is a resource for infinite
developments towards a more perfect brotherhood in history.
Niebuhrian theology agrees with Liberation theology that history is
fulfilled and completed by God in the absolute Kingdom of God at the
end of time. But the Kingdom of God is not simply the negation of
history.Niebuhr understands that there is a continuity between the
absolute ideals of the Kingdom and human moral agency. As Niebuhr
states;
Whatever the reality of human sin, the human spirit is still able
to recognize the validity of the laws of the Kingdom of God.
They are not superimposed upon the moral life by supernatural
revelation. They are rather transcendent possibilities implicit
in all moral experience.3®
In dialectical tension with this annunciation is the denunciation
or judgement of the absolute Kingdom of God. Niebuhrian theology
agrees with Liberation theology that this judgement is a critical force
opposed to the injustice of present social systems. As Niebuhr states;
"The Kingdom which is not of this world is . . . a more dangerous peril
to the kingdoms of this world than any competing worldly kingdom".S7"
In this dialectic of judgement Niebuhr understands that the Kingdom
reveals both the failure of love in human social life and the need of
mercy and grace beyond these failures.
... the Kingdom of God is not simply trans-historical. It is
involved in every moment of history. It is a clue to the fact
that every moment of history is a moment of judgement. For it
reveals the law of life which life defies and for the defiance of
which life is destroyed. But it is also a revelation of mercy
and grace in human history.130
In this way Niebuhr maintains that all human social achievements are
continually under the judgement of the Kingdom of God which reveals the
depth of sin involved in all moral achievements. It is for this reason
that Niebuhr refuses to identify the Kingdom of God with any actuality
of history. Because of the corruption of sin in all human achievements
of history Niebuhr looks to locate the Kingdom of God in the 'uneasy
conscience of man'.39
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If we mean by "the world.' only the realm of actuality, the
Kingdom of God is quite obviously not in it. It may be in the
conscience of man but not in his action. The same man who dreams
of an ideal justice or a perfect love acts according to his own
interests when he ceases to contemplate and engages in action.30
Kiebuhr immediately qualifies this statement with the recognition
that the Kingdom is constantly entering the world through human action.
Regardless of this, it must be asked from a Liberation perspective
whether liebuhr is subject to the criticism of lacking specificity in
identifying the Kingdom with human agency. The issue of causality
raised by Segundo and Jlfguez Bonino can appropriately be applied to
liebuhr. His emphasis on the denunciation or judgement in regard to
the Kingdom is more rigorous in its understanding of the perennial
nature of sin in human character and agency and is a critical
confrontation to Liberation optimism. On the other hand, this emphasis
on judgement has a tendency toward the danger of reducing the presence
of the Kingdom in human agency to an ideal of human consciousness.
Liberation theology correctly understands that this perception of the
Kingdom is easily subject to ideological manipulation. Liberation
theology seeks to avoid this danger by its understanding of the
presence of the Kingdom as the praxis of love and justice which has the
poor as its beginning referent. In linking the Kingdom with the poor,
Liberation theology creates a permanent location in history where the
Kingdom is potentially 'at hand'.
This brings us to the issue of Utopia as an imaginative means to
project into the future the possibilities of a just society. The use
of Utopia in Liberation theology has been an issue of debate in recent
years between Christian Realists using Hiebuhrian analysis and
Liberation theology.-'1 It will not be the concern of this critique to
enter into the development of the argument which has taken place in
this debate, but rather to directly place Hiebuhrian theology in
critical comparison with Liberation theology on the issue of utopia.
The starting place for this critique is Itiebuhr and his
understanding of imagination in relation to expectations for the
future. Kiebuhrian theology perceives that imagination is a quality of
the human experience of self-transcendence and that this quality
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involves the capacity to 'dream' or 'envision' a more perfect justice
than is currently realized. Uiebuhr observes that this characteristic
is especially prevalent in those who suffer oppression. As hiebuhr
states; "The disinherited of every age have dreamt of a just
society".32 Niebuhr maintains that the transcendent or 'spiritual'
capacity of human life indicates that human agency will always be
guided by ideals and goals which are difficult to realize in human
history. While one's 'reach' may well be beyond one's 'grasp', these
ideals and goals are still relevant and are to be approximated in human
existence, As liebuhr states;
The beauty and meaning of human life are partially revealed in
ideals and aspirations which transcend all possibilities of
achievement in history. They may be approximated and each
approximation may lead to further visions.33
. . . the highest ideals of justice, love and brotherhood are
concepts of the human spirit when spirit completely transcends
the infirmities of the flesh and the frustrations of history.
They must be approximated but they will never be fully
realized.®A
This leads liebuhr to the conclusion that human agency is limited and
finite and yet always oriented in history by goals and 'visions' which
are ever on the horizon of human life.
It is man's ineluctable fate to work on tasks which he cannot
complete in his brief span of years, to accept responsibilities
the true ends of which he cannot fulfil, and to build communities
which cannot realize the perfection of his visions.®®
Within this understanding of imagination it is appropriate to
examine Niebuhr's criticism of utopia. Uiebuhr criticises Utopian
thought and gives it the predicate 'romantic' on the basis of a two¬
fold illusion. The first element of this illusion is the conviction
that community can be characterized by uncoerced harmony of life with
life and that the fulfilment of meaning can be achieved in human
history by human agency. The second element is directly related to the
first and is the basis for it. This is the optimistic assessment of
human potential and an obscuring of the perennial human tendency to
self-regard and will-to-power.
Niebuhr identifies two groupings of this romantic Utopian
expectation: soft Utopians and hard Utopians. Historical examples of
soft Utopians include secular liberals, christian liberals, and
sectarian christians. Niebuhr maintains that all the these groups
expect human life to achieve a state of harmony through the progress of
history. They understand that the strife and contention of human life
will be progressively eliminated by education, the practice of love, or
the immanent presence of God.3® Hard Utopians differ from the soft
Utopians in that they claim that the realization of perfect community
will by achieved by means of historical catastrophe. As Niebuhr
states;
The hard Utopians create a fighting community which regards
itself as the embodiment and champion of an ideal commonwealth of
perfect justice or perfect love, for which it is ready to do
battle against all enemies.37
Historical examples of these hard Utopians, identified by Niebuhr, are
the continental Anabaptists of the Reformation, the Diggers, Levellers,
and Fifth Monarchy Men of seventeenth-century England and contemporary
Marxists.33
The question must now be raised concerning how this assessment of
romantic utopia relates to the realistic Utopia of Liberation theology.
It is no doubt passible to read some liberation theologians and
identify them in categories of either soft or hard Utopians. This
might be the case with Boff in his understanding of divine immanent
teleology. But this is not the case with the core of Liberation
theologians which we have been examining. They are careful to identify
the eschatological Kingdom of God as the ultimate utopia which only God
can achieve and which will mark the end of history. This absolute
utopia of harmony of life and fulfilment of meaning is not within the
possibilities of human agency. Realistic utopia corresponds to
Niebuhr's understanding of relative and approximate historical
achievements in relation to an ideal which are in need of continual
reassessment and re-creation. In this manner, realistic utopia is a
gain in realism in comparison with Niebuhr's understanding of
imaginative 'vision' or 'dream'. Liberation theology places the
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imaginative 'vision' or 'dream' under the critique of social science,
current praxis, and the concrete needs of the poor. For this reason
the categories of soft and hard romantic utopianism do not apply simply
to Liberation theology.
But this is not to say that the realistic utopianism of Liberation
theology is free from the critique of liebuhrian analysis. While
Liberation theology avoids the first illusion of an achievable heaven
on earth, it is questionable whether they avoid the second illusion of
an optimistic appraisal of human potentiality. As we have already seen
in examining the value of love, Liberation theology tends toward
optimism concerning human nature. This may in fact undermine the
realism of their Utopian thought.
From the perspective of Niebuhrian theology it is passible to
recognize realistic Utopian thought as a legitimate means for human
transcendent spirit to project the possibility of future justice.
According to Liberation definition, even the liebuhrian vision of
justice as balance of economic and political power qualifies as a
radical change, and thus as a 'utopia', in relation to the current
economic and political situation of Latin America. What Niebuhrian
theology is concerned to hold in tension is a dialectical understanding
of utopia. From a Niebuhrian perspective utopia can be understood as
both necessity and peril. It is a necessity in that it is a
requirement of creative transcendent human consciousness in relation to
the future under the absolute value of the Kingdom of God. It is a
peril in that this creative imaginative work functions in the dimension
where freedom and imagination transmute the will-to-live into the will-
to-power and where community and group loyalty is transmuted into
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10. CONCLUSION: THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE
In the above chapters we have examined Niebuhr's understanding of
justice and placed this understanding in critical dialogue with
Liberation theology of Latin America, In this examination we have not
explored how Liberation theology perceives justice to be implemented
within the Latin American context. In this regard, Liberation theology
is not concerned with general theory but with the specific requirements
of the Latin American situation. It is beyond the scope of this study
to analyse and assess their interpretation of socio-political life in
Latin America and their suggested liberative solutions. This concern
falls into the area of practical theology and would require a working
knowledge of the specifics of Latin American socio-political and
economic life as well as the specific histories of the widely divergent
regions of Latin America. Obviously, a study of this nature would be a
substantial work in its own right. It has been the intention of this
study to focus analysis and assessment on the 'theory' side of the
dialectic between theory and praxis.
It will be the thesis of this conclusion that Niebuhrian theology
can be inclusive of various dimensions of Liberative theology and be
described as 'liberative'. This is particularly true in regard to
Liberation theology and its commitment to the poor and oppressed. In
this chapter we will be using the term 'Liberative realism' to identify
this modified Niebuhrian theology.
In the above critical dialogue between Niebuhrian theology and
Liberation theology, Niebuhrian theological method has demonstrated a
superior theological dialectic and pragmatic ethic. It will the
concern of this conclusion to justify this assessment. At the same
time, it is to be recognized that the above dialogue has revealed some
serious weaknesses in the content of the Niebuhrian dialectic. In this
regard, Liberation theology has challenged Niebuhrian theology
concerning its tendency toward being vulnerable to ideological
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manipulation. 1 It will also be the concern of this conclusion to
demonstrate that Niebuhrian theology can be integrative of these
criticisms and be modified so as to reflect a greater intensity in its
prophetic orientation. Thus, it will be intention of this conclusion
to present theoretic antecedents to a theology of justice which are
inclusive of the general methodology of realism and the specific
commitment of liberation.
Liberative realism as liberative method
Theological method in Liberative realism finds its focus in
biblical hermeneutic, dialectical theology, and ethical pragmatism.
These areas of theological endeavour do not function exclusively, but
in mutual modification and interdependence in a dialectical manner. In
whatever area of theological endeavour one begins, critical movement
takes place between all areas. Ve will begin our examination with
biblical hermeneutic because this area of theological work is the
source of themes which form the foundation for theological reflection
and ethical practice. As liebuhrian theology understands, theology has
its roots, not in rational theological reflection nor in pragmatic
ethical practice, but in the biblical-dramatic world-view.* This is
also the appropriate beginning place because it is in Niebuhr's
hermeneutic that we find the inception of a dialectical weakness that
runs throughout his theology.
The strength and weakness of liebuhr's theology lies in his
emphasis on the trans-historical and transcendent. This emphasis finds
its inception in his biblical hermeneutic. His weakness in this
hermeneutic is the absence of his dialectic. He moves directly from
the reading of myth, drama, or symbol, in scripture to the
identification of trans-historical and transcendent themes which
comprise his religious idealism. The strength of this hermeneutic is
that it provides for theological reflection religious ideals which
avoid the problems of historicity and which stand as absolute reference
points around which reflection and ethics will revolve. The weakness
of this hermeneutic is that it does not reflect the dialectic which is
the strength of his theology. In this hermeneutic the dialectical
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tension and interpenetration of the historical and the trans-historical
and the immanent and the transcendent is lost.
In is in this regard that Liberative realism is better served by-
adopting a modified version of the hermeneutical circle employed by
Liberation theology.® Liberation theology understands the hermeneutic
circle to be a dialectical process which moves between the world of the
interpreter and the world of the text. The contribution of liebuhrian
theology to this hermeneutic circle is the application of the
Niebuhrian dialectic at each moment in the interpretive process.
The first moment in this hermeneutic circle is that of critical
self-awareness. For Liberation theology this means a sociological
analysis of the world of the interpreter. This entails an awareness of
socio-political structures and economic systems and how these relate to
current Church practice, language, and the ideologies implicit in that
language. The purpose of this critical self-awareness is the creation
of questions which the interpreter in turn takes to the text.
Hiebuhrian dialectic intensifies this critical self-awareness by
emphasizing the recognition that social life is not simply transparent
to analysis and that such analysis is subject to distortion by the
interests of the interpreter. This means that questions taken to the
text must be asked with humility in the knowledge that these questions
are relative and parochial and therefore may reflect a certain degree
of self-interest and even will-to-power.
The second moment of this hermeneutic circle is that of the
reading of the text. For Liberation theology the concern is to
identify the historical dimensions of the text. In this manner,
recognition of divine agency in the historical world of the text can be
fruitful in understanding divine agency in present history. This is
not to say that there is a direct correspondence between present socio¬
political reality and the socio-political reality of the text. It is
rather the recognition that the biblical text in its socio-political
dimensions provides themes, values, and referents, which are regulative
for interpreting the presence and agency of God in current socio¬
political life. This reading of the text as 'history' is also not
restricted to problems of verified historicity. Vhile scientific
historicity is always a critical concern, the reading of scripture with
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its history-like quality as narrative is still fruitful in representing
divine presence and agency in a narrated socio-political 'world' of the
text. This narrated 'world' of the text successfully provides themes,
values, and referents, which are regulative in theological reflection.
This narrative understanding of the text is in agreement with Niebuhr's
understanding of scripture as providing a dramatic world-view.
The liebuhrian dialectic applied to this moment in the
interpretive process broadens the possible range of themes which can be
found in the reading of the text. The Niebuhrian dialectic also
intensifies the dialectic tension between the interpreter and the text.
A dialectic interpretation which recognizes the trans-historical as
well as historical dimensions of the text results in a more extensive
hermeneutic. In this interpretive process, the interpreter may find
that the historical dimensions of the text relate to his or her
questions which originate in an understanding of current socio¬
political life. But at the same time, the interpreter may find that
there are dimensions of the text which indicate a transcendent referent
which reveals the interpreter's questions to be relative, parochial,
and even inappropriate. In other words, trans-historical and
transcendent themes may in fact call the interpreter and his or her
perceptions into question. It is at this point that Klebuhr's
understanding of symbol and myth is held in dialectical tension with
the historical concerns of Liberation theology. This recognition of
the dialectical tension in the reading of the text allows a reading
which embraces both existential as well as historical dimensions.
Thus, the text may address injustice as a socio-political concern as
well as the problems of sin found in human transcendent freedom. This
dialectic hermeneutic would be a gain to realism in that it recognizes
both the strength of liebuhrian religious idealism as well as the
strength of the historical concerns of Liberation theology.
The third moment in this hermeneutic circle is that of
reinterpretation and application. Liberation theology understands that
we move from the text back to the current situation with the themes,
values, and referents, which our exegetical work has provided. With
these resources we reinterpret the current situation and are guided in
ethical endeavour. For Liberation theology, this moment is one of
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prophecy and ethical action in relation to the socio-political and
economic realities of current social life. As a result of this
hermeneutic process, Liberation theologians are provided with the
themes, values, and referents, by which they can make discriminating
decisions concerning the quality of justice found in social existence.
From this perspective, Liberation theologians are able to commit
themselves to liberative projects which seek greater justice. The
liebuhrian dialectic applied to this moment of the hermeneutic circle
qualifies the optimism of Liberation theology concerning
reinterpretation and application. Under the dialectical tension of the
trans-historical and historical, all historic projects are placed under
judgement and all interpretations shown to be distorted by individual
and group self-regard and will-to-power. At the same time, this
dialectic does not relax the requirement of historical commitment. But
it does place this commitment within the context of faith and humility.
This presentation of a dialectic hermeneutic can be no more than
suggestive. A thorough study would require much more than the above.
But this outline does suggest to us what a hermeneutic circle might
look like when liebuhr's dialectic is maintained with its tension and
ambiguity at every moment in the interpretive process. A hermeneutic
of this type would be a gain in realism over the hermeneutic employed
by Niebuhr. It would recognise the need to maintain the continual
tension between the trans-historical and the historical in biblical
interpretation. It would also correspond to Niebuhr's theological
pragmatism in that this extensive dialectic would successfully address
and reveal the height and depth of the divine-human relationship in its
existential as well as historical dimensions.
The second area of methodological concern is that of dialectic
theology. Liberative realism embraces a dialectic which recognizes the
opposition of themes held in unresolvable tension. An example of this
dialectic is the opposition of transcendent and organic vitalities in
the human subject. The human being is determined by such realities as
biological impulse, individual physical attributes, and cultural and
social specificity. In dialectical opposition to this limited and
determined dimension of human nature is the transcendent dimension
which realizes indeterminate possibilities of freedom through
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historical creativity, moral agency, reason and imagination, and
religious sensibilities. This is a 'dialectic of tension' because
these oppositions bath interpenetrate one another and exist in conflict
with out resolution. For this reason the term; 'dialectic tension',
will be used to indicate this ever-present context of opposition of
vitalities which exist in dynamic opposition and interpenetration.
This dialectic is applicable to all dimensions of reflection. It
applies to anthropology, theology, history, and any other theme of
concern. For Liberative realism this dialectic has pragmatic
justification. This dialectic of tension functions as a successful
model for revealing and understanding the ambiguities and the
frustrations of human existence and history. This dialectic recognizes
both the possibilities and the limitations inherent in human thought,
spirit, and endeavour. This dialectic is not a comfortable theoretic
posture. It avoids both confident optimism and excessive pessimism.
It reminds theological work of the relativity, distortion, and
ambiguity, present in all human endeavour, whether rational or ethical.
This theology can provide no simple answers and is continually aware of
its provisional nature.
The strength of this dialectical theology is that it is
integrative, contextual, and dynamic as a theological process. As an
integrative theology it follows the pragmatic concern to achieve
coherence with the larger environment of ideas and experience. In this
manner it is an open theology willing to integrate insights from any
source, subject to pragmatic justification. This means that Liberative
realism must be a theology of dialogue. In complimentary fashion, the
dialectic nature of this theology prevents Liberative realism from
claiming any final coherence. The dialectic method forces theology to
be self-critical concerning its own areas of tension and ambiguity. As
contextual theology, Liberative realism seeks to achieve the pragmatic
concern of relevancy in a particular cultural and historical situation.
In like manner, the dialectic dimension of theology forces it to
recognize its inherent relativity which prevents claims to universality
or 'eternal truth'. And finally, because of these various elements,
dialectical theology can be described as a dynamic process which seeks
continual reform and reformulation.
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The choice of this dialectical theology of Liberative realism over
the historical dialectic theology of Liberation theology is based in
its superior ability to appreciate the possibilities and
impossibilities of human existence in its religious and ethical
dimensions. The content of this difference between Liberative realism
and Liberation theology will be dealt with below. At this point it is
appropriate to indicate the weakness in the content of Uiebuhr's
dialectic. At the heart of Niebuhr's theology is the dialectic between
anthropological realism and religious idealism. As already indicated
above in the concern for biblical hermeneutic, this religious idealism
must be questioned concerning its dialectic rigour. This is not a
criticism of method, but rather of content. From the perspective of
Liberation theology, Niebuhr's dialectic lacks a sufficiently concrete
historical referent. This lack of historical referent may weaken the
dynamic nature of Niebuhrian theology. The transcendent and trans-
historical understanding of the divine is not held in tension with a
corresponding immanent and historical referent which is specific.4
From a pragmatic perspective, it must be questioned whether this
religious idealism adequately incorporates the human experience of the
divine in the height of her or his spiritual transcendence as well as
in the concreteness of historical existence. From the perspective of
Liberative realism which seeks to be integrative concerning the
insights of Liberation theology, these dimensions need to be held in
dialectic tension. From this point in our examination we will be using
the term 'religious realism' to indicate a more thorough dialectic
which includes both the idealism of Niebuhr's transcendent and trans-
historical concerns as well as the concern for the historical
specificity of Liberation theology.
The third area of our examination is that of pragmatic ethics.
Vhile we are considering the area of ethics last in our examination, it
is in fact the centre of theological methodology. Liberative realism
agrees with Liberation theology that the christian faith is first and
foremost relational. In this sense it understands the rational work of
theology to be a 'second step' in service of life lived in relation to
God and other human beings.-1 It is for this reason that love and
justice are not to be understood as the mere conclusions of an equation
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of theological logic. Rather, love and justice are the central
concerns around which theology seeks illumination and coherence. In
this pursuit of illumination and coherence, the relationship between
theology and ethics is dialectic in nature. Theology and its work of
biblical hermeneutic provides regulative themes, values, and referents,
which are embraced by faith and verified in action and religious
experience. In dialectical tension with this function of theology is
the transcendent height and historical concreteness of lived faith
which will call into question theological rationality. Thus, it is at
the point of lived faith that theological concerns are either justified
or questioned. It is also at this point that biblical themes are
understood to be 'authoritative'. In terms of religious realism the
'historical Jesus' of Liberation theology and the 'Christ myth' of
Hlebuhrian theology are authoritative according to their ability to
reveal and illuminate the trans-historical as well as the historical
dimensions of human life in relation to God and other humans.
This brings us to the point where we must justify our choice of
pragmatism over praxis as an epistemological model. Liberation
theology contends that knowledge is obtained in the modification or
transformation of reality. It is in historical praxis that theological
truth finds verification. This position is similar to that of
pragmatism but is to be judged as inadequate according to Liberative
realism.'3 liebuhrian theology recognizes that human beings are
transcendent creatures as well as creatures of history. From this
perspective, pragmatism functions in reference to the 'spiritual' and
transcendent dimension of religious experience as well as the concrete
creativity of historical existence. It is in this regard that the
religious experience of justification by faith is verified in the
dimension of human transcendent spirituality but can not be verified by
a historical praxis. This is not to deny the historical dimension as a
locus of justification of theological reflection. It is rather the
recognition that the pragmatic method can include a broader realm of
human experience which is both trans-historical and historical. The
utilization of historical praxis by Liberation theology tends to
neglect this transcendent dimension of human experience.
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The second criticism of historical praxis is concerned with its
function in relation to history. Liberative realism understands that
knowledge which is the result of pragmatic method is qualified by a
dialectic which recognizes the limited nature of all human knowledge as
well as the perennial presence of sin in all efforts at knowledge,
This means that realism must take issue with the optimism of Liberation
theology and its use of historical praxis concerning the transparency
of historical experience. For liebuhrian theology there is always a
quality of 'hiddeness' concerning the meaning of history. This means
that relativity and ambiguity are never resolved in human historical
agency.'7 This is not to deny ethical optimism, but rather to qualify
such optimism with the realities of limitation and possibility
understood within anthropological realism. In the same manner the
pragmatic method is qualified by the recognition of the presence of
self-regard and will-to-power in all human historical agency. Once
again the optimism that results from historical praxis is questioned
and qualified. It is because of this dialectical dimension that
pragmatism is understood to be more successful as an epistemological
model. This model holds in tension the perception that knowledge is
both verified by human experience and action and also is to be held as
provisional by the very limitations of human experience and action.
This brings us to consider pragmatic ethic as a liberative ethic.
Niebuhrian theology maintains that ethical action occurs within the
dialectical tension of anthropological realism and religious idealism.
In regard to anthropological realism, pragmatic ethics can be described
as a consequential ethic. In other words, ethics seeks the optimal
course of action within the limitations and possibilities inherent in
the realist understanding of human existence. In regard to religious
idealism, pragmatic ethics can be described as a dispositional ethic.
In this manner, ethics is guided to seek the most successful
approximation to ideals which are both existential and historical in
nature. In this regard it is the ideals of agape and the Kingdom of
God which are regulative for the ethical disposition. This
relationship of ethical action to ideals is dialectic in that agape
indicates the transcendent dimension of human nature while the Kingdom
of God indicates the trans-historical dimension in terms of the future.
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It is here again that we encounter the weakness of content in the
Niebuhrian dialectic. Niebuhr's religious idealism is realized in a
disposition which limits the dialectic to a realm in human
consciousness. It is once again from the perspective of Liberation
theology that we must modify Niebuhr's dialectic to realize a more
substantial dialectic which can be described as 'liberative'. If we
adopt a dialectic of religious realism, then we are moved to embrace
the Liberation concept of 'solidarity' in regard to a particular
referent of history. This would mean placing 'disposition' and
'solidarity' in dialectical tension in relation to ethics. In this
regard 'disposition' refers to the trans-historical norms of Niebuhrian
theology while 'solidarity' refers to the specific historical
commitment of Liberation theology.
It is within this dialectical tension of anthropological realism
and religious realism that the pragmatic ethic is justified. Religious
realism allows ethical action to identify 'ends' which can be stated
with clarity. From the perspective of religious realism one can
identify both trans-historical ideals and historical referents which
give ethical action its orientation. But while the identification of
'ends' is relatively uncomplicated, the 'means' to these 'ends' are
plagued with ambiguity in relation to anthropological realism. It is
within this dialectic tension that ethical action must seek relative,
approximate, and optimal, 'means' under the guidance of ideal and
historical 'ends'. Because pragmatic ethics is qualified by this
dialectical dimension, it is to be described in the same manner as
dialectical theology. It is to be understood as integrative,
contextual, and a dynamic process.
This brings to a conclusion our examination of the modification of
the method of Mebuhrian theology which results in a more 'liberative'
orientation. It is now appropriate to move to examine the general
theoretical positions taken by Liberative realism which form the
conceptual horizon for the specific elements of a theology of justice.
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General conceptual framework in which a theology of justice is
developed
Liberative realism takes issue with Liberation theology concerning
three major areas of theory which are antecedent to a theology of
justice. These theoretical horizons indicate the limits to which a
theology of justice will conform. Due to the methodology indicated
above, these limits set by Liberative realism are not to be understood
as hard and fast. But Liberative realism does perceive these
theoretical horizons to be justified in human experience and relevant
to contemporary discussion of justice. These conceptual horizons have
to do with the comprehension of and decisions concerning: nature, sin,
and divine presence. In relation to these themes, Liberative realism
and Liberation theology come into conflict concerning history and the
potential creation of justice. Thus, as we consider these different
conceptual horizons, an understanding of the possibilities of justice
in history will be the central concern.
Cosmological horizon
For Liberative realism the cosmos is perceived as an environment
of conflict. It is a temporal flux wherein unity and chaos, harmony
and anarchy are seen to be in continual dialectical tension. For
Niebuhr, this world of nature is exemplified by the anarchy and harmony
of the forest.0 In the forest species of life live by the death of the
other forms of life. This exemplifies the conflict and chaos of
biological life in its struggle to survive. But in the same manner,
harmony is present in this chaos in that all the species of life
continue to survive.
For the human being, this world of nature is both environment and
a fundamental dimension of human nature. The human being is a finite
organism living in a passing flux of time and change. He or she is the
prisoner of partial perspectives and subject to inner biological
impulse. In this regard the human being is subject to contingent and
arbitrary determinisms. He or she is subject to the fate of sex, race,
geographical location and physical individuality. It is in this
dimension of human organic life that inequality has its inception.
It is because human life is rooted in nature-necessity that it is
limited concerning historical ambitions. The world of nature creates
continual ambiguity and inertia in regard to the relative achievements
of human beings. Human beings can never step outside their
relationship to nature. They are, by nature, a part of the dialectic
of unity and chaos, harmony and anarchy, which makes organic life one
of conflict and change. This means that human reason and agency is
always limited and relative. From the perspective of human reason, the
cosmos exhibits boundaries which limit intelligibility. For the human
being, the meaning of the cosmos is a mystery. In terms of human
agency, human beings discover that historical existence is always
fragmentary and contradictory. It is for this reason that the optimal
expectations of history will be realized in provisional meanings,
judgements, and fulfilments, in history. liebuhrian theology provides
the term ' irony' as a category descriptive of this relative and
ambiguous dimension of nature and history. Because of the relative and
ambiguous condition of human organic life, intentions and results do
not always correspond in realized history. Human beings are caught in
the 'irony' of life when the limitations of their perspective is
revealed in the failures of historical endeavour.
From this perspective of the world of nature and its relation to
history, the concept of progress has limited application. While it can
relate to the cumulation of knowledge or growth in technology, or even
biological evolution, it can not indicate the elimination of the
fundamental limitations to which the human being is subject as an
organic being. From the perspective of liebuhrian theology, progress
can be equally toward chaos as well as unity, anarchy as well as
harmony.
Liberation theology does not necessarily disagree with the
position of Liberative realism concerning the limits of human organic
existence. Rather, Liberation theology treats this concern as
insignificant in comparison to the determinative presence of the divine
in human beings and in history. This issue of divine presence will be
addressed below. From the perspective of Liberative realism this
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reveals an inadequate understanding of the relationship between the
organic nature of human beings and socio-political injustice realized
in history. It neglects the dialectic presence of the organic sources
of conflict, inequality, and tension, which are the foundations for all
expressions of injustice in history. For Liberative realism, the
achievement of relative justice must take with seriousness these
organic dimensions of dialectical tension. It must seek to mitigate,
redirect, and even use, such forces for the achievement of a relative
justice within the ambiguities of historical life.
This brings us to consider another theoretical horizon of
Liberative realism. The understanding of human nature and sin further
complicates the basic relative and ambiguous character of organic human
life.
Anthropological horizon
Liberative realism understands that human life is lived in the
context of a dialectic in which sin is its perennial characteristic.
On one side of this dialectic is the organic dimension of human life.
This organic dimension of life is characterised by finitude, change,
and conflict of life with life. The other side of this dialectic is
the transcendent dimensions of human life. These include the creative
potentials of reason and imagination. This transcendent dimension also
includes the religious capacity by which the human being apprehends a
unity and coherence beyond itself. This side of the dialectic can be
identified as the 'spiritual'. It is the dimension of self-
transcendence.
This dialectic between the organic and spiritual dimensions of
human life is such that it produces anxiety for the human subject. The
human being has a ' reach that is beyond his or her grasp' . The
capacities of reason, imagination, and religious sensibility, allow the
human being to want to be more, know more, have more, and do more, than
her or his finite organic nature will allow. It is within this
dialectical tension that Liberative realism perceives the occasion for
sin, This dialectical context within which sin finds fruition can not
be diminished by education, moral incentive, or social restructuring.
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This anxiety, which exists as a result of dialectic tension between the
organic and the spiritual, is fundamental to human nature.
While this anxiety is the occasion for sin, it is not to be
understood as the source of sin. Sin has its inception in the freedom
of spiritual life. For Liberative realism, sin is actualized when the
human being seeks security through pretension. This pretension is
revealed in the expansion of the self whereby the self claims
significance and power which are not justified according to organic
life. This sin is inevitable for human beings as surely as freedom is
a quality of human existence. In this manner the human seeks to
resolve existential anxiety by a denial of his or her finite and
relative qualities. Uiebuhrian theology identifies this sin as pride.
Pride is the expansion of the self through reason, imagination, and
religious sensibilities. Through reason and imagination this pride
transmutes the organic will-to-live into the will-to-power, This will-
to-power is revealed in social existence in socio-political structures
which achieve security at the expense of other human life. It is this
pride which allows the human being to claim certainty for partial
knowledge and to universalize a particular interpretation of history
which can be used to justify oppression. It is this desire for self
expansion and self-regard that leads the human being to give socio¬
political movements the sanctity of religious justification. In this
way the human being achieves religious transcendence, meaning, and
prestige, by identifying with a larger social power or movement.
This sin of pride achieves greater intensity in terms of group or
collective existence. Niebuhrian theology understands that groups are
far more ruthless and egoistic than the individual. The group lacks
the transcendent capacities which inform the individual conscience. At
its best, it achieves the ethical mediocrity of group consensus. At
its worse, the collective will-to-power finds justification in emotive
ambitions rooted in the organic conflict of life with life. For this
reason the group tends to respond less to rational and spiritual
impulse and more to emotional and organic impulse. This results in the
group responding to immediate needs without reflection on long term
results. It is for this same reason the group tends to misappropriate
power in order to achieve collective security. And in a corresponding
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manner the group claims ultimacy for its interpretations of history and
life in order to justify the oppression and violence which is the means
to this security.
A dimension of this sin of pride is what Niebuhr identifies as
'sensuality'. This form of sin occurs when the human subject denies
his or her freedom by loosing one's self in the vitalities of nature or
society. This understanding of sin as 'sensuality' has come under
criticism by Feminist theologians.31 They observe that emphasis on sin
as pride addresses the sin of power, but not the sin of powerlessness.
Liberative realism gains in dialectical rigour by integrating these
insights of Feminist theology into a balanced dialectic. This
dialectical understanding of sin perceives that sin as pride is to be
held in tension with sin as humility. Where sin as pride refers to
human self-regard and will-to-power, sin as humility refers to human
self-deprivation and complicity with loss of power. For Feminist
theologians the problem of sin as humility is not the expansion of the
self, but rather the lack of a realized self. In sin as humility the
human being does not realize his or her individual potentialities and
becomes the mere appendage of others. Liberation theology is also
aware of this sin of humility.10 They identify this sin as one of
avoiding responsibility and withdrawing from the conflicts of life.
Liberative realism recognizes that this sin of humility has a
religious dimension which corresponds to that of the sin of pride. The
sin of pride seeks to expand the prestige of the self through
identification with social movements which it gives the prestige of
'religious' justification. In this way the individual borrows the
prestige of the group for its self. In a corresponding manner the sin
of humility seeks to lose freedom and responsibility by giving the self
to something greater than its self. In this way the human being
realizes the religious experience of self-giving transcendence in
regard to a greater power. This is sin in that it is a way of losing
the self in its freedom and responsibility to something which is
partial and finite.
It is concerning this understanding of sin that Liberative realism
enters into serious disagreement with Liberation theology. This
disagreement is not in regard to sin as embodied in socio-political
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structures and economic systems. Rather it is in regard to where sin
has its origin and inception. Liberation theology understands that sin
exists within a circular relationship between the individual and his or
her socio-political and cultural environment. In this circular
relationship, Liberation theology is concerned to emphasize the
conditioning role of environment. They understand that this
environment embodies structural sin which conditions human life to
alienation, oppression, and exploitation. Thus, they are concerned
with the restructuring of society in such a way that it embodies
justice and conditions human life to community and solidarity. Within
this liberating environment it is possible for the human being to
become a 'new self' characterized by mutuality and love.11
Liberative realism does not disagree with this concern for a more
just socio-political environment which conditions the human being to
achieve greater mutuality in social life. Realism does not disagree
with the possibility of modifying, reforming, or revolutionary
restructuring of social systems in favour of greater justice. Where
Liberative realism disagrees with Liberation theology is concerning the
optimism of such an endeavour. This difference of optimism directly
relates to the understanding of where sin has its inception in human
life. Liberation theology is concerned with the creative capacity of
human life wherein human beings can recreate themselves as 'new selves'
by recreating their socio-political and economic environment or
'world'. This optimism is possible for Liberation theology because
they understand the origin and inception of sin to be outside the
transcendent, 'spiritual', dimension of creativity. They understand
sin to have its origin and inception in organic weakness or social
conditioning. In this manner they understand that sin is a fault or
lack which is subject to rectification, This is a major point of
difference between Liberation theology and Liberative realism. Realism
qualifies the creative optimism of human endeavour with the insight
that sin has its origin and inception in the creative and imaginative
capacity of human life. From the perspective of Liberative realism,
the human being is capable of creating socio-political and economic
realities which approximate a greater justice and encourage a more
humane life. But at the same time it understands that all creative
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endeavours of human agency are subject to distortion by the self-regard
and will-to-power of individuals and groups. It is for this reason
that Niebuhrian theology emphasizes the 'new self' as one which is
aware of perennial sin in human achievement and is one which must live
by faith and humility under a forgiveness which transcends human
endeavour.
This difference in the understanding of sin directly relates to
expectations concerning history. Liberation theology displays an
optimism concerning progress in history which Liberative realism can
not embrace. Liberative realism understands that human endeavour in
history is not only qualified by the parochial and partial
perspectives, but also by the perennial distortion by sin. From this
perspective, the achievement of greater justice in history also
provides new conditions and opportunities for injustice. Liberative
realism understands that historical achievement does not resolve the
inevitability of self-regard and will-to-power in individuals or its
more excessive expressions in collective behaviour. It is for this
reason that Hiebuhr recognized the biblical symbol of the 'anti-christ'
as indicating the growth of injustice in history till the end of time.
In this manner history is not only characterized by 'irony' in terms of
partial and parochial perspectives, but also is subject to 'tragedy'
when effort at greater justice is distorted by sin and becomes the new
source of injustice.
This brings us to consider the final theoretical horizon which
determines the development of a theology of justice. This horizon is
concerned with divine presence and agency in regard to the cosmos and
human life.
Theological horizon
Our examination of the presence and agency of God in regard to the
cosmos and human life will focus on the tension of the dialectic
between transcendence and immanence, or the trans-historical and the
historical. This dialectic is determinative in regard to all
theological themes of Liberative realism.
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In regard to the cosmos, Liberative realism understands that
reality is God's creation. God is the creator of time and history and
transcends this world at the limits of its beginning and end. Thus God
is identified with the mystery which surrounds our existence. While
God is transcendent and not to be identified directly with creation,
God is also immanent in time and history. In Uiebuhrian language, God
is both the pinnacle and the basis of reality; both the goal toward
which life strives and the force by which it strives.12 In this
manner, God is the 'hidden' basis of reality. Liberative realism
understands that God is epistemologically transcendent. God is present
in, and is the ground of, reality. And yet God is not
epistemologically available to human perception or analysis. This is
not to mean that the cosmos lacks theological significance. According
to Niebuhrian theology, cosmic reality indicates the impartiality of
God. In this regard nature shows no partiality toward human life.
Nature is impartial as it hands out disaster or blessing. Niebuhrian
theology understands this to be an expression of divine grace and
judgement. It is grace in that we receive the benefits of nature
regardless of personal qualities. But in the same manner it is
judgement in that we are equally subject to the destructive dimensions
of nature regardless of merit.
It is because of this dimension of mystery concerning the 'hidden'
God that the meaning of reality comes only through revelation. It is
through revelation that love is revealed to be the law of life and the
Kingdom of God to be the final consummation of historical existence.
These themes partake of this same dialectical tension. They are
revelations of divine intention and will and indicate a dialectic of
judgement and mercy upon all human agency and historical existence.
They are transcendent and trans-historical norms which judge all
ambiguous and partial human achievements. And yet they are immanent in
human life in that they are relevant in every moment of human
existence. They are the occasion for judgement and forgiveness in
regard to human endeavour. They both inspire greater achievements and
reveal the partial nature of all achievements.
Liberative realism understands that this revelation of meaning,
and fulfilment of meaning, occurs in Jesus Christ. In Jesus Christ we
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find revealed the dialectic between the 'telos' of history and the
'finis' of history. The telos or 'end' is the revelation of meaning.
In this regard we find that love is the 'hidden' meaning of life and
the Kingdom of God is its intention. But this meaning remains 'hidden'
in terms of historical achievement. It is not a meaning which is
capable of being made explicit in human agency due to the limitations
of nature-necessity and the distortions of sin. In this way Jesus
Christ is also the revelation of the finis or 'end' as divine act. It
is by divine agency that human life and history will fulfil its meaning
and intention. Thus, human life and history will have a termination
wherein it will be transformed to achieve its telos.
It is within this dialectical understanding that salvation and
grace is to be understood. From the liebuhrian perspective, grace is
both a power over human life and a power in human life. It is a
transcendent and trans-historical power over human life in that only
divine forgiveness can resolve and complete the desires and distortions
of the human transcendent spirit. Thus, it is justification by grace
through faith which is divine power over human life. In corresponding
manner, God is sovereign over history and is the power which will
complete all human partial endeavour. But grace is also an immanent
and historical power in human beings in that it is the source of
judgement and mercy which gives rise to faith and hope. In this way,
divine forgiveness and promise frees human agency concerning its
inadequacies. The human being can engage in historical activity in the
sure knowledge that divine agency will rectify and complete the partial
and distorted efforts of human endeavour.
This understanding of the dialectic nature of divine agency and
presence has specific application in regard to human historical
achievement. While God is understood as immanent and as a power in
human life, this does not remove the limitations of organic life or the
distortions by sin in the spiritual dimension of human life,
liebuhrian theology understands that history is an interim between the
revelation of the meaning of history and the consummation of that
meaning. This means that present history remains ambiguous and subject
to human distortion through self-regard and will-to-power. Here again
we find the dialectic. Human history seeks to fulfil its meaning and
intention and is empowered in that endeavour by the revelation of
meaning and the immanent presence of Gad as power in human life. And
yet human history remains partial and parochial and is not capable of
achieving these ends. Only a power over history, a sovereign God of
history, can bring history to its completion. And this can only be
achieved by the removal of organic limitation and human sin. For this
reason the consummation of history is to be understood as a termination
wherein God will transform this world.
This Uiebuhrian understanding of divine transcendence and
immanence is in stark contrast to the Liberation theology of Gustavo
Gutie'rrez and Leonardo Boff. Both of these theologians understand the
cosmos to be infused with divine grace.13 This understanding of divine
immanence understands God to be a constitutive element of reality, of
human nature, and of history. In this regard Guti/rrez emphasizes
God's presence as an immanent creative force in history. He perceives
the initial creation of the cosmos to be the beginning of an
evolutionary creationism wherein human beings are invited to
participate in ongoing divine creation in history. In similar manner,
Boff emphasizes divine immanence as a teleological force in history
which is bringing creation and history to its consummation. This
optimism concerning the divine role in history is reinforced by their
perspective on sin. Both these theologians understand sin and evil to
be an aberration in a cosmos determined by grace. Reality is to be
understood as a divine milieu in which human rebellion is unequal to
the creative and teleological presence of grace.
From the perspective of Liberative realism, this understanding of
divine immanence lacks a dialectic of transcendence. This lack of
transcendence allows Liberation theology to give human beings, history,
and nature itself, a positive ethical value which is not justified by
human experience. Vith this optimism concerning divine presence, these
theologians assume a transparency concerning the ability to perceive
and assess the meaning of history and the will of God. Liberative
realism qualifies such optimism with its understanding of organic
limitation and the perennial presence of sin. From the perspective of
Liberative realism, knowledge and value judgements concerning social
and historical existence are never as clear and unambiguous as
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Liberation theology sometimes assumes. In this way realism qualifies
the historical optimism of Liberation theology with the insight that
all human endeavour stands under a transcendent dimension which judges
and reveals our inevitable individual and collective self-regard and
will-to-power.
This criticism concerning divine immanence does not apply to all
Liberation theologians. Ismael Garcia and Jose Miguez Bonino present a
Liberation theology which does not embrace this understanding of divine
presence as constitutive of human beings, history, and nature.1"1 This
difference is significant in regard to their understanding of the role
of the poor and oppressed. In agreement with Liberative realism they
reject any sacralization of any particular social group. They can not
accept the optimism with which Guti/rrez and Boff understand this
specific group to be the carriers of historical meaning and salvation.
But this is not to say that Garc/a and Miguez Bonino do not perceive
the poor and oppressed to have theological significance. It is at this
point that they challenge Niebuhrian theology. Vhile Niebuhrian
theology retains a dialectic strength concerning divine transcendence,
it must be questioned concerning the cancreteness of its understanding
of immanence. In this regard the Niebuhrian dialectic seems to be
lacking a real historical dimension. At best it seems to recognize the
divine dimension in the moral consciousness of human beings.
This problem finds a focus in the understanding of agape and the
promise of the Kingdom of God. In liebuhrian theology these themes
find their strength as transcendent and trans-historical concepts which
impinge on the moral consciousness of human beings. Critics of this
perspective have observed that the weakness of this position is that it
lacks dialectic rigour wherein the transcendent and trans-historical is
balanced by the immanent and historical.1--' Feminist theologians point
out that Niebuhrian divine self-giving love appears as an abstraction
of the full dimensions of love which occur in relationships. They are
suspicious of this apparent 'idealism' which makes self-sacrifice a
norm. They understand that this norm can be used to serve injustice.
The norm of self-sacrifice is oppressive when applied to those who are
denied the will-to-live. In this situation, love as mutuality is the
more significant norm. From the perspective of Feminist theology, the
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dialectic between transcendent self-giving love and immanent mutual
love needs a more positive relationship, This would lead to an
understanding of divine love that is gratuitous and forgives our
failures, and which is also a love that expects us to achieve our full
potential as human beings. In this regard, divine love is also
perceived to have dimensions of mutuality. While divine love is
initially self-giving, it is also a love which takes the human subject
with a seriousness that requires reciprocal self-giving. In this way
divine love has expectations in reference to the human being. The
strength of Liberation theology is the recognition that this divine
love requires discipleship and a spirituality which is realized in
historical existence.
It is within this concern that Garcia and Mi'guez Bonino illustrate
the historical dimension of this dialectic. They recognize that divine
transcendent love is universal and is self-giving in regard to all
human beings. At the same time they maintain that is love is not to be
understood as impartial. This universal love is preferential toward
particular human beings in history. This divine preferential love is
not based on human merit, but rather on human need. In this way
transcendent love finds immanent expression in regard to a specific
historical referent. This understanding is a gain to liebuhrian
theology in that it demonstrates a more balanced and rigorous dialectic
of love. It avoids the danger of identifying divine immanence with the
particular projects of history and at the same time pushes divine
immanence beyond mere reference to human moral consciousness. In this
way agape and the promise of the Kingdom have a specific historical
referent. It is love and promise addressed first to those in need for
the sake of all.
This balanced dialectic also reinforces another historical
dimension which is lacking in Niebuhrian theology. Because Niebuhrian
theology emphasizes the transcendent dimension of the divine and the
transcendent moral consciousness of the human, the dialectic has tended
to focus on judgement and mercy and justification by grace through
faith. As Liberation theology has rightly observed, this emphasis on
the transcendent has the danger of weakening historical commitment.
When divine universal transcendent love is balanced by a love in
solidarity with specific human beings, then the relationship with God
entails historical commitment. In this way faith and hope is not
simply identified in relation to the human consciousness which exists
under the transcendent norms of love and the Kingdom of God. Faith and
hope function in relation to a historical commitment to specific people
to whom this love and the Kingdom is first addressed. This means that
faith as a universally available relationship with God realized through
justification by grace must be held in dialectical tension with
historical commitment and faith lived as discipleship.
This brings to a conclusion our examination of the general
theoretical horizons to a theology of justice as understood by
Liberative realism. As we have observed, this Liberative realism is
modified beyond Hiebuhrian theology to embrace a more liberative
commitment to history. At the same time, we must recognize that this
examination of theoretic horizons is negative in function. We have
been examining the limitations to human ambition in history. In this
way we have been identifying the 'impossibilities' which determine the
theology of justice. These 'impossibilities' can be simply identified
as; the limitations of organic life, the distortion of life rooted in
the human spirit, and the 'otherness' of God in regard to historical
endeavour. As we move to examine the more specific elements of a
theology of justice we will find that we are exploring the
'possibilities' of human life and history. This understanding of
'possibility' and 'impossibility' needs to be held in dialectic
tension. The theoretical horizons determine the limits and
'impossibilities' of human agency and history. But in tension with
these 'impossibilities' is the discovery of what is possible in human
agency and history, This may lead to re-evaluate and modify our
horizons.
Specific elements of a theology of justice within Liberative realism
With the identification of the theoretical horizons of justice in
place, it is now passible to examine the specific themes which are
constitutive of a theology of justice. This examination will be
comprised of three parts. The first part will deal with justice as a
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human creation. The second part will deal with justice as human
possibility and necessity, And the third part will deal in detail with
justice as an approximation to divine will.
Justice as human phenomenon
Liberative realism understands justice to be fundamentally a human
creation necessitated by the conflictive nature of social existence.
This conflictive nature of social life requires the creation and
utilization of artifacts of social justice. These artifacts are;
political structures, economic systems, legal systems and law, and
police power. This creative activity of human collective life is
guided by values, historical referents, and future goals, provided by
organic and transcendent dimensions of human life. Organic life
provides justice with a foundation in community. Community provides
the natural coherences which make social life possible. These organic
coherences are relational hierarchy, common memory, common language,
and geographical boundaries. This organic realm is the source for such
values as freedom and equality. Freedom relates to the transcendent
dimension of the individual which the intimate community will hold as a
value and will protect and respect. Equality is the logical equivalent
of mutual love that is experienced in intimate community, It is the
task of justice to implement these values of organic community in the
more complex and less intimate context of human social life.
In like manner, the creation of justice is guided by the
transcendent norms of divine love and the promise of the Kingdom of
God. In regard to divine love, the universal and preferential
dimensions of' lave challenge creative justice to recognize equality and
freedom as limited approximations and to find in particular groups in
social life the evidence of such limitations. In regard to the Kingdom
of God, the dimension of future possibility opens the present to the
creation of realistic Utopia. This creation of realistic Utopia serves
justice through creative imagination applied to future economic and
political possibility.
The concern of Liberative realism is to maintain the understanding
that justice is a human creation which is realized in the context of
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dialectical tension found in the organic and transcendent dimensions of
human life and can not be equated directly with either. Organic,
intimate community achieves a mutuality of love which can not be
achieved on the level of complex and ambiguous social life. For this
reason justice is to be held in dialectical tension with the
possibilities of organic community life. In like manner, justice can
not be simply equated with divine love and the Kingdom of God. Justice
is created in the conflict and ambiguity of nature-necessity and the
social propensity toward sin in human collective life. It is for this
reason that Liberative realism takes issue with Liberation theology
concerning its understanding of divine immanence in the historical
realization of justice and its optimistic assessment of organic
reality. Liberative realism maintains that justice is fundamentally a
human creation and reflects the full potentials and distortions of
human existence.
It is within this context of dialectic tension that the creation
of justice must be understood as integrative, contextual, and dynamic.
The creation of justice is integrative in that it seeks coherence with
a larger environment of ideas and experience. This means that the
pursuit of justice must be dialogical and open-ended. It can not claim
finality or be exclusive in regard to other attempts to create justice.
Liberative realism is suspicious of Liberation theology in this regard.
It perceives the historical praxis of Liberation theology as being in
danger of a myopia which does not look beyond its parochial concerns.
This myopia finds expression in their adaption of social analysis which
rejects capitalism, social classes, and international dependency.1®
The suspicion of Liberative realism is that these realities have been
rejected with a finality which prevents discussion.
Liberative realism also understands justice to be contextual and
pragmatic. Justice is created within a specific cultural and
historical context. Within this context it seeks to create the
artifacts of justice which will be successful in the production of
greater social justice. From this perspective, Liberative realism
recognizes the legitimacy of Liberation theology and its social
analysis. From the perspective of Latin America the realities of
capitalism, social class, and international dependency, have been major
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forces for injustice. And Liberative realism agrees with. Liberation
theology that these realities need drastic modification if justice is
to be achieved. But Liberative realism does not agree with a
distinction between capitalism and socialism as a means to justice.
Neither does it agree with the possibility of a society without class
or group conflict. And similarly, realism also has difficulty with an
understanding of nationalistic liberation if this liberation assumes
political and economic isolation. For Liberative realism, these
concerns must submit to pragmatic resolution within the national as
well as international context.
It is because the creation of justice is understood as integrative
and contextual that it can be described as a dynamic process. Justice
cannot be defined by a model, paradigm, or regulative equation. It is
to be understood as a process wherein prudent reason seeks to adapt
values, historical commitments, and future hopes, into the complexities
and ambiguities of human social existence. These values, historical
commitments, or future hopes, do not represent a fixed hierarchy. The
hierarchy of importance of these themes will vary according to the
context to which they are applied. It is in regard to this culture-
specific determined hierarchy of regulative themes that the artifacts
of justice will seek approximation. Liberative realism understands
that this creation of justice is a continual process for social life.
In changing historical existence, the hierarchy of values shift
according to social change and need. For this reason the artifacts of
social life will also continually change to meet the new needs of
social existence. All that can be said definitively of justice is that
it is the continual attempt of social existence to approximate the
norms of transcendent life and extend the coherences of organic life
within the possibilities and limitations of human agency. It is now to
an explicit consideration of these possibilities and limitations that
we now turn.
Justice as human possibility and necessity
Liberative realism understands that social justice is both a
possibility and a necessity. It is a possibility to the degree that
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human reason and creativity can extend the natural coherences of
organic life under the inspiration of regulative values, historical
commitments, and future hope. It is a necessity in that reason and
imagination expressed in human endeavour also extend natural forces for
chaos and anarchy. Social justice is necessitated by the rationality
and creativity of human beings which extends the will-to-pawer and
egoism of groups in the conflict of life with life. It is concerning
this dialectic between possibility and necessity that Liberative
realism comes into conflict with Liberation theology. Liberative
realism perceives that Liberation theology lacks dialectic rigor in
regard to the realization of social justice. Realism understands that
social justice stands in dialectical tension with both its organic
foundation and its transcendent and trans-historical norms. It is this
dialectical tension which is lacking in Liberation theology. In the
fallowing we will examine the content of this dialectic tension and its
relevance to social justice.
The beginning point for the consideration of this dialectic is the
relationship between social justice and organic life. Social justice
has its foundation in the natural coherence of intimate community. In
intimate community there is no need for principles or prudent
calculation to guide human relationships. In intimate community human
beings achieve a collective life wherein the needs and desires of each
is known to all. In this context justice is implicit in the intimacy
of communal life. It is here that love as mutuality finds its natural
and fullest expression, Siebuhrian theology understands that it is
intimate community which provides the organic coherence upon which all
social justice is built.It is the implicit justice found in
intimate community which is translated into explicit principles which
guide the creation of artifacts of justice. From the JTiebuhrian
perspective, social justice is not possible if it is not grounded in
the natural coherences of community life. It is in relation to these
natural coherences that social justice obtains its legitimacy.
This liebuhrian understanding of the role of intimate community is
expanded when placed in comparison with Liberation theology concerning
Christian Base Communities. The role of intimate communities in regard
to social justice is intensified by integration of the role of
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Christian Base Communities. Liberation theology understands that Base
Communities are involved in theological reflection which includes
biblical interpretation and socio-political conscientization. It is
this reflective process in christian communities which leads to
commitment to the poor and oppressed. In this manner, intimate
communities are not only to be perceived as the the context in which
mutuality is achieved. They are also the context where socio-political
and religious critical awareness is increased in regard to social
justice. These Christian Base Communities of Latin America are not to
be understood as general models for intimate christian community.
Christian Base Communities are the culture-specific realization of
intimate community as understood by Niebuhrian theology. These
Christian Base Communities are intimate christian communities which are
the organic foundation for the values, commitments, and hopes, which
can guide the achievement of social justice in Latin America. A
general understanding of intimate christian community includes the
elements of mutuality, conscientization, and solidarity. But the form
that these intimate communities take will be culture-specific and no
one expression of community is to be valued over another. What is
valued in various forms of community is the common features of intimacy
and the process by which people come into awareness of human need and
respond to that need.
Vith this understanding of intimate community we can move to
consider the dialectical relationship between intimate community and
social justice. This relationship involves both continuity and
discontinuity. In terms of continuity, intimate community provides the
quality of human relationships which social justice wishes to
approximate. By means of human rationality and creativity, the
implicit justice of intimate community is translated into regulative
principles which will guide the creation of artifacts of justice.
Niebuhrian theology understands that the principles of equality and
freedom are the result of this rational process. To these two
regulative principles, Liberation theology could add the principle of
solidarity. Liberation theology has not explored the organic origin of
this principle in intimate community. They have been concerned with
the justification of this principle from the perspective of divine
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preferential love. But solidarity can also be understood as a rational
principle rooted in the experience of intimate communities. Intimate
communities provide the environment of 'family' wherein needs are
immediate to the conscience of the members of the community. In this
environment the poor and oppressed find immediate support from those
with whom they are intimate in communal life. To transfer this
experience into a regulative principle results in a principle of
solidarity with those most in need within a social framework.
It is this understanding of love as mutuality, which looks first
to the poor and oppressed, that is the strength of the position of
Liberation theology. Later in this chapter we will examine a more
inclusive term to replace this designation of 'poor and oppressed'. In
regard to love as mutuality, Liberation theology perceives a direct
continuity between love expressed in intimate community and love
expressed in social justice. This is a weakness of their position,
Because they neglect the discontinuity between intimate community and
social justice, their understanding of social justice is over
optimistic. Their position lacks the dialectical rigour which reveals
the limitations of social justice in relation to intimate community.
Liberative realism understands that social justice lacks the dimension
of intimacy which obtains in community life. This means that needs are
not immediate to the consciousness of human beings. It means that
human action and the results of such action are not present to the
awareness of the human actor. On the level of social existence, the
human is subject to social fragmentation, plurality, and complexity,
which makes intimate community an impossible model for social justice.
This ambiguity of social life is further complicated by organic forces
for anarchy and chaos which are also realized in social existence. In
this regard the conflict of' life with life achieves greater intensity
in the egoism and imperialism of groups within society. Group will-to-
power is not mitigated by the conscience of intimate relationships in
the complexity of social life.
It is because of these destructive qualities of social existence
that liebuhrian theology identifies regulative principles and artifacts
of justice which specifically deal with individual and collective will-
to-power and self-regard. From the perspective of social existence,
order is a primary principle. Order provides social continuity and
stability. Niebuhrian theology understands that freedom, equality, and
order, are held in dialectical tension in social life. The exclusive
pursuit of any of these regulative principles will result in injustice.
The principle of solidarity can be added to this dialectic.
This Riebuhrian understanding of social existence has specific
consequences in regard to the creation of artifacts of justice. With
group egoism and conflict as continual social realities, social justice
will seek to hold in tension the need for freedom of individuals and
groups to pursue their potentials, and the need for these competing
interests to be affirmed equally. These needs will be held in tension
with the need of social life to order these vitalities in a way that
maintains social existence. This means that coercive power is also a
dimension of social justice. Order will be realized by hierarchies of
authority and the centralization of power. And in order for freedom
and equality not to be jeopardized by this centralization of power and
hierarchy of authority, artifacts of justice will need to be created
which distribute power and ensure solidarity with those at the
periphery of social life.
This understanding of social life as conflictual and complex is in
fundamental discontinuity with intimate community. It is for this
reason that Liberative realism can not agree with Liberation theology
concerning its optimism in relation to social justice. In regard to
mutuality realized in intimate communities, Liberative realism is in
agreement with Liberation theology. Liberative realism would also
agree that the experience of mutual love in intimate community
permeates social existence and pushes social justice to achieve greater
mutuality. This is the positive contribution of intimate community to
social justice. But at the same time, social justice is to be
understood as mainly negative in function. Unlike intimate community,
it does not inspire greater mutuality. Rather, through principles and
artifacts of justice it seeks to restrict the natural capacities for
anarchy and chaos which exist in human life. Through the use of
coercive power, it seeks to limit the egoism and imperialism of group
behaviour. Through the centralization of power and the balance of
power it seeks a relative social harmony which allows greater mutuality
- 301 -
to take place. In this manner intimate community and social justice
are to be held in dialectical tension. Intimate community has the
positive function of providing natural coherences and inspiration of
mutuality in social life. In discontinuity with this function of
intimate community, social justice functions in a negative fashion by
restricting the expansive and oppressive potentials of individual and
group behaviour. This is not to say that there are no positive
dimensions in social justice. The structure of social justice is
positive in that it provides distribution of economic and political
power. But at the same time it is to be recognized that this
distributive function of the structures of social justice do not
operate due to natural coherences or the inspiration of mutuality. The
positive distributive role of social justice functions by means of law
and coercive power.
It is because of this difference in the understanding of social
existence that Liberative realism is critical of the rationality of
justice held by Liberation theology. Uiebuhrian theology identifies
four areas in the rationality of justice. These are: the vividness
with which we appreciate the needs of others; the extent to which we
become conscious of the real character of our own motives and impulses;
the ability to harmonize conflicting impulses in our life and in
society; and the capacity to choose adequate means for approved ends.10
Liberative realism recognizes that the strength of Liberation theology
is found in the first category wherein we appreciate the need of
others. Liberation theology presses social justice to adopt principles
and artifacts of justice which reflect this concern. It is in regard
to the other principles of the rationality of justice that Liberation
theology is found wanting. Liberation theology perceives a dialectic
of conflict wherein egoism and will-to-power are exhibited in the
oppression and impoverishment of people by the ruling groups of Latin
American society. In this dialectic they neglect the Siebuhrian
insight that all groups exhibit egoism and will-to-power and that
conflict, plurality, relative inequality, and the potential for abuse
of power, will always be characteristic of social existence. For this
reason an effective rationality of justice will include the concern to
limit and harmonize the conflict and egoism inherent in social life.
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Within this rationality a healthy society is one which can achieve the
greatest possible equilibrium of power and greatest possible numbers of
centres of power, the greatest possible social check upon the
administration of power, and the most effective use of forms of
coercion wherein consent and coercion are compounded. Liberation
theology neglects this dimension in their rationality of justice.
This brings us to consider the dialectic between social justice
and the themes of religious realism. This dialectic is also understood
in terms of continuity and discontinuity. Corresponding to the above
examination, Liberation theology has tended to emphasize the continuity
while Niebuhrian theology has emphasized the discontinuity. An
integrative Liberative realism will seek to hold these two emphases
together to obtain a fuller dialectic.
The themes of religious realism are divine love and the promise of
the Kingdom of God. Within this understanding of religious realism
there is a recognition that divine love and promise are both trans-
historical and historical, transcendent and immanent. It is the
opposition of these themes which reveal the continuous and
discontinuous relationship with social justice. Liberative realism
understands that divine love and the promise of the Kingdom are
discontinuous with social justice in that they are trans-historical and
transcendent themes. In this regard divine love is to be understood as
gratuitous and universal. This is a love which is self-giving and
self-sacrificial. This gratuitous and universal divine love stands in
contrast with the love achieved in social relationships. The greatest
love achieved in social life is mutuality. This is a love realized in
reciprocity. In contrast to this mutuality is divine love which is
self-giving without calculation of reciprocity. This divine love is a
love which can not be the basis for social justice. Social justice
requires the consideration of conflictive interests where mutuality is
the highest achievement. In this regard, divine love is judgement and
inspiration in regard to the achievements of social justice. Divine
love continually reveals the human failure to live according to the law
of life and inspires human endeavour to greater approximations of
mutuality. The promise of the Kingdom of God takes on this same
dialectical relationship in regard to social justice. It reveals
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future promise of social existence which is not possible to human
endeavour. It mediates judgement on present creations of justice and
inspiration for future approximation.
Following the insights of Liberation theology, Liberative realism
also understands these themes of religious realism to be continuous
with social justice. It is in this regard that divine love and the
promise of the Kingdom are understood to be preferential in regard to a
specific historical referent. This means that divine love and promise
are not impartial when applied to the realities of social life. This
understanding of love and promise perceives that God is in solidarity
with the marginated and oppressed in the social context. This
preferential love and promise also carries with it judgement and
inspiration. In this regard the poor and oppressed became the
mediation of judgement on the failure of social justice. And in like
manner, they also become the focus for commitment to achieve greater
justice.
This dialectical relationship between social justice and the
themes of religious realism has specific consequences in regard to the
regulative principles and the artifacts of justice. The discontinuity
of divine love and the promise of the Kingdom mediate judgement on all
social endeavour and reveal the continual need for repentance and
divine forgiveness. In terms of rational principles of justice, this
experience of human limitation and divine grace is translated into the
principle of tolerance. Tolerance is grounded in the humility of human
social life under the judgment and mercy of God. In tension with this
principle of tolerance is the principle of solidarity. Solidarity is
the rational principle which originates from the preferential nature of
divine love and promise which is continuous with social existence.
While the principle of tolerance corresponds to our collective and
general sense of limitation in social endeavour, the principle of
solidarity indicates the specific referent in social life by which our
limitation becomes explicit. In this manner both humility and
commitment become characteristics of social justice.
In similar manner, the principles of freedom and equality are
qualified by the themes of religious realism. In regard to freedom,
the discontinuous nature of divine love and promise set the limits and
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redefines the possibilities of human freedom. Niebuhrian theology
understands that human freedom transcends the determined principles or
laws of social justice. It is from the perspective of transcendent
divine love and trans-historical promise that freedom is bound by the
will of God. In this relationship freedom finds its greatest
expression in self-giving love and faith in future promise. In like
manner the continuous nature of preferential divine love and promise
give this freedom a specific orientation in regard to self-giving and
faith in the future. In this way freedom is expressed in a commitment
toward the poor and oppressed and seeks social forms of justice which
meet their needs.
The principle of equality is also qualified by the themes of
religious realism. The transcendent and trans-historical themes of
divine love and the promise of the Kingdom provide a religious
justification for the principle of equality. These themes mediate
divine judgment and mercy which reveal that human beings are equally
subject to sin and equally recipients of divine forgiveness. This
religious dimension affirms human equality in rejecting the possibility
of a human claim to merit. But at the same time, this discontinuous
nature of divine love and promise place the principle of equality under
judgement. In this regard equality is a social principle of
reciprocity approximating mutuality. For this reason the principle of
equality represents a relational norm which is always less than the
self-giving, gratuitous love of God. In similar manner the
preferential nature of divine love and promise reveal the specific
limitation and inadequacies of this principle. In this way the
continuous nature of divine love and promise press social justice to
seek greater possibilities of equality by means of commitment to those
who are marginalized in the social attempt at equilibrium of power and
interest.
The last two principles for our consideration are those of order
and coercive power. These two principles are of specifically social
origin and stand under judgement in regard to the themes of religious
realism. These principles have to do with the maintenance and
limitation of the conflictive nature of human social existence. Order
in its most successful expression supports the social possibilities of
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mutual love which are always less that divine self-giving. And
coercive power is completely alien to love which is self-sacrificial.
It is in regard to these principles that divine love and promise find
their greatest discontinuity. Order and coercive power do not reflect
any dimension of divine will or agency. Rather, they are necessitated
by the limited and sinful nature of human individual and collective
behaviour. The only manner in which divine love and promise are
continuous with these principles of social justice is in the
specificity of judgement provided by the preferential nature of divine
love and promise. Divine preferential love and promise indicate a
historical referent by which order is assessed and coercive power
revealed as oppressive. In this manner judgement is not only general
but has a specific historical referent.
This brings to a conclusion our examination of the possibility and
necessity of social justice as understood by Liberative realism. The
final part of this study will deal with the examination and
justification of the integration of themes of Liberation theology into
Niebuhrian theology. These specific themes are; the commitment to the
poor and oppressed, and the utilization of realistic Utopia.
Justice as the approximation to divine will
As indicated above, justice is a human endeavour pursued in the
context of dialectical tension concerning divine love and the promise
of the Kingdom of God. In this creative endeavour human beings seek to
achieve the greatest degree of mutuality possible in their social life.
For Niebuhrian theology this task is pursued under the transcendent
norm of divine love and the trans-historical promise of the Kingdom of
God. Liberation theology modifies the Niebuhrian position by
identifying a historical dimension for these transcendent and trans-
historical themes. In this manner Liberation theology identifies the
concrete historical mediations of these Niebuhrian themes. In terms of
divine love, Liberation theology perceives the poor and oppressed to be
the preferential recipient of divine lave. It is for this reason that
the poor and oppressed become the mediation of divine judgement and
call to repentance, conversion, and discipleship. In similar manner,
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the present absence of the Kingdom of God and the future promise of the
Kingdom of God is mediated through the presence of the poor and
oppressed. This focal point found in the poor and oppressed, which
indicates the need of the Kingdom, leads to the imaginative
construction of realistic Utopias. In this way the Kingdom of God
finds relative and approximate realization in the creation of political
structures and economic systems.
It will be the task of the rest of this section to identify how
these historical mediations can be integrated into Niebuhrian theology.
Our first concern will be with the significance and role of the poor
and oppressed as a mediation of theological significance. This
examination will be developed with reference to the christologies of
both liebuhrian and Liberation theology.
An initial observation is that the 'poor and oppressed' is
primarily a sociological reference rather than a theological category.
In this regard, the reference to the 'poor and oppressed' has to do
with a specific historical context and is not applicable for a general
theory. It is with this in mind that I suggest 'vulnerability' as a
term which will be more general and inclusive of the 'poor and
oppressed' as an identification of human vulnerability within a
specific context. The term 'vulnerability' comes from the latin word
vulnus, which means 'wound'. The English use of the word refers to
openness to being wounded or exposed to damage.123 In the following we
will explore the richness of this term as it serves as an
anthropological as well as theological descriptive category.
A primary definition of 'vulnerability' will correspond to the
liebuhrian understanding of human organic existence. In this way,
vulnerability refers to that dimension of human life wherein life is
determined and restricted by nature-necessity. The theological
significance of this organic vulnerability is that it is the occasion
for sin. This vulnerability results in anxiety which the human being
inevitably seeks to resolve by either the sin of pride or the sin of
humility. By means of either self-regard and will-to-power or by self-
degradation, the human being seeks to deny the vulnerability which is
fundamental to human nature. The human seeks to lose this 'vulnerable
self' by either a grandiose interpretation of the self or by
- 307 -
surrendering the self over to other vitalities and losing
responsibility for dealing with one's vulnerability.
Both Niebuhrian and Liberation christology understand that Jesus
Christ exemplifies this vulnerability and reveals the divine resolution
of the sin which is the inevitable human response to vulnerability.
Niebuhrian christology is in agreement with Boff and Sobrino concerning
the human vulnerability of the 'historical Jesus'.20 This Jesus is
subject to nature-necessity as are all human beings. This is
especially relevant in regard to Jesus' understanding of his mission.
Sobrino perceives that Jesus was subject to a developmental process.
His understanding of his mission evolved and grew in relation to the
historical realities he had to deal with. For this reason Sobrino
identifies the 'historical Jesus' as the history of Jesus' faith and
trust in God. For Liberation and Niebuhrian theology this faith and
trust is paradigmatic for how the self is to relate to the
vulnerability of life. As Niebuhrian theology illustrates, seeking the
self results in increased anxiety and an inescapable cycle of sin.
Whereas the giving of the self over to God through faith and trust
mitigates this anxiety and the cycle of sin. This does not mean that
the self ceases to be vulnerable. It is rather the insight that the
bondage relating to the vulnerability of the self has its foundation in
the denial of vulnerability. This relationship with God in faith and
trust means that the self is accepted in its fundamental vulnerability
and that the resolution of that vulnerability is recognized as residing
in the agency of God.
Niebuhrian theology emphasizes that this vulnerability, and the
sin associated with it, are only resolved by God beyond current
historical existence. The Cross of Christ reveals the perennial
attempt by human beings to resolve vulnerability by will-to-power. In
like manner, the resurrection indicates the divine power which will
resolve human vulnerability and the sin associated with it by the
transformation of human existence. It is in this regard that
Liberative realism understands Jesus Christ to be the revelation of the
'impossible possibility'. It is impossible for human beings to resolve
the vulnerable dimension of their organic existence. For this reason
human beings are inevitably tempted to resolve this anxiety of the
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'vulnerable self' either by loss of self or expansion of self. It is
the affirmation of our christological study that Jesus Christ is
subject to this vulnerability and temptation. And yet this same
vulnerable Jesus Christ is also the revelation of human life lived in
faith and trust. And in his death and resurrection is the revelation
of divine mercy and grace which will resolve human vulnerability and
sin. ¥hat is impossible for human agency is possible for divine
agency.
A second meaning for the term 'vulnerability' corresponds to the
concern of Liberation theology in regard to the 'poor and oppressed'.
This form of vulnerability relates to human need to which society can
respond. The first form of vulnerability had to do with human organic
life which could only be resolved by the eschatological agency of God.
This form of vulnerability has to do with the human condition wherein
human agency can resolve or mitigate vulnerability. This vulnerability
is imposed on human life from two sources. One source is biological.
This vulnerability is exemplified by children, the elderly, the
mentally ill, and the physically handicapped. This is a vulnerability
imposed by nature and expresses itself in terms of need. And unlike
the previous examination of vulnerability, it is a need to which human
agency can respond in creative and constructive ways. The second
source of vulnerability is socio-political and economic. This is the
vulnerability which Liberation theology is familiar with. It is the
vulnerability imposed on human life through political oppression and
economic impoverishment. The need associated with this vulnerability
has many expressions. It is poverty, lack of education, lack of
medical care, poor housing, political powerlessness, low self-esteem,
fear, and so an. What is characteristic concerning this vulnerability
is that it is social in origin. It is not necessitated by organic
life, but is the result of human agency in social existence. For this
reason it is a vulnerability which can be resolved or mitigated by
social agency.
This form of vulnerability is identifiable at all levels of social
existence. In terms of the smallest social unit, the family, it is the
recognition of the need expressed by children and the elderly. In
terms of the social dimensions on up to the national level, it is the
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identification of those who are marginated within the socio-political
and economic system. This can include the mentally ill and physically
handicapped as well as the 'poor and oppressed'. It can include ethnic
minorities, religious minorities, women, or any other group of people
whose values or needs do not correspond to the current social reality.
In terms of international relations this vulnerability is expressed by
nations that are marginated by international economic and political
power. This vulnerability is also realized in natural disaster or
ecological changes which threaten whole nations. In all these social
levels of human existence the common factor is vulnerability as human
need to which there can be human response. This is true from the level
of the human family on up to the international community. At all
levels there is human need and the ability and responsibility to meet
that need.
This presence of the 'vulnerable' in social life takes on
theological significance in regard to the prophetic ministry of Jesus
Christ. Liberation christology understands that Jesus Christ denounces
injustice on the basis of divine filial love. Under this universal
love all human beings are understood to be brothers and sisters. It is
for this reason that Jesus Christ reveals divine solidarity with those
who suffer imposed vulnerability. Sobrino perceives this solidarity to
be explicit in Jesus' decision to take the role of the marginated and
oppressed upon himself.21 In the cross is revealed the human who
suffers imposed vulnerability. In like manner the resurrection reveals
the divine solidarity with the human who is subjected to such
vulnerability. Liberation theology perceives that this imposed
vulnerability has continued theological significance. God continues to
be in solidarity with those whose suffer imposed vulnerability. This
is true of both biological and social sources of vulnerability. God's
familial love is preferential toward those in need. It is in this
regard that the presence of the vulnerable continue to mediate divine
judgement and invitation. Their presence mediates the judgement of God
by revealing the failure of our love and social justice. At the same
time their presence is an invitation to repentance, conversion, and
discipleship. It is an invitation to use our resources to meet human
need and in so doing live out the fraternal love of God.
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A third and final meaning far vulnerability which we will examine
is in reference to divine love. Liberation theology identifies divine
love as gratuitous and Niebuhrian theology identifies divine love as
disinterested self-giving. Both of these positions indicate that
vulnerability is a fundamental quality of divine love. Both these
positions perceive divine love to be non-coercive and self-sacrifical.
Sobrino and Niebuhr are in agreement that this quality of divine
character is revealed in Jesus Christ as the suffering servant.22 As
noted above, Jesus not only suffers imposed vulnerability, but he
accepts this vulnerability in faithfulness to his mission and to God.
It is in the Cross and this accepted vulnerability that love is
revealed as the law of life and the character of God, In Jesus Christ
the nature of love is revealed. It is making one's self vulnerable to
others, even to the point of experiencing rejection and death. Without
this vulnerability, love is not possible. Love without vulnerability
becomes another form of coercion or manipulation.
It is for this reason that Niebuhrian theology emphasizes divine
love as' judgement and mercy on human love. In Jesus Christ we have
perceived that God has embraced 'accepted vulnerability' to a degree
which transcends our ambiguous self-giving. In Christ, God has become
vulnerable to the point of being rejected and crucified. In Christ we
also perceive that it is not only the person of God who is subject to
rejection, but also the promise of the Kingdom of God, As Liberation
christology points out, the death of Jesus is also the rejection of his
message. In this manner God is also vulnerable concerning the
revelation of his will. Neither God's love or truth is a coercive
power. This love and truth is a transforming power only as human
beings embrace 'accepted vulnerability' through repentance, conversion,
and discipleship. Niebuhrian theology corresponds to this insight with
the understanding that faith in God is a relationship to a self-giving
love or vulnerability which is finally revealed as a transcendent grace
which is sovereign over human life and history.
This understanding of divine 'accepted vulnerability' has
continuing historical significance. In this regard, love as the law of
life continues to be vulnerable to rejection and distortion.
Niebuhrian theology is sensitive to this perennial rejection and
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distortion of the transcendent dimension of life by individual and
group egoism and self-regard. Liberation theology also perceives
"accepted vulnerability" to have continued historical significance.
Gutierrez and Boff understand that discipleship involves accepted
vulnerability in the context of oppression.23 Above we identified the
theological significance of those who suffer imposed vulnerability.
This imposed vulnerability has significance in a passive and general
manner. The theological significance of those who suffer imposed
vulnerability has nothing to do with their agency or commitment.
Accepted vulnerability differs from imposed vulnerability in that it is
more specific and active, and relates directly to human agency. This
accepted vulnerability refers to those who follow the path of Christ
and who suffer his fate, In this way the Cross and the role of
suffering ser%7ant continues to have historical expression. Like the
theological significance of imposed vulnerability, this accepted
vulnerability has the significance of judgement and invitation. In the
'cross' of those who suffer death in accepted vulnerability, we are
challenged concerning our own discipleship and our own historical
commitment.
In the above we have considered the term 'vulnerability' as a
general concept which is inclusive of the historical commitment of
Liberation theology. In this manner we have demonstrated that this
understanding of vulnerability is one which gives Niebuhrian theology a
liberative dimension through a historical referent. It is now
appropriate to turn to the second historical mediation suggested by
Liberation theology. This is the use of realistic Utopia as a relative
and approximate effort to realize the values and commitment of the
Kingdom of God in social life.
The Kingdom of God refers to divine love in terms of future
eschatological fulfilment. For this reason, what has been said about
love as vulnerability also applies to the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom
of God is an 'impossible possibility' in regard to human ambitions in
history. It is the promise of divine fulfilment which is not possible
within human agency. And corresponding to divine love as accepted
vulnerability, this Kingdom of God is not a coercive power in history.
Like the vulnerability of love, the Kingdom of God is a transforming
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power which becomes relatively present through faith expressed in
repentance, conversion and discipleship. In like manner, the presence
of those who suffer 'imposed vulnerability' are also significant in
regard to the Kingdom. By their presence they indicate the absence of
the Kingdom and prevent any historical achievement from claiming divine
justification. In this way they also indicate future possibility for
greater achievement of justice.
The weakness of liebuhrian theology, in regard to the Kingdom of
God, concerns concrete historical reference. Niebuhrian theology
perceives that the Kingdom of God impinges on the moral conscience of
the human agent in history. Liberation theology intensifies this
presence of the Kingdom of God by reference to the 'poor and
oppressed'. The presence of the 'vulnerable' and their theological
significance makes the dialectical nature of the Kingdom more explicit.
But this reference to those who are vulnerable in society does not
provide guidance for the creation of just social systems. It does
provide the historical referent from which social systems can be
assessed and judged. But it does not guide the creative process of
imaginative work concerning future possibility. Liberation theology
understands that imaginative models of social life need to be created
to guide social life as it exists under the Kingdom of God as future
promise. They identify this process as the creation of realistic
utopia. This realistic Utopia is an imaginative model of human origin
which seeks to realize relative approximations of the divine promise in
the realities of social existence. This use of the term 'utopia' is
problematic. It has been used to refer to an imagined perfect place or
state of things. For this reason it has carried pejorative meaning
when used in political discussion. Liberation theologians wish to
avoid this meaning of the term 'utopia'. Liberation theology is more
concerned with the creative use of imagination in the task of exploring
future political and economic possibility. In this regard 'realistic
utopia' is to be understood as referring to an imaginative vision of an
optimal society.
From the perspective of Niebuhrian theology this use of utopia in
Liberation theology is subject to dangerous abuse. Because Liberation
theology assumes an optimistic anthropology, its utopic constructions
are subject to the increased, danger of becoming emotive symbols which
will justify collective egoism and will-to-power. From the perspective
of Liberation theology, Niebuhrian theology lacks any mediation between
the 'impossible possibility' of the Kingdom of God and the reality of
human social existence. A Liberative realism which is integrative
concerning the insights of Liberation theology will seek to adapt the
mediation of realistic utopia within the horizons of its dialectical
theology and pragmatic ethics. This would effectively mitigate the
optimism of Liberation theology and provide Niebuhrian theology with a
guide for imaginative work concerning the construction of future social
possibilities.
This imaginative work of creating realistic Utopia within the
context of Liberative realism would exhibit the same characteristics as
that of theology and ethics. Utopic thought would be understood to be
integrative, contextual, and a process. It would be integrative in
that it would follow the pragmatic method of seeking coherence with the
larger environment of ideas and experience. This dimension of
realistic Utopian thought is exemplified by Liberation theology in its
recognition of the importance of the social sciences. The move from
present social realities to the realm of future possibility needs the
analysis and insight which social science can provide. Another
consequence of this integrative process would be that utopic thought be
dialogical. Utopic thought within the context of Liberative realism
would recognize the plurality and conflict of groups within society.
This would entail dialogue between different interests in society and
an attempt to achieve consensus concerning future goals. This
dialogical dimension of utopic thought is especially important on the
level of international relationships. Liberative realism recognizes
that national utopic work cannot function in isolation. On the
international level, different national utopic visions come into
conflict and can result in political and economic intervention and
domination. Liberation theology is aware of this reality in terms of
'dependence theory'. Therefore, national utopic thought needs to be in
dialogue, debate, and negotiation, with other nations and their utopic
options. This dialogue is necessitated by the political and economic
power of other nations which can restrict or support the utopic hopes
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of a specific nation. In this manner utopic options are subject to
pragmatic assessment. A national utopic option is not realistic if it
disregards the utopic goals of its larger economic and political
environment. In this way utopic thought is a continual exploration of
political and economic possibility in regard to plurality within its
national borders as well as in reference to powers outside its borders.
The second concern of Utopian thought is that it be contextual.
It is contextual in that it seeks to be relevant to the culture,
history, and needs of a specific society. In this regard Utopian
thought is relative to its cultural and geographical context. There is
no one Utopian hope which applies to all societies. Different
societies reflect different determinisms of history, culture, nature,
and geographical specificity. Utopian thought seeks to integrate and
relate to these various determinisms. It is in regard to this
contextual and relative social environment that Utopian thought must
demonstrate its pragmatic utility. In this regard, Utopian thought
must be successful in guiding human agency in the achievement of
greater justice in social life. It is at this point that the
'vulnerable' became significant for Utopian thought. The presence of
the 'vulnerable' of society indicate the need for Utopian thought and
are the point for pragmatic assessment. They are the continual
reference for judgement on all creative activity which is guided by
Utopian expectation.
The third description of realistic Utopian thought is that it is
to be understood as process. This means that Utopian thought is future
orientated reflection which continually calls into question 'what is'
for the sake of 'what can be'. This process is not understood as
cumulative in nature. The pursuit of future possibility of greater
justice is always an ambiguous process. It includes the possibility of
greater injustice by means of new forms of individual and collective
self-regard and will-to-power. Therefore, it is a process of continual
social criticism and experimentation. There is never a point at which
a Utopia is achieved. Vhen the goals of utopic thought are realized,
new distortions of social life are revealed and new possibilities of
improved justice are indicated. In this manner, justice is to be
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understood as a continual journey which is completed only in the
realization of the eschatological Kingdom of God.
Summary: The contribution of Liberation theology to Niebuhrian theology
Rubem Alves once stated that post-Niebuhrian Christian Realism was
the ideology of the establishment.2:4 This assessment reveals an irony
concerning Niebuhrian theology. Niebuhr was concerned with the
maintenance of a justice that balanced group interest and distributed
power. And yet, the comment by Alves would indicate that his theology
was utilized by a specific group to justify its hegemony. This irony
concerning the intention and the use of Niebuhrian theology reveals its
weakness. When Liberation theology asks liebuhrian theology: 1 who' does
theology serve?, the answer is ambiguous. Niebuhrian theology would
hope to answer that it roughly serves everyone. But this answer does
not seem to be justified by its use. In practice it would seem that
Niebuhrian theology has been in service of particular groups and their
political interest.
Our dialogue with Liberation theology has revealed this area of
weakness in liebuhrian theology. This weakness is found in the
religious dialectic of Niebuhrian theology. This weakness is not in
Niebuhr's anthropological realism. Here we find a rigorous dialectic
inclusive of organic, social, and transcendent dimensions of human
life. Vhere we find an inadequate dialectic is in reference to the
theological themes of love and the promise of the Kingdom of God. Here
we find that Liberation theology confronts Niebuhrian theology
concerning its lack of religious realism. Niebuhrian religious
analysis is lacking in historical breadth concerning religious
experience. He emphasizes the human experience of transcendence in
regard to the divine. The strength of this analysis is the recognition
of trans-historical and transcendent themes. The weakness of this
analysis is lack of historical and immanent reference concerning these
themes. Niebuhr's religious themes are historical in that they impinge
on the moral consciousness of human beings as they act as historical
agents. But these religious themes are not to be identified directly
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with, any vitality of history. Niebuhr maintains a continual suspicion
concerning the ambiguity and distortion of historical reality.
It is this lack of dialectic rigour in regard to history that
allows Niebuhrian theology to be manipulated to serve various interests
in society. Liberation theology rectifies this weakness by identifying
a specific commitment within history. This commitment is justified by
divine preferential love and solidarity. Following Liberation
theology, the 'vulnerable' are the subject of this commitment. It is
this commitment that is the occasion for religious experience in
history beyond the moral consciousness of Niebuhrian theology. The
'vulnerable' give the moral consciousness a specific, historical
referent. It is in the commitment to the 'other' identified in the
'vulnerable' which serves as the context in which one experiences the
vulnerability of the divine 'Other'. This historical dimension of
religious experience gives new meaning to repentance, conversion, and
discipleship. These categories have concrete meaning in regard to
specific folk in social existence. In this manner, Liberation theology
provides a spirituality engaged in historical experience.
It is this concern for the historical dimension which presses
Niebuhrian theology to modify its dialectic. We have seen in earlier
chapters that Liberation theology has contributed to Niebuhrian
theology in regard to theological method, ethics, and christology. The
result of this dialogue is the recognition that 'vulnerability' is
intimately tied to an understanding of justice. And we have seen that
'vulnerability' is more that just a general description of human
organic existence. It is a description of human need to which God
becomes vulnerable. It is at this point that Niebuhrian theology can
adopt a religious realism. Divine love is a preferential love which
guides justice to embrace a similar commitment.
Liberation theology presses Niebuhrian theology to understand that
justice is not just the maintenance of balance of power in an
environment of social conflict. It is also a concern of christian
spirituality. It is a continual repentance, conversion, and
discipleship, exercised in reference to the 'vulnerable' of social
life. This does not deny the insights of Niebuhrian theology
concerning the ambiguity, complexity, or cross-purposes found in social
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existence. It is a commitment and a faith expressed in spite of these
limitations. It is here that Niebuhrian spirituality expresses a
creative dialectic with Liberation spirituality. Hiebuhrian emphasis
on justification by grace supports this historical commitment with the
affirmation that divine agency will complete and rectify our inadequate
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